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Summary
This thesis argues that Collingwood’s philosophy is best understood as a diagnosis of 
and response to a crisis of Western civilisation. The various and complementary 
aspects of the crisis of civilisation are explored and Collingwood is demonstrated to 
be working in the traditions of Romanticism and ‘historicism’. In Part One, I 
examine Collingwood’s conception of the crisis of modernity in terms of the 
Romantic idea of the unity of the forms of experience and his philosophy of art. 
Contemporary civilisation is seen as corrupted by the suppression of emotion and is 
to be regenerated by art: the expression of emotion and truthful consciousness. In 
Part Two, the crisis of civilisation is explained as the failure of contemporary 
civilisation to significantly move beyond a dependency on a Platonic philosophy of 
being. The solution, it is proposed, is the development of a philosophy of becoming, 
which reconciles normative thinking with historical change. The criteria for value 
and truth are located, not in an ideal transcendent world, but in a ‘way of life’ in the 
widest sense. In this respect, Collingwood is compared with Ortega y Gasset and 
Nietzsche. Part Three demonstrates that Collingwood’s dialectical philosophy 
reveals itself in a historicist phenomenology of mind and a dialectical theory of 
liberalism and civilisation. This dialectical view leads to a critique of the ill effects 
of capitalism and of the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of contemporary life. 
On these subjects, the theories of Collingwood and Ortega y Gasset are contrasted 
with those of Nietzsche and Weber.
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Introduction
The importance of R.G. Collingwood ought to be understood in the context of the 
legacy of romanticism and the development of historical thinking in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The emergence of ‘historicism’ and the 
influence of Romanticism meant a change from regarding philosophy as the pursuit 
of abstract transcendental truths towards regarding truth and meaning as immanent, 
historically contextual, and contingent. This critical development, in both 
philosophy and Western culture more generally, occurred in response to what was 
perceived as a profound crisis in Western civilisation. Collingwood was one of the 
thinkers that provided a key positive contribution to these movements, and developed 
a response to the crisis.
The transition towards a greater appreciation of historicity and contingency, 
brought about by the influence of Romanticism and historicism, meant that 
philosophy comes to be understood to a greater extent as philosophy of cultures and 
civilisations. It is in this context that the notion of ‘crisis’ ought to be understood: at 
any given time, a culture or civilisation will undergo conditions of relative strength 
or vigour and of relative crisis or decadence1. Also, although the focus of this study 
is primarily on Collingwood, similar philosophies were developed by Ortega y 
Gasset and Croce, and in the course of the thesis these affinities, especially with 
Ortega, will help to shed light on Collingwood’s philosophy2.
The theme of the crisis of civilisation pervades Collingwood’s work, and 
although this theme has been mentioned by some commentators on Collingwood’s 
philosophy, it has not been discussed in much detail. David Boucher asserts that the 
later published works of Collingwood reflect his lifelong preoccupation with 
identifying and combating the enemies of civilisation, by coming to a better self- 
understanding (Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 186). Collingwood, as Boucher argues,
1 In investigating Collingwood’s treatment of the theme o f the crisis o f the West, therefore, I am 
assuming that it is to some extent a valid concern. I make the assumption that there is such a thing as 
‘the West’ or ‘Western civilisation’, although the boundaries between what is and is not the West may 
be ambiguous and debatable. Also, I am assuming that the West has a history and that therefore it can 
undergo conditions of relative strength or decadence. Furthermore, I am treating as plausible 
Collingwood’s view that there is, if not a unity, an intimate relation of philosophy to practice. 
Philosophy on this view is not simply the apprehension o f eternal transcendent truths, but to some 
extent descriptive o f a world in flux. The starting assumptions o f this thesis therefore are themselves 
of a ‘historicist’ nature.
2 With regard to the theme o f the crisis o f Western civilisation in general, Dilthey, Nietzsche and Max 
Weber are particularly important. Other important thinkers were Bergson, Spengler and Freud.
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was prolific in formulating theories about what ailed civilisation. Boucher rightly 
points out that Collingwood’s diagnoses, prognoses, and remedies are best viewed as 
explorations into various aspects of the disease, constituting complementary, rather 
than alternative, theories (Boucher, 1989: 231).
Boucher refers to an explosion and proliferation of ‘crisis’ literature in the 
period between the two world wars in Europe, where civilisation was described as 
being in a state of severe crisis, or even experiencing its final death throe3. Similarly, 
William M. Johnston remarks that Collingwood belonged to that generation of inter­
war thinkers who felt called upon to interrogate the entire tradition of the West in 
search of its raison d ’etre. In the case of Spengler and Freud, this interrogation 
yielded evidence of decline and collapse. In the case of Collingwood and Croce, on 
the other hand, the scrutiny was pursued with the avowed hope of finding fresh 
sources of rejuvenation. Unlike Spengler, Johnston explains, Collingwood never 
doubted that the West could recover its creative energies (Johnston, 1967: 139-41). 
However, it was throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and not 
just in the inter-war years, that this theme was important. The theme of the crisis of 
Western civilisation is prominent in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
philosophical, social, political, literary and artistic discourse.
What I propose to do here is briefly to outline what Collingwood saw as the 
crisis of Western civilisation, and its Romantic and historicist context, and then to 
explain the order of enquiry. To put it very briefly, the crisis of civilisation, for 
Collingwood, is an over-reliance on abstractly rationalistic forms of thinking. The 
solution is the cultivation of forms of emotional expression, and to think historically 
and dialectically.
The theme of the crisis of civilisation is strongly present in Collingwood’s 
philosophy of art, where he argues that civilisation is in crisis because of the 
suppression of emotion. In the ‘Fairy Tales’ manuscript (written in 1936-37), this 
same suppression of emotion is blamed for an obsession with utilitarianism and the 
failure to understand the primitive survival of emotion in contemporary civilisation. 
The suppression of emotion is exemplified in the suppression of art proper by
3 For example, E.H. Carr described the whole period as ‘the Twenty Years’ Crisis’, Paul Valery refers 
to a ‘crisis o f the mind’, Karl Mannheim refers to a ‘crisis in our intellectual life’, Albert Schweitzer 
to a ‘collapse o f civilization’, Peter Drucker to a ‘revolution which threatens every concept on which 
European civilization has been based’, and Edward Carpenter to an ‘intensified manifestation o f  
Disease -  physical, social, moral’ (Boucher, 1989: 231).
amusement art and the ill effects of industrialisation, and by the destruction of the 
countryside. In his logic and metaphysics Collingwood regards Western civilisation 
as being under threat from natural science and the effects of positivism and 
utilitarianism. Here dialectical and historical thinking are seen as a solution. Both of 
these aspects of the theme of the crisis of civilisation and its solution coincide in 
Collingwood’s account of morality, politics and civilisation.
In Speculum Mentis, following the Romantic tradition, Collingwood 
identified the crisis of civilisation as being the detachment of the forms of 
experience, art, religion, science, history, and philosophy, from one another. The 
solution to this spiritual fragmentation is the reunion of the forms of experience ‘in a 
complete and undivided life’ (SM, 36).
Following Speculum Mentis, Collingwood argued that civilisation was 
threatened not only by the separation of the forms of experience from one another, 
but the emergence of one which threatened to suffocate the rest. The foundations of 
civilisation were being undermined by the natural-scientific, or positivist, tendency 
to undervalue or deny the importance of other forms of experience4. As Boucher 
puts it, the civilisation generated by an excessive deference to natural science is a 
utilitarian one in which emotion is denied or suppressed; art is perverted into an 
artificial stimulant to the senses; the mystical content of religion is eliminated, 
leaving only a rationalistic code of morals, devoid of the substance from which it 
emerged; and psychology claims to be a science of mind, leaving its legitimate realm 
of the psyche, or the science of feeling, and claiming instead the entire workings of 
mind as its province (Boucher, 1989: 232-3).
The various attacks on civilisation are manifestations of ‘irrationalism’ and 
one aspect of irrationalism in philosophy is a preoccupation with psychology. For 
Collingwood psychology is non-criteriological, and history, not psychology, is the 
science of mind. Also, philosophies such as positivism and realism, by elevating 
natural-scientific knowledge to a status which reduces all knowledge of ethics and 
morality to the level of mere beliefs and superstitions, facilitated the growth of 
irrationalism (cf. Boucher, 1989: 237-40). I agree with Boucher’s judgement that 
although fascism failed in its revolt against civilisation, all those other elements
4 Boucher provides a brief account o f the theme o f the crisis o f civilisation in Collingwood’s thought 
towards the end o f The Social and Political Thought o f  R. G. Collingwood, which I am making use of 
here (1989: 232-241).
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which Collingwood identified as insidiously eroding the foundations of modem 
European civilisation have become, on the whole, accentuated rather than alleviated 
(Boucher, 1989: 241).
As I have indicated, Collingwood’s idea of the crisis of civilisation derives 
from Romanticism and historicism. His concern with the suppression of emotion and 
emphasis on the importance of art are Romantic in origin, and, as a historicist, 
Collingwood argues that dialectical and historical thinking are a solution to the crisis 
of civilisation. Demonstrating the inter-connectedness of Romanticism and 
historicism, then, Collingwood’s philosophy of art and of the idea of a union of the 
forms of experience complements his theory of dialectical and historical thinking. 
As with art, where we express and become conscious of our emotions, through a 
historicist philosophy we achieve self-knowledge at the level of thinking.
Collingwood inherited, and continued, from the Romantic tradition the 
critique of industrial society: a tradition including John Ruskin, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
and the modernist writers, T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, and Ezra Pound. Regarding 
his historicism, Collingwood has close affinities with Croce and Ortega y Gasset. 
Hence Collingwood is an important point of connection between these parallel 
traditions. His philosophy connects the romanticism of John Ruskin with the 
historicist and dialectical thought of Ortega y Gasset and the Italian Idealists. As a 
note of caution, however, at this point, the term ‘historicism’, as I will explain in the 
first chapter, has a variety of meanings. What is important to emphasise at this stage 
is that, in the sense in which it is being used here, historicism is not equivalent to 
relativism.
Collingwood’s philosophy, which places historicity at the centre of 
philosophical understanding, along with Ortega y Gasset and the Italian Idealists, 
also foreshadowed some of the principal developments of twentieth-century 
philosophy. The crisis of modernity, and the attempt to overcome it through the 
development of an alternative model for thinking to the one provided by natural 
science, is central to most of twentieth-century continental philosophy, for example, 
Heidegger, critical theory, existentialism, and hermeneutics. One common point of 
origin for the above-mentioned movements is Nietzsche. Nietzsche is also 
significant for his influence on literary modernism and the legacy of Romanticism in 
the twentieth century. Thus, although Nietzsche does not exert any direct obvious 
influence on Collingwood, Collingwood’s investigation of the crisis of civilisation
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participates in a stream where Nietzsche is central. The philosophy of Nietzsche, 
therefore, serves as an illuminating foil or contrast to Collingwood in the course of 
this study.
Instructive comparisons could also have been made in this thesis between 
Collingwood and thinkers such as Adorno, Benjamin and Heidegger, particularly 
regarding the relation between art and technology. However, the actual comparisons 
(particularly in the area of the philosophy of art) are mostly with Ruskin, Orwell, 
Lawrence, Pound, Eliot and Ortega y Gasset. The justification for comparing 
Collingwood with Orwell, Lawrence, Pound and Eliot is that they are all to some 
extent (like Collingwood) influenced by Ruskin and are part of the English Romantic 
tradition (see Williams, 1993), where Ruskin is a leading figure.
The comparisons that I make between Collingwood and Ortega y Gasset are 
more extensive. The importance of Ortega (from the perspective of this thesis) is the 
pivotal role he occupies as a ‘crisis’ thinker in the early twentieth century and his 
Nietzschean concern with promoting the conditions for an ‘aristocracy of culture’, 
which is central to the crisis of Western civilisation as I understand it in this thesis. 
John T. Graham, for example, describes Ortega as ‘the most challenging of all crisis 
theorists, past and contemporary’ and as ‘a pioneer of systematic crisis theory’ in the 
twentieth century (Graham, 1997: 208 and 217). Also, as I have argued, Ortega 
plays a key role in the development of historicist thought in the early twentieth 
century. The comparison with Ortega, therefore, illuminates Collingwood’s concern 
with the crisis of civilisation and his attempt to overcome the rationalism of 
modernity with a theory of art and culture and a theory of historical and dialectical 
thinking.
In the use of Ortega’s philosophy as a comparison with Collingwood’s, there 
is, to follow Collingwood’s own argument in An Essay on Philosophical Method, an 
affirmation and a denial. In An Essay on Philosophical Method (which I will 
examine in more detail in Part Two of this thesis) Collingwood argues that, in 
philosophy, affirmation and denial imply one another. Concrete affirmation involves 
the negation of definite ideas that one regards as inadequate (EPM, 106-7). This 
principle of concrete affirmation and concrete denial is explored by Joseph 
Levenson, who explains that ‘... an idea has its particular quality from the fact that 
other ideas, expressed in other quarters, are demonstrable alternatives’ (Levenson, 
1965: xii-xiv).
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Hence, (in order to provide a fuller understanding of the crisis of the West) 
the aim of this thesis is to situate Collingwood’s philosophy in a wider context than 
Idealism5. This context will be wide enough to illuminate both the Romantic and 
historicist aspects of Collingwood’s thought. The attention devoted to examining 
Ortega’s philosophy in comparison with Collingwood is an affirmation of the 
importance of historical thinking in the solution to the crisis of modernity. However, 
there is also a denial: the investigation is not so wide as to take into account the 
whole of twentieth-century philosophy. To write an account of ‘crisis’ thought in 
twentieth-century philosophy as a whole would go beyond the confines of this thesis, 
which is specifically a critical analysis of Collingwood’s philosophy. Ortega, as a 
point of comparison, is important for the particularly historicist solution that he 
provides to the crisis of civilisation.
Examining Collingwood’s philosophy through the theme of the crisis of the 
West, then, requires an awareness of the broader context of his work (although there 
are limits to this broader context). It involves taking a slightly broader perspective 
than that taken by other commentaries on his philosophy, and perhaps this broader 
emphasis is, to some degree, faithful to Collingwood’s advice to scholars to ‘write 
not about me but about the subject’ (A, 118-9).
For Collingwood, it was an appropriate task for philosophy to respond to the 
crisis of civilisation because, as he argued in Speculum Mentis, ‘all thought exists for 
the sake of action’ (SM, 15). Collingwood’s historicist conception of reality and his 
rapprochement between theory and practice leads to the view that philosophy can 
help to effect far-reaching transformations in a civilisation or culture. In his 
Autobiography, Collingwood speaks of using philosophy as ‘a weapon’ to change the 
world6 (A, 153). (In his view that philosophy is transformative, Collingwood 
resembles Nietzsche.)
5 1 will, however, occasionally consider Collingwood’s affinities with Italian Idealism in the course of 
this thesis. These affinities which have been discussed by many commentators on Collingwood’s 
philosophy: for example, Connelly discusses Collingwood’s affinities with Italian Idealism in ‘Art 
Thou the Man: Croce, Gentile or de Ruggiero?’ (1995).
6 Collingwood’s view of the transformative potential o f philosophy is evident in his assertion in 
Speculum Mentis that: ‘An engineer whose engine will not go does not plead that Nature’s stores of 
energy are exhausted; but the social reformer who cannot get society to obey him is too ready to 
explain the fact by accusing his age o f spiritual poverty. He ought to know better. He ought to know 
-  or his licence as a prophet ought to be taken away -  that the spiritual energy pent up within the 
breast o f his own boot-and-knife boy is enough to overthrow empires if  the word were spoken that 
released it’ (SM, 21).
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As Collingwood points out in ‘The Present Need of a Philosophy’, part of the 
business of philosophy is to show that whatever ills exist in human institutions are 
within the scope of human will to solve (EPP, 166-70). The abstractions that 
imprison us are our own creations, extensions of our own subjectivity7. This view of 
the transformative role of philosophy on practice is also expressed by Ortega y 
Gasset: ‘For philosophy to rule it is sufficient for it to exist; that is to say, for the 
philosophers to be philosophers’ (RM, 115n).
In Collingwood’s works subsequent to Speculum Mentis (published in 1924), the 
theme of the crisis of civilisation is most explicitly present in Collingwood’s 
philosophy of art. Hence Part One of this thesis will concentrate primarily on the 
philosophy of art. I then proceed in Part Two to discuss Collingwood’s dialectical 
logic and metaphysics. Part Three will be dedicated to his theory of politics and 
civilisation, where Collingwood’s dialectical philosophy is put into concrete form 
and overlaps to some extent with his philosophy of art. Part Three, then, will also 
attempt to draw together some of the conclusions from the first two parts.
Chapter One places Collingwood’s concern with the crisis of modernity in the 
context of Romanticism and the emergence of historicism in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. I argue that Collingwood’s philosophy is very much a part 
of the tradition of both Romanticism and historicism. Additionally, this chapter 
discusses Collingwood’s early formulation of his conception of the crisis of the West 
in Speculum Mentis, published in 1924, and in his 1919 lecture, ‘Ruskin’s 
Philosophy’. In Speculum Mentis his solution to the crisis is ‘unity of mind’ and, in 
‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’, ‘historicism’. I also point out that Collingwood’s conception 
of the ‘unity of mind’ corresponds to the Romantic idea of ‘culture’, an idea 
promoted by John Ruskin, and in the twentieth century by D.H. Lawrence, T.S. Eliot, 
and Jose Ortega y Gasset. For Ortega, like Collingwood, the unity of the forms of 
experience is just one part of a philosophy where historical and dialectical thinking 
are seen as a solution to a crisis of modernity. Following ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’ and 
Speculum Mentis, Collingwood came to place greater emphasis on the philosophy of 
art and on historical and dialectical thinking, which became inter-related aspects of a 
solution to cultural crisis.
7 As Derek Sayer points out, mechanisation is but a metaphor for forms of our own sociality and 
subjectivity (Sayer, 1991: 155).
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According to Collingwood, it is in aesthetic activity that we first begin to 
apprehend the world. Hence, in art, and the subversion of our artistic life, we find 
the first evidence and symptoms of the crisis of civilisation. In Chapter Two I 
explain that Collingwood’s conception of art as a starting point for a critique of 
contemporary civilisation and a solution for its ills depends on a distinction between 
art and craft. Collingwood argues that Western civilisation is in crisis because of a 
suppression of emotion, symptoms of which are the predominance of values 
associated with industrialisation, the replacement of art proper with amusement, and 
the suppression of magic and the emotional aspects of religion. Collingwood’s 
solution to the problem is a theory of art as the expression of emotion.
Chapter Three explores Collingwood’s conception of art as a solution to the 
crisis of civilisation more deeply. For Collingwood, art is identified with 
consciousness and language, and provides the data upon which intellect can build. 
Art, then, creates the world, by becoming conscious of it. In doing so, art is the 
revelation of truth and provides an antidote to cultural crisis, and to what 
Collingwood calls the ‘corruption of consciousness’. In developing the conception 
of art as a solution to the crisis of modernity, I suggest that Collingwood is 
consciously working within the Romantic tradition. The idea of art as having a 
regenerative effect on civilisation is strongly present in the works of Ruskin, 
Nietzsche, D.H. Lawrence and Ezra Pound.
Chapter Four demonstrates that the creation of the world through art is a 
continuous process and is constrained by collaboration between the artist and the 
wider community. The artist is the spokesperson of his or her audience, and art is the 
community’s medicine for the corruption of consciousness. I argue that the 
dialectical interaction between innovation and tradition in Collingwood’s philosophy 
of art is complemented by the philosophies of art put forward by Eliot and Ortega y 
Gasset and prefigures Collingwood’s dialectical account of logic and metaphysics.
In Part Two, Chapter Five, I examine Collingwood’s dialectical conception of 
philosophy as a solution to the crisis of civilisation, precipitated by the inadequacy of 
the Platonic philosophy of being. I discuss his ‘revolution’ in logic, beginning with 
his modification of the coherence theory of truth in his early manuscripts and leading 
to his conception of the scale of forms in An Essay on Philosophical Method.
Collingwood’s dialectical logic is inextricably linked with ontological claim 
that reality is dialectical. Hence his reform of logic also implied a reform of
14
metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Collingwood, as I explain in Chapter Six, is an 
historical science and provides an account of the constellations of absolute 
presuppositions upon which ‘science’, or systematic and orderly thinking, proceeds. 
In his later work, Collingwood characterised dialectical logic as the logic of question 
and answer. The meaning of a set of absolute presuppositions, I contend, can only be 
fully understood in the context of the complex of questions and answers that it gives 
rise to.
Chapter Seven discusses what Collingwood regarded as the threat to his 
historical metaphysics from reactionary traditional philosophy and irrationalism. I 
also demonstrate how Collingwood’s philosophy responds to the cultural crisis by 
reconciling normative thinking with historical change. For Collingwood, I suggest, 
the advancement of science and civilisation are not achieved by metaphysics alone: 
metaphysics needs to be supplemented by a broader philosophy of history which 
gives an account of the sciences and practices that absolute presuppositions have 
given rise to and thus determining if progress has occurred. The criteria for value 
and truth, then, are located not in an ideal transcendent world, but in a ‘way of life’, 
considered in its widest context. This chapter also discusses Ortega y Gasset and 
Nietzsche who, like Collingwood, also responded to the crisis of modernity by 
advancing philosophies which placed value less on fundamental principles or 
individual judgements in themselves, but on their ability to generate vitality and 
enhance life as a whole.
Part Three examines how Collingwood’s solution to the crisis of Western 
civilisation in terms of logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of history manifests 
itself in the practices of civilisation and politics. In Collingwood’s view, theory and 
practice are intimately related. In Chapter Eight I demonstrate how Collingwood’s 
dialectical philosophy reveals itself in a historicist phenomenology of mind and in an 
account of morality as duty. Duty in practical reason corresponds with history in 
theoretical reason. Comparisons and contrasts with Ortega and Nietzsche are also 
explored.
Chapter Nine demonstrates how Collingwood’s philosophy leads to a reform 
of social contract theory. In response to the abstractions of social contract theory, 
Collingwood puts forward a dynamic and dialectical conception of liberalism. In this 
chapter I also examine Collingwood’s argument that civilisation is a dialectical 
process. It is demonstrated that Collingwood’s account of civilisation leads to a
15
dialectical critique and response to the negative effects of capitalism. The growth of 
a distinction between rich and poor, and the suppression of emotion that 
contemporary capitalism promotes are an element of barbarism in civilisation, 
something that would be corrected by Collingwood’s dialectical conception of 
civilisation and by his philosophy of art. I also demonstrate that Collingwood’s 
critique of modernity for its over-reliance on rationalistic and dogmatic philosophies, 
and his proposed solution to the problem in the form of dialectical thinking and the 
cultivation of forms of emotional expression, are evident in his discussion of 
education and bureaucracy. Collingwood’s views about the dialectic of political life 
here are shown to be complemented by de Ruggiero and Ortega y Gasset, and 
contrasted with the ideas of Nietzsche and Weber.
16
Part One:
Art and the Crisis of Civilisation
17
Chapter One: 
Romanticism, Historicism and the Unity of the Forms of Experience
In the course of this thesis, I will argue that Collingwood’s diagnosis of and solutions 
to the crisis of Western civilisation ought to be situated in the context of 
Romanticism and historicism. Therefore, in order to prepare the ground for 
forthcoming chapters, the purpose of this chapter is to outline what I understand by 
the terms ‘Romanticism’ and ‘historicism’. Also, in this chapter, I will outline 
Collingwood’s treatment of the theme of the crisis of civilisation in his early career. 
In particular, I will discuss his view that the ills of modernity are due to the 
fragmentation of the forms of experience from one another and that the solution to 
the problem is their re-union in a complete and undivided life.
The legacy of Romanticism is conveniently discussed by Larmore under the 
headings of ‘imagination’, ‘community’ and ‘irony and authenticity’. For 
Romantics, according to Larmore, the mind is understood in terms of its creative 
power, and our sense of reality is inseparable from the creative imagination. 
Through imagination we transform what we are given in experience (Larmore, 1996: 
3). The Romantic imagination, he asserts, is both creative and responsive. Kant was 
influential for Romantic thought because of his view that the mind is essentially 
active, not merely registering but structuring what we call reality (Larmore, 1996: 
22). As Larmore puts it, ‘The mind responds to the world only by at the same time 
creating its own forms of understanding’ (Larmore, 1996: 23).
The second aspect of Romanticism outlined by Larmore is the theme of 
community. Our deepest beliefs cannot be chosen upon reflection, for we have no 
sense of what is valuable, and so no adequate basis for choice, without them. We 
must regard them as felt convictions, which set the terms of the choices we make and 
which are embodied in the way of life that is ours, and such allegiances express our 
sense of belonging (Larmore, 1996: 38). For Herder, Larmore argues, we must strive 
for the right balance between critical reflection and belonging. This is connected to 
pluralism: the ultimate sources of objective value are not one, but many (Larmore, 
1996: 40).
For Romantics, contrary to Enlightenment rationalism, reason cannot take the 
place of belonging, of identifying with an ongoing way of life, as the source of our 
moral substance (Larmore, 1996: 46). Our deepest convictions are the sustaining
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basis of our critical reflection. This new conception of reason receives its most 
profound expression in the philosophy of Hegel. For Hegel, the human spirit makes 
its advances not by rising to a standpoint outside a given way of life but only by 
thinking within it, attending to its internal contradictions and failed aspirations. 
According to Larmore, ‘Hegel’s philosophy, taken as a whole, is doubtless a 
grandiose and implausible construction. But if we strip from it his confidence that 
History harbours an inner logic, geared towards inevitable progress, then it shows 
itself to be the very paradigm of the new conception of reason that the Romantics 
introduced. It has been an inspiration to all those thinkers ever since, in movements 
as otherwise diverse as American pragmatism and the Frankfurt School, who have 
sought to work out a less metaphysical, more social conception of reason’ (Larmore, 
1996: 48). The Romantic philosophy of belonging represents a further step in 
intellectual clarity.
The Romantic conception of reason, Larmore points out, also represents an 
innovation. Traditionalism does not mean ‘recovering’ a pre-Enlightenment form of 
thought: it is itself modem (Larmore, 1996: 60). The community to which we affirm 
our belonging is not simply given, but is also reconceived and imagined (Larmore, 
1996: 61).
Another aspect of Romanticism according to Larmore’s account is irony, or 
‘the disquiet of never feeling fully at home’ (Larmore, 1996: 70), whereby we hold 
back from identifying completely with what we nonetheless affirm. Contrary to 
Hegel, Larmore asserts, irony is not the absence of commitment, but is necessary for 
commitment. The mature mind needs to be able to stand back from a belief or 
practice and look at it from the outside (Larmore, 1996: 81). Recognising that our 
deepest convictions are a leap of faith rather than objects of rational choice is to look 
at these commitments ironically (Larmore, 1996: 82).
A different way of being an individual, according to the Romantic legacy, is 
the idea of authenticity. Authenticity, Larmore argues, means not acting with an eye 
to social convention -  not that we act unaffected by it (Larmore, 1996: 90). Charles 
Taylor traces the emergence of the ‘ethic of authenticity’ to Rousseau and Herder. 
Rousseau articulated the idea that I am free when I decide for myself what concerns 
me, rather than being shaped by external influences (Taylor, 1991: 27). 
Subsequently Herder put forward the idea that each of us has an original way of
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being human and gave a new importance to being true to oneself, something which 
only each individual can articulate and discover (Taylor, 1991: 29).
Although Larmore has distinguished three aspects of Romanticism, it is 
evident that these are inter-connected. For example, the idea of authenticity overlaps 
with the Romantic theme of community. Taylor points out that human life is 
fundamentally ‘dialogical’ in character (Taylor, 1991: 33). We become full human 
agents, capable of understanding ourselves through dialogue with others who matter 
to us and the ideal of authenticity depends upon this dialogical feature of our 
condition. To define ourselves, we have to take as background some sense of what is 
significant, and this means taking into account history, nature, society, and ‘the 
demands of solidarity’ (Taylor, 1991: 40)8.
The emergence of the ethic of authenticity is also inter-connected with the 
Romantic emphasis on the role of the creative imagination. Taylor points out that 
previously the artist could draw on publicly available reference points, but since the 
end of the eighteenth century these reference points no longer hold for us (Taylor, 
1991: 83). The decline of an old order with its established background of meanings 
made necessary the development of new poetic languages in the Romantic period 
(Taylor, 1991: 84). There was a change from a mimetic to a creative conception of 
poetry and this was not merely a critical philosophical phenomenon. The modem 
poem, Taylor points out, must both formulate its own cosmic syntax and shape the 
poetic reality that the cosmic syntax permits. ‘Nature’, which was once prior to the 
poem and available for imitation, now shares with the poem a common origin in the 
poet’s creativity. The Romantic poets and their successors make us aware of 
something for which there are as yet no adequate words (Taylor, 1991: 85). Each 
new ‘order’ can become ours only through being ratified afresh in the sensibility of 
each new reader (Taylor, 1991: 87).
It can be argued however, following Taylor, that this subjective turn in post- 
Romantic art does not rule out the fact that authenticity connects us to a wider whole. 
The wider whole, however, and this is where my interpretation differs from Taylor’s, 
is human community, not an objective and transcendent ‘nature’. This takes our 
discussion to the subject of ‘historicism’.
8 The development o f one’s identity through dialogue, partly overt and partly internalised, with others 
gives an importance to recognition (Taylor, 1991: 48).
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As Boucher points out, historicism does not have a determinate meaning but, 
nevertheless, a number of broad features can be attributed to the concept (Boucher, 
1985, 12). The essence of historicism is a stress upon the contextual nature of 
understanding human beings. According to Boucher,
The term historicism, then, has been used in many contradictory ways. It is used to refer to 
anyone who may believe that an historical study o f an event offers a valid form o f knowledge; 
to stigmatise those who love the past for the sake of the past; to denigrate those who refuse to 
pass moral judgements on past actions; to ridicule those who have perceived grandiose patterns 
in history; to disapprove o f those who espouse any form o f mild or radical relativism; to sneer 
at those who see history in terms o f constant progress. It describes those who are firmly 
committed to an independent and autonomous discipline o f history, and those who would 
transform it into something else. (Boucher, 1985: 18)
Dilthey is seen by most commentators as one of the main initiators of 
historicism. As Bruce Haddock points out, sustained criticism of the conception of 
historical knowledge as a monolith susceptible of understanding according to a 
method common to all the empirical sciences first began to emerge in Germany with 
Dilthey, who distinguished between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften 
(Haddock, 1980: 151). Hegel was the philosophical patriarch of the movement, and 
in Italy, with Benedetto Croce, a radically reconstructed Hegel became the 
fountainhead of a new historicism which asserted the supremacy and logical priority 
of historical knowledge (Haddock, 1980: 154). Collingwood, as a follower of Croce, 
was ‘the leading philosophical exponent of the new idealism’ (Haddock, 1980: 158).
As Rubinoff explains, ‘Against the dogma of positivism there arose in the 
nineteenth century, under the banner of historicism, various attempts to rescue the 
human and social sciences from the domination of the natural sciences. For most 
historicists their quarrel with positivism had serious existential implications 
concerning the foundations of culture itself (Rubinoff, 1970: 345). They believed 
that the very survival of a culture depended upon its ability to resist the 
dehumanising effects of positivism. Rubinoff refers to Droysen, Nietzsche, Croce, 
and Ortega y Gasset, all of whom regarded positivism as a threat to European 
culture. It was in the spirit of the historicist assault on positivism that Collingwood, 
at various points in his career, described positivism as a threat to science and 
civilisation and saw history as the antidote (Rubinoff, 1970: 346).
Similarly, Eugene F. Miller locates the foundations of historicism in the 
radicalisation of the Hegelian tradition which occurred in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. According to Miller,
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The world, or nature, came to be understood in terms of flux, change, or becoming rather than 
fixity, permanence, or being. Knowledge was now conceived in terms of creation rather than 
discovery. Worldviews and theories were seen as individual or social creations, which are 
shaped decisively by sub rational forces. It was denied that the human mind can grasp the 
character o f ‘reality’ or ‘nature’ in any final, objective, or absolute way. The position which I 
have described was developed comprehensively by Friedrich Nietzsche in the 1800s. Yet a 
number of other thinkers at that time and in the decades that followed came to similar 
conclusions, often independently of the influence of Nietzsche or of each other. (Miller, 1972: 
796)
This position, Miller argues, was expressed by the American pragmatists, in England 
by Collingwood and Wittgenstein, and in France by Bergson, Sartre and Merleau- 
Ponty, and it gained wide acceptance in Germany through the influence of Nietzsche, 
Dilthey, Spengler, Mannheim, and Heidegger (Miller, 1972: 797).
John T. Marcus points out that the consciousness of history and ‘becoming’ 
are central characteristics of our world sense today. As Collingwood argued, natural 
science had appeared to be the eighteenth century’s model discipline, so in the 
contemporary world society tends to see in the historical perspective the archetype of 
its approach to reality (Marcus, 1962: 28; LH, 209 and 232). Collingwood saw 
history, rather than psychology, as the true science of mind. Marcus remarks that 
‘The historically oriented outlook is marked by the consciousness of a distinctive 
dimension to man’s being’ (Marcus, 1962: 30). Bergson and Heidegger, for 
example, found the essence of man’s consciousness in the ‘historicity’ of the 
awareness of self: ‘Thus the historical sense, whether understood or only felt, 
becomes synonymous with the ontological quality of man. And the distinctive 
dimension of the human condition reveals itself to be the identification of man’s 
being with the process of his becoming’ (Marcus, 1962: 31).
Miller makes a number of points to characterise historicism. Firstly, 
historicism claims that there is no direct awareness of pure sense-data. It agrees with 
Kant that we apprehend sense-data only as unified and structured by a priori 
principles or categories of the mind. The experience of which we are aware has 
already been selected and shaped by the mind itself. Secondly, whereas Kant 
thought that the principles of understanding are constant from one epoch or society to 
another, historicism follows Hegel in asserting that the very ordering principles or 
categories of the mind have varied with the succession of epochs and cultures. Each 
epoch develops a characteristic view of the world in its totality; and essential 
differences will be found from one epoch or culture to another in the presuppositions,
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values, and categories upon which cognition is based. All knowledge is perspectival 
in character and arises not so much from discovery of the real character of nature as 
from social or individual creation (Miller, 1972: 800).
Another characteristic of historicism, as Rader points out, is that it posits an 
affinity of art and history, and this is the case with ‘the best representatives of the 
historicists’: Croce9, Collingwood, and Dilthey (Rader, 1967: 158).
Collingwood’s emphasis, therefore, on historical thinking as a solution to the 
ills of modernity was part of the broader phenomenon of historicism. In this 
Collingwood differed from the earlier British idealists, to whom he owed much. The 
earlier British idealists failed to display a strong understanding of history and hence, 
like Oakeshott, Collingwood attempted to derive fresh inspiration from the new 
generation of Continental idealists and neo-idealists (cf. Boucher, 1985: 50).
For Collingwood, history and the study of human affairs had become the 
central preoccupation of the present age, and this was paralleled by the priority of 
historiography and philosophy of history in twentieth-century thought, which had a 
practical as well as a theoretical basis. Commenting on the First World War in his 
Autobiography, Collingwood remarked on the contrast between success in 
controlling situations which were part of the physical world and failure to control 
situations in which human beings are elements. By the late 1930s the triumph of 
natural science seemed to go hand in hand with the gradual destruction of 
civilisation10.
Collingwood’s solution to this problem, as Rubinoff points out, was to seek a 
proper understanding of the human mind. However, unlike behaviourism and 
positivism, which treated the human mind as if it were a mere species of nature, 
history, according to Collingwood, was the genuine science of the human mind. It is 
only through history that we can grasp the fact that human activity is free (IH, 315, 
319-20; Rubinoff, 1970: 4).
However, historical thought which apprehends the fact of freedom is itself a 
necessary condition of the existence of that freedom. The historical process ‘is a 
process in which man creates for himself this or that kind of human nature by
9 Croce argued that science is knowledge formulated in laws and generalisations, whereas art is the 
vision of individuality -  the intuitive grasp o f the unique. History is similar to art in that the historian 
recreates the mental drama o f the past in his own imagination, making the thoughts and deeds of 
individuals live again. Art, however, Croce argued, is not history, because history implies the critical 
distinction between reality and unreality. For art, this distinction is as yet unmade (Rader, 1967: 158).
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recreating in his own thought the past to which he is heir’ (IH, 226). As 
Collingwood argues in The New Leviathan, it is in the world of history rather than in 
the world of nature that man finds the central problems he has to solve (Rubinoff, 
1970: 4). Collingwood argued that just as the chief business of seventeenth-century 
philosophy was to reckon with seventeenth-century natural science, so the chief 
business of twentieth-century philosophy is to reckon with twentieth-century history 
(A, 78-9). According to Collingwood in ‘The Present Need of a Philosophy’:
As the seventeenth century needed a reasoned conviction that nature is intelligible and the 
problems o f science in principle soluble, so the twentieth needs a reasoned conviction that 
human progress is possible and that the problems of moral and political life are in principle 
soluble. In both cases the need is one which only philosophy can supply. What is needed 
today is a philosophical reconsideration o f the whole idea of progress or development, and 
especially its two main forms, ‘evolution’ in the world o f nature and ‘history’ in the world of 
human affairs. What would correspond to the Renaissance conception o f nature as a single 
intelligible system would be a philosophy showing that human will is o f a piece with nature in 
being genuinely creative; that social and political institutions are creations o f the human will, 
conceived by the same power which created them, and essentially plastic to its hand; and that 
whatever evils they contain are in principle remediable. In short, the help which philosophy 
might give our ‘dissatisfied, anxious, apprehensive generation’ would lie in a reasoned 
statement o f the principle that there can be no evils in any human institution which human will 
cannot cure. (EPP, 169)
As Rubinoff explains, Collingwood also saw the sciences of mind as 
historical because he repudiated all theories which presuppose the conception of 
mind or human nature as a fixed and unchanging substance. Reality is a ‘dialectical’ 
process of change, and the being of mind, if it is to be found at all, is to be found 
only in its acts, as art, religion, science, history, philosophy, and so on (Rubinoff, 
1970: 6).
However, despite its emphasis on process and becoming, and on the 
contextual nature of understanding, historicism ought to be distinguished from 
relativism. According to Rubinoff, historicism of the radical variety11 implies that 
while history teaches us that there have been changing views, it cannot teach us 
whether the change was sound or whether the rejected view deserves to be rejected, 
without presupposing what it denies -  namely that there are eternal objective truths. 
Rubinoff refers to Leo Strauss’s argument that historicism asserts that all human 
thoughts and beliefs are historical, but historicism is itself a human thought and
10 Here I am drawing upon Lionel Rubinoff s Collingwood and the Reform o f  Metaphysics (1970: 4).
11 Rubinoff distinguishes between transcendental historicism and radical historicism. Transcendental 
historicism means that philosophical truth, while it is historically grounded, is nevertheless absolute 
and trans-historical. Radical historicism is the tendency to interpret the whole of reality in historical 
terms and, according to Rubinoff, radical historicism leads to scepticism (Rubinoff, 1970: 359).
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hence can only be of temporary validity. Historicism, according to Rubinoff, claims 
to have brought to light a truth valid for all thought and for all time (Rubinoff, 1970: 
361). Similarly, Miller claims that historicism is essentially relativist because, for 
historicism, there is no supra-temporal truth which can be grasped from above the 
historical stream (Miller, 1972: 801). Marcus declares that by the twentieth century 
historical relativism and the abandonment of transcendent ideals had led to a sense of 
collapse of the moral order and the impossibility of any order of values (Marcus, 
1962: 39).
Contrary to Rubinoff and Miller, I suggest that historicism is agnostic on the 
question of whether or not there are eternal truths and claims that truths ought to be 
apprehended as being within historical contexts. Historicism presupposes that its 
own position is to some extent ‘true’. But it is true only in comparison with other 
philosophies within the same process of development.
Boucher rightly argues that Collingwood was a historicist in believing that in 
the context of a complex of circumstances the historical understanding must 
conclude that things could not be other than what they were. But he was prepared to 
pass judgement on whether one set of circumstances was better than another, and 
was thus not a relativist (Boucher, 1995a: 22). My point is that the criteria for this 
judgement themselves ought to be viewed as being immanent to the complex of 
circumstances or the historical process. This distinction between historicism and 
relativism will be explored in more detail in Part Two.
Romanticism and historicism, then, obviously overlap one another. This is 
evident in what H. Stuart Hughes calls the ‘emerging critical consciousness’ of the 
early twentieth century (Hughes, 1959: 9). Hughes argues that in the time-span of 
the forty years from the fin de siecle to the beginning of the 1930s, the major 
innovators were the last in a long succession of system-builders descending from 
Aristotle, but they introduced a period of specialisation. They had drawn no clear 
line between literature and social science, but their rigour precluded the formation of 
successors in their own image. For these thinkers, the problem of consciousness 
became crucial, and emotion became central (Hughes, 1959: 15). Man, they came to 
see, was guided in his conduct by supra- or infra-rational values, and this also 
applied to the scientific observer (Hughes, 1959: 16). The work of this ‘generation 
of the 1890s’, Hughes argues, risked falling into radical scepticism, and encouraged 
an anti-intellectualism to which the majority of them were intensely hostile. The
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greatest of these thinkers fought to salvage as much as possible of the rationalist 
heritage, and shifted the axis of that tradition to make room for man as something 
more than a logically calculating animal (Hughes, 1959: 17).
According to Hughes, in what he calls ‘the generation of the 1890s’, the 
towering figures of the era were Sigmund Freud, Max Weber and Benedetto Croce, 
and Wilhelm Dilthey is seen as a precursor (Hughes, 1959: 20). A critique of the 
Enlightenment was one of the central tasks that social thinkers of the early twentieth 
century set themselves (Hughes, 1959: 28). However, the hostility of these thinkers, 
especially Weber and Croce, was directed not so much against the eighteenth-century 
tradition in its original guise as against its late nineteenth-century reincarnation -  in 
travestied form -  as the cult of positivism (Hughes, 1959: 29). Hughes points out 
that, in the intellectual revolution that took place in the decade of the 1890s and the 
one succeeding it, the basic assumptions of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century social 
thought underwent a critical review from which there emerged the new assumptions 
of our own time (Hughes, 1959: 33). It was seen by some as the fin de siecle or the 
end of an era. In the work of Freud, Weber, Croce, Durkheim, Sorel and others there 
was an attack on positivism, and naturalistic explanations of human conduct were 
seen as radically insufficient (Hughes, 1959: 37).
Hughes also argues that in the twentieth century imaginative literature came 
to play a more serious and self-conscious role in the enunciation of values than was 
the case in the two preceding centuries. The major novel or play has devolved the 
task of making concrete and thereby more readily approachable the abstract insights 
of philosophers and social scientists (Hughes, 1959: 21). In the twentieth century, 
according to Hughes, philosophy has tended to be replaced by social science on the 
one hand, and imaginative literature on the other, and the ‘generation of the 1890’s’ 
are a part of this transition (Hughes, 1959: 25). Imaginative writers of the early 
twentieth century, such as Gide, Mann, Hesse, Proust and Pirandello, occupied 
themselves with themes similar to those that troubled social theorists. The sense of 
living under high tension, Hughes explains, was common. They had a conviction 
that they were living in historical circumstances in which all fixed norms were 
lacking: the old ethic had collapsed, and a new one was yet to be found (Hughes, 
1959: 364).
The principal themes of this thesis also overlap with some of the central 
concerns of philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century. Historicism
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employed distinctive methodologies, distinguishing the human sciences from the 
natural sciences, including the procedure of understanding, or verstehen (cf. Hughes, 
1959: 187), and the methodologies of historicism have become intimately related to 
hermeneutics. As well as being a historicist, Collingwood is directly related to the 
hermeneutic tradition. Boucher asserts that Collingwood has had a considerable 
impact upon the continental hermeneutic tradition, with Bultmann, Gadamer, 
Pannenburg, Lonergan and Ricoeur indebted to him (Boucher, 1995a: 17).
According to Parker, Collingwood can also be seen as providing a solution to 
some of the problems raised by postmodernism. Parker argues that while the 
postmodernist critique of modernism implicates earlier idealists, this is not the case 
with Bradley, Oakeshott and Collingwood. Similarities between modem idealism 
and postmodernism are, according to Parker, ‘very strong’ (Parker, 2000: 224). For 
Parker, Collingwood’s attack on the realist doctrine that the subject or knower of 
knowledge could not affect the object or known could help postmodernism in the 
stmggle against relativism (Parker, 2000: 229).
In his concern with the crisis of modernity, therefore, Collingwood is both a 
Romantic and a historicist, and this chapter so far has attempted to provide an 
introductory overview of these movements. As our exploration of the theme of the 
crisis of civilisation in his philosophy unfolds in more detail, Collingwood’s place in 
the context of these movements will become clearer.
At this point, I want to turn to a discussion of Collingwood’s treatment of the 
problem of the crisis of civilisation in his early philosophy. In the early part of 
Collingwood’s career, his Romanticism, historicism and concern with the ills of 
modernity manifest themselves in a preoccupation with the unity of the forms of 
experience. In this, as I will explain, Collingwood was influenced by his father, 
W.G. Collingwood and John Ruskin. Collingwood had also inherited a concern with 
unity of mind from the British and Italian Idealists and from Hegel.
As Boucher indicates, ‘In Hegel’s mind, we understand a part only by 
looking at it as part of a whole. The early stages of something are only properly 
understood when they are seen as the early stages of something more fully 
developed’ (Boucher, 1997: xix). The British Idealists imported Hegel’s rejection of 
all dualisms. They subscribed to Hegel’s insistence on the unity of experience and 
‘... sought to demonstrate that there could be no absolute divisions, for example,
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between mind and nature, nature and environment, or the individual and the state. 
Each includes something of the other and their opposition is overcome in a unity, not 
one that obliterates differences, but one that is a genuine unity in diversity’ (Boucher, 
1997: xi).
One of the central claims, then, in Collingwood’s early philosophy is that 
Western civilisation has reached a point of crisis because of the detachment of the 
forms of experience from one another. In Speculum Mentis, published in 1924, he 
argues that it is the special problem of modem life that, on the one hand, there is an 
unsatisfied demand for art, religion and philosophy, and, on the other hand, there is a 
crowd of artists, philosophers and ministers of religion who can find no market for 
their wares. The producers and consumers of spiritual wealth are out of touch (SM, 
20). There is a difference between our age and earlier ages, a special maladie du 
siecle which is endemic among us and which we can detect if we compare our 
society with that of former times, for example, the Middle Ages (SM, 22-3). 
Medieval man had a firm grip on what we may call the unity of mind: no mental 
activity existed in its own right and for itself. Art worked hand in hand with religion, 
and religion hand in hand with philosophy. There was no separation between secular 
art and religious art (SM, 27).
However, Collingwood argues, ‘Art, religion and philosophy are not really 
the same thing: there are differences between them which need not appear as long as 
they are at a comparatively low level of development, but appear all too sharply 
when they reach maturity’ (SM, 29). To reach full development, art, religion and 
philosophy must separate and go each its own way. This separation occurred in the 
Renaissance, and meant freedom for all the different activities of the mind from 
interference by each other. The medieval unity of the mind, however, also included 
freedom, the freedom of occupying an ordained place, in which there is no conflict, 
‘a positive freedom, like the freedom of a child at play’ (SM, 30).
The freedom of the Renaissance is a negative freedom, bought at the price of 
internal conflict. Religion of the Reformation and the counter-reformation adopted a 
puritanical and philistine attitude to art and to thought, but reached a new pitch of 
religious intensity (SM, 31). Art played at reverting to paganism and became 
irreligious, but also gave birth to a galaxy of great artists. Yet, Collingwood argues, 
Renaissance art is overshadowed by brooding tragedy: ‘Nothing is more typical of 
the Renaissance than the quality of its laughter: the way in which for Shakespeare the
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dreadfulness of life lurks among the rose leaves of the lightest comedy, or the way in 
which Moliere jokes like a man who watches himself dying by inches and has 
nothing left to do but laugh at his ridiculous body’ (SM, 32).
According to Collingwood, religion cannot live without art and philosophy. 
But now that art and philosophy have parted company from religion, it cannot 
employ them. Therefore it invented neo-Gothic and neo-Scholasticism, as it is 
incapable of keeping up with the advance of art and thought as it did in the middle 
ages (SM, 33). Art, religion and thought have each tended to become a specialised 
activity, pursued by specialists, and have lost touch with the people:
Today we can be as artistic, we can be as philosophical, we can be as religious as we please, 
but we cannot ever be men at all; we are wrecks and fragments o f men, and we do not know 
where to take hold o f life and how to begin looking for the happiness which we know we do 
not possess. (SM, 35)
For Collingwood, then, the answer is to re-establish the unity of experience: 
‘What is wrong with us is precisely the detachment of these forms of experience -  
art, religion, and the rest -  from one another; and our cure can only be their complete 
reunion in a complete and undivided life’ (SM, 36). However, the advance from the 
Middle Ages to the Renaissance was a real advance, and a re-union must allow for 
the full development of each form of experience, unlike in the Middle Ages. This 
answer is ‘. .. the fundamental principle of Christianity that the only life worth living 
is the life of the whole man, every faculty of body and soul unified into a single 
organic system. Incarnation, redemption, resurrection of the body, only repeat this 
cardinal idea from different angles’ (SM, 37).
Unity of the forms of experience can be achieved either positively, by 
bringing every activity into harmony, or negatively, by suppressing all but one. The 
former was the medieval way, the latter that of the Renaissance. ‘Our solution, 
then’, Collingwood argues, ‘can only be in principle the Christian solution; but it 
must not be the naive Christianity of the middle ages or the self-mutilated 
Christianity of the Renaissance, but something in which the good of both these is 
preserved, the bad destroyed’ (SM, 38). In this he claims to be following and 
working out the Romantic movement, ‘... purifying it, perhaps, of some things that 
are worthless today, but happy if we can attain anything like the clearness of vision 
and closeness of thought which they attained, and anxious above all not to pose as
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repositories of a new revelation, or vendors of any new-fangled philosophical patent- 
medicine, but to say once more, in words suited to our generation, something that 
everybody has always known’ (SM, 38).
As William M. Johnston demonstrates, the ideal of a many-sided intellectual 
life, and the unity of the forms of experience, was something Collingwood inherited 
from John Ruskin, mediated through his father, W.G. Collingwood (Johnston, 1967: 
28 and 64-65). However, Johnston argues that in Speculum Mentis, Collingwood 
differs from Ruskin in the demand for greater precision in philosophy. For 
Collingwood, philosophy is the most effective tool for seeking unity of mind. 
Ruskin’s exhorting of others to pursue a variety of activities gives way to a 
delineation of the principal activities which the mind pursues (Johnston, 1967: 96).
Collingwood describes five forms of experience in Speculum Mentis: art, 
religion, science, history and philosophy, proceeding in a scale from the most 
primitive to the most elaborate. Concurrently with the rise of each form of 
experience, there emerges a type of dogmatic philosophy based on it. Each one 
shares the limitations of their corresponding form of experience and serves to justify 
its one-sidedness. True philosophy emerges only after the other four forms of 
experience and their corresponding philosophies have come into existence. The task 
of true philosophy is to expose the limitations of the other forms of experience (see 
Johnston, 1967: 97).
Johnston argues that Croce is the contemporary thinker whom the early 
Collingwood most resembles (1967: 66). Croce’s philosophy of culture began to 
take shape when he turned from Marxism to aesthetics. He set himself the task of 
trying to set out the chief ‘modes of operation’ of the mind or spirit (Johnston, 1967: 
73). Croce’s ‘philosophy of spirit’, whereby he attempts to describe the spheres of 
experience, had great significance for the early Collingwood, and Collingwood’s 
Speculum Mentis was his attempt to improve upon Croce (Johnston, 1967: 75). It 
was Croce who resurrected this approach to philosophy in the early twentieth century 
(Johnston, 1967: 76).
However, Croce distinguishes sharply between theory and practice, 
something which Collingwood criticises in ‘Croce’s Philosophy of History’, as it 
violates his basic principle that the mind is indivisible. According to Johnston, 
Collingwood went much further than Croce in the effort to unite thought and life, and 
in so doing he was following a tradition quite removed from anything which Croce
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had experienced in Italy, namely the educational ideal of John Ruskin (Johnston, 
1967: 83-4).
Not only is unity of mind an important part of what Collingwood regards as 
the solution to the crisis of Western civilisation, but artistic expression and historical 
thinking are also important. Collingwood had already described Ruskin as an apostle 
of the ideal of unity of mind in an earlier lecture, ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’, delivered in 
1919. Ruskin is described as an unwitting Hegelian. However, in ‘Ruskin’s 
Philosophy’ Collingwood also demonstrates the connection between the unity of 
mind and historicism.
Collingwood argues that a man’s philosophy is a central thread on which his 
actions are strung, a constant purpose, or a consistent point of view running through 
all his work. There are ‘certain central principles which the man takes as 
fundamental and incontrovertible, which he assumes as true in all his thinking and 
acting’ (EPA, 10). These principles form a ‘ring’ of solid thought -  often they are in 
motion, but a motion seldom perceptible by the naked eye. The ring is formed by a 
number of different ideas or principles, welded together by some force of mutual 
cohesion. This central core of convictions is, for the most part, unknown to us, and 
we do not know what the convictions are which constitute it. According to 
Collingwood, ‘The fact seems to be that a man’s deepest convictions are precisely 
those which he never puts into words’. The business of the philosopher is to probe 
into the mind and uncover people’s ultimate beliefs (EPA, 11).
As Johnston points out, the emphasis on judging a person by premises 
inherent in both his or her words and deeds characterised Collingwood throughout 
his career. The nucleus of the later theory of philosophy as question and answer is 
here (Johnston, 1967: 59). It might be added that ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’ also 
anticipates the later theory of absolute presuppositions (cf. Connelly, 2003: 117).
According to Collingwood in ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’, ‘One of the most 
remarkable facts about the history of thought in the middle nineteenth century is the 
conflict between two methods of thinking which I shall call the Logical and the 
Historical’ (EPA, 12). The Logical method of thinking proceeds on the assumption 
that every individual fact is an instance of some eternal and unchanging principle, 
some law to which time makes no difference; and that the general law is more 
important than the particular fact. The aim of knowledge, therefore, is to discover 
these general laws. To explain a fact is to show what law it exemplifies. The task of
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the statesman is so to govern his country that its national life shall so far as possible 
obey and exemplify the eternal principles of justice and the natural rights of man.
This type of thought leads to a contempt for facts, a habitual intolerance, and 
a tendency towards monotony and rigidity in mental work. These qualities are 
conspicuous during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the ‘age of 
rationalism’. Political theorists of the time, Collingwood contends, believed in 
systems of eternal and immutable rights, from which political institutions drew their 
validity, and art critics believed in the ‘unities’ of the stage and in a rigid adherence 
to classical forms (EPA, 13-4).
Where the logical mind looks for general laws, according to Collingwood, the 
historical mind looks for individual facts, and it explains these facts by appealing not 
to laws but to other facts. Faced with the problems of political life, it tries not so 
much to determine the natural rights of man as to get at the rights and wrongs of this 
particular war, controversy or proposal. This type of thought is the reverse of 
everything we mean by the word doctrinaire (EPA, 14). Hence its natural inclination 
is always toward tolerance; for it respects facts to such an extent as to suppose that 
nothing can ever have existed unless it had something to say for itself.
The historical habit of thought was coming into existence in the early 
nineteenth century, and its rise was shown in a growing interest in the Middle Ages, 
and growing freedom with regard to art-forms (as shown by the difference between 
Pope and Browning). Also, there was a growing scepticism with regard to the 
permanence of political structures (EPA, 15). Logic in the nineteenth century was 
different from that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which was the old 
scholastic logic of formal correctness, consistency, clarity and definiteness in 
thinking. The logical mind distorted history. Collingwood argues:
No one can be a true historian till he realizes that truth is many-sided and not to be attained by 
the pursuit o f logical consistency; till he has discovered that he cannot be both an historian and, 
in the old sense o f the word, a logician. But this very fact led to the rejection o f the old logic, 
and the growth o f a new logic whose whole being was rooted in history; so that just as logicism 
produced its own school o f history, historicism created for itself a logic. (EPA, 16)
By Ruskin’s time, according to Collingwood, historicism was beginning to 
show itself as the philosophy of the future. The teaching in which it was 
systematically expressed, that of Hegel, superseded all previous philosophies. Of 
this historical movement Ruskin was a whole-hearted adherent. He had the same
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outlook on the world, the same instinctive attitude towards reality, which made 
Hegel rewrite logic in terms of history (EPA, 17).
Collingwood argues that the historicism of Ruskin has ‘a whole cycle of 
unmistakable consequences’. The first and most important is the belief in the unity 
or solidarity of the human spirit. For Ruskin, the art of a particular person or nation 
is connected with questions of morality, religion, politics, and so on. ‘If there is 
something visibly good or bad in the art of a certain people at a certain date, he 
always assumes that there must have been corresponding virtues and vices in their 
moral and political life’ (EPA, 18). Each form of human activity is an expression of 
the whole self. This principle of the unity and indivisibility of the spirit can be 
shown to proceed from the historical trend of his philosophy. The logical habit of 
mind takes the historical fact of, say, ancient Greece, and analyses this fact into 
abstract conceptions such as art, religion, political institutions and so on. The 
historical habit of mind, on the contrary, takes the historical fact of ancient Greece as 
a whole, and regards this fact as ultimately real. Thus, for the historical mind, Plato 
and Phidias both expressed the Greek spirit. For the logical mind, Plato belongs to 
the eternal company of philosophers, and Phidias to the equally eternal and equally 
exclusive army of artists. This principle of the unity of the spirit constitutes a breach 
with the trend of eighteenth century philosophy and a point of contact with Hegel, in 
whose philosophy it was a cardinal axiom.
For Collingwood, the second point in which Ruskin’s thought shows a 
historical tendency is the emphasis which he lays upon historical causes: ‘In the 
hands of a logically minded person, history becomes a mere succession of events, 
fact following fact with little or no internal cohesion. To a historically minded 
person, on the contrary, history is a drama, the unfolding of a plot in which each 
situation leads necessarily to the next’ (EPA, 19). Ruskin had a strong interest in the 
causes of national prosperity and decay, an interest which forced him to devote much 
of his life to political and economic speculation.
The third characteristic is Ruskin’s tolerance, in the sense of feeling the 
rightness and value of things which lay outside his own personal system of ideals. 
Ruskin passionately admired many things in medieval art and medieval life, but 
never wished to reinstate the Middle Ages, nor to copy their characteristic features 
(EPA, 20-1):
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This tolerance is the surest mark of the historical as opposed to the logical mind; and here, in 
this imaginative sympathy with the past, as opposed to idolatrous worship of one phase o f the 
past, Ruskin’s kinship with Hegel strikingly appears. For the Hegelian treatment o f history 
depends on the principle that every historical phase has its own individual character, ideals and 
virtues, and that every phase alike should be an object of admiration, none of imitation. (EPA, 
22)
A fourth characteristic of Ruskin’s mind which shows his kinship with Hegel 
is his attitude towards the logical problem of contradiction. ‘The old logic’, 
Collingwood argues, ‘lays it down that of two contradictory propositions one must be 
false and the other true. To contradict yourself, on this view, is a sign of mental 
confusion: the wise man never contradicts himself. The alternative view starts from 
the axiom that there are two sides to every question, and that there is right on both 
sides; from this, the inference is drawn that truth is many-sided and that self- 
contradiction may easily be a mark not of weakness but of strength -  not of 
confusion, but of a wide and comprehensive view which embraces much more truth 
than the one-sided consistency of the logicians’ (EPA, 22). Ruskin adopted and 
defended the second of these views. Collingwood cites from Ruskin’s Cambridge 
Inaugural Lecture: ‘I have never met with a question yet, of any importance, which 
did not need, for the right solution of it, at least one positive and one negative 
answer, like an equation of the second degree. Mostly, matters of any consequence 
are three-sided, or four-sided, or polygonal; and the trotting round a polygon is 
severe work for people any way stiff in their opinions’ (EPA, 22-3). Ruskin believed 
that by contradicting himself he got nearer the truth. According to Collingwood, 
‘Both in Hegel’s case and in Ruskin’s, the recognition of this principle is associated 
with a sympathetic understanding of history; and, as we have already seen, the one is 
hardly possible without the other. The history of a struggle -  and all history is the 
history of struggles -  cannot be written by a man who believes that one party must 
have been right and the other wrong’ (EPA, 23).
Ruskin’s historicism, however, accentuated his opposition to the philosophers 
of his day (EPA, 24). Collingwood argues that English Kantians, such as Sir 
William Hamilton and Coleridge, interpreted Kant’s philosophy as a thoroughgoing 
example of the logical view of contradiction, namely that of two contrary 
propositions one must be false. Also, the Kantians firmly believed in the reality of 
distinctions within the mind. Ruskin thought of art, religion, and politics as 
‘alternative manifestations of the same indivisible spirit, acting and reacting on each 
other with perfect freedom’. The Kantians on the contrary believed that the mind
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had ‘a number of different faculties which worked, to all intents and purposes, in so 
many watertight compartments’, and they distinguished between the theoretical and 
practical functions (EPA, 25-6).
The ideas of the English Kantians were popularised so as to dominate the 
thought of the Victorian age. According to Collingwood, ‘During the whole of the 
central and later Victorian period it was usual for educated and thoughtful 
Englishmen to believe as a matter of course that the mind has two faculties, the 
theoretical and the practical, and that the theoretical was fundamentally unreliable, 
while the practical was always trustworthy’ (EPA, 26). Hence, ‘it became the 
fashion to despair of solving difficult intellectual problems, while moral problems of 
at least equal difficulty were held to be soluble without hesitation, by the 
employment of the faculty called conscience which you had only to obey and all 
would be well’. This combination of intellectual scepticism with moral dogmatism 
‘made the Victorian Englishman appear in the eyes of the world as a prig and a 
Philistine, religious in it, and proud of his ignorance, confident in his sense of justice 
and “fair play” .... It was the same fallacy that underlay the typically Victorian 
suggestion that the doctrines of Christian belief should be given up as being 
incapable of proof, while the Christian ethics should be preserved, as the best ethical 
system in existence’ (EPA, 27). Ruskin, therefore, was at cross-purposes with his 
age (EPA, 29).
Collingwood argues that Ruskin used his belief in the unity of mind as a 
philosophical weapon. His synthetic habit of mind laid stress on resemblances and 
connections between problems, which resulted in a frequent appeal to argument by 
analogy (EPA, 30). Collingwood cites a passage from Ruskin in Modern Painters:
There are laws of truth and right in painting, just as fixed as those of harmony in music or of 
affinity in chemistry. Those laws are perfectly ascertainable by labour, and ascertainable no 
otherwise. It is as ridiculous for any one to speak positively about painting who has not given 
a greater part of his life to its study, as it would be for a person who had never studied 
chemistry to give a lecture on affinities of elements; but it is also as ridiculous for a person to 
speak hesitantly about laws o f painting who has conscientiously given time to their 
ascertainment, as it would be for Mr. Faraday to announce in a dubious manner that iron had an 
affinity o f oxygen, and to put it to the vote o f his audience whether it had or not. (EPA, 31)
Ruskin, then, assumes that chemistry and painting are alike an example of the 
free activity of the human spirit (EPA, 31). According to Collingwood, this 
analogical method of reasoning is a dangerous weapon to use. But in skilled hands it 
is a weapon of immense power, clearing the ground of unnecessary argument and
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accomplishing a vast amount of varied work with the least possible waste of energy 
(EPA, 32).
Ruskin’s belief in the unity of mind leads him to deny that art is a thing by 
itself, which can thrive in a vacuum, cut off from the general interests of humanity. 
Art is expression, and it cannot arise until one has something to express. Ruskin 
opposed the idea of Art for Art’s sake, issuing as it did from the analytic or 
separating tendency in the Victorian mind. He tried to express the idea that for art to 
be healthy, it must strike its roots deep into the common earth of life, with all its 
interests, passions and prejudices (EPA, 33-4).
Because of his synthetic view of the human mind, and hence of the 
connection between art and morality, Ruskin is mystified by the fact that the 
attainment of perfection in art often seems to herald the downfall of a civilisation, 
while a high state of moral nobility may coexist with a complete absence of art 
(EPA, 34). It is for Ruskin ‘a dark and terrible mystery that perfection and death 
should walk hand in hand’. Collingwood’s answer is that the perfection of any one 
artistic style or social ideal ‘lays a dilemma before the human spirit: either go on 
repeating the perfection that has been attained, become merely imitative, or else 
launch out into the void, feeling for a new style or a new ideal, and acquiescing in the 
death of the old. Such a death is in every way preferable to the decrepitude which is 
the only alternative’ (EPA, 37-8).
For Collingwood, then, ‘Ruskin was in philosophy the best-equipped mind of 
his generation’. In an age that was turning from the ideal of abstract, logical, 
doctrinaire thinking to an ideal of concrete, historical, imaginative thinking, Ruskin 
refrained from putting his ‘new wine’ into the ‘old bottles of eighteenth century 
philosophy’ (EPA, 40). Ruskin’s philosophy is historical, dialectical and synthetic, 
and it is not the analytic mind, but the synthetic mind, the mind that sees the unity of 
things, that is rare (EPA, 41).
According to Johnston, Collingwood, in ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’, singles out 
those aspects of Ruskin which most resemble Collingwood himself. The emphasis 
on seeing things as a whole, on unity of the mind, on willingness to contradict 
oneself, and on the historical habit of mind are all traits of Collingwood (Johnston, 
1967: 64).
Collingwood’s concern, then, with the unity of the forms of experience can 
evidently be placed in the broader context of Romanticism and historicism. The
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unity of the forms of experience corresponds to what Raymond Williams refers to as 
the Romantic idea of ‘culture’. As Williams points out, according to the English 
Romantic tradition, ‘culture’ means ‘a whole way of life, material, intellectual and 
spiritual’ (Williams, 1993: xvi). Williams emphasises the importance of art in the 
conception of a ‘whole way of life’. According to Williams, ‘An essential 
hypothesis in the development of the idea of culture is that the art of a period is 
closely and necessarily related to the generally prevalent “way of life”, and further 
that, in consequence, aesthetic, moral and social judgements are closely interrelated’ 
(Williams, 1993: 130). This is a product of the intellectual history of the nineteenth 
century. As an idea, the relation between periods of art and periods of society is to 
be found earlier, in Europe, in the work of, among others, Vico and Herder and 
Montesquieu, but the decisive emphasis in England begins in the 1830s. Williams 
cites Kenneth Clark’s The Gothic Revival', ‘the idea of style as something organically 
connected with society ... does not occur, as far as I know, in the Eighteenth 
Century’ (Williams, 1993: 130).
The development of Romanticism and the examination of the relations 
between ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’, in Coleridge and Carlyle, had prepared the 
ground for the influence which first Pugin, and later Ruskin, exerted. According to 
Williams, Ruskin is a major contributor to the development of the complex ideas of 
culture. For Ruskin, art criticism and the social criticism are inherently and 
essentially related because both are applications of his concern with beauty or ‘truth’ 
(Williams, 1993: 135). On this view, the function of the artist is to reveal the 
‘essential truth of things’ (Williams, 1993: 137).
According to Ruskin, the artist reveals organic life: his goodness is his 
‘wholeness’, and the goodness of society lies in its creation of the conditions for 
‘wholeness of being’ (Williams, 1993: 138). The ‘organic society’ and the ‘whole 
way of life’ are largely drawn from the study and practice of art. Ruskin’s standard 
by which a society must be judged was ‘vital beauty’, or ‘the felicitous fulfilment of 
function in living things’, and whether in its essential order it created the conditions 
for such a fulfilment (Williams, 1993: 139).
For Ruskin, the evils of society are to be met by a right understanding of 
‘what kinds of labour are good for men, raising them, and making them happy’ 
(Williams, 1993: 141). Regarding the division of labour, Ruskin argues:
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It is not, truly speaking, the labour that is divided; but the men -  divided into mere segments of 
men -  broken into small fragments and crumbs o f life .... You must make a tool o f the 
creature, or a man of him. You cannot make both .... It is ... this degradation of the operative 
into a machine, which, more than any other evil o f the times, is leading the mass o f the nations 
everywhere into vain, incoherent, destructive struggling for a freedom of which they cannot 
explain the nature to themselves .... It is not that men are ill fed, but that they have no pleasure 
in the work by which they make their bread, and therefore look to wealth as the only means of 
pleasure. It is not that men are pained by the scorn o f the upper classes, but they cannot endure 
their own; for they feel that the kind of labour to which they are condemned is verily a 
degrading one, and makes them less than men (cited from Williams, 1993: 141-2).
According to Williams, then, Ruskin held that a society had to be judged in terms of 
all the human activities and relationships which the methods of manufacture and 
consumption brought into existence (Williams, 1993: 144).
Williams’ account of the Romantic idea of culture, therefore, not only 
corresponds with Collingwood’s conception of the unity of the forms of experience, 
but it also illustrates the idea of art as a standpoint for a critique of industrialism. As 
I will explain in the next chapter, the use of a philosophy of art to criticise 
industrialism is an important part of Collingwood’s proposed antidote to the crisis of 
Western civilisation.
As examples of the Romantic tradition in the twentieth century, Williams 
refers to D.H. Lawrence, R.H. Tawney, T.S. Eliot and George Orwell, among others. 
According to Williams, from the Romantic emphasis on ‘a whole way of life’, we 
learn that one element of a complex system cannot be changed without affecting the 
whole. Also it has given us new illustrations of an alternative way of life, and 
reassures us that the version of life which industrialism has forced on us is neither 
universal nor permanent (Williams, 1993: 233).
The Romantic context of Collingwood’s concern with the unity of the forms 
of experience is further revealed by comparisons with both Eliot’s and Ortega y 
Gasset’s accounts of culture. ‘Culture’, Eliot explains, is the way of life of a 
particular people, as made visible in their arts, in their social system, in their habits 
and customs, in their religion. Eliot asserts that, unlike machinery, culture is 
something that must grow and you must wait for it to mature in its due time (Eliot, 
1962: 119). There can be no European culture if countries are reduced to an identity: 
‘We need variety in unity: not the unity of organisation, but the unity of nature’ 
(Eliot, 1962: 120).
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In Eliot’s view, religion is the dominant force in creating a common culture. 
The common tradition of Christianity has made Europe what it is, and has brought 
with it common cultural elements:
An individual European may not believe that the Christian Faith is true, and yet what he says, 
and makes, and does, will all spring out o f his heritage of Christian culture and depend upon 
that culture for its meaning. Only a Christian culture could have produced a Voltaire or a 
Nietzsche .... If Christianity goes, the whole o f our culture goes. Then you must start painfully 
again, and you cannot put on a new culture ready made. You must wait for the grass to grow 
to feed the sheep to give the wool out o f which your coat will be made. You must pass through 
many centuries o f barbarism. We should not live to see the new culture, nor would our great- 
great-great-grandchildren: and if we did, not one of us would be happy in it. (Eliot, 1962: 122)
No political and economic organisation can supply what this cultural unity 
gives. The unity of culture, in contrast to the unity of political organisation, means a 
variety of loyalties, not just loyalty to the state or super-state. For example, Eliot 
argues that universities ought to be independent of the governments of the countries 
in which they are situated. They should not be institutions for the training of an 
efficient bureaucracy, and they should stand for the preservation of learning and the 
pursuit of truth (Eliot, 1962: 123).
The idea of ‘culture’ as a vital aspect of civilisation and a means to its 
preservation also strongly features in the thought of Jose Ortega y Gasset. Whereas 
Eliot emphasises the importance of art in culture, for Ortega y Gasset ‘culture’ draws 
much of its content from science.
In Mission o f the University, Ortega argues that, as well as the teaching of 
learned professions and scientific research, it is thought that university education 
ought to impart something called ‘general culture’, the expression implying that the 
student ought to be given some kind of ornamental knowledge, which in some way is 
to educate his or her moral character or intellect (MU, 41-4). However, in the 
medieval epoch, this was what constituted higher education, proper and entire. 
According to Ortega, ‘It was not an ornament for the mind or a training of the 
character. It was, on the contrary, the system of ideas, concerning the world and 
humanity, which the man of that time possessed. It was, consequently, the repertory 
of convictions which became the effective guide of his existence’ (MU, 43). Life is a 
chaos through which a person finds ‘roads’ or ‘ways’, in the form of culture. For 
Ortega, ‘Culture is what saves human life from being a mere disaster; it is what 
enables man to live a life which is something above meaningless tragedy or inward
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disgrace’ (MU, 44). Culture is the vital system of ideas of a period. The 
contemporary university has developed professional instruction and research, but has 
abandoned almost entirely the transmission of culture, something which ought to be 
its basic function (MU, 44-6).
For Ortega, in order to be a cultured person, one must possess the vital idea of 
the world which has been created by physics, biology, history and speculative 
philosophy. Otherwise, all things that one does in the world which transcend the 
boundaries of one’s profession will turn out unfortunately. According to Ortega, 
regarding the uncultured man, ‘His political ideas and actions will be inept; his 
affairs of the heart, beginning with the type of women he will prefer, will be crude 
and ridiculous; he will bring to his family life an atmosphere of unreality and 
cramped narrowness, which will warp the upbringing of his children; and outside, 
with his friends, he will emit thoughts that are monstrosities, and opinions that are a 
torrent of drivel and bluff (MU, 47).
Like Collingwood, Ortega argues that professionalism and specialisation have 
‘smashed the European man in pieces’, and the task of the university is to reassemble 
out of scattered pieces a complete living organism12 (MU, 48). With instruction in 
professional matters and the methods of science, there is a fabulous profusion of 
studies, which the ordinary student cannot master (MU, 49). According to Ortega, 
‘Instead of teaching what ought to be taught, according to some Utopian desire’, the 
university must teach only what can be learned. It was the innovation of Rousseau, 
Pestalozzi, Froebel, and German idealism to shift the centre of gravity of teaching 
‘... from knowledge and the teacher to the learner, recognizing that it is the learner 
and his characteristics which alone can guide us in our effort to make something 
organic of education’ (MU, 50).
From the eighteenth century onwards life has assumed a huge complexity, 
and it is impossible to assimilate the profusion of cultural and technical possessions. 
Like Collingwood’s ‘principle of the limited objective’ in The New Leviathan 
(31.61), Ortega argues that teaching should be based on the ‘principle of economy’ in 
education. The minimum curriculum must include only what is necessary for the life 
of the student, and what the student can really learn with thoroughness and 
understanding (MU, 55-7).
12 In contemporary times, Beiner (1983) and Gadamer (1981) argue against this reliance on the expert.
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Culture, or the vital ideas by which an age conducts its life, is the repertory of 
our active convictions as to the nature of the world and our fellow creatures: 
convictions as to the hierarchy of the values of things (MU, 64). The vast majority 
of these convictions or ideas are received by one’s historical environment, and ‘in 
our age, the content of culture comes largely from science’. According to Ortega, 
‘Culture borrows from science what is vitally necessary for the interpretation of our 
existence’ (MU, 66). Unlike science, culture is always urgent, ‘here and now’, and 
‘... is required to be, at every instant, a complete, unified, coherent system -  the plan 
of life, the path leading through the forest of existence’ (MU, 66). The dispersion 
and complication of science needs to be counterbalanced by consolidation and 
synthesising of knowledge (MU, 69-70). According to Ortega, through culture, and 
the integration of knowledge, the university becomes an agent for the salvation of 
science itself (MU, 71-2).
Not only does the university need perpetual contact with science, it also needs 
contact with public life, and the life of the people needs to have the university 
participate in its affairs (MU, 76). The university should not be a retreat or an 
institution exclusively for students. It should intervene in ‘the thick of life’s 
urgencies and its passions’, and assert itself as a major ‘spiritual power’, higher than 
the press, standing for serenity, seriousness and the grasp of intellect (MU, 78).
Ortega’s conception of culture, however, is just one part of a philosophy 
where, like Collingwood’s, historical and dialectical thinking are seen as the solution 
to a crisis of modernity. To sum up, therefore, Collingwood, following the Romantic 
tradition, saw the unity of the forms of experience as a solution to the crisis of 
Western civilisation. However, as I have argued, the conception of the unity of the 
forms of experience and the Romantic idea of culture are interconnected with an 
emphasis on the importance of artistic expression and historical thinking.
‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’ and Speculum Mentis prefigure some of the central 
points that Collingwood developed in more detail in his later philosophy. Following 
Speculum Mentis, however, Collingwood came to see both the crisis of civilisation 
and solutions to the problem in a different way. Collingwood argued that the threat 
to civilisation came not only from the separation of the forms of experience from one 
another, but the emergence of one form of experience, natural science, which, 
through philosophies such as positivism and utilitarianism, threatened to suffocate 
the rest. Collingwood’s solutions to the crisis of civilisation also underwent change.
41
The outline of the five forms of experience that he presented in Speculum Mentis 
came to be seen as inadequate and had to be modified in important ways. In 
particular, art assumed a role of greater prominence, and history came to be more 
closely connected with philosophy. This meant that the ‘historicist’ revolution that 
he described in ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’ became more developed, and the philosophy 
of art was improved. A closer rapprochement between the forms of experience 
emerged in Collingwood’s philosophy, which as I will demonstrate, corrected some 
of the inadequacies in his earlier writings.
Following Speculum Mentis, Collingwood placed greater emphasis on his 
philosophies of art and of historical and dialectical thinking, which became related 
solutions to the crisis of civilisation. As a result, the next three chapters will be 
dedicated to analysing Collingwood’s philosophy of art, and discussion of 
Collingwood’s dialectic and ‘historicism’ is (mostly) postponed until Part Two.
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Chapter Two:
Art and craft
In the unpublished manuscript, ‘Realism and Idealism’ (1936), Collingwood makes 
an important point which is particularly pertinent to the order of enquiry in this 
thesis. Although a long quotation, it is worth citing at length:
When new ideas begin to dawn upon the human mind, they generally begin by assuming a 
poetic or imaginative or sentimental shape; they begin as feeling, not yet able to state 
themselves in clear theoretical form or justify themselves by argument, but nevertheless strong 
and definite; and in the course o f time they work themselves out in the shape of logical thought 
and so provide themselves with a scientific organization and justification. Over and over 
again, in the history o f human affairs, you will find that a logically complete and orderly 
system, whether of science or philosophy or legal or social institutions, has been wrecked, not 
by cool criticism calling attention to logical flaws in its structure, but by the growth o f some 
blind or shapeless, but enormously powerful, feeling which begins by revolting against it as 
something stupid and irrelevant; this feeling then proceeds, with no apparent justification in 
logic, to attack the existing system and destroy it by main force, as it were with dynamite, or 
else simply withdraws from it and leaves it standing as a picturesque but deserted monument to 
the ingenuity o f a past age, while it begins to build up another more to its liking. (RI, B, VII, 
sect. 2)
Hence when we are confronted by new movements, ‘... it is idle to meet them 
with criticism derived from thought structures already existing; what we must do is 
first and foremost to feel by experience the quality of life which these new 
movements contain, and use our judgement to decide whether it is a genuine life, 
sincere in its quality and rich in promise of new growth, or either a shallow and 
frivolous affectation or a mere revival, of something that has already tried and 
failed’. New movements must be tested not by using our heads, but by using our 
hearts: ‘It is only when they have come to maturity that they leam to use their heads, 
and it is then that we have to use our heads to appraise their merits’ (RI, B, VII, sect. 
2).
It is in art, then, that we receive the first intimations of profound change in a 
civilisation, and it is only later that the details are worked out by thought proper. For 
Collingwood, it is in art, and the subversion of our artistic life, that we find the first 
evidence and symptoms of the crisis of modernity, and it is the philosophy of art, 
rather than other areas of philosophy, that deals most directly with this theme. In a 
sense, therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, Collingwood’s philosophy of art is 
logically prior to the other aspects of his philosophy. As a result, I will examine his 
aesthetics first, before proceeding to a more detailed examination of the theme in his
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logic and metaphysics, in Part Two, and his theory of society, politics and 
civilisation in Part Three.
For Collingwood, following the principle of the unity of mind, art is 
something that affects the whole of life13. To some extent, we are all artists. 
Collingwood argues: ‘every utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes is 
a work of art’ (PA, 285). One of the improvements to Collingwood’s later 
philosophy is that art is seen to have a closer union with thought, and the place of 
emotion in his account of the crisis of civilisation assumes greater importance. The 
crisis of civilisation, according to his later philosophy, is no longer only due to the 
fragmentation of the unity of the forms of experience, but is more complex. A 
particularly important factor is the suppression of emotion. According to 
Collingwood’s philosophy of art, the suppression of emotion in the modem industrial 
world and the predominance of amusement over art proper are evidence of a 
profound crisis in contemporary civilisation. The suppression of magic and of the 
emotional aspects of religion are also contributory factors.
Collingwood’s conception of art as a standpoint for a critique of 
contemporary civilisation and as a solution to its ills depends on a distinction 
between art proper and craft. His distinction of art from craft supports his contention 
that art is the truthful expression of emotion. Collingwood’s philosophy of art, as it 
emerges in The Principles o f Art, takes up and develops the Romantic tradition.
In Book I of The Principles o f Art, Collingwood argues that craft involves 
various kinds of distinctions not present in art: a distinction between means and end, 
a distinction between planning and execution and a distinction between raw material 
and artefact. Art does not involve the distinction between means and end in that the 
‘poetic labour’ in the artist’s mind is not the means for creating a poem in the way 
that the craftsman’s tools are a means for making an artefact. Similarly, regarding 
the distinction between raw material and artefact, the words cannot be seen as the 
raw material of a poem. Collingwood rejects the idea of art as a craft, and the related 
doctrine of artistic technique: ‘... however necessary it may be that a poet should 
have technical skill, he is a poet only in so far as this skill is not identified with art, 
but with something used in the service of art’ (PA, 27). As Aaron Ridley points out,
13 As Mink points out, it also rests on the claim made in An Essay on Philosophical Method that a 
philosophical concept ‘leaks or escapes’ out of any limits imposed on its application, as by the rules o f  
classification (Mink, 1969: 206).
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in Collingwood’s distinction between art and craft, his concern is entirely negative: 
he is not claiming that art, unlike craft, never involves distinctions between means 
and ends, between planning and execution, between raw material and finished 
product. He is claiming only that art need not involve these, whereas craft always 
does (Ridley, 1998: 13). In line with the argument of An Essay on Philosophical 
Method, which I will examine in more detail in Part Two of this thesis, there is an 
overlap between art and craft (cf. Donagan, 1962: 111-2).
Also The Principles o f Art, as Connelly points out, follows the 
recommendation in An Essay on Philosophical Method that
To define a philosophical concept it is necessary, first, to think o f that concept as specifying 
itself in a form so rudimentary that anything less would fail to embody the concept at all. Later 
phases modify this minimum definition by adding new determinations, each implied in what 
went before, but each introducing into it qualitative changes as well as additions and 
complications. (EPM, 100-1)
Hence, in The Principles o f Art, Collingwood proceeds from the most rudimentary 
specification to the most advanced. Book I is provisional and it is only in Book III 
that the full theory of art is given (Connelly, 2003: 16).
Collingwood argues that, unlike craft, what the artist produces consists of two 
things: an ‘internal’ thing and a bodily/perceptible thing. The ‘internal’ thing is most 
important: ‘There is no such thing as an objet d ’art in itself; if we call any bodily and 
perceptible thing by that name or an equivalent we do so only because of the relation 
in which it stands to the aesthetic experience which is the “work of art proper’” (PA, 
37). Also, art is not representative, as representation is a craft. For example, a 
portrait is a work of representation, and aims to capture a likeness. The portrait 
painter subordinates his artistic powers to the end of making a portrait. However, a 
portrait can also be a work of art, when the artistry triumphs over the representation 
and the portrait is an opportunity to create a work of art (PA, 44-5).
Collingwood argues that the mistaken identification of art with representation 
is responsible for a modem misinterpretation of Plato’s theory of art. Many modem 
writers on aesthetics attribute to Plato the view that all art is bad because it is 
imitative. In fact, Collingwood contends, Socrates in Plato’s Republic divides poetry 
into two kinds, one representative and the other not. In Book III of Republic Plato 
banishes from his ideal city the representative artist who creates amusement, but not 
the representative artist who represents the discourse of a good man. In Book X 
Plato’s opinion has changed. Here all representative poetry is banned because it is
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representative. However, non-representative poetry is retained. Plato, according to 
Collingwood, does not regard poetry in general as representative. Tragedy and 
comedy were kinds of poetry that Plato classified as representative. For Plato in 
Book X, all drama must go, and he finds himself left with that kind of poetry whose 
chief representative is Pindar (PA, 46-8). Aristotle’s Poetics defends amusement art 
against Plato’s attack, arguing that the emotions generated in tragedy, for example, 
are discharged in the experience of watching tragedy. Plato’s analysis, however, is 
related to the problem of the decadence of the Greek world, which is not appreciated 
by Aristotle. Plato regards the replacement of an old magico-religious art with a new 
amusement art as a symptom of this decadence (PA, 50-2).
Collingwood identifies three different levels of representation. Firstly, a 
naive, almost non-selective representation attempts complete literalness, examples of 
which can be found in Palaeolithic animal painting and Egyptian portrait-sculpture 
(PA, 54). Secondly, there is literal representation which emphasises characteristic 
features and omits all else, for example, a drawing of a dance might leave out the 
dancers altogether and just trace the pattern (PA, 55). A portrait may depart from 
literal representation to emotional representation. For example, a portrait of a 
fearsome wild animal may have its teeth and claws magnified; a person of whom we 
stand in awe seems to have large and piercing eyes (PA, 54). On the third level, 
emotional representation abandons literal representation altogether. A Brahms song, 
for example, may evoke a feeling remarkably similar to that which a person feels on 
a summer’s day (PA, 56).
Representative art, as distinct from art proper, is the subordination of art to a 
certain end, the end being to induce a certain state of mind or emotion in the 
audience. Collingwood discusses two kinds of representative art: magic and 
amusement. Magic, he insists, is not pseudo-science or neurosis. Anthropologists 
studying ‘savage’ civilisations were led by their prejudices to compare the magical 
practices of the savage with the scientific knowledge of civilised man, and concluded 
that magic is erroneous natural science (PA, 57-61). Similarly, Freud associated 
magic with neurosis (PA, 63-5). In fact, the purpose of magic is to arouse emotions 
for the benefit of practical life. For example, a tribe might do a war dance before 
going to fight its neighbours. This produces warlike emotions, and develops and 
conserves morale. Unlike in amusement, emotions aroused by magical acts are not 
discharged by those acts. Instead the emotions are focussed and crystallised and
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directed upon the conduct of practical life (PA, 66). Collingwood argues that ‘Magic 
is a kind of dynamo supplying the mechanism of practical life with the emotional 
current that drives it’ (PA, 69). Hence it is a necessity for every person and society, 
and: ‘A society which thinks, as our own thinks, that it has outlived the need of 
magic, is either mistaken in that opinion, or else it is a dying society, perishing for 
lack of interest in its own maintenance’ (PA, 69).
According to Collingwood, magic has flourished unrecognised in modem 
society, which bases its claim to enlightenment on giving up magic. Examples of 
magic are: practising a religion, patriotic songs, war memorials, and anything that 
stimulates loyalty to country, party, class, family or any other social or political unit 
(PA, 72-3). Other examples of magic include: fox-hunting and amateur football, 
which are ‘part of the religion of being a gentleman’, weddings, which create an 
emotional motive for maintaining the partnership of marriage, the funeral, which is a 
public undertaking to live in future without the deceased, the dinner-party, which 
creates and renews friendship, and the dance, which is a courtship-ritual (PA, 73-6). 
Collingwood points out, however, that magic, in the hands of a true artist, can also be 
art, if the artistic and magical motives are felt as one motive, as it happened among 
the Aurignacian and Magdalenian cave-men, the ancient Egyptians, the Greeks, and 
the medieval Europeans (PA, 77).
Another example of representative art, or art falsely so-called, is amusement. 
Whereas magic is the arousal of emotions for their practical value, amusement is the 
arousal and discharge of emotions so that they do not interfere with practical life 
(PA, 78). For example, the ‘thriller’ or detective story arouses and discharges 
emotions of fear, craving for excitement and adventure and delight in power. The 
earthing of certain emotions, by arousing and discharging them in make-believe 
situations, makes it less likely that they will discharge themselves in practical life. 
Similarly, sexual fantasy and pornography are a substitute for sexual passion14 (PA, 
84-6).
Amusement involves the bifurcation of experience into a ‘real’ part and a 
‘make-believe’ part, and the ill-effects of this are negligible in so far as the emotions 
aroused in the make-believe part, which is called amusement, are not allowed to 
overflow into the affairs of ‘real life’. Collingwood contends that amusement
14 This is compatible with D.H. Lawrence’s view, which I discuss in the next chapter.
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becomes a danger to practical life when the debt it imposes on our stores of energy is 
too great to be paid off in the course of ordinary living. When this reaches a point of 
crisis, practical life has become emotionally bankrupt and a moral disease has set in, 
whose symptoms are a constant craving for amusement and an inability to take any 
interest in ordinary affairs of livelihood and social routine (PA, 95). Collingwood 
compares the modem world to the later Roman Empire, with its unprecedented 
growth of the amusement trade which is symptomatic of a moral disease, and almost 
universal agreement that the kinds of work upon which our civilisation depends have 
become an intolerable drudgery (PA, 96-7).
According to Collingwood, modem Western civilisation suffers from a moral 
or spiritual disease because art and magic are suppressed and relegated to the status 
of amusement. He outlines a history of amusement, according to which in the 
fourteenth century merchants and princes began to change the character of artistic 
work by diverting it from the Church’s use to their own personal service. This 
provoked violent hostility, which was drawn into the service of the Reformation, and 
entered into the mainstream of modem civilisation through its inheritance by 
nonconformist bankers and manufacturers, the dominant class of the modem world, 
and drove the artistic consciousness into the position of something outcast and 
persecuted. Having displaced the gentry, the new plutocracy compelled the arts to 
accept the status of amusements and persuaded themselves to reconcile their 
enjoyment of these amusements with a religious principle according to which there 
was no room in life for anything but work. Collingwood asserts: ‘The artists, who 
had struggled from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century to work out a new 
conception of art, detaching it from the ideas of amusement and magic alike, and 
thus liberating themselves from all service, whether of church or of patron, stifled 
these thoughts, spared themselves the labour of developing their new conception to 
the height of its potentialities, and put on again the servant’s liveries they had thrown 
aside’ (PA, 100).
This, Collingwood claims, led to a decline in artistic standards during the 
nineteenth century and also the corruption of the dominant class of merchants and 
bankers, who got into the habit of retiring into a state of pseudo-gentility on making 
a fortune, where they had nothing to do but amuse themselves. The merchant class 
was distinguished from the real gentility by the fact that they had no duties to the
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community, whether military or administrative or magical, such as occupied the 
latter. According to Collingwood,
Until close on the end of the nineteenth century, the rustic population of England had an art of  
its own, rooted in the distant past but still alive with creative vigour: songs and dances, 
seasonal feasts and dramas and pageantry, all o f magical significance and all organically 
connected with agricultural work. In a single generation this was wiped out of existence by the 
operation of two causes: the Education Act o f 1870, which, as imposing on the countryman an 
education modelled on town-dweller’s standards, was one stage in the slow destruction of  
English rural life by the dominant industrial and commercial class; and the ‘agricultural 
depression’, to give that vague and non-committal name to the long series of events, partly 
accidental and partly deliberate, which between 1870 and 1900 wrecked the prosperity o f the 
English agricultural population.
A similar process was going on among the poor of the towns. They too had a vital and 
flourishing folk-art o f the same magical type; they too were deprived of it by the organized 
forces of the law acting as the secular arm o f the ruling industrialists’ Puritanism. (PA, 101-2)
By 1900 town and country alike had been purged of the magical art known as 
folklore, and was then replaced by amusement art -  football, cinema and wireless. 
As a result, Collingwood contends, ‘Increased production combined with the break­
down of economic organization led to the appearance of an unemployed class, forced 
unwillingly into a parasitic condition, deprived of the magical art in which their 
grandfathers took their pleasure fifty years ago, left functionless and aimless in the 
community, living only to accept panern et circenses, the dole and the films’ (PA, 
102). For Collingwood, our civilisation is tracing a path, which is a close parallel to 
that of the later Roman Empire:
What we are concerned with is the threatened death o f a civilization. That has nothing to do 
with my death or yours, or the deaths of any people we can shoot before they shoot us. It can 
be neither arrested nor hastened by violence. Civilizations die and are bom not with the 
waving o f flags or the noise o f machine-guns in the streets, but in the dark, in a stillness, when 
no one is aware o f it. It never gets into the papers. Long afterwards a few people, looking 
back, begin to see that it has happened. (PA, 102-4)
Collingwood’s criticism of amusement art and industrialism in The Principles 
o f Art is a continuation of similar criticism in earlier essays, ‘Art and the Machine’ 
and ‘The Place of Art in Education’. In the unpublished manuscript, ‘Art and the 
Machine’, thought to have been written around 1926, Collingwood attacks the 
mechanical reproduction of art: ‘The cinema, or mechanized theatre, through the 
vulgarity and crudeness which are the result of mechanization, is not enjoyed in the 
sense in which a work of art is enjoyed, at all’. Those who pay for a seat at the 
cinema, Collingwood asserts, are paying for, not aesthetic enjoyment, but sensuous 
and emotional stimulation:
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They regard the film not as a work o f art but as a form of ‘dope’. The ordinary attitude 
towards dance-music, popular songs and novels is the same. The reason why all these are 
popular is that everyday life in the present world is so dull and drab that emotional stimulation 
has become a commodity on sale in the market, and an immense trade has grown up in what 
may be called pseudo-art, things superficially resembling works o f art but in reality having a 
quite different function and related to genuine art as intoxicating drink is related to 
nourishment. Whereas the reader of a poem enjoys the poem itself, that is, derives pleasure 
from the objective contemplation of its structure and effect, the audience at a film enjoys, not 
the film, but the emotional ‘kick’ which it gets out o f the film. (AM, 8)
Collingwood argues: ‘The habit of taking these emotional drugs is not only 
leading people to rely on them increasingly as part of their daily lives, it is also 
bringing other forms of art into conformity with these models’ (AM, 9). Hence, he 
argues, modem novels often tend to be forms of ‘dope’ and not works of art. 
According to Collingwood, ‘A people thus drug-sodden in its mental life, 
systematically replacing all forms of art by corresponding forms of emotional 
excitement has naturally lost its power of creating or enjoying art in any form 
whatever’ (AM, 10). This has led to a decline of taste in architecture, furniture and 
clothing, and ‘The great tradition of English poetry has been divided between the 
despised highbrows and the purveyors of metrical dope’ (AM, 10).
I think that Collingwood’s straightforward identification of cinema (and the 
use of technology in art) with amusement is questionable, a subject I will return to in 
Chapter Four. But this does not substantially affect his argument that the 
suppression of art by amusement has serious consequences for civilisation.
In ‘Art and the Machine’, like in The Principles o f Art, Collingwood argues 
that in England the decay of taste roughly corresponds with the decline of agriculture 
and the predominance of industrial interests. The traditional life of the agricultural 
population was an aesthetically rich one, in contrast to that of the industrial classes, 
who dedicated themselves to ‘the cult of utility’, whose places of worship were bare 
of architectural grace, and whose housing for workers expressed a repudiation of 
beauty, giving rise to ‘the drab and squalid environment of the English industrial 
proletariat’ (AM, 11). In the industrial world, ‘the grimly utilitarian and inartistic 
character of life was universal’ (AM, 12).
Those who attempted to arrest this decline of artistic taste failed, as they 
overlooked the thriving agricultural life, drew their culture from abroad, and 
‘rhapsodized’ over the heads of their audiences about French cathedrals and Italian 
paintings, ‘thus creating the gulf of misunderstanding that separates the highbrow
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from the common herd’ (AM, 12). The victory of industrial life over agriculture has 
led to the rejection of art, and the ‘mechanized dope of cinema and wireless’ has 
been brought into every village. For Collingwood, ‘This total rejection of art is a 
thing in which we cannot acquiesce, because ... no mind can be sanely rational 
without possessing an artistic basis for its rationality. An inartistic civilisation is, to 
that extent, an insane civilization, melancholy mad’ (AM, 13).
The pernicious effects of the confusion of art with amusement are also a 
subject that Collingwood discusses in his 1926 essay, ‘The Place of Art in 
Education’. He rejects the view that ‘all art is quite useless’, that art is the bare 
absence of utility: ‘Thus art is a relaxation of the practical strain of everyday life, an 
escape from the all-pervading gloom and squalor of our urban civilization, a side 
issue, a backwater of the mind, an ornament upon a fabric whose structure is a matter 
not of art, but of engineering’ (PAE, 436). This idea of art as a ‘stunt’, an ‘extra’, 
something luxurious and distanced from real life is based on a ‘profoundly vicious 
philosophy of art’. The truth is that beauty and utility are not the same thing and art 
is not practical life as such. The error, however, is to define art in terms of this bare 
negation. Hence:
... we are driven to infer that art is nothing real, and to bestow on it a kind or residual or 
marginal existence, feeding on the crumbs that fall from the table o f utility .... Architecture as 
an art means, in this sense, not the dignity and grace of the naked building, but the prudishness 
that covers this nudity with irrelevant fig leaves; literature means not the expression of 
meaning but the systematic concealment of meanings behind artificial flowers of speech, and 
so forth. (PAE, 437-8)
When we revolt against this form of art:
We want to sweep away the pattern on the wall-paper because we want to see the wall; to get 
rid o f the stencilled roses on the bedroom jug in order to see the jug; to shear away the flowers 
of speech in order to hear the statement; because the wall and the jug and the statement have 
each a beauty o f its own that cannot be heightened and can only be spoilt by the addition of 
ornament .... The fact is that, though utility and beauty are not the same thing, nothing can be 
truly useful without thereby acquiring beauty -  a peculiar and unique beauty that blossoms, as 
it were, out o f the soil o f sound design. (PAE, 438)
According to Collingwood, the superstition that the useful must be ugly and 
the beautiful useless is a relic of the industrial revolution, which introduced new 
methods of manufacture necessitating new methods of design, and introduced these 
new methods so rapidly that the old schools of design failed to keep in touch with 
them. The old designers retained an out-of-date tradition of manufacture, while the
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new manufacturers had to create a new tradition of design and did it at first very 
clumsily. Collingwood explains:
The artist and the manufacturer, who were identical in the days o f Phidias and Leonardo da 
Vinci, were suddenly tom apart. The artist ceased to be an efficient manufacturer and the 
manufacturer ceased to be a properly trained artist; and thus artistic design acquired a false 
association with antiquated methods o f production and gimcrack or unseaworthy products, 
while mechanical efficiency acquired an equally false association with clumsy and repulsive 
design .... If we are to recover the artistic sanity of the Greeks, the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, we must recover the conviction that nothing can be beautifully made unless it is 
efficiently made, nothing efficiently made unless it is beautifully made (PAE, 438-9).
If something is designed well you will find that it has ‘come’ beautiful without any 
decoration, and if beauty is the proper object of the aesthetic faculty, everything 
well designed is a work of art; and the function of art in life is therefore not 
ornamental, but structural’ (PAE, 439). Although, later on, in The Principles o f Art 
Collingwood came to reject the association of art with beauty and replace it with the 
idea of art as the expression of emotion, his argument in this essay emphasises the 
importance of art as a form of experience and distinguishes it from amusement.
For Collingwood, then, agricultural life is an important aspect of civilisation, 
and the destruction of the countryside by industrialism is a key feature of the 
suppression of emotion that afflicts modem life. In ‘Man Goes Mad’, Collingwood 
argues that Western civilisation is at bottom an agricultural civilisation, and its 
vitality or sanity depends on the health of our emotions regarding the land (MGM, 29 
and 32). Love of the countryside is neither aesthetic nor political, but ‘far deeper and 
more primitive than that’. It is ‘in the deepest sense religious .... And upon the 
vitality of this religious feeling depends the vitality of civilization as a whole’ 
(MGM, 33). These emotions were strong until the nineteenth century. But, with the 
rise of industrialisation came the building of cheap and ugly houses for the industrial 
proletariat, and the defacement of the countryside by railway lines. An antagonism 
grew up between industry and agriculture as rivals for political patronage, industry 
gradually gained the ascendancy, and the countryside was economically mined 
(MGM, 34).
In the twentieth century the countryside was further damaged by the invasion 
of town dwellers. If traditional country life had still been intact then the invasion 
from the towns could have been met by a flood of new buildings in the tradition of 
country architecture, and they would have become part of the countryside. But the 
tradition was dead, and ‘the architecture of the town, as corrupted by the housing
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tradition of the industrial revolution’ defaced the countryside even further (MGM, 
35). In Collingwood’s view, we have lost ‘that religious sense of loving union’ with 
the soil (MGM, 36). Hence, it is proposed to divide the dead body of our agricultural 
life into a town-dwellers playground and a museum exhibit. If this is done the 
emotional foundations of our civilized life will perish. Industry, if it cuts itself off 
from its roots in agriculture, is a kind of madness with no lasting vitality. According 
to Collingwood, ‘Of this we are beginning to be aware; we know that our civilization 
has in it a sickness of the mind, a morbid craving for excitement, a hyperaesthesia of 
emotion, for which it offers no cure. There is a cure, if only we could get it: the 
deep, primitive, almost unconscious emotion of the man who, wrestling with the 
earth, sees the labour of his hands and is satisfied’ (MGM, 37).
Collingwood’s reverence for the countryside is obviously Romantic and 
reminiscent of D.H. Lawrence. It is also influenced by John Ruskin, and was a 
common theme among liberals in the early part of the twentieth century. In ‘Ruskin 
and the Mountains’ Collingwood interpreted Ruskin as primarily a lover of 
mountains whose interests were all connected with this central passion manifesting 
itself in a sensitivity to town and country relations, and the duties of a tourist both to 
the landscape and inhabitants of a foreign land (cf. Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 186). 
As Connelly points out, Collingwood’s emphasis on the importance of the 
countryside seems prophetic and much of his concerns are at the centre of current 
discussion in environmental ethics and philosophy (Connelly, 2003: 315).
Collingwood’s romanticism is further evident when compared with another 
member of this tradition, George Orwell. In The Road to Wigan Pier Orwell claims: 
‘We are living in a world in which nobody is free, in which hardly anybody is secure, 
in which it is almost impossible to be honest and to remain alive’ (Orwell, 1989: 
158). He refers to ‘... the frightful debauchery of taste that has already been effected 
by a century of mechanisation’, something that applies to food, furniture, houses, 
clothes, books, amusements and everything else that makes up our environment 
(Orwell, 1989: 189-90). According to Orwell,
The mechanisation of the world could never proceed very far while taste, even the taste-buds of 
the tongue, remained uncorrupted, because in that case most of the products o f the machine 
would be simply unwanted. In a healthy world there would be no demand for tinned food, 
aspirins, gramophones, gas-pipe chairs, machine guns, daily newspapers, telephones, motor­
cars etc. etc; and on the other hand there would be a constant demand for the things that the 
machine cannot produce .... But in addition to this there is a tendency for the mechanisation of  
the world to proceed as it were automatically, whether we want it or not. This is due to the fact
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that in modem Western man the faculty o f mechanical invention has been fed and stimulated 
till it has reached almost the status o f an instinct .... the Western man invents machines as 
naturally as the Polynesian islander swims. (Orwell, 1989: 190-1)
Although my focus in this chapter is on how Collingwood’s conception of the 
crisis of civilisation relates to his philosophy of art, for Collingwood, the suppression 
of emotion that impairs Western civilisation also affects religion. In ‘Fascism and 
Nazism’, he expresses his conviction that Western civilisation was built on a 
religious foundation. But, he argues, modernity has stripped religion of its emotional 
element. Under the influence of ‘Illuminism’, modem philosophy and science have 
distilled from Christianity its rational contents, but have discarded the superstitious 
ideas and magical rituals, in which they were embodied. According to Collingwood,
Thus in the last two hundred years Christianity has suffered a curious double fate. Whatever in 
it is capable o f logical formulation as a system o f first principles has been analysed and 
codified and has come to function as the axioms upon which our sciences o f nature and history, 
our practice in liberal economics and free or democratic politics -  in short all the things which 
make up our civilization are built. But whatever is not capable o f logical formulation, 
whatever is in the nature o f religious emotion, passion, faith, has been progressively 
exterminated, partly by ridicule and partly by force, under the names of superstition and magic. 
(EPP, 188)
Our liberal and democratic principles, then, derive from Christianity (EPP, 
189-90). Fascism and Nazism owed their success to the fact that they used pagan 
pre-Christian religions as a source of emotional energy. They tapped a source 
unavailable to their opponents, and exhibited a psychological dynamism which 
liberal democracy lacked. The Nazis, who ‘think with their blood’, managed to get 
the better of liberals and democrats who think merely with their brains (EPP, 191-2). 
Fascism and Nazism, however, aroused emotion at the expense of rational 
consciousness, and in support of barbarism instead of civilisation. Collingwood, 
therefore, regards the practice of a religion rich in emotional elements as an 
indispensable element of a civilisation. Another aspect of the solution to the crisis of 
civilisation in this respect is awareness of what the fundamental principles of a 
civilisation are, a subject which Collingwood treats of in his metaphysics, and which 
I will discuss in Part Two.
According to Collingwood’s philosophy of art, therefore, the suppression of 
emotion has led to a crisis in Western civilisation. The solution to the crisis is a 
more adequate understanding of art. Art proper, then, is emphatically distinct from 
amusement and representative art in general, and, for Collingwood, is to play a
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crucial part in education. In ‘Art and the Machine’ he claims: ‘The only hope is to 
begin with that part of the people which is not yet sodden with drugs: the children -  
the problem is an educational one’. He calls for a ‘gigantic bonfire’ of all 
mechanised reproductions of art, little editions of Shakespeare and every aid for 
introducing children to great art (AM, 13). Children ought to be taught that art is not 
something to be placed on a pedestal and reverently stared at, but an activity by 
which they become able to speak their minds, and utter themselves clearly and 
accurately in every medium that they handle. If this is done, children need no longer 
experience that boredom of school, which is ‘the first lesson of a future drug addict’. 
Collingwood concludes:
A child so trained will need no dope, for it will be able to do something better with its 
emotions than stimulate them artificially. It will be able to express them, and so to understand 
the expressions of other people. Thus its training in art will qualify it to live in a world of 
reality, facing intelligently the facts o f its own and other people’s lives .... Children so trained 
may or may not turn out great artists: they may or may not turn out learned scholars, but they 
will begin life sane (AM, 15).
The above lines show that in ‘Art and the Machine’ the idea of art as the 
expression of emotion was already present, something which Collingwood later 
developed as a central feature of The Principles o f Art. In The Principles o f Art, 
Collingwood argues that at first, the artist is conscious of having an emotion, but not 
conscious of what this emotion is. He liberates himself from this oppressed 
condition by expressing the emotion. Unlike when emotions are discharged in a 
make-believe situation, expression of an emotion is a way of becoming conscious of 
it (PA, 109-10). Expression is also different from description. Whereas description 
generalises, expression individualises (PA, 111-3). Similarly, an artist cannot choose 
which emotion to express and which not to express. He does not know the emotion 
until he has expressed it (PA, 115-7).
That the artist cannot freely choose which emotion to express is a point that 
Nietzsche also makes: ‘Every artist knows how far from any feeling of letting 
himself go his “most natural” state is -  the free ordering, placing, disposing, giving 
form in the moment of “inspiration” -  and how strictly and subtly he obeys 
thousandfold laws precisely then . . . ’ (BGE, 188; cf. Hinz, 1994a: 35).
By expressing his or her emotions, the artist enables the audience to express 
theirs. According to Collingwood, ‘As Coleridge put it, we know a man for a poet 
by the fact that he makes us poets. We know that he is expressing his emotions by
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the fact that he is enabling us to express ours’ (PA, 118). Expression does not mean 
that the artist should isolate himself from the wider world by being part of a special 
clique or ivory tower. In this case the artist neglects the emotions of the wider world 
and is mostly manufacturing amusement art for the members of the ivory tower (PA, 
120). Finally, the expression of emotion is distinguished from betraying the 
symptoms of emotion and exhibitionism or ‘blowing off steam’ (PA, 122-3).
As well as the expression of emotion, art involves creation and imagination. 
Creation is distinguished from simple making: ‘To create something means to make 
it non-technically, but yet consciously and voluntarily’ (PA, 128). Imagination is 
distinguished from make-believe. Make-believe, Collingwood argues, has a motive 
which is to provide the audience with fantasies in which their desires are satisfied, as 
is the case, for example, with daydreaming, and Hollywood, which is ‘an organized 
and commercialized development of day-dreaming’ (PA, 136). Make-believe 
implies a dissatisfaction with the situation in which one actually stands and a desire 
for something which we should enjoy if the make-believe were true, whereas 
imagination is indifferent to desire (PA, 137). Confusion between imagination and 
make-believe reinforces the confusion between art and amusement (PA, 138).
The work of art exists in the imagination of the artist. Music, therefore, is not 
a collection of noises, but the tune in the musician’s head. If the audience listens 
intelligently to a performance of the music it can reconstruct the tune for itself (PA, 
139). Similarly, painting, or viewing a painting, is not just the experience of seeing; 
we also experience an imaginative sense of distance, space and mass. Collingwood 
cites the example of Cezanne, who painted Tike a blind man’ and proved that 
painting can never be solely a visual art (PA, 144). What we get from a work of art 
is the specialised sensuous experience of seeing or hearing, and also the imaginative 
experience of total activity (PA, 148).
The imaginative experience and the sensuous experience, however, are not 
two separate things: ‘There is no justification for saying that the sensuous part of it is 
something we find and the imaginary part something we bring, or that the sensuous 
part is objectively “there” in the “work of art”, the imaginary part subjective, a mode 
of consciousness as distinct from a quality of a thing’ (PA, 150). Through 
imagination, Collingwood explains, we find what a picture reveals because the 
painter has put it there. Similarly, if we see the same colours that the artist saw as he 
or she painted, that is because our similar powers of colour-vision (PA, 150).
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Art, however, is not just the expression of emotion and an act of creative 
imagination. In Collingwood’s view it is also consciousness of truth. There is in 
aesthetic experience the beginning of self-awareness and self-knowledge. This will 
be explained in the next chapter and will illustrate how, for Collingwood, art has a 
crucial role in overcoming the ills of modernity.
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Chapter Three: 
Art, consciousness and truth
As we have seen, in Collingwood’s view, in the contemporary Western world there 
has been a tendency to suppress art proper and replace it with the pseudo-art of 
amusement, and this has been a primary aspect of the malaise that Western culture 
now faces. In order to explore this problem more deeply, this chapter will examine 
what Collingwood regards as the fundamental place occupied by art in human life.
For Collingwood, art is the beginning of the process by which we create the 
self and the world. The distinctions between the self and the world and between the 
world as discovered and the world as made only occur at the level of intellect. 
However, for intellect to function, there must first be art. As Hinz points out, for 
Collingwood, the world in its most basic and pristine nature is not so much a world 
that is thought as a world that is felt (Hinz, 1994a: 31). Art, therefore, creates the 
world by becoming conscious of it. Art also has a transformative effect on a culture. 
In Collingwood’s view, a healthy artistic life will transform a civilisation from one of 
cultural crisis to one of vigour.
Collingwood’s idea of art as self- and world-creation, of art as the revelation 
of truth, and of art as the antidote to cultural crisis demonstrates that he is part of the 
same tradition as Ruskin, Nietzsche, Ezra Pound, and D.H. Lawrence. Like all of 
them, Collingwood saw the role of the artist as crucial in maintaining the standards 
of civilisation.
According to Collingwood in ‘The Place of Art in Education’, the art of 
literature is the art of speaking one’s mind, which is the same thing as making up 
one’s mind. The thought that before utterance lies obscured and unrealised in the 
dark places of the soul comes into living existence in the act of expressing it: ‘... a 
person who has not, somehow and in some kind of language, said what he means, 
strictly cannot be said to have a meaning. Thus the act of imagining, which is the act 
of uttering language, is not an embroidering of a pre-existent thought; it is the birth 
of thought itself. Speaking or writing is, therefore, at once practising the art of 
literature and bringing into actuality the thought of one’s mind’ (PAE, 440).
Collingwood argues that education is in essence aesthetic or imaginative. Art 
is divided into poetry and prose, where poetry is pure imagination, and prose is 
imagination controlled by and consciously expressive of thought. Poetry precedes
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prose. The false view is that prose comes first, and poetry decorates this pre-existent 
object. He argues: ‘The consciousness that first expresses itself in poetry, in fantasy 
and myth, afterwards clarifies out and sobers down into prose, into science and 
philosophy. The progress of thought is a perpetual passage from poetry to prose and 
a perpetual birth of new thought in the form of poetry’ (PAE, 442). Hence education 
sets imaginary problems and solves them according to arbitrary rules, thereby 
enabling the pupil to solve the problems of real life. In real life imagination is awake 
and active, but working under the control of thought (PAE, 443). For Collingwood, 
then, ‘a right training in art is the absolute bedrock of all sane human life’ (PAE, 
448).
However, with the development of Collingwood’s philosophy, a change takes 
place. Collingwood’s theory of art as the expression of emotion, put forward in The 
Principles o f Art, was the result of a change from his earlier philosophy of art. 
According to the ‘phenomenology of mind’ in earlier works such as Speculum 
Mentis and Outlines o f a Philosophy o f Art, art is the first of five forms of 
experience, which constitute a scale of forms, where the more advanced both contain 
and correct the more primitive. Art, as the most primitive of the five, is purely 
imaginative. The value of art lies outside itself, and therefore it is transcended by the 
more adequate forms of experience: religion, science, history and philosophy (cf. 
EPA, x-xi).
The consequence of this position, as Donagan points out in his Introduction to 
Essays in the Philosophy o f Art, was that artists as artists are unaware of what their 
work means. In order to resolve this problem, in Collingwood’s later philosophy art 
assumes a role of greater prominence and is seen as having a more intimate relation 
with thought. As Donagan argues, ‘Whereas in the Outlines he had held that art, or 
imagination, always exists “in the closest union with thought”, which transcends it, 
in The Principles o f Art he recognizes that imagination is a necessary element in 
every act of thought. To think is not to transcend imagination, but to put imagination 
to work in a specific way’ (EPA, xii).
According to Collingwood in The Principles o f Art, there are two types of 
feeling: sensation and emotion. Every sensation carries an emotional charge, and 
sensation and emotion, thus related, are twin elements in every experience of feeling 
(PA, 162-3). Feeling has the character of a foundation upon which the superstructure 
of our thought is built (PA, 164). Collingwood proposes that imagination occupies
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an intermediate position between sensation and thought: freer than sensation and less 
free than thought (PA, 197-8). Through imagination the colours, sounds, and so 
forth that we perceive through sensation are retained before the mind, anticipated and 
recalled, although the same colours and sounds, in their capacity as sensa, have 
ceased to be seen or heard (PA, 202). Collingwood explains that it was in order to 
distinguish imagination from sensation that Hume distinguished impressions from 
ideas, and it is imagination, not sensation, to which appeal is made when empiricists 
appeal to ‘experience’ (PA, 203).
According to Collingwood, before we classify and detect resemblances 
between sensa, we must attend to them, distinguish each as a thing by itself, and 
appreciate its qualities (PA, 203). Attention divides sensa present to the mind 
between the conscious part that we pay attention to and the unconscious part that we 
remove from the focus of attention (PA, 204). Seeing and hearing are species of 
sensation; looking and listening are species of attention: ‘The principle of this 
analysis depends on the fact that attention (or, as we may now indifferently call it, 
consciousness or awareness) has a double object where sentience has a single. What 
we hear, for example, is merely sound. What we attend to is two things at once: a 
sound, and our act of hearing it’ (PA, 206).
Attention chooses what sensation or feeling to place in the focus of 
consciousness. The self dominates the feeling, making it conform to a certain 
structure. It takes and retains a feeling from the flux of sensation, and converts it 
from impression to idea (PA, 210). The work of determining the relations between 
sensa depends on having these things held before the mind so that we can compare 
them with one another. What consciousness, or attention, produces out of sensation, 
Collingwood asserts, is imagination. Imagination, therefore, (or ideas, as distinct 
from impressions) is sensations that we have become conscious of and not yet 
interpreted by thought (PA, 213).
According to Collingwood, consciousness is a kind of thought, but not yet 
intellect. It is thought in its fundamental and original shape. Therefore, it has the bi­
polarity of thought: what it thinks may be true or false. As consciousness gives 
attention to certain feelings and leaves others unattended, a true consciousness, 
Collingwood argues, is a confession to ourselves of our feelings. A false 
consciousness disowns them thinking: ‘That feeling is not mine’ (PA, 216). 
Consciousness, therefore, is ‘corrupt’ when it rejects a feeling it has already focused
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attention on because it is alarmed at the idea that the impression is being converted 
into.
Ridley claims that the corruption of consciousness is a failure at the level of 
ideas: a failure to get our ideas clear rather than a failure in converting an impression 
into an idea (Ridley, 1998: 5-6). But, I think that Ridley is mistaken15. For 
Collingwood, there is no distinction between converting impressions into ideas and 
getting ideas clear, and he is emphatic that the corruption of consciousness is a 
failure in the process of conversion. A corrupt consciousness, then, means that the 
whole picture of imagination now has vital omissions (PA, 218).
As psychologists describe it, the disowning of experience is called repression, 
the ascription of these to other persons, projection, their consolidation into a mass of 
experience, homogeneous in itself, dissociation, and the building up of a sham 
experience which we admit to be our own, fantasy-building (PA, 218-9). 
Collingwood defines the corrupt consciousness as ‘evil’. It is evil as yet 
undifferentiated into evil done and evil suffered. The attempt by psychoanalysts to 
rescue those in whom this evil has advanced has ‘won a great place in the history of 
man’s warfare with the powers of darkness’ (PA, 220-1).
According to Collingwood, language comes into existence at the level of 
consciousness and is an imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion. 
Intellectualised language is language modified to express thought. The difference 
between language in its original form and intellectualised language is the difference 
between language and symbolism. Language, in its original form, is prior to 
symbolism. Contrary to traditional language theory, Collingwood argues that a 
symbol is something whose meaning is arrived at by agreement, and this presupposes 
the existence of an original language out of which agreement can be arrived at (PA, 
225). He rejects the idea of taking the language we use for expressing our thoughts 
as the fundamental character of language: ‘. .. beneath all the machinery of word and 
sentence lies the primitive language of mere utterance, the controlled act in which we 
express our emotions’ (PA, 236).
Unlike psychical expression, which occurs prior to consciousness and 
consists of involuntary and often unconscious bodily acts which relate to the 
emotions they are said to express, at the level of consciousness our emotions no
15 As Ridley (1998: 4) remarks, Collingwood’s use o f Hume’s terminology may have been unhelpful, 
a point also mentioned by Lund (1998: 3).
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longer arise in us as brute facts, but are dominated in such a way that we can 
summon them, suppress them or alter them (PA, 235). According to Collingwood, 
the difference between psychical expression and language (in its primitive form) is 
illustrated by the difference between a small child’s uncontrolled cry of emotion and 
a self-conscious cry to call attention to its needs. With the second cry, language is 
bom, and its articulation into fully developed speech is only a matter of detail (PA, 
236).
Collingwood contends that language is any controlled and expressive bodily 
activity. Speech is a system of gestures, where each gesture produces a characteristic 
sound. Every kind of language, he argues, is a specialised form of bodily gesture: 
hence ‘the dance is the mother of all languages’ (PA, 244). The predominance of the 
language of the vocal chords is explained by the fact that the habit of going heavily 
clothed cramps the expressiveness of all bodily parts except the face. The 
cosmopolitan civilisation of Europe and North America, with its tendency towards 
rigidly uniform dress has limited our expressive activities almost entirely to the voice 
(PA, 244-5).
Different kinds of language, then, cannot express the same feeling. The 
English language expresses different emotions from French, and music expresses 
different emotions to speech. Every kind of language is an offshoot of an ‘original’ 
language of total bodily gesture. This means that whenever we express ourselves, we 
do so with our whole bodies -  and rigidity is a gesture no less than movement (PA, 
246).
Because, in language, our bodily activity is raised from the psychical level to 
the conscious level and is converted from object of sensation to object of 
imagination, language, Collingwood asserts, is identical with art (PA, 247).
According to Collingwood, consciousness begins as consciousness of our 
own existence and, simultaneously, consciousness of the existence of others. The 
discovery of myself as speaker and hearer is also the discovery of speakers and 
hearers other than myself PA, 248). As we have seen, by being conscious of an 
emotion we convert it from impression into idea. The expression of an idea is 
inseparably linked to having the idea, and this is important for Collingwood’s claim 
that art is apprehension of truth16. Collingwood argues: ‘... it is only because we
16 Louis Mink denies that we can know an emotion simply by expressing it. He argues that ‘... an 
artist may know completely what he has created (as an imaginative object) without knowing in any
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know what we feel that we can express it in words; it is only because we express 
them in words that we know what our emotions are’ (PA, 249-50).
The person to whom speech is addressed is conscious of the other’s 
personality as correlative to his own. He takes what he hears exactly as if it were 
speech of his own, and thus constructs in himself the idea which these words express. 
There is no absolute assurance for the hearer or speaker that one has understood the 
other, but if they understand each other well enough to go on talking, that is as much 
understanding as they need (PA, 251).
A second stage in the development of language, where it undergoes 
modification to serve the purposes of the intellect, is the grammatical analysis of 
language. Language is seen as a product or ‘thing’, ‘speech’ or ‘discourse’. This 
‘thing’ is cut up into parts and, through lexicography, rules of syntax and so forth, 
relations between the parts are devised. However, the rules only hold ‘for the most 
part’ (PA, 257). According to Collingwood, ‘Language as it lives and grows no 
more consists of verbs, nouns and so forth than animals as they live and grow consist 
of forehands, gammons, rump-steaks and other joints. The grammarian’s real 
function ... is not to understand language, but to alter it: to convert it from a state (its 
original and native state) in which it expresses emotion in to a secondary state in 
which it can express thought’ (PA, 257). This function is fulfilled, but only in a 
limited and qualified way, as language resists the grammarian’s efforts and retains a 
measure of its original vitality and expressiveness. Logic, Collingwood explains, is a 
further development in this adaptation of language to the expression of thought. But 
the logician’s modification of language, like the grammarian’s, can never be carried 
out entirely. Language only retains its function as language in so far as this process 
of intellectualisation is incomplete. Every attempt to state truths retains an element 
of emotional expressiveness (PA, 264).
Collingwood argues that an emotion is always the emotional charge upon 
some activity. For every different kind of activity there is a different kind of emotion
other way what he has expressed’ (Mink, 1969: 226). For Mink, if  emotions become objects of 
consciousness in the same way that impressions become ideas, the products o f imagination would all 
be objects o f consciousness and would all be describable, and there would be no necessity for any 
theory o f expression (Mink, 1969: 235). However, Mink assumes that for objects of consciousness to 
be knowledge they must be describable. For Collingwood, expression is also knowledge, at a 
primitive level. I think that Mink is making too strong a distinction between expression and 
consciousness, and that Collingwood’s effective identification o f expression and consciousness is 
coherent. It seems that Mink denies Collingwood’s claim that art is knowledge because he has an 
overly rationalistic conception o f knowledge.
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and a different kind of expression. As the emotions of consciousness are expressed 
by language in its original form, intellect also has its emotions, which are expressed 
by language in its intellectualised form. Archimedes’ cry of “Eureka” expressed the 
excitement of a man who had just solved a specific scientific problem (PA, 267). 
The expression of thought is not direct or immediate expression. It is mediated 
through the peculiar emotion which is the emotional charge on the thought. The 
speaker expresses to the hearer the particular emotion with which he or she thinks the 
thought, and the hearer thinks out this emotion for himself or herself and rediscovers 
the thought whose peculiar emotional tone the speaker has expressed17 (PA, 267-8). 
The progressive intellectualisation of language means acquiring new emotions (PA, 
269).
For Collingwood, then, art is identified with language. Art does not use a 
‘ready-made language’, but creates language as it goes along. This is because 
language is ‘... not a utilizable thing but a pure activity’ (PA, 275). However, ‘the 
by-products of this creative activity, ready-made words and phrases, types of 
pictorial and sculptural forms, turns of musical idiom, and so forth, can be used as 
means to ends’ (PA, 276). Craft, therefore, or art falsely so-called, makes use of, not 
language, but cliches from language. Collingwood compares the difference between 
art and craft to the difference between a live man and a dead man, and the difference 
between good art and bad art to the difference between two living men, one good and 
the other bad (PA, 277).
A work of art is good or bad depending on the extent of the artist’s corruption 
of consciousness. Good art means successful expression. Bad art means a failure in 
expression, a failure to become conscious of a given emotion. Corruption of 
consciousness, however, is always only partial. Nobody’s consciousness can be 
wholly corrupt. The failure of expression will not be recognised as good art by the 
artist. The artist will have expressed himself or herself successfully on other 
occasions, and through comparison of these with the occasion of failure in 
expression, he or she can recognise bad art (PA, 284). According to Collingwood,
Art is not a luxury, and bad art not a thing we can afford to tolerate. To know ourselves is the 
foundation of all life that develops beyond the merely psychical level o f experience. Unless 
consciousness does its work successfully, the facts which it offers to intellect, the only things 
upon which intellect can build its fabric of thought, are false from the beginning. A truthful
17 This implies that Collingwood’s theory o f historical re-enactment includes the re-enactment of  
emotion as well as thought.
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consciousness gives intellect a firm foundation upon which to build; a corrupt consciousness 
forces the intellect to build on quicksand. The falsehoods which an untruthful consciousness 
imposes on the intellect are falsehoods which intellect can never correct for itself. In so far as 
consciousness is corrupted, the very wells o f truth are poisoned. Intellect can build nothing 
firm. Moral ideals are castles in the air. Political and economic systems are mere cobwebs. 
Even common sanity and bodily health are no longer secure. But corruption of consciousness 
is the same thing as bad art. (PA, 284-5)
For Collingwood, therefore, art is essentially the pursuit of truth, truthfulness 
about one’s emotions. However, it is truth of consciousness, as distinct from truth of 
intellect. Intellect, unlike consciousness, is concerned with the ‘relations between 
things’, and because the truth of intellect is a relational truth it apprehends it through 
arguing or inferring (PA, 287). Collingwood argues:
A poet will say at one time that his lady is a paragon of all the virtues; at another time that she 
has a heart as black as hell. At one time he will say that the world is a fine place; at another 
that it is a dust-heap and a dunghill and a pestilient conglomeration of vapours. To the intellect 
these are inconsistencies .... on the poet’s behalf it may be replied, to some one who argues 
that a lady cannot be both adorably virtuous and repellently vicious, or that the world cannot be 
both a paradise and a dust-heap, that the arguer seems to know more about logic than he does 
about ladies, or about the world. (PA, 287-8)
Collingwood explains this point as follows:
Art is not indifferent to truth; it is essentially the pursuit o f truth. But the truth it pursues is not 
the truth o f relation, it is a truth of individual fact. The truths art discovers are those single and 
self-contained individualities which from the intellectual point o f view become the ‘terms’ 
between which it is the business o f intellect to establish or apprehend relations. Each of these 
individualities, as art discovers it, is a perfectly concrete individual, one from which nothing 
has yet been abstracted by the work o f intellect. Each is an experience in which the distinction 
between what is due to myself and what is due to my world has not yet been made. (PA, 288)
Art, then, is knowledge of the individual. In art, distinctions between theory 
and practice, thought and action, and subject and object have not yet arisen (PA, 
290). Aesthetic experience is a knowing of oneself and of one’s world. It is also a 
making of oneself and of one’s world. The self which was psyche is remade in the 
shape of consciousness and language (PA, 292).
Also, the emotions that art expresses are not taken solely from the psychical 
level. Thought also has emotions which we are not conscious of and which can be 
expressed in art. Collingwood gives the example of ‘Romeo and Juliet’, which 
expresses the intellectual apprehension of how sexual passion can break across socio­
political divides (PA, 294). Similarly, T.S. Eliot ‘in the one great English poem of 
this century, has expressed his idea (not his alone) of the decay of our civilization, 
manifested outwardly as a break-down of social structures and inwardly as a drying- 
up of the emotional springs of life’ (PA, 295). For Collingwood, therefore, it seems
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that poetry and philosophy overlap one another: ‘Good philosophy and good poetry 
are not two different kinds of writing, but one; each is simply good writing. In so far 
as each is good, each converges, as regards style and literary form, with the other; 
and in the limiting case where each was as good as it ought to be, the distinction 
would disappear’ (PA, 298).
As Mink explains, art, in Collingwood’s thought, is the dynamic power which 
spurs the mind to further adventures. Every mental activity is accompanied by its 
own characteristic emotion, which remains unexpressed at that level, and this 
unexpressed significance lies on the mind as a burden, challenging one to find some 
way of uttering it. According to Mink, ‘What drives the mind to a higher level is not 
the thirst for knowledge or novelty, but the need to express the emotion attendant on 
thinking at the lower’ (Mink, 1969: 237). The expression of emotion is a source of 
energy for all rational enquiry, and the truths we seek must not only satisfy the 
logical criteria of knowledge but also express the emotions which well up through 
the levels of consciousness (Mink, 1969: 238).
Mink’s account emphasises the connection between Collingwood’s 
philosophy of art and the dialectic of mind. Collingwood’s philosophy of art, Mink 
points out, identifies in the aesthetic transformation of first-level consciousness the 
origin of all those modes of thought and action which culminate in the historical 
consciousness (Mink, 1969: 196). As we have seen, whereas in Speculum Mentis art 
is a primitive stage which is superseded by thought, in The Principles o f Art this 
view is transformed. Art is now the process where feeling is converted into self- 
conscious emotions capable of being expressed, and conscious activity at every level 
has its attendant emotions of which we may become fully conscious by successfully 
expressing them (Mink, 1969: 197-8). But the activity of expressing an emotion not 
only consists in becoming conscious of that emotion but is accompanied by a new 
emotion. As Mink argues, ‘At every level of consciousness (above the first) it is 
necessary to distinguish between the emotion expressed and the emotion attending 
the activity of expressing. The activity of expressing makes us conscious of the 
former, and simultaneously brings the latter into being as something of which we 
may become conscious only in a further expressive act’ (Mink, 1969: 203).
As Collingwood argues, a higher level of consciousness differs from the 
lower in having a new principle of organisation. It does not supersede the old but is 
superimposed on it. Each level of experience must organise itself on its own
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principles before a transition can be made to the next. Emotions of consciousness 
must be formally or linguistically expressed before a transition can be made from the 
level of consciousness to the level of intellect (PA, 233-4).
To sum up, then, for Collingwood, aesthetic activity is the crucial initial stage 
where we both create and apprehend ourselves and the world. A truthful 
consciousness is an integral and indispensable part of this. The corruption of 
consciousness, if it is sufficiently widespread, means the corruption of civilisation.
Collingwood’s conception of art as a solution to the crisis of Western 
civilisation, therefore, ought to be seen in the context of the Romantic idea of art as 
truth. Collingwood’s later philosophy provides a more detailed and nuanced account 
of how this is so, improving on his Ruskin-inspired early work. Nevertheless, the 
notion of art as the apprehension of truth, as we have seen in Chapter One, has an 
important place in the work of Ruskin. For example, in ‘Traffic’, Ruskin argues: ‘. .. 
a nation cannot be affected by any vice, or weakness, without expressing it, legibly, 
and for ever, either in bad art, or by want of art; and ... there is no national virtue, 
small or great, which is not manifestly expressed in all the art which circumstances 
enable the people possessing that virtue to produce’ (Ruskin, 1908: 55). For Ruskin, 
a nation’s art reflected the state of its spirit or inner being, and no nation could 
produce great art without corresponding greatness of spirit (cf. Johnston, 1967: 21).
The idea of aesthetic activity as a vehicle for rescuing European civilisation
from decadence is important in the Romantic tradition, and especially for Nietzsche.
* 18Nietzsche’s thinking contributed to what might be called the Ruskin tradition , 
especially as it manifested itself in the work of D.H. Lawrence and the modernist 
writers, Yeats and Pound. Like Collingwood, Nietzsche regards art as having a 
potentially transforming effect on Western culture.
For both thinkers, as Hinz demonstrates, the world in its most basic and 
pristine nature is not so much a world that is thought as it is a world that is felt. Art 
is the creation of a world, or centre of feeling (Hinz, 1994a: 31). Nietzsche asserts, 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, that ‘all life is dispute over taste and tasting! Taste: that 
is at the same time weight and scales and weigher; and woe to all living creatures
18 According to Thatcher, ‘The aesthetics of Pater tended to assume an inevitable opposition between 
art and the way society was organized. Nietzsche, working in the tradition o f Arnold, Ruskin and 
Morris, broadened aesthetic enquiry, releasing it from the oppressively narrow confines which Pater, 
and later Wilde, had imposed on it. Although Nietzsche granted art its own autonomy, he also
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that want to live without weight and scales and weigher!’ (Z, 139-40). In The Will to 
Power, Nietzsche argues: ‘The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means 
of communication, together with an extreme receptivity for stimuli and signs. It 
constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living 
creatures -  it is the source of languages. This is where languages originate: the 
languages of tone as well as the language of gestures and glances. The more 
complete phenomenon is always the beginning: our faculties are subtilized out of 
more complete faculties. But even today one hears with one’s muscles, one even 
reads with one’s muscles’ (WP, 809, pp. 427-8).
Nietzsche’s view of the primacy of art and its transformative effect is evident 
in his account of artistic inspiration:
Has anyone at the end o f the nineteenth century a distinct conception o f what poets of strong 
ages called inspiration? If not, I will describe it. -  If one had the slightest residue o f  
superstition left in one, one would hardly be able to set aside the idea that one is merely 
incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely medium o f overwhelming forces. The concept o f  
revelation, in the sense that something suddenly, with unspeakable certainty and subtlety, 
becomes visible, audible, something that shakes and overturns one to the depths, simply 
describes the fact. One hears, one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a 
thought flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - 1 never had any choice. 
An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes discharges itself in a flood of tears, while 
one’s steps now involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag ... a depth o f happiness in 
which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as antithesis, but as conditioned, 
demanded, as a necessary colour within such a superfluity of light .... Everything is in the 
highest degree involuntary but takes place as in a tempest o f a feeling of freedom, o f  
absoluteness, o f power, o f divinity. The involuntary nature o f image, o f metaphor is the most 
remarkable thing of all; one no longer has any idea what is image, what metaphor, everything 
presents itself as the readiest, the truest, the simplest means o f expression. It really does seem, 
to allude to an expression o f Zarathustra’s, as if  the things themselves approached and offered 
themselves as metaphors .... This is my experience o f  inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to 
go back thousands o f years to find anyone who could say to me ‘it is mine also’. (Z, 22-3)
Hinz argues that for both Collingwood and Nietzsche artistic activity is the 
fundamental activity which creates self and world. The self-creative process is a 
development, and genuine self-creation can only be an ongoing practical 
accomplishment, independent of any external telos or ideal. For both Collingwood 
and Nietzsche, ‘the self becomes what it is’ (Hinz, 1994a: 51-2).
However, Nietzsche’s understanding of the role of art is different from 
Collingwood’s. The artistic process, for Collingwood, is a process of knowing, 
where knowing is a kind of making of self and world. For Nietzsche, the artistic 
process is a process of self-overcoming. Whereas for Collingwood the assertion of
stressed the vital relationship of art to life and society as a whole. He stood for civilization as opposed 
to aestheticism, and also ... to socialism’ (Thatcher, 1970: 273-4).
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the self is an act of self-awareness, for Nietzsche the assertion or domination of the 
self is an act of self-transfiguration (Hinz, 1994a: 41). According to Nietzsche, the 
self dominates its situation and imposes a kind of harmony on feelings through 
language and art. Hence one ‘gives style’ to one’s character (Hinz, 1994a: 38). 
However, Nietzsche regards conscious activity as not essential to art.
According to Nietzsche, as Hinz explains, the self-creative process of 
imposing order and form on a situation may fail due to a lack of vitality of the self or 
because of the recalcitrance of the situation. In the first case the self is ‘sick’ or 
decadent, and the decadent person has to fight his instincts. The second case is a 
case of weakness. The attempt to overcome a situation is directed back on the self, 
through a process of internalisation, and leading to ‘bad conscience’ (Hinz, 1994a: 
46). The other effect of internalisation is ressentiment, which means retaliation 
against the situation (Hinz, 1994a: 47).
For Nietzsche, consciousness is a development of instinctive activity, and 
therefore its primary function cannot be the pursuit of knowledge. Reason is no 
more than a reflection of irrational drives and is a vehicle for untruth (Hinz, 1994a: 
74-5). Nietzsche’s different conception of rational consciousness from 
Collingwood’s, as we will see in subsequent chapters, leads to a quite different view 
of the role of philosophy in combating the decadence of Western civilisation.
Ezra Pound was influenced by both Ruskin and Nietzsche19, but it seems that 
Pound’s emphasis on the importance of art in regenerating civilisation is more akin 
to Ruskin and Collingwood than Nietzsche. Like Ruskin and Collingwood, Pound 
understands art as the apprehension of truth. Pound separates art from entertainment. 
He intemperately rejected the idea of poetry as entertainment, remarking: ‘... it 
flatters the mob to tell them that their importance is so great that the solace of lonely 
men, and the lordliest of the arts, was created for their amusement’ (Pound, 1954: 64- 
5). According to Pound, ‘The arts, literature, poesy, are a science, just as chemistry 
is a science. Their subject is man, mankind and the individual .... The arts give us a 
great percentage of the lasting and unassailable data regarding the nature of man, of
19 Coyle points out the influence of Nietzsche and Ruskin on Pound: ‘Pound indisputably absorbed a 
good deal of Nietzsche, but he did so through the mediation o f A.R. Orage and such o f his circle as 
J.M. Kennedy .... [This] meant that the “Nietzsche” he picked up came already mixed with a stiff 
dose o f Ruskinian cultural organicism’ (Coyle, 1995: 6). According to Coyle, Pound attempted to 
perpetuate the Carlylean or Ruskinian tradition of treating cultural endeavour in all its aspects as an 
organic whole: ‘In his historicist equation o f artistic with economic production, his belief that
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immaterial man, of man considered as a thinking and sentient creature’ (Pound, 
1954: 42). Therefore:
Bad art is inaccurate art. It is art that makes false reports .... Yet it takes a good deal o f talking 
to convince a layman that bad art is ‘immoral’. And that good art however ‘immoral’ it is, is 
wholly a thing o f virtue. Purely and simply that good art can not be immoral. By good art I 
mean art that bears true witness, I mean the art that is most precise .... The serious artist is 
scientific in that he presents the image of his desire, o f his hate, o f his indifference as precisely 
that, as precisely as the image of his own desire, hate or indifference. The more precise his 
record the more lasting and unassailable his work of art. (Pound, 1954: 44-6)
For Pound, ‘“Artists are the antennae of the race.” If this statement is 
incomprehensible and if its corollaries need any explanation, let me put it that a 
nation’s writers are the voltometres and steam-gauges of that nation’s intellectual 
life. They are the registering instruments, and if they falsify their reports there is no 
measure to the harm that they do’ (Pound, 1954: 58).
The idea of art as apprehension of truth and as a means of regenerating a 
decadent civilisation is also proposed by D.H. Lawrence20. Lawrence separates art 
which has sexual content from pornography. The right sort of sexual stimulus is 
invaluable to human life, in contrast to pornography, which you can recognise ‘... by 
the insult it offers, invariably, to sex, and to the human spirit’ (Lawrence, 1955: 37). 
According to Lawrence, it is a catastrophe for our civilisation that the deep instincts 
have gone dead, and sex is identified with dirt. Wagner and Charlotte Bronte are 
nearer pornography than Boccaccio because they were both in a state where the 
strongest instincts have collapsed, and sex has become something slightly obscene 
(Lawrence, 1955: 39). For Lawrence, there is an emphatic difference between what 
he calls ‘the sneaking masturbation pornography of the press, the film and present- 
day popular literature, and then the creative portrayals of the sexual impulse that we 
have in Boccaccio or the Greek vase-paintings or some Pompeian art, and which are 
necessary for the fulfilment of our consciousness’ (Lawrence, 1955: 51).
The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight Collingwood’s view of the 
crucial role of art in generating a solution to the crisis of Western civilisation. As we 
have seen, in Collingwood’s view, becoming conscious of our emotions by
discussion of the work “may almost require a discussion of its where and amid what”, we can locate 
the fundamentally Ruskinian underpinnings o f Pound’s critical practice’ (Coyle, 1995: 29).
20 Williams points out that, for Lawrence, competitive acquisitiveness and ‘sheer mechanical 
materialism’ leads to the ugliness o f industrial society. Lawrence argues that ‘The human soul needs 
actual beauty even more than bread’ (cited from Williams, 1993: 201).
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expressing them is the fundamental first step in self-understanding and self-creation. 
It also rescues us from the ‘darkness’ of the corruption of consciousness.
In this respect, Collingwood is working in the tradition of such writers as 
Ruskin, Nietzsche, Pound and Lawrence. For Collingwood, like Ruskin, Pound and 
Lawrence, art is the revelation of truth. Nietzsche, as I have pointed out, takes a 
different view.
Collingwood draws together various strands of Romantic and modernist ideas 
about art into a systematic and comprehensive philosophy, and this philosophy is an 
improvement on the Romantic cultural wholeness argument of Speculum Mentis. He 
also extends the Romantic philosophy of art by connecting it, as we will see in Part 
Two, with the idea of historical process in a systematic way.
Art provides the truths, or ‘self-contained individualities’ (PA, 288), of 
individual works of art. But through these individual truths it is also constructing a 
world. The nature of this world (and hence the nature of the crisis of civilisation and 
its solution) is only fully revealed by logic and metaphysics. As I will show in Part 
Two, in logic and metaphysics Collingwood replaces a ‘realist’ conception of truth 
with a dialectical one.
Through aesthetic activity we first become conscious of the symptoms of the 
crisis of modernity, and this activity provides the first steps towards a solution. But 
the kind of solution that is unfolding in the activity of art becomes clearer when we 
look at another important aspect of this activity: the interaction between artist and 
community. The interaction between artist and community provides another 
standard for truth in art, supplementing the idea of the truthful consciousness, which 
I have discussed in this chapter. But it also indicates the kind of solution that 
Collingwood provides in his logic and metaphysics for the crisis of civilisation.
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Chapter Four: 
Artist and Community
The idea of art as a solution to the crisis of Western civilisation culminates in the 
notion of interaction between artist and audience, or community. For Collingwood, 
as this chapter will explain, art is the community’s ‘medicine’ for the corruption of 
consciousness. In Part Two, I will demonstrate that the world that is constructed out 
of the ‘self-contained individualities’ of art is a dialectical one. However, this 
dialectical world is already implicit in the activity of art itself, as is particularly 
evident in his account of the interaction between artist and community. This 
interaction or collaboration between artist and community also supplements the idea 
of the truthful consciousness in art that I examined in the previous chapter.
Collingwood rejects the idea of the artist as some kind of transcendent genius, 
separated from common humanity. Interaction with an audience is necessary for an 
artist. Collingwood contends:
The man who has something to say is not only willing to say it in public: he craves to say it in 
public, and feels that until it has been thus said it has not been said at all. The public is always, 
no doubt, a circumscribed one: it may consist only o f a few friends, and at most it includes 
only people who can buy or borrow a book or get hold of a theatre ticket; but every artist 
knows that publication o f some kind is a necessity to him. (PA, 313)
Every artist attaches some importance to the reception he or she gets from the 
public. The reaction of the audience affects the artist’s judgement as to the 
soundness of the work that he or she has done. Unless the audience agrees that the 
work is good, the artist wonders whether it really is good or not, and whether he or 
she was suffering from a corruption of consciousness. In spite of all disclaimers, 
Collingwood argues, artists do look upon their audiences as collaborators with 
themselves in the attempt to answer the question: is this a genuine work of art or not? 
(PA, 314)
Artistic labour, then, is undertaken not as something individual and private, 
but on behalf of the community to which the artist belongs. Furthermore, it is a 
labour in which the artist invites the community to participate. The artist will feel 
this
... not only after his work is completed, but from its inception and throughout its composition. 
The audience is perpetually present to him as a factor in his artistic labour; not as an anti- 
aesthetic factor, corrupting the sincerity o f his work by considerations o f reputation and 
reward, but as an aesthetic factor, defining what the problem is which as an artist he is trying to
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solve -  what emotions he is to express -  and what constitutes a solution o f it. The audience 
which the artist thus feels as collaborating with himself may be a large one or a small one, but 
it is never absent. (PA, 315)
As the artist needs an audience, the audience also needs the artist. In so far as 
he or she feels at one with the audience, the artist will express not private emotions, 
but shared emotions. The artist will conceive himself or herself as the audience’s 
spokesperson, saying for it things it wants to say, but cannot say unaided (PA, 312).
For Collingwood, the bodily or perceptible ‘work of art’ plays an important 
role in the communication between artist and audience. As we have seen, the work 
of art is not a bodily or perceptible thing, but an activity of the artist’s consciousness. 
But, in order to communicate his or her experience to other people, the artist uses a 
bodily and perceptible thing: for example, a painted canvas, a carved stone or a 
written paper (PA, 300). Taking the example of painting, Collingwood argues that 
the aesthetic experience and the painting of a subject are bound up together. One 
paints a thing in order to see it. ‘Seeing’ here means awareness, noticing what you 
see. It also includes awareness of solid shapes of things, relative distances, warmth, 
coolness, stillness and noise. This is ‘a total imaginative experience’. He argues: 
‘There are two experiences, an inward or imaginative one called seeing and an 
outward or bodily one called painting, which in the painter’s life are inseparable, and 
form one single indivisible experience which may be described as painting 
imaginatively’ (PA, 304-5).
Every imaginative experience, Collingwood explains, is a sensuous 
experience raised to the imaginative level by an act of consciousness. Thus, the 
aesthetic experience presupposes a corresponding sensuous experience. This 
sensuous experience may come into being at the same time as consciousness so that 
it no sooner comes into being than it is transmuted into imagination. The sensuous 
experience in this example is the psycho-physical activity of painting, and out of this 
consciousness generates the aesthetic experience. The person who looks at the 
subject without painting it has a sensuous experience which is scantier, poorer and 
less highly organised than that of the artist (PA, 306-8).
A picture produces in the viewer a sensuous-emotional or psychical 
experience which is transmuted by consciousness into a total imaginative experience 
that is, in principle, identical with that of the painter. Of course there is no assurance 
that the imaginative experience of the spectator is identical with that of the artist, just
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as there is no assurance of mutual understanding between speaker and hearer in 
ordinary language. Our imaginative experience may often be partial and imperfect 
(PA, 309). But with a good work of art (Collingwood gives the examples of Dante’s 
Inferno and Eliot’s Sweeney Among the Nightingales), a determined and intelligent 
audience will always penetrate far enough to get something of value (PA, 310-11).
For Collingwood, then, the work of art properly so-called is the imaginative 
experience, shared by artist and audience. However, appreciation of a work of art 
cannot be accomplished without a physical medium, although this physical medium 
is not part of what is defined as art.
Collingwood’s emphasis on the physical medium involves a modification of 
his earlier claim in The Principles o f Art that the work of art exists in the artist’s 
head, which I mentioned in Chapter Three, and that, referring to music, ‘the tune is 
already complete and perfect when it exists merely as a tune in the artist’s head, that 
is, an imaginary tune’ (PA, 139). Collingwood modifies his view when he comes to 
discuss the relation between artist and audience. Art is no longer complete in the 
‘head’ (i.e. imagination) of the artist, but in the shared imagination of artist and 
audience. As a result, the physical medium, although it is not itself identified with 
art, becomes indispensable.
There is some controversy among commentators on this point (see Ridley, 
1998; Dilworth, 1999; and Winchester, 2004). According to Collingwood’s theory, a 
work of art is not complete until it involves interaction with an audience. Because of 
this, Ridley21 is correct in his view that works of art are not complete without being 
worked on in a physical medium (Ridley, 1998: 20).
Collingwood sees it as important for the future of art and aesthetic theory that 
we understand the audience’s function as collaborator and reject the individualistic 
view of art. Traditionally we think of the artist as a self-contained personality and of 
his or her work as ‘self-expression’. In fact, Collingwood argues, everything the 
artist does is done in relation to others like himself or herself. Artists only become 
artists by learning from others. They become poets, painters or musicians by living
21 Ridley’s argument that, rather than seeing works o f art as existing solely in people’s heads, 
Collingwood thought that everything exists in people’s heads, because he was a global ideal theorist 
(Ridley, 1998: 21) is mistaken. In the interests of using ordinary language and avoiding metaphysical 
controversy, Collingwood explicitly puts to one side the idea that ‘the things we describe as being in 
our minds are thereby as real as anything else’ (PA, 131).
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in a society where these languages are current22. Self-awareness is constantly being 
reinforced, developed and applied in new ways through communication with others 
(PA 316-7).
The artist, therefore, should not become isolated from the wider world by 
being part of a special clique or ivory tower. Collingwood claims: ‘. .. it was the call 
of practical life that rescued Yeats from the sham world of his youthful Celtic 
twilight, forced him into the clear air of real Celtic life, and made him a great poet’ 
(PA, 120).
All artists have modelled their style upon that of others, used subjects that 
others have used and treated them as others have treated them already. In the history 
of art, Collingwood contends, so-called ‘plagiarism’ has always been the rule. The 
idea of plagiarism as a crime he associates with artistic barrenness and mediocrity, 
and a concern more with reputation than the intrinsic value of artistic work. Artists 
are urged to ‘steal with both hands whatever they can use, wherever they can find it’ 
(PA, 318-20).
Similarly, for the dramatist and musician, there should be collaboration 
between author and performer. What the author puts on paper is merely the rough 
outline of a performance, and the performers must fill in the details. Performers 
should not accept their texts as fool-proof (PA, 320-1).
Collingwood takes theatre as an example of collaboration between artist and 
audience. In a rehearsal for a play, the performers go through the motions of acting a 
play, but no play is being acted. It only becomes a play when the audience is 
present. The play is an activity in which the audience is partner. The audience is not 
passively receptive of the performance, but determines by its reception how the 
performance is to be carried on (PA, 322).
Collingwood therefore puts forward a series of recommendations to 
encourage the various kinds of artistic collaboration. He recommends getting rid of 
the concept of artistic ownership, and the law of copyright, as it has a detrimental 
effect on art: ‘If he [the artist] could take what he wants wherever he could find it, as 
Euripides and Dante and Michelangelo and Shakespeare and Bach were free, his 
larder would always be full, and his cookery might be worth tasting’ (PA, 325).
22 John Ruskin elaborates on this point in The Political Economy o f  Art (1907). As Johnson argues, in 
Collingwood’s close connection between art and the community, ‘. .. we hear a powerful echo o f those 
Ruskinian ideas with which he had been familiar since youth’ (Johnson, 1998: 93).
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In theatre and music, he criticises the heavy use of stage directions, as they 
indicate the author’s distrust of the performer. Authors must become willing to let 
performers into their counsel, and performers must take an intelligent and instructed 
interest in the problems of authorship (PA, 327-8). Similarly, the audience should 
feel itself a partner in the work of artistic creation. This would require small and 
stable audiences, like that of a theatrical or musical club, where the audience feel 
themselves involved in the aims and projects of the group (PA, 329-30).
However, a problem arises over the place of technology in the collaboration 
between artist and audience. It is a weakness of printed literature, Collingwood 
argues, that the reciprocity between reader and writer is difficult to maintain. The 
relationship between artist and audience is weakened by every new mechanisation in 
art. Gramophone music, wireless and cinema take away the collaborative role of the 
audience. According to Collingwood, ‘The consequence is that the gramophone, the 
cinema, and the wireless are perfectly serviceable as vehicles of amusement or of 
propaganda, for here the audience’s function is merely receptive and not concreative; 
but as vehicles of art they are subject to all the defects of the printing-press in an 
aggravated form’ (PA, 323). Hence, the modem popular entertainment of the 
cinema, unlike the Renaissance popular entertainment of the theatre, cannot produce 
a new form of great art because the Renaissance theatre collaboration between 
author, actors and audience is lacking in cinema.
But Collingwood’s view is questionable here. He does not tell us why the 
mechanisation of art necessarily makes the audience’s role merely receptive and not 
also collaborative. Collingwood rightly recognises the importance of maintaining the 
distinction between art proper and craft, but in his anxiety to do so he makes the 
mistake of identifying craft, or pseudo-art, with the use of technology as such.
Earlier, as we have seen, Collingwood held the view that the reception of a 
work of art cannot be separated from, and is an integral part of, the audience’s 
collaboration with the artist in the artistic process. The audience, he claimed, is 
perpetually present to the artist as a factor in artistic labour (PA, 314-5). The 
question therefore arises: can collaboration between artist and audience take place 
despite the use of mechanisation in art? Or, to put it differently, can there be art 
proper that makes use of modem technology? Collingwood does not give us 
convincing reasons to the contrary.
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Instead, Collingwood’s distinction between art proper and craft (which 
resembles the distinction between ‘high art’ and ‘mass culture’) is clumsily applied, 
so photography and cinema are excluded from the category of art proper, along with 
almost everything except some painting, theatre, literature, dance and classical 
music.
Contrary to Collingwood, it could plausibly be argued that cinema and 
photography, for example, can become for the artist vehicles for expressing emotion, 
and not only means of creating amusement or magic, can accommodate collaboration 
between artist and audience, and consequently can be transformed into art.
However, Collingwood seems to change his view a few pages later, as he 
thinks that in art forms such as painting and literature, there can be some degree of 
collaboration between the artist and the wider community. Despite a note of 
pessimism: ‘The promiscuous dissemination of books and paintings by the press and 
public exhibition creates a shapeless and anonymous audience whose collaborative 
function it is impossible to exploit’ (PA, 330), he argues that with the arts of painting 
and non-dramatic writing, critics, reviewers, and literary and aesthetic journals ought 
to work at establishing contact between a writer or painter and the kind of audience 
he or she needs.
It is possible, then, Collingwood seems to say, for art proper and 
collaboration between artist and audience to take place in spite of mechanisation, 
although there are difficulties to be overcome. Non-dramatic literature and painting, 
Collingwood argues, can be rescued by bringing them back into contact with their 
audience. In the case of literature, this can be done by writing on subjects about 
which people want to read (PA, 331). The artist, he suggests, can spontaneously 
share the interest which people around him or her feel in certain subjects, and let that 
determine what he or she writes about. It is necessary to leave behind the blind alley 
of nineteenth century individualism, and adopt a new path where the artist is the 
spokesperson of his or her audience (PA, 332-3).
Collingwood selects T.S. Eliot for praise on this point. Eliot took as his 
theme ‘a subject that interests everyone, the decay of civilization’ (PA, 333). Eliot’s 
early work is seen as a series of sketches and studies leading up to The Waste Land. 
Collingwood comments:
The poem depicts a world where the wholesome water of emotion, which alone fertilizes all 
human activity has dried up. Passions that once ran so strongly as to threaten the defeat of
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prudence, the destruction o f human individuality, the wreck of men’s little ships, are shrunk to 
nothing. No one gives; no one will risk himself by sympathizing; no one has anything to 
control. We are imprisoned in ourselves, becalmed in a windless selfishness. The only 
emotion left us is fear: fear o f emotion itself, fear o f death by drowning in it, fear in a handful 
of dust. (PA, 335)
The poem is not amusement, for example, an entertaining description of 
vices, or magic, for example, an incitement to political virtue. It forgoes both 
entertainment value and magical value and draws a subject matter from the audience 
themselves. Art proper is prophetic, in that it tells the audience the secrets of their 
own hearts and the community needs the artist because no community altogether 
knows its own heart. According to Collingwood, ‘Art is the community’s medicine 
for the worst disease of the mind, the corruption of consciousness’ (PA, 336) .
The implications of the terms ‘audience’ and ‘community’, as Collingwood 
uses them, are beguilingly complex. It is possible to distinguish two different aspects 
to the dialogical24 relation between the artist and the ‘audience’ or ‘community’, or 
two senses to the term ‘audience’ or ‘community’. Firstly, in Collingwood’s 
description of artist and community, there is a dialogue between the artist and his or 
her immediate audience, perhaps a cultured and sympathetic few. But, secondly, 
there is a dialogue between this artistic elite and the community as a whole.
This is something that is misunderstood by Donald Taylor, who criticises 
Collingwood for regarding the reception of a work of art as part of the collaborative 
activity of the audience. Taylor argues that if the artist tells the audience painful 
truths he or she may not receive such a favourable response, as was the case with 
Madame Bovary and Ulysses, among other examples of the ignorant or trivialising 
reception of major works of art (Taylor, 2000: 38-9). But, contrary to Taylor, great 
works of art, by definition, always receive a favourable reception, even if it is only 
from a cultured minority or from an audience in later generations: they are great 
works of art only in so far as they ‘speak’ to an audience. Nietzsche and Pound, for
23 Although Collingwood uses the word ‘medicine’, it is important to note that art is not to be 
understood instrumentally. Some commentators (Ridley, 1998; Johnson, 1998; Lewis, 1995) have 
found difficulties with this point. But, as Ridley argues, if  art as expression is the proper business of 
consciousness, then art is the remedy for the corruption of consciousness, since it simply is the 
successful execution o f the task that the corrupt consciousness fails to perform: ‘Expression is not a 
means to the end o f solving the problem posed by corruption, since it just is the solution to that 
problem’ (Ridley, 1998: 40).
24 I am borrowing this term from Charles Taylor (1991: 33).
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example, address themselves to audiences composed of the discerning few and future
• • 25audiences which, at the time of writing, can only be imagined .
In order to further elucidate Collingwood’s account of the artist and the 
community, I will now compare Collingwood with Ortega y Gasset and T.S. Eliot. 
The role of a cultured minority in the dialogue between artist and community is 
highlighted by Ortega y Gasset.
In The Dehumanization o f Art, Ortega argues that whereas the art of the 
nineteenth century was popular with the masses, modem art is essentially unpopular. 
It divides the public into two groups: one very small who are favourably inclined 
towards it, and another very large -  the hostile majority, who do not understand it 
(DA, 5-6). Modem art is unpopular, according to Ortega, because it distinguishes 
‘the illustrious’ minority from ‘the vulgar’ masses, and undermines the assumption 
that all men are equal (DA, 7).
Ordinary people’s view of art involves an emphasis on individuals and 
emotional arousal. A man likes a play when in the human drama presented to him 
the emotions move his heart as though it were happening in real life: ‘And he calls a 
work “good” if it succeeds in creating the illusion necessary to make the imaginary 
personages appear like living persons. In poetry he seeks the passion and pain of the 
man behind the poet. Paintings attract him if he finds on them figures of men and 
women whom it would be interesting to meet. A landscape is pronounced “pretty” if 
the country it represents deserves for its loveliness or its grandeur to be visited on a 
trip’ (DA, 9).
Ortega contends: ‘Not only is grieving and rejoicing at such human destinies 
as a work of art presents or narrates a very different thing from true artistic pleasure, 
but preoccupation with the human content of the work is in principle incompatible 
with aesthetic enjoyment proper’ (DA, 9-10). A work of art ‘vanishes from sight for 
a beholder who seeks in it nothing but the moving fate of John and Mary or Tristan 
and Isolde and adjusts his vision to this’ (DA, 10). ‘But [according to Ortega] not 
many people are capable of adjusting their perceptive apparatus to the pane and the 
transparency that is the work of art. Instead they look right through it and revel in 
the human reality with which the work deals. When they are invited to let go of this 
prey and to direct their attention to the work of art itself they will say that they
25 The dedication in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for example, is ‘A book for everyone and no 
one’.
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cannot see such a thing, which indeed they cannot, because it is all artistic 
transparency and without substance’ (DA, 11).
For Ortega, nineteenth century art, which he refers to as ‘Romanticism’, 
reduced the strictly aesthetic elements to a minimum and let the work consist almost 
entirely in a fiction of human realities. Hence they were realistic, and Romanticism 
and naturalism have common realistic roots (DA, 11). Accordingly, modem art 
‘divides the public into two classes, those who understand it and those who do not 
understand it -  that is to say, those who are artists and those who are not. The new 
art is an artistic art’ (DA, 12).
The new artists found that they had no use for traditional art; and their way of 
feeling represents the inevitable and fruitful result of all previous artistic 
achievement. The alternative to developing a new art is to obstinately remain shut up 
in old forms (DA, 13). The most general and characteristic feature of the new artistic 
sensibility, modem artistic production, is the tendency to dehumanise art (DA, 20). 
But, as Ortega explains: ‘This new sensibility is a gift not only of the artist proper but 
also of his audience. When I said above that the new art is an art for artists I 
understood by “artists” not only those who produce this art but also those who are 
capable of perceiving purely artistic values’ (DA, 20n).
Whereas nineteenth century art tended to reflect reality, the modem artist, in 
contrast, sets out to deform it and dehumanise it (DA, 21). The sentiments and 
passions of the new art belong to something other than primary human life. Rather 
they evoke secondary passions, specifically aesthetic sentiments (DA, 22). But it is 
not simply a matter retreating from reality: ‘to construct something that is not a copy 
of “nature” and yet has a structure of its own is a feat which presupposes nothing less 
than genius’ (DA, 23).
Ortega contends that the realism of the nineteenth century was a ‘freak in 
aesthetic evolution’, and that ‘All great periods of art have been careful not to let the 
work revolve about human contents’ (DA, 25). Thus the new inspiration on one 
point is a return to the road of art, which is called the ‘will to style’. To stylize is to 
deform reality and to dehumanise (DA, 25).
Consequently, modem art aims to distinguish between delight and titillation. 
Art must not proceed by ‘psychic contagion’, as in Romanticism: ‘. .. art ought to be 
full clarity, high noon of the intellect. Tears and laughter are, aesthetically, frauds. 
The gesture of beauty never passes beyond smiles, melancholy or delighted. If it can
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do without them, better still’ (DA, 27). As Ortega argues, seeing requires distance. 
Art removes and transfigures its objects, and without this derealisation, there is 
perplexity: ‘The new sensibility, it seems to me, is dominated by a distaste for human 
elements in art very similar to the feelings cultured people have always experienced 
at Madame Tussaud’s, while the mob has always been delighted by that gruesome 
waxen hoax’ (DA, 29).
In the new art metaphoric expression is one of the instruments of 
dehumanisation: ‘Before, reality was overlaid with metaphors by way of 
ornamentation; now the tendency is to eliminate the extrapoetical, or real, prop and 
to “realize” the metaphor, to make it the res poetica’ (DA, 36-7). According to 
Ortega, a distance separates the idea from the thing. Yet, with the natural attitude, 
our yearning for reality leads to an idealisation of reality. If we take ideas for what 
they are and realise them, we do not move from the mind to the world. Rather, we 
‘worldify’ the immanent (DA, 38). Ortega’s explanation of this point resembles 
Collingwood’s distinction between art and traditional portrait painting:
A traditional painter painting a portrait claims to have got hold of the real person when, in truth 
and at best, he has set down on the canvas a schematic selection, arbitrarily decided on by his 
mind, from the innumerable traits that make a living person. What if  the painter changed his 
mind and decided to paint not the real person but his own idea, his pattern, o f the person? 
Indeed, in that case the portrait would be the truth and nothing but the truth, and failure would 
no longer be inevitable. In foregoing to emulate reality the painting becomes what is 
authentically is: an image, an unreality. (DA, 38)
For Ortega, then, modem art has grown out of a conscious antagonism to 
traditional style (DA, 43-4). An ever-growing mass of traditional styles hampers the 
direct and original communication between the nascent artist and the world around 
him. In this case one of two things may happen. Either tradition stifles all creative 
power, or the new art, step by step, breaks free of the old which threatened to 
smother it. ‘The latter’, Ortega claims, ‘is typical of Europe whose futuristic instinct, 
predominant throughout its history, stands in marked contrast to the irremediable 
traditionalism of the Orient’ (DA, 44). The dehumanisation of art is inspired by just 
such an aversion against the traditional interpretation of realities.
Ortega argues that the tendency in modem art to attack all previous art 
betrays a hatred of Western civilisation up until the present time (DA, 45). Hence 
cubism, for example, makes fun of itself as art, and the new art ridicules art itself 
(DA, 48). Curiously, Ortega’s argument culminates in the assertion that art has
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become a thing of no transcending importance (DA, 49). Art no longer undertakes to 
save mankind, as it did in the nineteenth century. Instead it has changed its position 
in the hierarchy of human activities and interests. Art has now moved to ‘the outer 
rings’ and become a minor issue. The trend towards pure art is a sign of modesty 
(DA, 52).
Nevertheless, it seems that art retains much of its importance for Ortega, as 
he regards changes in art as symptomatic of changes in civilisation. For Ortega, it is 
in art and pure science, precisely because they are the freest activities and least 
dependent on social conditions, that the first signs of any changes in collective 
sensibility become noticeable:
A fundamental revision of man’s attitude towards life is apt to find its first expression in 
artistic creation and scientific theory. The fine texture of both these matters renders them 
susceptible to the slightest breeze o f the spiritual trade-winds. As in the country, opening the 
window o f a morning, we examine the smoke rising from the chimney-stacks in order to 
determine the wind that will rule the day, thus we can, with a similar meteorological purpose, 
study the art and science of the young generation. (DA, 42)
There are interesting similarities between Ortega’s account of the 
transcending of realism with a purer and more dehumanised art and Collingwood’s 
account of the gradual distinction of art proper from amusement and magic. But 
there are important differences. Unlike Ortega, for Collingwood, as we have seen, 
art is not something distinct from reality and the effect of art is not to distance one 
from reality; rather art uncovers the truth about human emotions, and creates reality 
anew. And this different conception of art leads to a different view of the role of the 
audience and wider community. Like Ortega, Collingwood recognises that the 
audience which an artist addresses himself or herself to is often a cultivated minority. 
But whereas Ortega draws a distinction between art and life, for Collingwood art is 
co-extensive with the whole of human experience. We are all artists in our everyday 
lives because every utterance and gesture that we make is a work of art (PA, 285). 
The implication of Collingwood’s philosophy of art is that the barrier between ‘the 
masses’ and those who understand art is permeable and flexible. For Collingwood, 
unlike Ortega, people are not essentially incapable of adjusting their perspective in 
order to appreciate art proper. If they are incapable at a given time, this is something 
that can change with education and experience. In this sense, Collingwood takes a 
more democratic and ‘dialectical’ view than Ortega.
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Collingwood’s view is that, although the ‘community’ or audience that the 
artist primarily appeals to may be only a select few, everybody is to some degree a 
part of this community or audience. In this Collingwood resembles T.S. Eliot.
Eliot held the view that, in the interaction between the artist and the wider 
community, it is to the benefit of art that the community should be as broad as 
possible. He argues that art tends to flourish when it has a wide variety of cultural 
influences, and that the development of art in individual European countries owes 
much to a common European culture. On the subject of poetry, he contends that no 
one nation or language would have achieved what it has if the same art had not been 
cultivated in neighbouring countries and in different languages (Eliot, 1962: 112). 
When several countries of Europe are cut off from each other, literature and poetry in 
every country must deteriorate (Eliot, 1962: 113).
According to Eliot, literary review journals are an important part of the 
transmission of ideas which ‘fertilises and renovates’ literature in individual 
European countries, and the failure of his own literary review, The Criterion, was 
due to a ‘closing of the mental frontiers of Europe’ in the 1930s (Eliot, 1962: 116). 
Also, literature of that period suffered from a divisive obsession with politics, which 
‘tends to destroy the cultural unity of Europe’ (Eliot, 1962: 117). The Criterion, on 
the other hand, had ‘a common concern for the highest standards both of thought and 
of expression’, and ‘. .. a common curiosity and openness of mind to new ideas. The 
ideas with which you did not agree, the opinions which you could not accept, were as 
important to you as those which you found immediately acceptable. You examined 
them without hostility, and with the assurance that you could learn from them’ (Eliot, 
1962: 117-8).
This stress that Eliot places on cultural openness and transmission of ideas 
resembles Collingwood’s account of ‘historicism’, in ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’, as 
fundamentally tolerant, and of his later distinction between dialectical discussion and 
eristical discussion in The New Leviathan (NL, 24.58-9). Hence Eliot’s conception 
of cultural dialogue points to a connection between Collingwood’s dialogical view of 
the interaction between artist and community and his historicist and dialectical view 
of philosophy in general. Collingwood’s response to the crisis of civilisation is only 
fully evident when we move beyond his philosophy of art to his theory of logic and 
metaphysics, which I examine in Part Two. But his dialectical logic and 
metaphysics, with its emphasis on dialogue, is implicit in his account of the artist and
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the community. Unlike Eliot, however, Collingwood does provide a systematic and 
comprehensive dialectical logic and metaphysics, and, as I will demonstrate in Part 
Three, this is the conceptual framework for a liberal politics.
For Eliot, like Ortega, the artist interacts not only with his or her community 
but with a tradition. According to Eliot in Tradition and the Individual Talent, the 
value of a work of art is only to be judged against the background of the entire 
literary tradition, and poetry is ‘not the expression of personality, but an escape from 
personality’ (cited from Vanheeswijck, 1996: 80). Eliot argues that tradition is a 
living, conscious power, and the artist writes ‘... not merely with his own generation 
in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole literature of his own country has a 
simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order’ (Vanheeswijck, 1996: 
85). I contend that there is implicit in Collingwood’s account of the creative process 
as a dialogue between artist and community an interaction between innovation and 
tradition. Ortega places more emphasis on the innovative side of this interaction, and 
Eliot on the traditional. Collingwood’s philosophy of art, then, is consistent with a 
historicist view of philosophy. The interaction between innovation and tradition 
described here also corresponds with Larmore’s account of Romanticism. Larmore’s 
description of irony, or ‘the disquiet of never feeling fully at home’ (1996: 70), 
coincides with the Ortegean emphasis on innovation.
Collingwood’s view of the relation between artist and community is not 
outrightly elitist, in the sense that is often attributed to Nietzsche and the modernist 
writers of the early twentieth century, such as Pound, Lawrence, Yeats and Eliot. In 
Collingwood’s philosophy of art elitism has a positive role to play. An artistic elite 
may provide the dynamic impetus to extend our boundaries, explore new ground, and 
escape from the stifling weight of what is already accepted as tradition in any 
particular community. However, this is complemented by the dialogical view that 
the ‘community’ which an artist interacts with is open-ended and unlimited.
The elitism of Nietzsche and the modernists is sometimes seen as responsible
9 f \for their toying with illiberal, and, in the case of Pound, fascist, political views . It 
may be the case, therefore, that these illiberal political views stem from a failure in 
their philosophies to provide an account of the dialogical relation between artist and
26 John Carey provides an interesting account o f the elitism of Nietzsche and the modernists, albeit a 
somewhat polemical and lop-sided one, in The Intellectuals and the Masses (1992). For a more sober 
analysis o f Pound’s fascism, see Redman’s Ezra Pound and Italian Fascism (1991).
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community. Alternatively, where their philosophies are sound, the political anti­
liberalism of the modernists may be due to a failure to apply them coherently and 
consistently to politics.
As I have argued in the previous chapter, Collingwood’s later philosophy 
improved and modified the view of art that he held in Speculum Mentis. Whereas in 
the latter art was an inadequate form of experience, transcended by thought, in The 
Principles o f Art Collingwood recognised that imagination (or art) is an integral part 
of thought.
Similarly, in The Principles o f Art, the idea of artist and community that 
Collingwood appeals to improves on his view in Speculum Mentis. As Taylor 
demonstrates, Collingwood’s understanding of the role of the audience gradually 
changed in the development of his philosophy of art. In Speculum Mentis and 
Outlines o f a Philosophy o f Art, the audience to a work of art is seen as having a 
merely passive or receptive role. But by the time of The Principles o f Art, the 
audience is seen as having a more important role, involving a close partnership with 
artists (Taylor, 2000: 32-4). The collaborative role of the audience, outlined in The 
Principles o f Art, is an improvement on Collingwood’s attempt to find a solution to 
the crisis of civilisation through a union of the forms of experience in Speculum 
Mentis, as it demonstrates to a greater degree that art can have a regenerative effect 
for people who are not professional artists.
However, this more historicised view of art, and the dialogical account of 
interaction between artist and community, was already implicit in Collingwood’s 
early philosophy. As we have seen, in ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’ he discussed Ruskin’s 
confusion as to how greatness in art often seems to herald the downfall of a 
civilisation, while a high state of moral nobility may coexist with a complete absence 
of art. In response, Collingwood argued that the perfection of any one style leads to 
a dilemma between becoming imitative or launching out into the void in search of a 
new style or a new ideal (EPA, 37-8).
According to Donagan in the Introduction to Collingwood’s Essays in the 
Philosophy o f Art, working out this more historicised conception of art compelled 
Collingwood to change from explaining art as the apprehension of beauty to 
conceiving art as the expression of emotion. According to Donagan, the earlier 
definition of art as imagination referred only to its cognitive side. Collingwood 
needed to answer the question of what we are trying to achieve by imagining, and of
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what does an artist try to become aware. To do this, he had to go from Ruskin to 
Croce. Croce solved the problem by arguing that art is the expression of emotion, 
and emotion strives towards expression. Collingwood gradually assimilated this 
solution, and had wholly done so by the time he came to write The Principles o f Art 
(EPA, xvii-xix). Here he argues that ‘aesthetic theory is the theory not of beauty but 
of art’ (PA, 41). Collingwood, then, moves beyond Ruskin’s more static conception 
of art to provide a thoroughly historicised account of art as an ever-continuing 
process.
Collingwood’s conception of ‘art proper’ in The Principles o f Art, however, 
has been criticised as being Platonist by T.J. Diffey, who argues that, unlike in the 
earlier Outlines o f a Philosophy o f Art, Collingwood fails to discuss the history of art 
(Diffey, 1995a: 242). According to Diffey, Collingwood drops his idea of ‘art 
proper’ on top of his cultural narrative without offering any historical explanation for 
its entrance. Despite Collingwood’s attempts to reconcile history and metaphysics, 
Diffey claims: ‘... “art proper” as a metaphysical notion, must seem securely 
immune to and above any historical change or development which might, and indeed 
does, actually occur in the arts. “Art proper” remains a Platonic standard outside 
historical developments in art which some particular works of art will approximate to 
more than others’ (Diffey, 1995a: 241).
However, in the Introduction to The Principles o f Art, Collingwood does 
indicate that the word ‘art’ has a history and gives an, albeit very brief, outline of this 
history. Collingwood points out that the Greeks and the Romans had no conception 
of what we call art as something different from craft. He argues:
It was not until the seventeenth century that the problems o f aesthetic began to be disentangled 
from those o f technic or the philosophy of craft. In the late eighteenth century the 
disentanglement had gone so far as to establish a distinction between the fine arts and the 
useful arts; where ‘fine’ arts meant, not delicate or highly skilled arts, but ‘beautiful’ arts (les 
beaux arts, le belle arti, die schdne Kunst). In the nineteenth century this phrase, abbreviated 
by leaving out the epithet and generalized by substituting the singular for the distributive 
plural, became ‘art’. (PA, 6)
It seems that Collingwood would concur with Raymond Williams who also 
argues that the idea of ‘art’, as distinct from craft, is the outcome of an historical 
process. According to Williams, in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century, a number of words came for the first time into common English use, or, 
where they had already been generally used in the language, acquired new and
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important meanings. In this context are five key words: ‘industry’, ‘democracy’, 
‘class’, ‘art’ and ‘culture’ (Williams, 1993: xiii). The word ‘art’ changed around this 
time from its original sense of a human attribute, a ‘skill’, to a particular group of 
skills, the ‘imaginative’ or ‘creative’ arts. A separation grew up between ‘artist’ and 
‘craftsman’ (Williams, 1993: xv-xvi).
Collingwood, then, should not be seen as Platonist or essentialist in his 
conception of art. As Diffey observes, if there is an essentialist fallacy, Collingwood 
does not commit it because Collingwood’s view is that ‘art proper’ names not a 
property which works of art share, but rather ‘art proper’ designates that complex 
and corporate activity undertaken by artists and audiences in a reciprocal relationship 
described at length in The Principles o f Art (Diffey, 1995b: 76). Collingwood’s 
theory of meaning is different from that of the Wittgensteinians in being both broader 
and normative (cf. Diffey, 1995b: 74):
The proper meaning o f a word ... is never something upon which the word sits perched like a 
gull on a stone; it is something over which the word hovers like a gull over a ship’s stem. 
Trying to fix the proper meaning in our minds is like coaxing the gull to settle in the rigging, 
with the rule that the gull must be alive when it settles: one must not shoot it and tie it there. 
The way to discover the proper meaning is to ask not ‘what do we mean?’ but, ‘what are we 
trying to mean?’ And this involves the question ‘What is preventing us from meaning what we 
are trying to mean?’ These impediments, the improper meanings which distract our minds 
from the proper one, are of three kinds. I shall call them obsolete meanings, analogical 
meanings, and courtesy meanings. (PA, 7)
As Alan Donagan rightly points out, whether art properly so called is 
definable cannot be settled a priori. You must examine the aesthetic usage of the 
word, and Collingwood’s aim was to define the actual usage of the word ‘art’ in the 
modem European critical tradition (Donagan, 1962: 122 and 104). According to 
Donagan, Collingwood appeals to and his definition is roughly true of the critical 
tradition in literature of Coleridge, Croce and T.S. Eliot, which condemns every 
work that is in any degree inexpressive (Donagan, 1962: 123 and 126), and which I 
refer to as ‘Romanticism’.
Collingwood’s philosophy of art belongs to a tradition, but it also explains 
and develops that tradition. Collingwood also adds to what I have called the 
Romantic tradition, as I will demonstrate in Part Two, by working out a dialectical 
conception of logic and metaphysics as a solution to the crisis of civilisation, 
something which I have argued is implicit in his philosophy of art.
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Peters argues that Collingwood’s philosophy of art failed to rectify the 
problem of subjectivism. Collingwood’s attempt to develop the idea of art as 
language, to identify error with the corruption of consciousness, and to view art as a 
communal activity failed to provide a solution to this problem, Peters claims, 
asserting that ‘counting heads is not a measure for objectivity’ (Peters, 1995: 124). 
According to Peters, Collingwood only overcame subjectivism by basing the 
dialectic of subjective mind on historical inter-subjectivity in his work on logic, 
metaphysics and theory of civilisation, something which was incomplete because of 
ill health and premature death (Peters, 1995: 125).
However, contrary to Peters, the idea of historical inter-subjectivity is present 
in Collingwood’s philosophy of art. Collingwood, as we have seen, argues that the 
corruption of consciousness will be recognised through comparison with other 
occasions of successful and failed expression (PA, 281-4). Truthfulness in art is 
measured not simply by the ‘counting of heads’, but by taking into account the 
history of the artist’s and the community’s previous expressions. The expressive 
labour of the artist is normative, or ‘criteriological’ (to use the term that Collingwood 
employs in An Essay on Metaphysics).
We move, therefore, from considering the importance of Collingwood’s 
philosophy of art (as a critique of the crisis of civilisation) to outlining the 
importance of his theory of dialectic not, as Peters seems to argue, because of a flaw 
in Collingwood’s philosophy of art which is corrected by his theory of civilisation 
and dialectic, but because from the truths which art expresses, the details are worked 
out by thought proper. The crisis of civilisation becomes fully revealed in his logic 
and metaphysics.
Part Two:
Logic and Metaphysics
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Chapter Five: 
A Revolution in Logic
Part One demonstrated the importance of Collingwood’s philosophy of art as a 
critique of contemporary civilisation. I first outlined Collingwood’s conception of 
the crisis of civilisation in terms of the separation of the forms of experience from 
one another and then in terms of a suppression of emotion, the symptoms of which 
are industrialisation and the predominance of amusement art in contemporary 
culture. As a solution, Collingwood advocates the Romantic idea of ‘unity of mind’, 
and stresses the importance of art. Art, as we have seen, is the expression of emotion 
and consciousness of truth, and involves collaboration between artist and audience.
For Collingwood, we first apprehend and create the world through aesthetic 
activity, but it is only through thought proper that the nature of the world is fully 
revealed to us. Hence, Collingwood’s philosophy of art provides the first steps 
towards recognising the symptoms of the crisis of modernity and finding a solution, 
but the nature of this crisis and its solutions are only fully understood by examining 
his logic and metaphysics.
Part Two will explain how Collingwood’s reformulation of traditional logic 
and metaphysics in a dialectical and historicist manner provides a diagnosis and a 
solution to the crisis of Western civilisation. It will become apparent that, for 
Collingwood, the essence of the problems facing contemporary Western civilisation 
is an over-reliance on abstract forms of thought connected with natural science and a 
failure to think historically and dialectically. The solution, then, is dialectical 
thinking.
As Mink comments, Collingwood’s philosophy is informed by a conceptual 
system that is ‘dialectical, in a complex and original way’ (Mink, 1972: 155), and 
‘the key to understanding Collingwood’s thought is an appreciation of how 
fundamentally and pervasively dialectical it is’ (Mink, 1972: 168). Peters also points 
out that ‘Collingwood’s philosophy is thoroughly dialectical’, and that 
Collingwood’s logic of question and answer should be interpreted as an original 
reform of the Hegelian dialectic (Peters, 1995: 107-8).
A convenient place to begin an examination of Collingwood’s account of the 
transitions that Western civilisation has undergone and the difficulties it faces is his 
unpublished manuscript, ‘A Footnote to Future History’, written in 1919. In this
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manuscript Collingwood argues that ‘The history of civilisation is known to us as the 
history of Platonism. The modem world first becomes coherent in Greece, and Plato 
is the expression of the Greek idea’ (FFH, 1). Platonism was the philosophy of the 
Greco-Roman world and of the Middle Ages: the Middle Ages are Platonism
become incarnate: and no other philosophy has ever achieved this fullness of self- 
determination’ (FFH, 2).
But, according to Collingwood, the Platonism of the Middle Ages has been 
gradually drawing to a close ever since Descartes pointed the road to a new 
philosophy -  subjective, idealistic, concrete, where Platonism is objective, realistic, 
and abstract. The seeds of change, Collingwood asserts, lay in Platonism itself. 
Plato’s ethics are idealistic and subjective, and therefore in open conflict with his 
metaphysics: ‘Idealism was always ready to raise its head in the heart of the Platonic 
system’ (FFH, 3).
The new philosophy struggled to birth with Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and 
Kant, but ‘It remained for Hegel to go to the root of the matter, to deny the axioms of 
Aristotle’s logic and to assert the unity of the real and the phenomenal, in the 
synthetic concept of history. The new philosophy foreshadowed by Descartes, was 
thus at last expressed. It is the absolute antithesis of Platonism -  a dialectical 
antithesis: in fact a synthesis of Platonism with the philosophical nihilism against 
which Plato fought’ (FFH, 4). Since Descartes, Collingwood argues, idealism and 
Platonism have been at war with one another:
In this century live Hegelism is struggling with the dead matter of the corpse of Platonism. 
There can be no doubt which will win: and as Platonism was the philosophy on which all 
human life was built up to the present time, so Hegelism is that o f the next age. But Hegelism 
does not yet exist. It has had its Plato: it may yet find its Aristotle: in order to become the 
philosophy o f all mankind it must pass through all the stages through which Platonism passed, 
till a new Age o f Faith systematises it into a concrete civilization founded on Hegel as the 
Middle Ages were founded on Plato. (FFH, 2)
According to Collingwood, ‘Hegelism today is the property of the learned: 
the common people are Platonists. We speak of the “plain man’s realism”; but the 
plain man learnt his realism and his logic at the feet of Aquinas and Duns Scotus, in 
the Sorbonne and the Great Hall of the University of Oxford. He must learn idealism 
and the philosophy of contradiction in the unfounded universities of the future -  after 
he has unlearnt his realism’ (FFH, 7).
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For Collingwood, then, Platonism needs to be replaced by a new philosophy 
and this involves what he later referred to in An Autobiography as a ‘revolution’ in 
logic (A, 52). The different aspects of the crisis or decadence that Collingwood 
draws attention to are manifestations of a failure by Western civilisation to fully 
adapt itself to this new philosophy.
Collingwood’s first attempts to work out his contribution to the revolution in 
logic came in the unpublished manuscripts Truth and Contradiction, written in 1917, 
and Libellus de Generatione, of 1920. Because of their importance in providing a 
detailed account of Collingwood’s dialectical logic, I will make extensive reference 
to both.
In Truth and Contradiction, Collingwood re-evaluates the coherence theory 
of truth. According to the coherence theory of truth, non-contradiction, consistency 
with itself, is the mark of truth, and a collection of true statements will cohere with 
one another. This view is summed up in the three Taws of thought’ of traditional 
Aristotelian logic, according to which firstly A is A, secondly A cannot also be B, 
and thirdly any given thing must be either A or not A. These are the three laws of 
identity, contradiction and excluded middle (TC, 1).
However, unless a false statement contains in itself the truth which it 
contradicts, it is coherent and as such true. It may be replied that there is a body of 
true opinions, whether we can distinguish them from false ones or not, and their 
nature is to cohere with themselves and with each other (TC, 4). ‘Thus’, 
Collingwood points out, ‘the last word of the coherence theory seems to be an appeal 
from the world of judgements as we know them to a transcendent world of absolutely 
true judgements; a world in which error is entirely absent and truth has taken on a 
final form incapable of improvement. Metaphysically this seems to be Platonism, 
the erection of an ideal world over against the phenomenal world, of a world from 
which the recalcitrant elements of our own are forcibly banished’ (TC, 5).
However, this does not explain error, development and change. The 
transcendent world of the coherence theory does not explain the way in which truths 
are attained and stated in the real world of our own experience (TC, 5). The formula 
‘A is A’, Collingwood argues, is the formula of tautology, but the element of 
tautology is present as a kind of substratum in every judgement. The formula ‘A is 
A’ has a certain value, but it acquires this value when we recognise as its 
complement the formula ‘A is B’ (TC, 6). The law of identity only becomes true
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when it is interpreted as the law of identity as difference, and of difference as identity 
(TC, 7).
The coherence theory of truth assumes that in the case of a discussion 
between contradictory views, one view must be right and the other wrong; and the 
debate would be devoted to discovering which was right and which was wrong. 
Collingwood explains: ‘The debate described in these terms is what Plato would call 
not dialectic but eristic; it aims not at truth but at victory’ (TC, 8). However, the real 
reason for debate, Collingwood contends, is to increase the comprehension of each 
by the inclusion in one’s own view of that which seemed to contradict it: ‘There can 
be no more real advance in knowledge than the discovery that your opponent’s 
diabolical heresy is your own dearest truth in disguise. The advance lies not merely 
in the satisfaction at having won an ally, or in the removal of the helpless feeling of 
despair that anyone should be so perverse in his opinions; but in a real growth of 
one’s own view, which gains strength, vitality and truth by comprehending and 
including its opponent’ (TC, 8).
For Collingwood, then, ‘That truth is greatest or truest which expresses most, 
which includes most successfully within itself a number of diverse and by 
themselves conflicting points of view. The victories by which a truth lives are not 
the annihilation but the conquest and absorption of its opponents. It is no use 
proving to a man that he is mistaken; your task is to show him why he went wrong, 
and how his real meaning is provided for and safeguarded by the view which he was 
attempting to resist’ (TC, 8-9).
Thought, therefore, cannot be split up into unitary judgements, which are true 
or false: ‘Truth and falsehood are attributes not of single isolated judgements but of 
systems of thought, systems in which every judgement is coloured by all the others’ 
(TC, 12a). A single judgement may be true, but ‘... true not by being isolated from 
others, but by absorbing into itself and acquiring in the process its significance; by 
becoming the concentrated vehicle of a whole system of thought’ (TC, 12b).
Furthermore, truth and falsehood are not merely matters of degree. A theory 
which supersedes another is different not merely in degree, but in kind. One theory 
may express fully the truth of another and at the same time supersede it by 
reconciling to it the contradictory which previously had proved recalcitrant (TC, 14). 
Hence Collingwood argues: ‘We seem forced to the conclusion that the truth of a 
judgement is shown, not by its power of resisting contradiction and of preserving
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itself unchanged in the face of opposition, but precisely by the ease with which it 
accepts contradiction and undergoes modification in order to include points of view 
which once it excluded. Not self-preservation but self-criticism is the mark of a 
truth; and the enjoyment of truth is not an achievement but an activity. It is an 
activity, because every statement must have a contradictory’ (TC, 14b-14c).
Collingwood rejects the notion of absolute truth, outside of which nothing 
can fall, which human thought can attain. The absolute is an abstraction, and to 
imagine it ‘... is only to express our weariness of the labour involved in continual 
thinking; to attain it would be not the consummation but the negation of life’ (TC, 
14c). The activity of thought is its own end, and ‘. .. its own value is only shown by 
the readiness with which it will decompose in the soil of a future crop. Truth is not a 
possession, but an activity’ (TC, 15).
However, the view that no truth is truer than it’s contradictory also applies to 
our own theory of truth (TC, 16). Collingwood’s dialectical account of logic is true 
only in so far as it includes within itself and transcends traditional Aristotelian logic. 
Boucher is correct therefore in his view that Collingwood’s theory can be seen as an 
‘extension and elaboration’ of coherence theory (Boucher, 1985: 66). Collingwood’s 
theory does ‘absorb’ coherence theory, but nevertheless it also transcends it.
In disputing with an antagonist we do not rely on mere refutation. 
Collingwood sums up the dialectical account of truth in the following way: ‘We do 
not simply aim at showing him that he is wrong, and thereby drive him to adopt our 
view as the only alternative. We aim rather at understanding his view and 
sympathising with it; we admit freely that within limits it is true and sound; and only 
when that is accomplished do we go on to show that it falls short of being as 
satisfactory as it might be, and that it is capable of certain more or less definable 
improvements’ (TC, 20).
Error, therefore, is incomplete truth: truth that fails to be quite satisfactory 
because it is not sufficiently comprehensive, and because it has left outside itself 
unassimilated contradictions. Equally, no truth is final, and every truth is partial 
error. There is a ‘union of truth and falsehood in every judgement’ (TC, 20).
Henry Jones, in his reader’s report on Truth and Contradiction, appreciated 
the dialectical nature of Collingwood’s account of thought:
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I do not know any writer more frank. He cares not one whit to what extent he exposes his 
flanks to his critics, and makes statements which, taken by themselves, look either purely 
absurd or preposterously untrue. But that is only one side: on the other is the fact that these 
statements are stages or steps in the development of his main argument, half truths or sheer 
errors in which it is not possible to rest and which just compel a movement onwards to a wider 
truth. And this is precisely what he means, and rightly means, by ‘dialectic’, the way in which 
‘the development o f thought’ takes place. (EPP, 230)
According to Jones, ‘All the time he is showing the true nature of Philosophy, 
and finding that movement, activity, process is the living soul of all thinking and of 
all objects of thought’ (EPP, 231).
Collingwood’s revolution in logic became further developed in his 
unpublished manuscript of 1920, Libellus de Generatione. This manuscript also 
presents a clearer account of how the revolution in logic is a solution to a crisis in 
Western civilisation. According to Collingwood,
My fundamental doctrine is that reality is becoming, that is to say reality not so much is as 
happens, which implies that the reality o f mind is the process o f its experience, its life, and 
nothing else. Nor do I admit any dualism between mind and its object such that while mind is 
wholly process its object can be conceived as a static whole outside it. The object is process 
too, and these are not two processes but one process. (Collingwood, 1920a: 1)
Since Plato, Collingwood explains, all philosophy has revolved around the 
concept of being, and the general epistemology of being, with its clear-cut distinction 
between knower and known, ‘subject’ and ‘object’, has even commended itself to 
‘... the man in the street and the man behind the plough .... It seems to us, today, a 
philosophy natural to the human condition: we forget the vast process of education 
by which our world has assimilated it, and we do not realise that it was definitely 
created by the Greeks, imposed upon humanity by the commanding prestige of their 
authority, and liable, like other human inventions, to reach its term of life and yield 
place to a successor’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 4).
When subject and object are regarded as separate entities with a knowledge- 
relation between them, it emerges that each is indifferently the other: the subject is 
defined in terms of the object and vice versa. A mind is nothing but its being 
conscious of something and has no character of its own in distinction from the object 
(Collingwood, 1920a: 6). Similarly the object becomes defined in terms of what I 
know about it and has no content except the content of the subject (Collingwood, 
1920a: 8).
There are therefore two forms of realism, that is, of the philosophy which 
conceives the subject and the object as independent existences united by a relation.
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Firstly, there is objectivism, whereby the mind simply is the object. But it fails to 
explain why there should be such a thing in the world as somebody’s process of 
thinking about something. On its assumption this process ought not to exist 
(Collingwood, 1920a: 12). A second possibility is subjectivism, whereby the subject 
is complete at every moment. It can have no defect of anything; it has nothing to aim 
at, because any goal is already within itself. All problems and difficulties are 
exorcised by the formula ‘that which is, is’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 15). Objectivism 
and subjectivism are opposites whose conclusions turn out to be indistinguishable: 
‘Each alike denies space, time and change, because each begins from a formula 
which excludes these and gives a static account of thought’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 
16).
Realism, then, leads to a rigid static monism, as has been discussed by the 
Parmenides of Plato. Subjectivism and Objectivism are both names for the same 
fundamental position: that opposites are indifferently identical (Collingwood, 1920a: 
19). According to Collingwood, ‘This coincidentia oppositorium is the necessary 
outcome, though at the same time the flat contradictory of the realist or materialist 
logic, and here realism expires by its own hand’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 35). In 
following out the implications of this logic, therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that 
opposites coincide: a discovery indicated by Plato and a commonplace of Christian 
mysticism. The whole world of being, the whole philosophical tradition that we 
inherit from Plato and Aristotle, crumbles into dust at the sight of this principle. 
According to Collingwood,
The whole of that Greco-medieval world upon whose foundations our own is for the most part 
still standing was a world constructed on the logic o f abstract identity, and its life depended on 
its success in silencing that principle o f coincidentia oppositorum which was yet its own 
necessary consequence .... The world o f realistic logic has never been free from bad dreams. 
Far more than the natural sorrows and pains of life it has suffered from the awful brooding 
shadow o f nothingness, the shadow of that gulf which to the question “to be or not to be?” 
answers “being is itself nothing”. To a world living under that shadow, it seemed reasonable 
enough that people who pointed to the shadow would be burnt alive. (Collingwood, 1920a: 37)
Like Nietzsche, therefore, Collingwood regards Western civilisation as 
reaching a point of crisis because of the contradictions inherent in the Platonic 
ontology of being. The different aspects of the crisis of civilisation that Collingwood 
draws attention to throughout his philosophy can be seen as manifestations or 
symptoms of the struggle to overcome realism, or Platonism, and to develop a 
dialectical logic as a solution.
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Nietzsche similarly argued that Western culture was confronted by ‘nihilism’ 
because of the dominance of decadent modes of valuation based on ressentiment. 
For Nietzsche, nihilism is the culminating condition of Western culture because of 
contradictions within its dominant modes of valuation (cf. Hinz, 1994a: 161-5). 
Parallels with both Nietzsche and Ortega y Gasset help to illuminate our 
understanding of Collingwood’s conception of the decadence of the West, but these 
parallels will be examined in more detail further on in Chapter Seven.
In finding a solution to the crisis of civilisation, Collingwood explains in 
Libellus de Generatione, any attempt to develop a philosophy antithetical to that 
which we have analysed would be futile. An idealist or spiritualist or monist 
philosophy ‘... will only prove identical with its opposite and lead to the same result, 
the destruction of itself and its world in the gulf of undifferentiated identity’ 
(Collingwood, 1920a: 37).
But, in the cycle of realism from its rise to its final collapse something was all 
the time going on which was not its own opposite: namely the march of argument, 
the process of thought. This is the world of becoming or process, and ‘... it neither 
contains nor rests upon nor presupposes a world of being’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 45). 
Collingwood argues: ‘In the world of becoming distinctions are real just because 
they are not pure: A is A not by rejecting Bness, but by admitting it, by being B: it 
achieves identity just by undergoing diversity, asserts itself as itself by negating itself 
and becoming something else. This means that if we take any pair of opposites we 
shall never find either in a “pure” state, excluding its other: we shall invariably find 
both together in a synthesis where the presence of each depends on the presence of 
the other’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 47).
Hence we must reinterpret the category of identity and difference, and ‘here 
we arrive at the fundamental principle of the world of becoming, namely the 
synthesis of opposites’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 48-9). Identity means that the past 
phase of a process is preserved in the present phase. However reality is no more 
change than it is permanence: ‘The world is not divided into two parts, that which 
changes and that which remains permanent: it changes through and through, down to 
its very bones. And in this incessant change it remains unalterably the same’ 
(Collingwood, 1920a: 56).
To regard the two moments of becoming, change and permanence, as 
embodied in separate worlds is the error of a philosophy of being. Collingwood
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remarks: ‘These are fashions of speech borrowed by Christianity from Platonism, 
and ill-suited to her own peculiar genius. Indeed, Christianity has long been 
straitened in this tabernacle of Platonism and it may be that in a philosophy of 
becoming she has a house to her liking at last’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 57).
As Massimo Iiritano points out, Collingwood re-interprets Hegel’s dialectic, 
retaining the moment of opposition, although in tension with a synthesis, which 
consequently is no longer conceived as a third moment of the process, beyond the 
contradiction. The synthesis of opposites is an ever-becoming process, in which 
there is no third term. The actual opposition between the two terms, Iiritano 
explains, is never eliminated, precisely because it is a real and not an ideal opposition 
(Iiritano, 2002: 53).
In ‘Notes on Hegel’s Logic’, a manuscript written in 1920, Collingwood 
recognises a residue of Platonism in Hegel’s Logic. For Collingwood, as Iiritano 
demonstrates, Hegel’s idea of the Absolute is a ‘realistic’ residue: it shuts him up in a 
conception of totality which is still a ‘world of Being’ (Iiritano, 2002: 54).
Hence in Libellus de Generatione, like in Truth and Contradiction, 
Collingwood rejects the Absolute. There is a synthesis of wholeness and partness. 
According to Collingwood, ‘There is no Whole. Becoming is not a series that can be 
summed to any number of terms, nor yet to infinity’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 61). Each 
phase is a whole in that it is all that exists: it is the one permanent and eternal reality. 
But at the same time each phase is a part in that it is only a phase, destined to give 
way to another (Collingwood, 1920a: 61-2). As Iiritano puts it, ‘In the world of 
becoming there is no logical conception of totality, but only the endless open 
becoming of a process . . . ’ (Iiritano, 2002: 54)1.
The relation between the world of becoming and the world of being is not a 
relation of opposites. To conceive them as opposites would be to fall back into the 
mistake we are trying to condemn (Collingwood, 1920a: 66). To conceive truth and 
error existentially as concrete realities is to convert abstract moments into concrete 
determinations, and to reassert the world of being. As Collingwood points out, ‘In 
the world of becoming there is no such thing as error: there is only the moment of
1 According to Collingwood in ‘Notes on Hegel’s Logic’, Hegel posits a dualism between thought and 
sense: ‘Hegel has no idea o f an a priori synthesis between the symbol and meaning. He thinks, like 
Plato, that we philosophise by getting out o f our senses, instead of deepening them’ (Collingwood, 
1920b: 1). In his dualism Hegel risks ‘... weakening completely the ontological fertility of the 
dialectical principle’ (Iiritano, 2002: 55).
98
falsity correspondent to the moment of truth in this or that concrete phase of thought’ 
(Collingwood, 1920a: 67). Plato’s realism, then, has its merits and its defects. 
Collingwood argues: ‘If we understand the synthesis of opposites we shall see that no 
truth can exist at all except in a particularised form, which is the same thing as being 
conditioned by error. All truth is truth only so long as the error which it negates has 
not yet been effectively negated; once the error is definitely abandoned the truth 
becomes tautology and therefore untrue’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 68).
The same point can be made regarding the antitheses of subject and object, 
thought and action, and history and philosophy. The cardinal mistake to avoid is the 
existentialism of the opposing categories. Subjectivity and objectivity are 
synthetically present in every moment of reality (Collingwood, 1920a: 71). As 
Iiritano explains, ‘In the category of becoming, subject and object put themselves 
ontologically as moments of the same process, phases of the same activity, which 
constitute them’ (Iiritano, 2002: 60). Similarly, history and philosophy ‘... are 
opposite moments which never exist apart, of which all real thinking is a concrete 
synthesis’ (Collingwood, 1920a: 78).
As an alternative to the Platonic ontology of being, therefore, Collingwood 
seeks to link the movement of thinking with the movement of reality. According to 
Collingwood in Draft o f an opening chapter to a ‘Prolegomena to Logic ’, (written in 
1920-21): ‘If there were a science of thought, we should expect it to fulfil the task of 
showing why, if reality is changeless and stable, our thoughts about reality change, 
develop, ebb and flow, so conspicuously lack just this quality of immobility’ 
(Collingwood, 1920-21: 37).
The philosophy of being, or realism, leads to a denial of a science of thought 
capable of being at the same time a science of thinking. Realism ‘. .. means drawing 
a distinction between real thought, thus conceived as a timeless intuition, and the 
process which we generally call thinking, i.e. the process of asking, searching, 
inquiring, doubting’ (Collingwood, 1920-21: 40). Hence Collingwood, as Iiritano 
points out, characterises thinking in terms of what he later refer to as the ‘logic of 
question and answer’ (Iiritano, 2002: 64). The process of so-called thinking had 
been quietly set aside by traditional logicians, who concentrated their analyses on,
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not thinking, but thought, regarded as a quiescent state of apprehension 
(Collingwood, 1920-21: 41).
In Collingwood’s mature philosophy, he expounded his dialectical logic in An 
Essay on Philosophical Method. In this book there is less explicit reference to a 
crisis in European civilisation. However, Collingwood does remark that despite two 
great constructive movements in philosophy since the Middle Ages, the Cartesian 
and the Kantian, now is a time of crisis and chaos in philosophy, and this can be 
remedied by agreeing upon principles of method (EPM, 6). Many of Collingwood’s 
books, however, employ a different terminology and Collingwood varied his 
terminology according to the context of publication and his intended audience. In An 
Essay on Philosophical Method he does not explicitly refer to his method as 
dialectical. Instead he uses the term ‘scale of forms’. However, Collingwood 
remarks that the method he has been outlining has been used by Socrates, Aristotle 
and Kant, and that Hegel ‘used this method throughout his philosophical works’ 
(EPM, 103)3.
According to Collingwood, in An Essay on Philosophical Method, philosophy 
never reaches its ultimate goal and it is characterised by being an activity or process 
(EPM, 3). In a philosophical inquiry
... what we are trying to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been 
ignorant, but to know better something which in some sense we knew already; not to know it 
better in the sense o f coming to know more about it, but to know it better in the sense of 
coming to know it in a different and better way -  actually instead o f potentially, or explicitly 
instead of implicitly, or in whatever terms the theory of knowledge chooses to express the 
difference ... (EPM, 11)
Collingwood rejects the principle that ‘when a generic concept is divided into 
its species there is a corresponding division of its instances into mutually exclusive 
classes’ (EPM, 49). This principle may be true in natural science, but is false in 
philosophy. Therefore the traditional philosophical theory of classification and
2 For Collingwood, the dialectical logic of becoming is however confronted with a dilemma regarding 
the beginning of thinking: ‘If the mind has no knowledge already of the nature of reality, the process 
of thinking in order to acquire such knowledge cannot begin: if  it has knowledge, the process is 
obviously not necessary .... We should perhaps try to evade this difficulty by saying either (i) the 
process of thinking begins with knowledge and leads to knowledge, but the knowledge on which it is 
based is not the same as that to which it leads, or (ii) the process is based not on knowledge at all, but 
on faith, guesswork or instinct’ (Collingwood, 1920-21: 48-9). Collingwood’s answer is to suggest 
that there has never been a beginning and that thought has always been underway. Iiritano points out 
that the question has been deferred to a more penetrating analysis later in Collingwood’s career 
(Iiritano, 2002: 66).
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division must be modified. The classes of a philosophical genus overlap, rather than 
exclude, one another (EPM, 31). Some concepts have a philosophical and a non- 
philosophical phase (EPM, 33). For Collingwood
... when a concept has a dual significance, philosophical and non-philosophical, in its non- 
philosophical phase it qualifies a limited part of reality, whereas in its philosophical it leaks or 
escapes out o f these limits and invades the neighbouring regions, tending at last to colour our 
thought of reality as a whole. As a non-philosophical concept it observes the rules of  
classification, its instances forming a class separate from other classes; as a philosophical 
concept it breaks these rules, and the class o f its instances overlaps those of its co-ordinate 
species. (EPM, 35)
In logic and in ethics the traditionally recognised concepts are specified into 
overlapping classes. As Modood argues, species of a philosophical concept can be 
said to ‘overlap’, because no one species of such a concept can make its contribution 
to human understanding without calling upon and being qualified by other species of 
that concept (Modood, 1995: 42). We cannot fully understand expediency or self­
advantage without reference to duty, as Plato’s Gorgias and Republic demonstrate. 
To claim that the good is self-advantage raises questions about who or what the self 
is, about how we can be sure what is to its advantage, and about the relations 
between one self and another. For Collingwood, Modood points out, we must expect 
from cultural life both a greater variety and a more integrated unity than is to be 
found within a narrowly scientific or intellectualistic framework (Modood, 1995: 
43).
Collingwood argues that a failure to appreciate the overlap of classes in 
philosophy leads to the ‘fallacy of precarious margins’ (EPM, 48). This means 
ignoring ambiguous instances and confining our attention to the part of the subject- 
matter in which the overlap seems to be absent: ‘It consists in assuming that the 
overlap which has already affected a certain area of the class in question can be 
trusted not to spread, and that beyond it lies a marginal area in which the instances 
exhibit only one of the specific forms, uncontaminated by the presence of the other’ 
(EPM, 48). In avoiding this fallacy one might fall into the opposite error. Once it is 
recognised that the overlap is in principle unlimited, one might think that two 
concepts are identical, for example, identifying duty and happiness. This is the 
‘fallacy of identified coincidents’ (EPM, 49).
3 Connelly argues that An Essay on Philosophical Method is a restatement o f Hegelian dialectic in 
non-Hegelian language (Connelly, 2003: 74).
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Besides overlap or interdependence, Collingwood explains, hierarchy is a 
feature of philosophy. The philosophical concept includes differences of degree 
combined with differences in kind: a system Collingwood calls a scale of forms 
(EPM, 57), and text book logic is to be modified in the light of the scale of forms 
(EPM, 63). Not only is there a logical relation of overlap between different species 
or aspects of a genus, but the genus is differently related to each of the species that 
constitute it. Temperance, fortitude, and wisdom, for example, as species of virtue 
are different kinds of virtue (EPM, 56). Yet, at the same time, they also differ in 
degree: they are not equally examples of virtue but form a scale in which the higher 
embodies more of the generic essence than the lower examples (cf. Modood, 1995: 
43). Because the specifications of a philosophical concept are differences at once in 
degree and in kind (differences of degree are fused with differences of kind), they 
cannot be measured, for measurement applies only to pure differences of degree 
(EPM, 73).
Similarly, the kind of opposition which is found among philosophical terms is 
at once opposition and distinction (EPM, 75). In a scale of forms the variable is 
identical with the generic essence and therefore the zero end forms no part of the 
scale; for in it the generic essence is altogether absent. The lower end of the scale 
lies not at zero, but at unity, or the minimum realisation of the generic essence (EPM, 
81). As Modood puts it, the two sets of criteria, the minimal and the maximal, those 
necessary for identifying mere instances and those necessary for identifying 
instances of excellence, form a unified concept (Modood, 1995: 47). The goodness 
or badness of expediency cannot be judged by expediency itself but by another 
species of the same genus as expediency, by one which as a species is truer to the 
generic essence, to the fullness of the genus. Knowledge of expediency presents us 
with an awareness of its goodness but not of its badness unless we have a superior 
awareness of goodness than is available in the notion of expediency. Thus, 
expediency is -  not just morally but logically -  an inferior species of good than, say, 
right or duty (Modood, 1995: 49-50).
The same relation which exists between the lowest member of the scale and 
the next above it reappears between any two adjacent forms. Each is good in itself, 
but bad in relation to the one above (EPM, 84). The higher term in a scale of forms 
possesses not only that kind of goodness which belongs to it in its own right, but also 
the kind which originally or in itself belonged to its neighbour: ‘It not only surpasses
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its neighbour in degree of goodness, but beats it, so to speak, on its own ground’ 
(EPM, 87). The lower professes to exhibit a certain kind of goodness, but can only 
do so in an approximate and inadequate manner. As Collingwood argues, ‘The 
higher thus negates the lower, and at the same time reaffirms it: negates it as a false 
embodiment of the generic essence, and reaffirms its content, that specific form of 
the essence, as part and parcel of itself (EPM, 88). Each term in the scale sums up 
the whole scale to that point. Infinity as well as zero can be struck out of the scale 
because the specific form at which we stand is the generic concept itself, so far as 
thought yet conceives it (EPM, 89).
Conceiving philosophy in terms of scales of forms means that in the case of 
philosophical statements the relation between affirmation and negation is peculiarly 
intimate. In philosophy every negation implies an affirmation, and every affirmation 
a negation: something Collingwood refers to as the principle of concrete negation 
and the principle of concrete affirmation (which I briefly discussed in the 
Introduction). An affirmative non-philosophical judgement denies indiscriminately 
all the judgements incompatible with it. But where the generic concept is 
philosophical, specified in a scale of forms of which the judgement is intended to 
affirm the highest, its denial of all the inferior forms is summarised in one denial, 
namely that of the proximate form; since each summarises the whole scale up to that 
point, and the denial of that involves the denial of all that it summarises4 (EPM, 108).
According to Collingwood’s dialectical conception of philosophy in An Essay 
on Philosophical Method, therefore, there is a continuity between experience and 
theory. The ‘conclusions’ of philosophical thinking and the ‘experience’ on which 
they are based are names for any two successive stages in the scale of forms of 
philosophical knowledge. What is called experience is relatively crude and irrational 
as compared with the next stage above it, in which its philosophical elements are 
more fully developed. The higher stage explains the lower (EPM, 172). The task of 
explaining a body of experience by constructing a theory of it is nothing but the same 
experience raised to a higher level of rationality. Whatever positive doctrine has 
been propounded, the next step for philosophy is to demolish it as a theory and leave 
it standing only as an experience (EPM, 173). That experience is explained by
4 This point is also made in Collingwood’s 1927 manuscript, ‘The Idea of a Philosophy o f Something, 
and in particular, a Philosophy of History’, published in the revised edition o f The Idea o f  History (IH, 
337-8).
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reference to new principles implied in the critical process itself (EPM, 174). The 
scale of forms, then, posits an overlap and dynamic tension between theory and 
practice, something which Collingwood later referred to in An Autobiography as a 
rapprochement between theory and practice (A, 147; cf. Modood, 1995: 57).
For Collingwood, in the history of thought *... all the philosophies of the past 
are telescoped into the present, and constitute a scale of forms, never beginning and 
never ending, which are different both in degree and in kind, distinct from each other 
and opposed to each other’ (EPM, 195), and every particular philosophical system is 
‘nothing but an interim report on the progress of thought down to the time of making 
it’ (EPM, 198).
As Mink points out, then, Collingwood’s philosophical method is self- 
conscious and self-corrective (Mink, 1969: 77). In philosophy ‘. .. the whole body of 
knowledge must be remade from the foundations at every step in advance’ (EPM, 
180). As in his earlier manuscripts, Collingwood abandons Hegel’s Absolute, but 
retains dialectic (cf. Mink, 1969: 78). Philosophy does not culminate in a single final 
Truth, and the development of mind is contingent and reversible. As Modood 
indicates, for Collingwood, like Gadamer on this point, we can always imagine 
further dialogue and inquiry, criticism and counter-criticism (Modood, 1995: 55-6).
For Collingwood, therefore, Western civilisation was confronted by a crisis 
or decadence because of the unsustainable nature of its philosophical foundations. 
His development of dialectical logic was intended as a solution to this problem. 
However, his dialectical logic is paralleled by a reform of metaphysics. This is 
because the dialectical logic outlined here presupposes an ontological claim about the 
nature of reality. Collingwood expounds his reform of metaphysics in An Essay on 
Metaphysics.
In both An Essay on Metaphysics and An Autobiography Collingwood also 
returned to the subject of dialectical logic, characterising it now as the logic of 
question and answer. The next chapter will provide an account of how 
Collingwood’s metaphysics responded to the crisis of the West and of its relation 
with the logic of question and answer.
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Chapter Six: 
Metaphysics and the Logic of Question and Answer
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, for Collingwood, the Platonic ontology of 
being had given rise to a decadence and crisis in Western civilisation because it 
placed all value in a transcendent world and failed to give an account of the actual 
processes of reality and becoming. Collingwood’s dialectical logic is inextricably 
linked with an ontological claim that reality is dialectical. Therefore, his promotion 
of dialectical logic as a solution to the ailments of Western civilisation is paralleled 
by a reconstruction, or reform, of metaphysics.
Traditionally understood as the study of static and eternal truths, and as the 
‘science of pure being’, metaphysics now becomes a historical science: historical in 
terms of both its methodology and its object. We move, then, from the world of 
being to the world of becoming.
Metaphysics is a study of the nature of reality. However, for Collingwood, 
an account of reality cannot be separated from an account of the processes by which 
we both apprehend and create reality. (These processes, according to the argument 
of Speculum Mentis, are art, religion, natural science, history and philosophy.) What 
Collingwood referred to in An Autobiography as a rapprochement between 
philosophy and history (A, 77) becomes in this context a rapprochement between 
logic and metaphysics.
Collingwood argues in An Essay on Metaphysics that metaphysics is a 
science. However:
The word ‘science’, in its original sense, which is still its proper sense not in the English 
language alone but in the international language of European civilization, means a body of  
systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject-matter. This is the sense and the 
only sense in which I shall use it. There is also the slang sense o f the word, unobjectionable 
(like all slang) on its lawful occasions, parallel to the slang use o f the word ‘hall’ for a music 
hall or the word ‘drink’ for alcoholic drink, in which it stands for natural science. (EM, 4)
According to Collingwood, the science of metaphysics is logically prior to 
the particular sciences, and the principles of metaphysics are presupposed by the 
particular sciences. All science is universal or abstract in that it ignores differences 
between particular things and focuses on what they have in common. There is a 
hierarchical relationship between the sciences: the subject matter of a science can be 
divided into sub-forms, which are less abstract and universal, logically generating 
subordinate sciences (EM, 12).
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Collingwood asserts that Aristotle was wrong in the claim that metaphysics is 
the science of pure being. The ‘science of pure being’ is not a science as it does not 
have any definite subject matter. It goes beyond the limits of abstraction. 
Abstraction means taking out differences and studying what is common between 
things. In this case, abstraction has gone so far that there is nothing left for science 
to investigate. Collingwood argues that this was implied by Berkeley, who attacked 
‘abstract general ideas’, by Hume, who agreed with Berkeley’s attack, by Kant, who 
argued that ‘being is not a predicate’, and by Hegel, who said that pure being is the 
same as nothing (EM, 15).
Having rejected Aristotle’s proposition that metaphysics is the science of 
pure being, Collingwood extracts another proposition from Aristotle which describes 
the true nature of metaphysics: metaphysics is the science which studies 
presuppositions (EM, 20). Collingwood explains that when a person expresses a 
thought in words, there are also presuppositions of that thought in his or her mind. 
For example, to point at a piece of string and say ‘that is a clothes-line’ is to make a 
presupposition: that the line was put there for a purpose. The presupposition has 
logical priority, but not priority in time (EM, 21).
There is a difference between ‘... the desultory and casual thinking of our 
unscientific consciousness and the orderly and systematic thinking we call science’:
In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a 
thought out of our minds like an anchor foul of its own cable, hanging upside-down and draped 
in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole thing on deck quite pleased with 
ourselves for having got it up at all. Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, 
and reducing a knot o f thoughts in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or 
series o f thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions 
between them. (EM, 22-3)
For Collingwood, logic must give an account of the activity of 
metaphysicians: ‘Logicians have paid a great deal of attention to some kinds of 
connexion between thoughts, but to other kinds not so much. The theory of 
presuppositions they have tended to neglect .... I will try to state so much of this 
theory as seems necessary for my present purpose’ (EM, 23).
According to Collingwood’s ‘theory of presuppositions’, then, every 
statement is made in answer to a question. The question is logically prior to the 
answer (EM, 24). Every question involves a presupposition. Directly, it involves 
only one presupposition, but this immediate presupposition may in turn have other
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presuppositions. For a question to be asked, this one immediate presupposition has 
to be made. Otherwise, the question ‘does not arise’. To say that a question does not 
arise means that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact being made (EM, 
26). The fact that something causes a certain question to arise he calls the ‘logical 
efficacy’ of that thing (EM, 27).
The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend on the truth of what is 
supposed, or even on it being thought true, but only on its being supposed. In 
scientific thinking, for example, one may often argue from suppositions known to be 
false, or concerning which we have neither knowledge nor belief as to whether they 
are false or true (EM, 28).
According to Collingwood, a presupposition is either relative or absolute. A 
relative presupposition is one which stands relatively to one question as its 
presupposition, and relatively to another question as its answer. That certain 
presuppositions are questionable is not disproved by the fact that someone who 
makes them fails to see that they are questionable. Collingwood explains: ‘To 
question a presupposition is to demand that it should be “verified”; that is, to demand 
that a question should be asked to which the affirmative answer would be that 
presupposition itself, now in the form of a proposition’ (EM, 30). To speak of 
verifying a presupposition is to suppose that it is a relative presupposition.
An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to 
which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer. For example, an absolute 
presupposition of medicine is that every event has a cause. Absolute presuppositions 
are not verifiable, and the idea of verification does not apply to them. Their use in 
science is their logical efficacy, and the logical efficacy of a supposition does not 
depend on its being verifiable: it depends only on its being supposed. Absolute 
presuppositions are not propositions, as they are never answers to questions. 
Absolute presuppositions, therefore, are not true or false, this distinction being 
peculiar to propositions. To put the same point differently: absolute presuppositions 
are not propounded, but only presupposed (EM, 32-3).
According to Collingwood, unscientific thought, at its lowest level, has a 
deceptive appearance of immediacy about it: it appears that things just are as we 
intuit them to be. Realism is the belief that this is all that knowledge is (EM, 34-5). 
At this level of thinking, we are unaware that every thought is an answer to a 
question, and that each question arises from a presupposition. This low-grade
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thinking cannot give rise to metaphysics. Collingwood asserts that man has created 
himself and civilisation through high-grade or scientific thinking, by thinking 
energetically instead of idly: ‘Everything that we call specifically human is due to 
man’s power of thinking hard’ (EM, 37).
High-grade thinking means an increase of mental effort and skill in the 
direction of that effort. An increase of mental effort means asking questions, and 
skill in the direction of mental effort means asking questions scientifically. This 
means disentangling and arranging questions. Collingwood chooses as an example 
the (politically incorrect) question: ‘have you left off beating your wife yet?’ This 
can be disentangled into four questions and arranged in their logical order: (1) have 
you a wife? (2) Were you ever in the habit of beating her? (3) Do you intend to 
manage in future without doing so? (4) Have you begun carrying out that intention? 
(EM, 38)
For Collingwood, therefore,
The analysis which detects absolute presuppositions I call metaphysical analysis; but as regards 
procedure and the qualifications necessary to carry it out there is no difference whatever 
between metaphysical analysis and analysis pure and simple .... In either case the question is 
being constantly asked, ‘Is this presupposition relative or absolute?’ and the modus operandi is 
the same, whichever answer is given. As regards its modus operandi, then, all analysis is 
metaphysical analysis; and, since analysis is what gives its scientific character to science, 
science and metaphysics are inextricably united, and stand or fall together. (EM, 40-1)
It might seem that it should be easy to distinguish between relative and 
absolute presuppositions, but, Collingwood contends, people have a motive to 
deceive themselves because absolute presuppositions are unfashionable. The 
conventional view is that all presuppositions are relative (EM, 42-3). In our less 
scientific moments, absolute presuppositions ‘... are doing their work in the 
darkness, the light of consciousness never falling on them’ (EM, 43). To discover 
absolute presuppositions takes skilful analysis.
In analysis, ordinary science focuses on relative presuppositions, in order to 
justify them, whereas metaphysics focuses on absolute presuppositions, in order 
scientifically to describe them. Collingwood describes absolute presuppositions as 
‘superstition’, as ‘uncanny’ and as inspiring terror.
This mattered less at a period of history when people had their well-established methods 
(magic, we call them) of dissipating the terror and enabling them to face the things that 
inspired it. Ours is an age when people pride themselves on having abolished magic and 
pretend that they have no superstitions. But they have as many as ever. The difference is that 
they have lost the art, which must always be a magical art, o f conquering them. So it is a
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special characteristic of modem European civilization that metaphysics is habitually frowned 
upon and the existence of absolute presuppositions denied .... If this neurosis ever achieves its 
ostensible object, the eradication o f metaphysics from the European mind, the eradication of 
science and civilization will be accomplished at the same time. (EM, 46)
The aim of metaphysics, therefore, according to Collingwood, is to find out 
what absolute presuppositions have been made by certain people, on certain 
occasions, in the course of certain pieces of thinking. It will then consider whether 
these absolute presuppositions are made singly or in groups, and so on. Pseudo­
metaphysics treats absolute presuppositions as relative presuppositions, and asks 
questions of them with regard to truth or falsehood, evidence, and demonstration 
(EM, 47).
Collingwood argues that metaphysical questions either are, or resolve 
themselves into, historical questions. For example, in Newtonian physics every 
event either has a cause or alternatively operates according to a law. Nineteenth- 
century physics, or Kantian physics, claimed that all events have causes. In modem 
physics the notion of causes has disappeared, and every event happens according to 
laws (EM, 50).
Pseudo-metaphysics would treat this as a problem of three different schools 
of thought, and endeavour to say which one is the true absolute presupposition. 
Science, however, does not depend on the truth of its absolute presuppositions, only 
on their being supposed (EM, 52). The business of the scientist is to presuppose 
certain absolute presuppositions for his scientific work. The business of the 
metaphysician is to find out what absolute presuppositions are in fact being made 
(EM, 54). The metaphysician, then, asks historical questions, and the rubric for 
metaphysics is: ‘in such-and-such a phase o f scientific thought, it is (or was) 
absolutely presupposed that . . . ’ (EM, 55). The rubric is left out because the reader 
already assumes it, or because of ignorance about metaphysics. As Collingwood 
argues, it is a mistake to take the characteristics of a certain historical milieu for 
characteristics of mankind at large (EM, 57).
Metaphysics, therefore, is an historical science. Unlike the ‘scissors-and- 
paste’ method, where the historian repeats statements about the past made by 
authorities, modem historical method means that the historian makes statements on 
his or her own authority, according to the evidence. The evidence is analysed with a 
certain question in mind, and ‘... absolutely cogent inferences about the past are 
drawn from interpretation of the evidence it has left behind’ (EM, 58). Metaphysics,
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Collingwood contends, must proceed according to this method in finding absolute 
presuppositions (EM, 60).
Hence, for Collingwood, the reform of metaphysics is an important part of 
the solution to the crisis that confronts Western culture. Aristotle’s idea of a science 
of pure being has led to the suggestion that metaphysics should consist in groping 
blindly for non-existent truths and is inadequate as an attempt to provide an account 
of reality. Instead metaphysics, Collingwood argues, must use historical methods 
and uncover facts. As a science, however, metaphysics has its own presuppositions: 
it shares the presuppositions of history (EM, 63).
Metaphysical facts, like historical facts, Collingwood explains, are 
independent of one another, but exist in constellations of facts.
I speak of a set o f absolute presuppositions, because if  metaphysics is an historical science the 
things which it studies, namely absolute presuppositions, are historical facts; and anyone who 
is reasonably well acquainted with historical work knows that there is no such thing as an 
historical fact which is not at the same time a complex of historical facts. Such a complex of 
historical facts I call a ‘constellation’. If every historical fact is a constellation, the answer to 
the question ‘What is it that such and such a person was absolutely presupposing in such and 
such a piece o f thinking?’ can never be given by reference to one single absolute 
presupposition, it must always be given by reference to a constellation o f them. (EM, 66)
Each absolute presupposition in a constellation must be consupponible with 
all the others: this means that it must be logically possible, when supposing one of 
them, to suppose all the rest (EM, 66). However, in supposing one of them, one 
cannot be logically committed to supposing any of the others. If this were the case 
the first would be a presupposition of the second, and therefore the second would not 
be an absolute presupposition. Accordingly, metaphysics is not a deductive or quasi- 
mathematical science.
A so-called metaphysical ‘doctrine’, Collingwood argues, is really a 
metaphysician’s description of absolute presuppositions. For example, Spinoza 
states an historical fact about the religious foundation of seventeenth-century natural 
science, that nature is the same as God (EM, 68-9).
Because metaphysics is an historical science, its scope can be enlarged 
beyond the present or recent past and encompass the past in its entirety. Metaphysics 
will show that different sets of absolute presuppositions correspond with differences 
in the fabric of civilisation, and discover on what occasions and by what processes 
one constellation of absolute presuppositions has changed into another. According to 
Collingwood, ‘This is the only legitimate (that is, historical) way in which he, or
110
anybody else, can answer the question “Why did such and such a people at such and 
such a time make such and such absolute presuppositions?’” (EM, 73).
One phase in history, Collingwood explains, changes into another because its 
fabric was not at rest; it was always under strain. The historian and metaphysician 
must analyse these internal strains and the effect they have on historical facts. 
Hence, Collingwood criticises Gibbon and Spengler for not being sensitive enough to 
the internal strains of what they wrote about, and praises Hegel and Marx. 
Collingwood argues:
Where there is no strain there is no history. A civilization does not work out its own details by 
a kind of static logic in which every detail exemplifies in its own way one and the same 
formula. It works itself out by a dynamic logic in which different and at first sight 
incompatible formula somehow contrive a precarious coexistence; one dominant here, another 
there; the recessive formula never ceasing to operate .... The historian in his study can perhaps 
afford to neglect these strains, because he does not really care about being a good historian; but 
the man o f action cannot afford to neglect them. His life may depend on his ability to see 
where they are and to judge their strength. It was not by gunpowder alone that Cortez 
destroyed Montezuma; it was by using gunpowder to reinforce the strains which already tended 
to break up Montezuma’s power. (EM, 76)
For Collingwood, not only is metaphysics to reform itself by becoming an 
historical science, but the extent to which metaphysics has already been a science in 
the past is governed by the extent to which it has already been history (EM, 77).
In Collingwood’s view, therefore, logic and metaphysics are inextricably 
linked and his reform, or revolution, in logic is closely related to his reform of 
metaphysics. Logic and metaphysics provide an account of the world of becoming 
and thereby provide a remedy to the crisis of Western civilisation, which is brought 
about by the inadequacy of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy of being.
In An Autobiography Collingwood asserted: ‘For a logic of propositions I 
wanted to substitute what I called a logic of question and answer’ (A, 36-7). Truth 
‘... was something that belonged not to any single proposition, nor even, as the 
coherence-theorists maintained, to a complex of propositions taken together; but to a 
complex consisting of questions and answers .... Each question and each answer in a 
given complex had to be relevant or appropriate, had to “belong” both to the whole 
and to the place it occupied in the whole’ (A, 37). Each question had to ‘arise’, and 
each answer must be ‘the right’ answer to the question it professes to answer. 
Collingwood distinguishes ‘right’ from ‘true’:
The ‘right’ answer to a question is the answer which enables us to get ahead with the process 
of questioning and answering. Cases are quite common in which the ‘right’ answer to a
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question is ‘false’; for example, cases in which a thinker is following a false scent, either 
inadvertently or in order to construct a reductio ad absurdum. Thus, when Socrates asks 
(Plato, Republic, 333 B) whether as your partner in a game of draughts you would prefer to 
have a just man or a man who knows how to play draughts, the answer which Polemarchus 
gives -  ‘a man who knows how to play draughts’ -  is the right answer. It is ‘false’, because it 
presupposes that justice and ability to play draughts are comparable, each of them being a 
‘craft’, or specialized form o f skill. But it is ‘right’, because it constitutes a link, and a sound 
one, in the chain o f questions and answers by which the falseness of that presupposition is 
made manifest.
What is ordinarily meant when a proposition is called ‘true’, I thought, was this: (a) the 
proposition belongs to a question-and-answer complex which as a whole is ‘true’ in the proper 
sense of the word; (b) within this complex it is an answer to a certain question; (c) the question 
is what we call a sensible or intelligent question, not a silly one, or in my terminology it 
‘arises’; (d) the proposition is the ‘right’ answer to that question. (A, 38)
Collingwood points out that the question ‘to what question did So-and-so 
intend this proposition for an answer?’ is an historical one, and cannot be settled 
except by historical methods (A, 39).
What Collingwood referred to, therefore, in An Autobiography and An Essay 
on Metaphysics, as the logic of question and answer is a continuation and refinement 
of the dialectical logic that he developed from the early manuscripts to An Essay on 
Philosophical Method, which I outlined in the previous chapter.
Peters points out that Collingwood’s ‘revolution’ (A, 52) in logic ought to be 
seen as part of a wider movement, including British Idealists and pragmatists, which 
tried to replace formal logic with a theory of inquiry. However, whereas the reforms 
of these philosophers were orientated towards science, Collingwood’s reform was 
orientated towards history, and in this, he was at one with the Italian Idealists (Peters, 
1999: 6).
Peters also indicates a correlation between Collingwood’s theory of dialectic 
and his theory of art. As Peters explains, Collingwood rejected Croce’s identity of 
intuition and expression in his aesthetics, by pointing out that an artist does not 
express himself in a single blow, but begins with a primitive expression which he 
gradually develops into a fuller expression. Similarly, in contrast with Croce’s view 
that philosophical concepts are formed simultaneously with the historical judgement, 
Collingwood defended a theory which accounts for the gradual development of 
concepts in a question and answer process (Peters, 1999: 9). This, Peters argues, is 
why Collingwood saw his life’s work not in Croce’s terms of an identity of 
philosophy and history, but in terms of a rapprochement between philosophy and 
history. Thus truth does not come in a single blow, but develops gradually in a
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question and answer process, beginning from vaguer truths leading to more precise 
truths5 (Peters, 1999: 10).
Collingwood’s autobiographical account of his meditations on the Albert 
Memorial demonstrates that the only way to explain the co-existence of beauty and 
ugliness in a work of art was to regard it as a product of a process of attempts and 
failures, or problems and solutions6 (Peters, 1999: 14). Peters explains:
On this basis Collingwood would further modify Croce’s account of the question and answer 
process. Croce had always sharply distinguished that question and answer process from the 
process of intuitions and expressions o f art. Meditating on the ugliness o f the Albert 
Memorial, Collingwood began to understand that such a distinction is untenable, and that what 
is required is a description o f a continuous process, or ‘overlap’, beginning from the intuition 
in art and ending with the formation of concepts in philosophy. Not surprisingly this is exactly 
the theory that Collingwood expounded in Speculum Mentis (SM, 76-80) and elaborated in The 
Principles o f  Art. (Peters, 1999: 15)
According to Peters, the close relation between art and logic also yielded 
Collingwood’s ‘principle of correlativity’ (A, 32): every answer is distinct and yet 
inseparable from the question which leads to it. The principle of correlativity meant 
that Collingwood could reject the principle of contradiction: the idea that two 
propositions in themselves can contradict each other. Collingwood held that two 
propositions can only contradict each other if they are answers to the same question 
(A, 33; Peters, 1999: 16).
For Collingwood, ‘Meaning, agreement, and contradiction, truth and 
falsehood, none of these belonged to propositions in their own right, propositions by 
themselves, they belonged only to propositions as answers to questions: each 
proposition answering a question strictly correlative to itself (A, 33). As we have 
seen, then, Collingwood argued that truth and falsehood do not belong to 
propositions as such, but to the entire complex of questions and answers of which
5 Peters points out that, similarly, in Religion and Philosophy, Collingwood argues that every truth 
takes its form by correcting some error (RP, 138). Truth and error cannot co-exist in relation with one 
another, because if  they are brought into contact the error is abolished by truth. But this process is 
never completed because the life of the world, like the life of man, consists in perpetual activity (RP, 
141; Peters, 1999: 12).
6 Peters indicates that, for Collingwood, both the Idealist coherence-theory o f truth and the Realist 
correspondence-theory o f truth wrongly assume the ‘propositional principle’. The propositional 
principle means the assumption that truth is a quality of one proposition, regardless of the context of 
other propositions (A, 36; Peters, 1995: 110). According to Collingwood in The Principles o f  Art, the 
propositional assumption presupposes a clean distinction between feelings and emotions on the one 
side and thought on the other side (PA, 259-61). Collingwood points out against all logicians that 
propositions are never purely logical entities, but also linguistic entities. Logicians should always 
take the development of the meaning o f concepts into account (Peters, 1995: 110).
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these propositions belong. The true unit of thought is not the proposition, but the 
entire question and answer complex (A, 37; Peters, 1999: 17).
The logic of question and answer that Collingwood presents in An 
Autobiography and An Essay on Metaphysics, therefore, is a re-presentation and fine- 
tuning of the logic that Collingwood first outlined in Truth and Contradiction. It 
follows from Collingwood’s claim in Truth and Contradiction that whereas 
coherence-theorists of truth tend to ‘dissect’ theories into true and false statements, 
‘Truth and falsehood are attributes not of single isolated judgements but of systems 
of thought, systems in which every judgement is coloured by all the others’ (TC, 11).
As we have seen, it is through the use of the logic of question and answer that 
the metaphysician uncovers absolute presuppositions. Rex Martin, however, denies 
that there is any essential connection between Collingwood’s logic of question and 
answer and the theory of absolute presuppositions. Martin in his Introduction to the 
revised edition of An Essay on Metaphysics argues that absolute presuppositions 
would have no meaning if seen as a part of the logic of question and answer -  
because, he argues, ‘meaningfulness for statements is grounded in the very same way
n
as truth values in a question-and-answer complex (see A, 33)’ (EM, xxm) .
Martin indicates that, in terms of the development of Collingwood’s theory of 
metaphysics, Collingwood’s essay, the ‘Function of Metaphysics in Civilization’8, 
which was written in 1938, like the later Essay on Metaphysics, and unlike his 1934 
lecture, ‘The Nature of Metaphysical Study’, denies that the governing principles of 
natural science can be described as true, or proven true or false (EM, lxxiv; cf. EM, 
393-409). However, Martin asserts, unlike An Essay on Metaphysics, the logic of 
question and answer does not appear in the 1938 lecture: there is no explicit claim 
here that truth values are essentially and internally related to the linked questions, to 
which various statements stand as answers (EM, lxxv). Also missing from the 1938 
essay is any mention of absolute presuppositions (EM, lxxvi). This means, 
according to Martin, that we have reason to challenge the alleged essential 
relationship between fundamental presuppositions and the logic of question and 
answer9.
7 Martin also makes this point in ‘Collingwood’s Logic of Question and Answer, its Relation to 
Absolute Presuppositions: a Brief History’ (1998: 124).
8 This essay is published in the revised edition of An Essay on Metaphysics, pp.379-421.
9 Martin also argues that in ‘Notes for an Essay on Logic’ (written in 1939, after Collingwood had 
completed Parts I and II of An Essay on Metaphysics, and incorporated in the revised edition of An
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Martin claims that the logic of question and answer, properly speaking, was 
not present in Collingwood’s earlier work and was only developed in An 
Autobiography. He also argues that fundamental presuppositions existed as features 
of Collingwood’s thought before he developed his logic of question and answer, and 
were expressed and understood independently of that logic. Collingwood’s use of 
the logic of question and answer to explain absolute presuppositions in Part I of An 
Essay on Metaphysics, Martin argues, was not a happy device, for that explication, in 
removing truth value from these presuppositions, also removed meaning from them 
(EM, lxxvii).
Contrary to Martin, however, Collingwood’s claim about meaning being 
dependent on a prior question does not apply to absolute presuppositions. It applies 
to ‘statements’ and propositions: Collingwood uses the words ‘statements’ and 
‘propositions’ interchangeably (for Collingwood, in An Autobiography, a ‘statement’ 
is a proposition). On p.33 of An Autobiography, Collingwood argues that ‘... you 
cannot tell what a proposition means unless you know what question it was meant to 
answer . . .’ (italics added). On p.31 Collingwood makes the same claim about 
‘statements’: ‘... you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his 
spoken or written statements .... In order to find out his meaning you must also know 
what the question was ... to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an 
answer’. Collingwood quickly changes terms from ‘statements’ to propositions, and 
continues thus:
It must be understood that question and answer, as I conceived them, were strictly correlative. 
A proposition was not an answer, or at any rate could not be the right answer, to any question 
which might have been answered otherwise. A highly detailed and particularized proposition 
must be the answer, not to a vague and generalized question, but to a question as detailed and 
particularized as itself. (A, 31-2)
Collingwood describes his ‘revolt’ against the current logical theories of the 
time, comparing it to the revolt against scholastic logic by Bacon and Descartes in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
Essay on Metaphysics, pp.422-27) Collingwood’s discussion of suppositions is not accompanied by a 
logic o f question and answer. Martin claims that, although Collingwood argues that supposing, 
questioning and asserting go on concurrently, there is no flat-out claim that either the meaning or the 
truth o f an assertion is logically dependent on the question it is said to be answering (EM, lxxx-lxxxi). 
But, contrary to Martin, Collingwood does actually claim that ‘Every P is an answer to a Q’, where Q 
is question and P is proposition (EM, 425).
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The Novum Organum and the Discours de la Methode began to have a new significance for 
me. They were the classical expressions o f a principle in logic which I found it necessary to 
restate: the principle that a body o f knowledge consists not o f ‘propositions’, ‘statements’, 
‘judgements’, or whatever name logicians use in order to designate assertive acts o f thought (or 
what in those acts is asserted: for ‘knowledge’ means both the activity o f knowing and what is 
known), but of these together with the questions they are meant to answer; and that a logic in 
which the answers are attended to and the questions neglected is a false logic. (A, 30-1)
Collingwood, however, does not say or imply that the meaning of an absolute 
presupposition is dependent on it being an answer to a question. Unlike ‘statements’, 
or propositions, absolute presuppositions cannot be asserted and do not have truth- 
value. Nevertheless absolute presuppositions do have meaning. Their meaning, I 
suggest, is their ‘logical efficacy’. Also, the meaning of a set of absolute 
presuppositions is only fully realised in the context of the questions and answers that 
it actually gives rise to.
As Peters argues, Martin’s claim that the logic of question and answer makes 
absolute presuppositions meaningless is based on the unwarranted assumption that 
there is only one kind of meaning, namely the meaning of propositions as answers to 
questions, whereas Collingwood distinguishes many kinds of meaning, ranging from 
the meaning of artistic expressions10, to the meaning of presuppositions (Peters, 
1999: 3).
Martin’s claim that the logic of question and answer was only developed in 
An Autobiography is untenable. As I have argued, Collingwood’s logic, from his 
early manuscripts to the Autobiography, can be seen as part of a unitary 
development11. The idea of absolute presuppositions also has a long history. The 
idea of ‘a solid ring of thought’ in ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’ (EPA, 10) has often been 
interpreted as a first statement of the notion of absolute presuppositions, and, as 
Peters indicates, the term appears with almost the same connotations in Bradley’s 
Presuppositions o f Critical History of 1874 (Peters, 1999: 23).
10 Collingwood changes his position on the question o f whether or not artistic expressions have 
meaning. In The Principles o f  Art, as we have seen, he equates art with language at its most primitive 
level. Art or language is primitive utterance. ‘Meaning’ and the rules of grammar, syntax, and logic, 
are something imposed on language afterwards. On the other hand, in The New Leviathan, as we will 
see in Part Three, Collingwood argues that language at its most basic level is the expression of 
meaning (NL, 6.1).
11 According to Peters, Collingwood developed his logic of question and answer in Truth and 
Contradiction, translations o f two books by de Ruggiero, Libellus de Generatione, half a dozen 
manuscripts on logic, his Moral Philosophy Lectures and Speculum Mentis. Contrary to Martin, 
Peters indicates that Speculum Mentis does contain a logic o f question and answer, and that 
Collingwood continued to refine this logic in later works. Peters cites p.78 o f Speculum Mentis: 
‘People who are acquainted with knowledge at first hand have always known that assertions are only 
answers to questions’ (Peters, 1999: 22).
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Absolute presuppositions and the logic and question and answer, therefore, 
are evidently inter-connected. Also absolute presuppositions derive their meaning 
from their function as presuppositions of an entire question and answer complex of a 
given science (cf. Peters, 1999: 25).
As I have argued, then, Collingwood’s dialectical logic has an ontological 
aspect. As Peters puts it, it is a form of noetic logic: it is both a study of the structure 
and development of our thought and a metaphysics or a theory of reality. According 
to Peters, ‘In Collingwood’s mature thought experience, logic and metaphysics are 
united in one single logic of question and answer which elucidates the problematic 
character of reality. The logic of question and answer enters in the tradition of 
dialectical Idealist logic which was founded by Hegel’ (Peters, 1995: 108).
Collingwood criticised Bradley because he had bequeathed to his successors 
the following dilemma. ‘Either reality is the immediate flow of subjective life, in 
which case it is subjective and not objective, it is enjoyed but cannot be known, or 
else reality is that which we know, in which case it is objective and not subjective, it 
is a world of real things outside the subjective life of the mind and outside each 
other’ (IH, 141). As Peters argues,
In Collingwood’s view Bradley accepted the first horn of the dilemma by holding that all 
experience was the immediate flow o f subjective life. The Realists accepted the second hom of 
the dilemma and holding ‘that what mind knows is something other than itself, and that mind 
itself, the activity o f knowing, is immediate experience and therefore unknowable’ (IH, 141-2). 
In Collingwood’s view both Bradley and the Realists thus agree, in a strange coincidentia 
oppositorum, on the concept of mind as a mere immediate flow of feeling and sensation, 
devoid o f all reflection and self-knowledge. Feeling and thought are thus completely separated 
by Bradley and the Realists. (Peters, 1995: 109)
Peters indicates that in response to this problem, and to the subjectivism of 
Gentile, Collingwood used Hegel’s Ontological Argument (Peters, 1995: 113). 
Collingwood, however, thought that Hegel had not applied the Ontological 
Argument thoroughly enough and that Hegel’s philosophy contained residues of 
Platonism12.
12 Peters argues: Hegel’s failure to apply the Ontological Argument to particular objects of thought 
caused an enormous tension within his philosophy. For Collingwood, this tension set the problem for 
the whole post-Hegelian development o f philosophy and would determine his own philosophical 
career: an insight expressed in ‘A Footnote to Future History’ (Peters, 1995: 114). Collingwood 
criticises Hegel for separating experience from thought, and this is the beginning of his reform of the 
Hegelian dialectic (Peters, 1995: 116). For Collingwood, we can no longer say that two propositions 
contradict each other absolutely, but we must say that they contradict each other from a certain point
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Collingwood had emphasised the ontological dimension of philosophy in his 
treatment of the Ontological Proof in An Essay on Philosophical Method. 
Collingwood argues that, whereas the judgements of mathematics and empirical 
science are hypothetical, philosophy consists of judgements about a subject matter 
conceived as real, or categorical judgements. The Ontological Proof is a recognition 
of this principle. Following Plato, Anselm argued that when we really think we must 
be thinking of a real object. His argument applied not to thought in general, but only 
to thought about one unique object, the absolute of Neo-Platonic metaphysics. In the 
special case of metaphysical thinking the distinction between conceiving something 
and thinking it to exist is a distinction without a difference (EPM, 124-5).
According to Collingwood, ‘Descartes, the acknowledged father of modem 
philosophy made it the mainspring of his system; it was the Ontological Proof that 
gave him the power to move from the pin-point of momentary subjective 
consciousness to the infinite process of objective knowledge’ (EPM, 126). It was 
criticised by Kant, but rescued by Hegel. The Ontological Proof, Collingwood 
asserts, proves that essence involves existence, not always, but in one special case, 
the case of God in the metaphysical sense: the object of metaphysical thought. 
However, metaphysics among the philosophical sciences is not unique in its 
objective reference or in its logical structure: ‘... all philosophical thought is of the 
same kind, and every philosophical science partakes of the nature of metaphysics, 
which is not a separate philosophical science but a special study of the existential 
aspect of that same subject matter whose aspect as truth is studied by logic, and its 
aspect as goodness by ethics’ (EPM, 127).
According to Collingwood, philosophy is a form of thought in which essence 
and existence are inseparable. Thus, logic and ethics stand committed to the 
Ontological Proof. Logic not only discusses, but contains reasoning. Its subject 
matter cannot be conceived except as actual. Also, moral philosophy is both 
normative and descriptive (EPM, 127-133).
For Collingwood,
of view. For this reason Collingwood held that Hegel’s dialectic was mono-perspectival. Hegel 
assumed that the meaning o f concepts had not changed and only by abstracting from the development 
of meaning Hegel could write his logic. For Peters, the attempt to improve on Hegel’s dialectic and 
overcome subjectivism is the key point o f Collingwood’s philosophy, something which was 
incomplete because of ill health and premature death (Peters, 1995: 121-5).
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The hypothetical judgments o f science, as we have seen, involve various kinds o f categorical 
judgments as accessories or conditions of their substantive being; and conversely if  the body of  
philosophical knowledge consists o f categorical judgments it must at least be surrounded, as it 
were, by a scaffolding of hypothetical; I mean that, in order to decide that a certain theory is 
true, our affirmation of this theory must be supported by considering what the consequences 
would have been, had any of the alternative theories been true. (EPM, 133)
There is an overlap, however, between the hypothetical and the categorical:
Even in science, therefore, the overlap exists; and this I have already recognized by showing 
that the purely hypothetical propositions forming the body of science involve certain 
categorical elements which are necessary to their being but form no part o f their essence quo 
science; these are, as it were, a solid structure of facts and truths upon which the pliant body of 
scientific hypothesis leads a parasitic life. But in the case o f philosophical judgments the 
overlap becomes particularly intimate; the categorical element is no longer something external 
to the hypothetical, even if  necessary to it; both elements alike are the essence o f philosophy as 
such. As before, what we find here is a peculiar fusion o f logical elements which elsewhere 
are found either separate or united in a relatively loose and external way. (EPM, 135)
Accordingly, there is in Collingwood’s philosophy what might be called a 
rapprochement between logic and metaphysics. The logic of process and becoming 
that Collingwood puts forward as a solution to the ailments of Western culture is 
paralleled by a metaphysics of becoming. Metaphysics, as a study of reality, is a 
study of the processes by which we construct and apprehend reality through 
‘scientific’ (that is, ‘systematic or orderly’) thinking.
There is, however, some controversy surrounding the view that I am 
defending here. Some commentators deny that Collingwood’s logic and metaphysics 
imply an ontological claim about the nature of reality.
Because Collingwood’s logic of question and answer supplements but does 
not replace formal logic, Mink argues that it is not a theory of logic at all, in the
1 'Xordinary sense of that term, but a hermeneutics (Mink, 1969: 131). Similarly, 
Oldfield contends that the logic of question and answer is not really a logic, but a 
method of enquiry (Oldfield, 1995: 186).
However, as Stein Helgeby argues, Collingwood’s logic of question and 
answer can be understood as logic in the sense of a theory of thought, where thought,
13 According to Mink, the logic of question and answer might more properly be called the dialectic of 
question and answer. This would make clear that the relation between question and answer must be 
understood as occurring in processes which are prospectively open but retrospectively determinate 
(Mink, 1969: 132). Mink emends Collingwood’s theory to argue that the logical efficacy of a 
presupposition is not a force which causes a question to arise, just as the existence of a problem is not 
a sufficient cause o f its solution. It is rather a property which accrues to presuppositions in 
retrospective reconstruction. This would make the logic o f question and answer closely analogous to 
the structure o f the scale o f forms. In the scale o f forms each lower level or earlier stage is a 
necessary condition of the next, does not necessitate the emergence o f the next level, but is seen from 
the standpoint o f that level as leading to it and incorporated in it (Mink, 1969: 134-5).
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like everything else in the world, is seen as a process emerging from less complex 
structures and processes. Collingwood’s logic must be consistent with his broad 
ontology of process and action (Helgeby, 1994: 97). Helgeby argues: ‘Despite 
sounding chiefly hermeneutical, the logic of question and answer cannot be simply 
about interpretation; it must also be about a kind of organisation already implicit in 
the organisation of the world, particularly the psyche’ (Helgeby, 1994: 97). 
Collingwood’s logic has clear ontological foundations: ‘In so far as hermeneutics is a 
theory of interpretation, applicable to the human sphere, the logic of question and 
answer includes hermeneutics but goes well beyond its confines’ (Helgeby, 1994: 
98). As Helgeby explains, ‘... the logic of question and answer is logic come to 
terms with the process and activity of history in a world that is entirely process. The 
logic of question and answer unravels the historical process, but it also presupposes 
that the world is in process’ (Helgeby, 1994: 102).
It has also been denied that Collingwood’s metaphysics involves the 
apprehension of reality. Modood, for example, regards Collingwood’s use of the 
term ‘metaphysics’ as inappropriate, and argues that what Collingwood calls 
metaphysics is merely a ‘history of ideas’ (Modood, 1989: 117).
Giuseppina D’Oro argues that Collingwood wished to distinguish between 
epistemological issues, or issues pertaining to the order of knowledge, and 
ontological issues, or issues pertaining to the order of existence (D’Oro, 1999: 33). 
According to D’Oro, Collingwood, like Kant, saw metaphysics not as a study of 
reality, but as an enquiry into the a priori element within knowledge, which explains 
how knowledge or experience is possible (D’Oro, 1999: 31).
For D’Oro, Collingwood’s metaphysics of absolute presuppositions provides 
a purely conceptual map of reality14 (D’Oro, 1999: 33). D’Oro contends that the 
doctrine of the overlap of classes illustrates the purely epistemological nature of the 
principles which lie at the basis of experience and that the subdivision of experience 
into religious, artistic, scientific, historical, does not cut nature at the joints because 
such a subdivision serves a merely epistemological purpose (D’Oro, 1999: 33). 
According to D ’Oro, if the distinction between the presuppositions which govern 
say, the natural sciences and history was not purely conceptual, there could be no 
overlap in the class of objects studied by natural scientists and the class of objects
14 D ’Oro makes the same point in ‘On Collingwood’s Rehabilitation of the Ontological Argument’ 
( 2000 : 182).
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studied by historians (D’Oro, 1999: 34). The artist, the scientist, and the historian 
disclose the world in different but complementary ways (D’Oro, 1999: 39).
Accordingly, D’Oro interprets Collingwood’s use of the Ontological 
argument as ‘innocent of ontological implications’ (D’Oro, 2000: 183). According 
to D’Oro, Collingwood’s use of the ontological argument preserves only the kernel 
of truth that certain logical forms are necessarily expressed by the kind of statements 
that are paradigmatically made by historians and natural scientists: ‘The ontological 
proof applies to the object of philosophical thought only in the rather weak sense that 
the logical forms which structure a given domain of enquiry and which are the object 
of philosophical study are implicit in the statements of historians and natural 
scientists’ (D’Oro, 2000: 178).
Contrary to D’Oro, however, for Collingwood, art, religion, science, history, 
and philosophy are nevertheless real experiences. The artist, the scientist, and the 
historian not only disclose the world in different ways, but they also disclose 
different worlds, or different realities, albeit worlds which complement one another.
I suggest that D’Oro’s distinction between epistemological issues and 
ontological issues in Collingwood’s philosophy is mistaken. Collingwood’s 
metaphysics attempts to overcome the distinction between thought and reality, and 
his rejection of metaphysics as the science of pure being does not entail a rejection of 
metaphysics as a study of the nature of reality. As we have seen, in Truth and 
Contradiction and Libellus de Generatione, Collingwood had rejected the distinction 
between a phenomenal world and an ideal transcendent world as unsustainable and 
ultimately nihilistic.
Guido Vanheeswijck emphasises the ontological dimension to Collingwood’s 
metaphysics, citing a passage from Collingwood’s ‘The Nature of Metaphysical 
Study’15 of 1934:
The distinction between processes that we can discover in the object, and processes which we 
can discover in our minds when we reflect on our thought about the object, is a distinction that 
we have no right to make here, because, as we learnt in reflecting upon the idea o f nothing, we 
are here in a realm of thought in which there is no object, and in which therefore whatever 
necessarily happens in our minds when we think about a given concept is a process necessarily 
ascribed to the concept itself. (NMS, 12-13; Vanheeswijck, 1997: 158)
Collingwood argues that the principles of science are not ‘... mere fictions of 
the scientific mind, having no basis in reality, for that would make them mere
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appearances, and there are no mere appearances. It is for the metaphysician of today 
to work out a general conception of reality into which all these findings of modem 
science will dovetail naturally, to the mutual comfort and confirmation of 
metaphysics and science’ (NMS, 31; EM, 375; Vanheeswijck, 1997: 161). Our time 
is a time of ‘intellectual crisis’ and the task of metaphysicians is to lay ‘the 
foundations of a new age’ (NMS, 31; EM, 375; Vanheeswijck, 1997: 161).
In an unpublished manuscript of 1935, ‘Method and Metaphysics’, 
Collingwood wrote: ‘The enterprise which goes by the name of metaphysics may be 
described as an attempt to find out what we can about the general nature of reality’ 
(MM, 1; Vanheeswijck, 1997: 166). The kind of reality that metaphysics describes 
is a reality of, not pure being, but becoming16. Collingwood argues that you simply 
cannot think about pure abstract being, or that if you do think about it you find that it 
won’t stay pure (NMS, 10). Being is never devoid of peculiarities: ‘Pure being 
becomes its own determinations, or develops them, for becoming or development is a 
process of change initiated from within .... The idea of metaphysics in general 
cannot be grasped in abstraction by a purely formal definition unless we allow this 
abstract idea to sprout determinations of its own in the shape of particular 
metaphysical problems’ (NMS, 11-13; Vanheeswijck, 1997: 163).
Metaphysics, then, provides an account of how we both apprehend and create 
the world through absolute presuppositions and thought. For Collingwood, as we 
have seen, metaphysics disentangles our thoughts, separating absolute 
presuppositions from relative presuppositions. We are ordinarily unaware of the 
connections between our thoughts, something which becomes apparent only through 
scientific thinking. Thought is ordinarily ‘unconscious’.
Collingwood introduced the notion of ‘unconscious thought’ while explaining 
how a civilisation came to hold the absolute presuppositions it does and how these 
came, in the course of time, to be rejected in favour of others.
15 Part o f this manuscript is published in the revised edition of An Essay on Metaphysics, pp.356-78.
16 Vanheeswijck points out that Collingwood’s understanding o f metaphysics as the study of reality 
complements his rejection of the idea of metaphysics as ontology in An Essay on Metaphysics, as 
ontology was his name for the study of pure being (Vanheeswijck, 1997: 165). Collingwood was 
responding to A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, published in 1936, whose first chapter is 
devoted to the destruction o f the possibility o f metaphysical knowledge. For Collingwood, Ayer’s 
attack on metaphysics is an attack not on metaphysics but on pseudo-metaphysics (EM, 163). In 
Collingwood’s idiosyncratic terminology pseudo-metaphysics means ‘metaphysics as ontology’, or 
metaphysics as the study o f pure being. But, this does not imply a rejection of the study of the nature 
of reality (Vanheeswijck, 1997: 166).
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People are not ordinarily aware of their absolute presuppositions, and are not, therefore, thus 
aware o f changes in them: such a change, therefore, cannot be a matter o f choice. Nor is there 
anything superficial or frivolous about it. It is the most radical change a man can undergo, and 
entails the abandonment of all his most firmly established habits and standards for thought and 
action. Why, asks my friend, do such changes happen? Briefly, because the absolute 
presuppositions o f any given society, at any given phase o f its history, form a structure which 
is subject to ‘strains’ o f greater or less intensity, which are ‘taken up’ in various ways, but 
never annihilated. If the strains are too great, the structure collapses and is replaced by 
another, which will be a modification of the old with the destructive strain removed; a 
modification not consciously devised but created by a process of unconscious thought. (EM, 
48n)
Through converting ‘unconscious’ thought into conscious thought, the 
metaphysician distinguishes relative from absolute presuppositions. In this respect, 
metaphysics plays a similar role to art in Collingwood’s philosophy. As we have 
seen, for Collingwood, art also provides a foundation for thought by bringing into the 
light of consciousness what was previously unconscious.
As Vanheeswijck explains, the notion of ‘unconscious thought’ is a central 
concept in Collingwood’s thought. According to Vanheeswijck, spread over 
Collingwood’s entire works the same idea is expressed by means of three different 
images: the conceptual contrast implicit/explicit, the Tight-darkness’ metaphor, and 
the motto ‘credo ut intelligam’, borrowed from patristic philosophy.
In Religion and Philosophy, ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’, and Speculum Mentis, 
Collingwood defines philosophy in terms of implicit and explicit. The ‘light­
darkness’ metaphor is used, for the first time, in ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’, and it 
reappears in all his major philosophical writings as an indication of the specificity of 
the philosophical activity, and as an indication of the main task of the metaphysician 
(Vanheeswijck, 1994: 115). With the publication of ‘Reason is Faith Cultivating 
Itself and Faith and Reason in 1927, Collingwood introduced a motto illustrating 
the philosopher’s task of making explicit what we implicitly know: ‘credo ut 
intelligam’ (Vanheeswijck, 1994: 116).
In An Essay on Philosophical Method (as we have already seen) Collingwood 
characterises philosophical inquiry as the elaboration of the so-called Socratic 
principle that in a philosophical inquiry what we are trying to do is to know better 
something which in some sense we always knew: to know it ‘... actually instead of 
potentially, or explicitly instead of implicitly . . . ’ (EPM, 11). Hence, for 
Vanheeswijck, ‘... the notion ‘unconscious thought’ is no marginal datum at all, but
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functions precisely as a hermeneutic key to unlock the quintessence of 
Collingwood’s thought’ (Vanheeswijck, 1994: 116).
Vanheeswijck demonstrates that Collingwood developed the function of 
‘unconscious thought’ and illustrated the ontological dimension of his metaphysics in 
two manuscripts, ‘Method and Metaphysics’ (1935) and ‘Realism and Idealism’ 
(1936). In the manuscript ‘Method and Metaphysics’ Collingwood distinguishes 
three kinds of reality: abstract entities, minds, and bodies. Abstract entities are mere 
potentialities, logically preceding both material reality and human thought, which are 
actualised only in minds and bodies17 (Vanheeswijck, 1994: 117, and 1997: 167).
In the manuscript ‘Realism and Idealism’, Collingwood links the future of 
metaphysics with what he calls ‘objective idealism’. For Collingwood, unlike 
subjective (Kantian) idealism,
Objective idealism is epistemologically realistic; it believes we know the object itself as it 
really is .... Thus it conceives the world of nature as something derived from and dependent 
upon something logical prior to itself, a world o f immaterial ideas; but this is not a mental 
world, a world of mental activities or of things dependent on mental activity, although it is an 
intelligible world or a world in which mind, when mind comes into existence, finds itself 
completely at home. (RI, B, IX, sect. 1)
As Vanheeswijck points out, implicitly, these abstract entities, or a priori 
concepts, are always present as the condition of potentiality of all the forms of actual 
reality. In the historical evolution of the absolute presuppositions of human thought 
they are time and again made explicit18 (Vanheeswijck, 1994: 117).
17 According to Collingwood, abstract entities are actualised in the world o f bodies and minds in a 
different way. Vanheeswijck indicates: ‘In the world of bodies, what has once happened has forever 
disappeared. In the world of minds, the past can be called up again. Hence, a distinction can be made 
between cosmology (i.e. the study o f material changes) and history proper (i.e. the study o f human 
thinking). Metaphysics, then, is primarily the study o f the general characteristics of reality by means 
of an enquiry into the changing absolute presuppositions of human thought, of which cosmology is an 
important part’ (Vanheeswijck, 1997: 168).
18 Vanheeswijck indicates that, from 1927 onwards, Collingwood states that religion implicitly 
contains all the intellectual content philosophy could know throughout its evolution. This thesis that 
each form o f knowledge and action presupposes a religious belief is not contradicted by the fact of the 
historical evolution o f religious belief: as is demonstrated by Collingwood’s account in An Essay on 
Metaphysics o f how religious faith has evolved from natural religion through polytheism to 
monotheism.
Showing the interrelations between religion and the presuppositions o f successive forms of scientific 
thought is, for Collingwood, a primordial task o f the metaphysician. Specifically, Collingwood shows 
in An Essay on Metaphysics how the presuppositions o f modern science are interrelated to the 
Christian interpretation of religious belief (EM, 213-27; Vanheeswijck, 1994: 118). In An Essay on 
Metaphysics Collingwood argues: ‘... if  science is ‘experience’ interpreted in the light o f our general 
convictions as to the nature of the world, religion is what expresses these convictions in themselves 
and for their own sake and hands them on from generation to generation. And it does this 
irrespectively of whether we know by means of metaphysical analysis what these convictions are’ 
(EM, 198). Thus, Vanheeswijck argues, the title Collingwood gave to his 1927 article, ‘Reason is
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Between 1933 and 1936, therefore, Collingwood wrote that metaphysics is an 
attempt to find out about the general nature of reality. After 1936, he defined 
metaphysics as the historical study of absolute presuppositions. Despite what might 
seem to be a contradiction, these two views are consistent with one another. As 
Vanheeswijck explains, before 1936 Collingwood’s aim is to describe what a priori 
ideas are, and to construct a metaphysical theory, in particular the theory of objective 
idealism. After 1936, (responding to Ayer and the logical positivists) Collingwood 
describes the way in which we know a priori ideas. This means identifying 
metaphysics with the historical study of changing absolute presuppositions 
(Vanheeswijck, 1997: 169).
Collingwood, however, aims to overcome the distinction between how we 
know the world and what the world is. According to Collingwood, in ‘Realism and 
Idealism’,
It is a speculation at least worth considering, that a world which had no mind to know it would 
be an immature, seedling or embryonic world, having many o f its potentialities as yet 
undeveloped; and that the appearance, in such a world, o f minds able to know it would bring 
some of these potentialities into actuality, and thus, so far from falsifying the object, would 
realise the object or make it more fully and truly itself. (RI, A, VII, sect. 14)
The world we perceive does really and truly exist just as we perceive it, but it 
exists as we perceive it only because we perceive it. The addition of new qualities 
that a thing receives through our act of perception is a realisation of its own inner 
potentialities (RI, A, XII, sect. 1). The key to difficult problems in modem 
metaphysics, Collingwood contends, consists in the discovery that the subjective and 
objective worlds are not mutually exclusive: ‘Modem idealism and modem realism 
in some of the more familiar senses of those terms simply consists in alternative 
ways of breaking down the distinction’ (RI, B, IV, sect. 9). For Collingwood, 
following Hegel, ‘The mistake of subjective idealism, he proclaimed, was to think 
that ideas could only exist in our heads .... The mistake of the materialist is to think 
that ideas could exist only as embodied in matter’ (RI, B, VIII, sect. 3).
Collingwood’s view of metaphysics as the study of reality, according to 
Vanheeswijck, complements Collingwood’s conclusion to ‘The Function of 
Metaphysics in Civilization’ (an unpublished manuscript from 1938): ‘We must start 
again at the beginning and construct a new metaphysical theory which will face the
Faith Cultivating Itself, could also be applied to An Essay on Philosophical Method and An Essay on
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facts revealed by history. This work has never yet been done’ (EM, 420). But, as 
Vanheeswijck indicates, Collingwood did not undertake this task in An Essay on 
Metaphysics. In his preface to An Essay on Metaphysics, Collingwood emphasises 
the point that he does not aim at constructing a metaphysical theory: ‘This is not so 
much a book of metaphysics as a book about metaphysics. What I have chiefly tried 
to do in it is neither to expound my own metaphysical ideas, nor to criticize the 
metaphysical ideas of other people; but to explain what metaphysics is ... and how it 
is to be pursued’ (EM, civ; Vanheeswijck, 1997: 171).
Metaphysics, therefore, is the study of reality, although this is inextricably 
linked with an account of the processes by which we create and apprehend reality. 
Collingwood’s philosophy transcends the dualism between realism and idealism: 
thought both ‘apprehends’ and ‘constructs’ (cf. Mink, 1969: 112-3).
As Vanheeswijck points out, ‘Precisely because of its hermeneutic approach, 
Collingwood’s project differs from that of the history of ideas on which it relies so 
heavily. Collingwood’s conviction is that those who impose a new pattern of 
meaning onto the life and thought of their time do more than simply apply a different 
film of thought to an indifferent reality. They transform the nature of reality itself 
.... Spiritual changes transform reality as much as physical changes do’ 
(Vanheeswijck, 1994: 120).
For Collingwood, absolute presuppositions are ‘... catalytic agents which the 
mind must bring out of its own resources to the manipulation of what is called 
“experience” and the conversion of it into science and civilization’ (EM, 197). 
However, as Collingwood points out at the beginning of An Essay on Philosophical 
Method, if science and civilisation are to develop beyond a rudimentary level, it is 
necessary for us to reflect on them.
There are some things which we can do without understanding what we are doing; not only 
things which we do with our bodies, like locomotion and digestion, but even things which we 
do with our minds, like making a poem or recognizing a face. But when that which we do is in 
the nature o f thinking, it begins to be desirable, if  we are to do it well, that we should 
understand what we are trying to do. Scientific and historical thought could never go very far 
unless scientists and historians reflected on their own work, tried to understand what they were 
aiming at, and asked themselves how best to attain it. Most o f all, this is true o f philosophy. 
(EPM, 1)
Metaphysics (Vanheeswijck, 1994: 119).
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The purpose of both logic and metaphysics, then, is to provide an historical 
awareness of the thinking, with its absolute presuppositions and complexes of 
questions and answers, by which we create science and civilisation.
Collingwood’s logic and metaphysics, therefore, provide an account of the 
world of process and change. In this respect, his philosophy constitutes a solution to 
the problems facing a Western civilisation that has not yet significantly moved 
beyond the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy of being.
The logic and metaphysics of the Greeks are inadequate in that they attempt 
to locate all meaning and value in a transcendent world, while failing to adequately 
account for the actual world of process and becoming. Collingwood’s philosophy 
aims to overcome the crisis of the West (i.e. the need for a more adequate 
philosophy, or communal self-understanding) by reconciling normative values with 
the historical world. Hence, as I have argued, he narrows the gap between logic, as 
the study of thought, and metaphysics, as the study of reality.
Although, as some commentators have indicated, Collingwood’s philosophy 
becomes something like hermeneutics, unlike most hermeneutical thinkers and 
continental philosophers, he retains the old names of logic and metaphysics. 
Although Collingwood’s ‘revolution’ in logic and metaphysics attempts to transcend 
the philosophy of the Greeks, there is continuity with the past. There is in 
Collingwood’s philosophy, I suggest, a middle ground between traditional 
philosophy (or Platonism) and postmodernism. The middle ground is the 
reconciliation of normative thinking with the world of becoming.
For Collingwood, however, the crisis of civilisation had many aspects. One 
of these aspects was the threat to an historical metaphysics from reactionary 
traditional philosophy and from irrationalism. These threats to metaphysics and to 
civilisation will be discussed in the next chapter, and will serve to provide a more 
detailed understanding of Collingwood’s reformed metaphysics. I will also explain 
in more detail how Collingwood’s philosophy in general provides a solution to the 
crisis of the West through reconciling normative thinking and historical change.
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Chapter Seven:
Metaphysics, History and Progress
As I have argued in the last two chapters, Collingwood regarded Western civilisation 
as confronted by a crisis due to the instability and inadequacy of its philosophical 
foundations. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, which Western culture to a 
large extent still depends upon, meant that our self-understanding was circumscribed 
by an abstract philosophy of being and failed to give an adequate account of 
historical reality. Collingwood’s solution to this was a reform of both logic and 
metaphysics, in order to provide an account of becoming, not being. As I have also 
argued earlier, Collingwood’s solution to the crisis of the West ought to be seen in 
the context of Romanticism and historicism and sought to improve on previous 
attempts to reform philosophy, for example, by Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche.
Collingwood regarded his reformed metaphysics, and with it the ideal of an 
historically self-conscious civilisation, as threatened by reactionary philosophy and 
irrationalism. In Part II of An Essay on Metaphysics he refers to this threat as ‘anti­
metaphysics’. This chapter will discuss Collingwood’s response to anti-metaphysics 
and how in both his reformed metaphysics and his philosophy as a whole 
Collingwood responded to the crisis of civilisation by reconciling normative thinking 
with historical change.
For Collingwood, ‘anti-metaphysics’ means a kind of thought that regards 
metaphysics as a delusion and an impediment to the progress of knowledge, and 
demands its abolition. He describes three kinds of anti-metaphysics: progressive 
anti-metaphysics, reactionary anti-metaphysics and irrationalist anti-metaphysics 
(EM, 82-3).
Collingwood reminds us that ‘... metaphysical analysis, the discovery that 
certain presuppositions actually made are absolute presuppositions, is an integral part 
or an indispensable condition ... of all scientific work’ (EM, 84). In the interests of 
science it is necessary that the work of metaphysics should be done. ‘Science’ in this 
context means not natural science, but orderly and systematic thinking on every 
subject, and not ‘theoretical’ thinking alone, but ‘practical’ thinking as well (EM, 
85). According to Collingwood, ‘If a case arises when, for the sake of progress in 
any scientific enquiry, there is need for a certain piece of analysis to determine 
whether a certain presupposition newly brought to light is a relative one or an
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absolute one . . .’; and if professional metaphysicians are not willing or able to do this 
piece of analysis, then persons who do not profess to be metaphysicians, but are 
concerned for the progress of scientific enquiry in this actual case, have to undertake 
it for themselves (EM, 85).
This results in amateur metaphysicians: that is, metaphysical work done by 
persons who do not regard themselves as qualified to do it, but find they have to do it 
because a metaphysical problem has arisen out of their own special work to which 
the professional metaphysicians do not seem to be attending, and unless this problem 
is solved their own special work cannot go forward. Examples of this can be found 
in the introductory chapters of large scale works in natural science, history, law, and 
economics, especially works which are regarded as original and important 
contributions to knowledge.
The amateur metaphysicians may come to resent the fact that they are doing 
the work of professional metaphysicians and regard their own work as anti­
metaphysics, an attack on metaphysics. This Collingwood refers to as ‘progressive 
anti-metaphysics’, but in fact it is metaphysics, sometimes good and sometimes bad 
(EM, 88). For example, the development of Newton’s physics and modem physics 
meant putting forward new metaphysical propositions and warning people against 
the metaphysics of the professional metaphysicians (EM, 90). Professional 
metaphysicians, in this case, were bad historians and failed to keep in touch with the 
advance of ordinary science, and mistakenly thought that metaphysics has to do with 
‘eternal’ problems -  which in practice means the problems of the last generation, not 
this generation (EM, 86).
Collingwood argues that the case of reactionary anti-metaphysics is similar to 
the case of progressive anti-metaphysics in terms of the loss of effective contact 
between metaphysics and science. However, in this instance, the professional 
metaphysicians have moved ahead of ordinary science. Ordinary science here would 
have to create its own metaphysics, which would be reactionary as compared to 
professional metaphysics. The reactionary anti-metaphysician embraces past works 
in metaphysics as his ‘doctrine’, considering them in abstraction from the historical 
context to which they were relevant. He condemns contemporary metaphysics as 
false, thereby also condemning the science it is derived from. The reactionary in 
metaphysics is also a reactionary in ordinary science (EM, 92).
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Collingwood indicates that ‘... reactionary anti-metaphysics became a living 
force in the nineteenth century’ (EM, 93). After the revolutionary movements of the 
eighteenth century, Collingwood asserts, the nineteenth century saw in science and 
politics a counter-revolution. In order to consolidate the work of the eighteenth 
century, it was thought that the revolutionary spirit that created them must be held in 
check. Although conceiving itself as an age of progress, the nineteenth century, until 
within twenty or thirty years of its close, was, with regard to fundamental principles, 
an age of reaction (EM, 93).
According to Collingwood, James Watt’s principles of the reciprocating 
steam engine and John Locke’s theory of the English parliamentary system were 
introduced in the eighteenth century and continued to be used for much of the 
nineteenth, but became obsolete in the late nineteenth century. Those with a vested 
interest in their maintenance opposed two new developments. There was a new 
physics which was to produce what we now know as the physics of relativity, and 
there was a new history, cutting itself loose from the age-old method of scissors and 
paste, which was to revolutionise the accepted view of the human world. 
Nineteenth-century reactionaries fought against these tendencies using the slogans 
‘back to Kant’ and ‘no more metaphysics’ (EM, 95).
Kant, Collingwood explains, laid down the lines on which natural science 
was content to travel during the central part of the nineteenth century. The new 
physics and new geometry involved a breach with the Kantian system: a breach 
foreseen and some of its consequences worked out by Hegel (EM, 95). 
Reactionaries, therefore, attempted to maintain the pseudo-metaphysical status quo 
and represented the conviction that all questions about fundamental principles had 
been settled and should not be re-opened (EM, 96).
According to Collingwood, the immaturity of historical technique in the 
eighteenth century found its characteristic expression in the doctrine that historical 
events were the effects of causes in the world of nature: nature seemed to be an 
absolute presupposition of all historical thinking. This illusion was dispelled by the 
development of historical thought in the nineteenth century. If the eighteenth century 
historians’ grasp of historical method had been firmer they would have said that 
man’s historical activities were conditioned not by nature but by what he was able to 
make out of nature. The so-called conditioning of history by nature is in reality a 
conditioning of history by itself (EM, 98).
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The Lockian system in politics presupposed nationality (as well as private 
property), where nationality was conceived as ‘natural’: an absolute presupposition 
of all political activity whatever (EM, 97). For the modem historian, however, 
nationality is a relative presupposition. Nationality can make history only because 
history has made nationality and is constantly destroying and remaking it. Those 
who wanted to retain the political principles of the eighteenth century, therefore, 
represented reactionary anti-metaphysics. The historian had worked out the 
metaphysics against which the political reactionaries tried to defend themselves19 
(EM, 99).
Collingwood, therefore, regarded his reformed historical metaphysics as 
threatened by reactionary pseudo-philosophy. However, it was also confronted by 
the threat of irrationalism. Reacting to the inadequacies of traditional philosophy 
derived from Ancient Greece, certain modem intellectual movements tended to reject 
normative thinking and metaphysics completely, giving rise to scepticism and 
nihilism. Collingwood refers to these tendencies as ‘irrationalist anti-metaphysics’. 
He describes two kinds of irrationalist attack on metaphysics, one that emerges from 
psychology, and another from logical positivism.
In revealing the absolute presuppositions in any given piece of thinking, 
metaphysics is one branch of the science of thought (EM, 101). Psychology claims 
to be the science which describes how we think, and if this is so it would embrace 
metaphysics (EM, 103). But this claim, Collingwood contends, is questionable.
Collingwood argues that unlike any kind of bodily or physiological 
functioning, thought is a self-criticising activity. Whereas judgement is passed on a 
body by its environment, the mind judges itself. Not content with the simple pursuit 
of ends, the mind also pursues the further end of discovering for itself whether it has
19 Collingwood’s discussion o f ‘reactionary anti-metaphysics’ casts an interesting light on Hughes’ 
account o f German historicism. Hughes remarks that the separation of Germany from the main stream 
of Western European social thought tormented the minds of Troeltsch and Meinecke: ‘Why was it, 
they asked themselves, that from “shallow” philosophies o f history and society the British and the 
French had been able to develop political practices that were both viable and humane, whereas the 
Germans, with their “deeper” understanding, not only failed to achieve a social equilibrium, but as the 
twentieth century advanced, were ever more obviously succumbing to the “demon” of naked physical 
power?’ (Hughes, 1959: 184). The German school o f historical idealism, Hughes contends, taught 
Europeans to be dissatisfied with merely intellectualist explanations and to seek out the living and 
growing stuff o f history and society themselves. Yet in the sense o f applied wisdom this teaching 
came to next to nothing. The great political innovations of the nineteenth century were based on 
presuppositions derived from the century preceding and, in a philosophical sense, already out of date. 
Again, from Germany, figures such as Nietzsche and Dilthey were to serve as the heralds of the
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pursued them successfully. Hence the sciences of body and mind respectively must 
take this difference into account. Unlike the science of body, the science of mind ‘ . 
must describe the self-judging function which is part and parcel of all thinking and 
try to discover the criteria upon which its judgements are based’ (EM, 108).
The Greeks, Collingwood points out, recognised this dual aspect of the mind 
and constructed a science of theoretical thought called logic and a science of 
practical thought called ethics (EM, 108). In view of the attention to the idea of a 
criterion or standard of judgement, in Latin norma, these sciences have been 
traditionally called normative sciences. But, Collingwood argues,
... the word ‘normative’ may prove misleading, as it conveys by its form the suggestion that 
the standard or criterion to which it refers is a criterion belonging to the practitioner o f the 
science thus described, and used by him to judge whether the thinking which he studies has 
been well or ill done; as if  it were for the logician to decide whether a non-logician’s thoughts 
are true or false and his arguments valid or invalid, and for the student of ethics to pass 
judgement on the actions of other people as having succeeded or failed in their purpose. This 
suggestion is incorrect. The characteristic o f thought in virtue o f which a science o f thought is 
called normative consists not in the possibility that one man’s thoughts may be judged 
successful or unsuccessful by another, real though that possibility is; but in the necessity that in 
every act of thought the thinker himself should judge the success o f his own act. (EM, 109)
Therefore, he substitutes ‘... for the traditional epithet “normative” the more 
accurate term “criteriologicar” (EM, 109). It seems then that, coinciding with his 
historicist reform of metaphysics, Collingwood replaces the term ‘normative’ with 
the term ‘criteriological’ because the criteria for judgements are not separate from or 
transcending judgements themselves: rather they are immanent to a particular 
context.
Collingwood asserts that the sixteenth-century proposal for a new science 
called psychology arose from the recognition that what we call feeling is not a kind 
of thinking, not a self-critical activity, and therefore not the possible subject matter of 
a criteriological science (EM, 109). Psychology, as the study of the ‘psyche’, or a 
science of feeling, was designed to fill the gap between logic and ethics on the one 
hand, and physiology on the other (EM, 110).
According to Collingwood, ‘The intellectual task of the eighteenth century 
was the liquidation of Europe’s debt to Greece’ (EM, 112). Eighteenth century 
religious innovations were an attack upon Christian doctrines and institutions in so 
far as these expressed a mentality moulded by Greek influence. Scientific
intellectual renewal o f the 1890s (Hughes, 1959: 185). According to Collingwood, however, 
reactionary anti-metaphysics was as much prevalent in Germany as elsewhere (cf. EM, 95).
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innovations attacked biology, as biology was the last refuge of teleological natural 
science. Thus, eighteenth century biology argued that organisms were nothing but 
complexes of material particles and operated solely according to mechanical 
principles. Similarly, in the theory of knowledge it was argued that operations of 
thought were nothing but aggregations and complexes of feelings, special cases of 
sensation and emotion. This ‘materialistic epistemology’ aimed to wipe out the old 
sciences of thought, logic and ethics, and replace them with psychology, the science 
of feeling (EM, 114).
Collingwood explains that a revolt against the old logic and ethics may have 
been desirable and beneficial ‘... for it might very well be true that people who 
professed those sciences had misunderstood their normative character, and had 
claimed a censorship over the thoughts and actions of other people . . . ’ (EM, 114). 
However, epistemological materialism proceeded on the assumption that thought did 
not possess the power of self-criticism, the criterion of truth and falsehood, by 
reference to which thought judges itself. Therefore, the new psychological science 
of thought proposed by epistemological materialism was a pseudo-science of thought 
(EM, 115). The difference between logic and psychology, Collingwood indicates, is 
that psychology has a clear and conscious determination to ignore the self-critical 
part of thought.
The advance of epistemological materialism in the nineteenth century meant 
that psychology was accepted as the science of thought and logic rejected as an out- 
of-date pseudo-science. But these claims, Collingwood argues, down to the present 
day, have always continued to be based on the principles of epistemological 
materialism. Psychology fails to understand thought as an attempt to think truly and 
avoid thinking falsely, and fails to distinguish thinking from feeling (EM, 117).
Despite the triumphs of psychology when it has attended to its proper 
business, the study of feeling, it does not survive critical inspection when it deals 
with such matters as art, religion, civilisation and the intellectual structure of 
institutions belonging to other civilisations. An example of this is Freud’s Totem and 
Taboo (EM, 118). Because psychology ignores the distinction between truth and 
falsehood, Collingwood contends, it is implicitly teaching that there is no difference 
between science and sophistry, and is covertly describing itself as no science at all 
(EM, 120-1). For example, Collingwood accuses W. McDougall’s discussion of
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animal behaviour of being an attempt to associate thinking with ‘a random scratching 
and clawing about’ (EM, 126).
Collingwood declares that European civilisation is based on the belief that 
truth is the most important thing in the world and that scientific thinking is the most 
valuable thing a person can do. In this kind of civilisation, ‘Religion would be 
predominantly a worship of truth ... and the god’s presence to the worshipper a gift 
of mental light’ (EM, 133). Philosophy would be predominantly an exposition of 
scientific thought and orderly action, and especially the problem of establishing 
standards by which on reflection truth can be distinguished from falsehood. Politics 
would be predominantly the attempt to build up a common life by the methods of 
reason and subject to the sanctions of reason. Education, social structure and 
economic life would also place orderly and scientific thinking in the most honourable 
and commanding position (EM, 134).
According to Collingwood, the growth of irrationalism is leading to an ‘... 
epidemic withering of belief in the importance of truth and in the obligation to think 
and act in a systematic and methodical way’ (EM, 135), and substituting the worship 
of truth for the worship of emotion and a cultivation of certain emotional states. The 
success of this attack on civilisation is conditional on the victims’ suspicions not 
being aroused. Immunity from criticism for irrationalist agents is ensured by putting 
forward their propaganda under the pretence that it is a special science (EM, 136).
With the irrationalist attack on civilisation, there has been a tendency ‘... to 
ignore and vilify the traditional theology of religion and to regard religion as an 
affair of the emotions’ (EM, 137). In philosophy there has been a tendency to belittle 
the notion of scientific thought, to magnify emotion at the expense of intellect and 
the developing of a kind of ethical intuitionalism. In politics, Collingwood asserts, 
there has been a tendency to become impatient with the work of politically educating 
an entire people, to choose leaders not for their intellectual powers but for their 
ability to excite mass-emotions, and to suppress discussion in favour of propaganda 
(EM, 139).
A civilisation perishes (Collingwood continues) if the people who share it are 
no longer convinced that the form of life which it tries to realise is worth realising: 
‘If European civilization is based on the belief that truth is the most precious thing in 
the world and that pursuing it is the whole duty of man, an irrationalist epidemic if it 
ran through Europe unchecked would in a relatively short time destroy everything
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that goes by the name of European civilization’ (EM, 140). In this condition
9 0  • •scientific workers would no longer be able to continue their work . Science will not 
grow ‘ . except where the scientist as the priest of truth is not only supported but 
revered as a priest-king by a people that shares his faith. When scientists are no 
longer kings, there will be (to adapt a famous saying of Plato’s) no end to the evils 
undergone by the society that has dethroned them until it perishes physically for 
sheer lack of sustenance’ (EM, 141).
Collingwood’s attack on psychology, as he remarked in An Autobiography, 
implied no hostility towards psychology proper, as a science of feeling, and when 
dealing with the problems of psychotherapy (A, 95). But psychology, in so far as it 
claims to be the science of thought and ignores the criteriological part of thought, is 
part of a nihilism that threatens civilisation.
From the psychological attack on metaphysics, Collingwood turns to the 
positivistic. Positivists believed that only knowledge attained by the methods of 
natural science was valid. Unlike the psychological attack on logic, positivists were 
concerned with the question of whether or not a process of thought had satisfied the 
scientific criterion of validity. However, in defining this criterion, they mistakenly 
argued that, in scientific enquiry, firstly, facts were ascertained by the senses, and 
then, secondly, they were classified by thought. Concepts, hypotheses and laws were 
defined in terms of the observation of facts (EM, 144).
Contrary to positivism, Collingwood argues that by means of our senses we 
do not observe any facts, we only undergo feelings. Positivism, in this respect, 
Collingwood contends, was reverting to a long-exploded error of the Middle Ages. 
Positivists failed to see that ‘fact’ is a term belonging to the vocabulary of historical 
thought: ‘Positivism thus implied, but did not furnish, a theory of historical 
knowledge as a foundation for its theory of natural science’ (EM, 145).
Furthermore, the positivist argument that every notion is a class of observable 
facts implied that scientific thought has no presuppositions. If the function of 
thought is to classify observed facts, this implied that there must be facts available 
for classification before thought can begin to operate. Once facts are available there 
would be no need to presuppose anything: you just set to work and classify them. 
But, Collingwood explains, the work of observing facts is really done by the senses
20 The point that irrationalism in society fatally undermines scientific work is discussed by Peter 
Drucker in his account o f Nazi Germany in The End o f  Economic Man (1939).
135
with assistance from the intellect. What the positivists called ‘observing’ facts is 
really historical thinking, which is a complex process involving numerous 
presuppositions (EM, 146).
Continuing the eighteenth-century programme of waging war against Greek 
elements in modem thought, the positivists attacked metaphysics because of its 
subject matter. They had never discovered that there were such things as absolute 
presuppositions. Presuppositions were misunderstood as general propositions about 
matters of fact, advanced on credit and awaiting verification (EM, 147). For the 
positivists, presuppositions were either facts arrived at from observation and 
verifiable through observation, or else nonsense (EM, 148).
In practice, Collingwood asserts, positivists practiced both metaphysics and 
pseudo-metaphysics. Through sound metaphysical analysis, they detected absolute 
presuppositions which were implied in the methods of natural science, then justified 
them on positivistic principles as generalisations from observed fact. This is because 
they thought themselves bound to justify any presuppositions which natural science 
thought fit to make (EM, 149). For example, John Stuart Mill discovered that natural 
scientists are convinced that all events happen according to laws. Mill mistakes this 
absolute presupposition for a proposition and tries to prove it true, but his argument 
is circular (EM, 151-2). Similarly, Bradley’s claim that ‘metaphysics is the finding 
of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct’, while equating absolute 
presuppositions with ‘what we believe upon instinct’, signifies that he also thinks 
that absolute presuppositions must be justified by appeal to observed facts, but, not 
realising that he is engaging in pseudo-metaphysics, has grown disillusioned with the 
process (EM, 153-4).
According to Collingwood, logical positivism developed further this 
erroneous approach to metaphysics, using the following syllogism, which had been 
put forward by A.J. Ayer, in Language Truth and Logic (1936): ‘Any proposition 
which cannot be verified by appeal to observed facts is a pseudo-proposition. 
Metaphysical propositions cannot be verified by appeal to observed facts. Therefore 
metaphysical propositions are pseudo-propositions, and therefore nonsense’ (EM, 
162).
For Collingwood, however, Ayer’s position is an attack not on metaphysics, 
but on pseudo-metaphysics. Characteristically, suppositions are mistaken for 
propositions (EM, 163). For Ayer, so-called ‘metaphysical propositions’ are not
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verifiable and are therefore ‘pseudo-propositions’. As such, Collingwood argues, 
they are not propositions. This gives rise to the question of what they really are (a 
question that Ayer does not answer) and the answer is suppositions (EM, 165). Ayer, 
Collingwood explains, proved merely that metaphysics is not a set a propositions 
claiming to give knowledge of a reality which transcends the phenomenal world.
Accordingly, the logical positivist demand for the elimination of metaphysics, 
Collingwood suggests, is the outcome of a desire to ‘... belittle what one cannot 
share, and destroy what one cannot understand’ (EM, 166). Ayer’s ideas of ethics 
and theology are, Collingwood proposes, foolish ideas from our childhood which we 
have a resentment towards in later life. We reject with argument the traces of that 
real or supposed teaching still discernible in ourselves (EM, 167).
According to Collingwood, the logical positivist attack on metaphysics is an 
attack on the foundations of natural science. To deny the doctrine that thought has 
presuppositions is to attempt to reduce all thinking to its most confused and 
unscientific level21 (EM, 170-1). The logical positivist attack on metaphysics, then, 
is part of the irrationalist threat to civilisation. For Collingwood,
The fate of European science and European civilization is at stake. The gravity of the peril lies 
especially in the fact that so few recognize any peril to exist. When Rome was in danger, it 
was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the Capitol. I am only a professorial goose, 
consecrated with a cap and gown and fed at a college table; but cackling is my job, and cackle I 
will. (EM, 343)
As Collingwood argues, therefore, the well-being of civilisation is 
inextricably bound up with the well-being of science. Furthermore, the preservation 
of science is the same thing as the growth of science: ‘Science is a plant of slow 
growth .... and for a plant the end of growth is the end of life . . . ’ (EM, 141). The 
advancement of science and the existence of science, he asserts, ‘... are not two 
things but one ... ’ (EM, 342).
However, for Collingwood, it seems that the advancement of science and the 
preservation of civilisation are not achieved by metaphysics alone. As I have already 
suggested, according to Collingwood’s account of metaphysics and the logic of
21 Collingwood, furthermore, argues that Samuel Alexander was infected by positivism in regarding 
the idea that every event has a cause as a summary statement of observed facts, rather than as a 
presupposition (EM, 176-7). Alexander mistakenly constructed his metaphysics on the assumption 
that all human beings everywhere and always accepted Mill’s law o f universal causation and 
everything enunciated in Kant’s ‘System of Principles’. But these principles, absolute presuppositions 
of eighteenth-century science, had only a short historical life in a limited part o f the world (EM, 179- 
80).
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question and answer, the meaning of a set of absolute presuppositions is only fully 
realised in the context of the questions and answers that it actually gives rise to.
The work of the metaphysician, in revealing absolute presuppositions and 
providing an historical account of how one set of absolute presuppositions has 
changed into another, is an indispensable condition for the advancement of science. 
But for a science, that is, ‘systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject 
matter’ (EM, 4), to progress it is also necessary to have knowledge of the relative 
presuppositions, questions and answers that have occurred in the history of that 
particular science.
This kind of historical knowledge must be possessed by the scientist in order 
to make an advance in any particular science or practice and by the philosopher in 
order to reflect on that science or practice and determine whether or not an advance 
has been made. It seems, however, that, for Collingwood, this kind of detailed 
historical knowledge of how a science or practice has developed over time is not 
primarily the concern of the metaphysician. Instead it is the business of philosophy, 
not metaphysics, to interpret the whole of a science or practice in order to say 
whether or not progress has occurred.
The interpretation that I am putting forward here is illuminated by the view of 
Oldfield. As Oldfield describes it,
Collingwood’s analysis o f the theory of absolute presuppositions is to work backwards from 
statements to the questions to which they are answers, or from propositions to the 
presuppositions which underlie them, until we reach rock bottom with presuppositions which 
are not answers to questions, and which are therefore absolutely not relatively presupposed. If 
we reverse this procedure, and start with absolute presuppositions working forwards, then we 
have a much more fruitful way o f linking the theory o f absolute presuppositions with 
Collingwood’s theory o f historical knowledge. If we stand at the mouth of a river, we have 
only to walk along its bank to find its source: if, on the other hand, we stand at its source, while 
some courses will definitely be ruled out, there is a variety o f courses which might have been 
taken. (Oldfield, 1995: 196)
It seems that Oldfield agrees with Mink’s claim that the questions which 
absolute presuppositions give rise to are prospectively open, but retrospectively 
determinate (cf. Mink, 1969: 132). According to Oldfield, ‘Questions arise from 
constellations of absolute presuppositions, but there is no logical entailment between 
them and the questions which do arise. One constellation can give rise to a number 
of relative presuppositions’ (Oldfield, 1995: 196).
Oldfield argues that ‘... for the theory of absolute presuppositions to 
illuminate Collingwood’s theory of historical knowledge, what has to be
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incorporated is an analysis of what relative presuppositions have in fact been given 
rise to by particular constellations of absolute presuppositions’ (Oldfield, 1995, 196- 
7).
As an example of particular relative presuppositions that absolute 
presuppositions have given rise to, one needs to discuss the history of science and the 
history of history. Oldfield draws attention to three different intellectual traditions 
that Collingwood analyses in The Idea o f History, each of which was in its time 
inimical to the development of historical knowledge: Greek mathematical thinking of 
the sixth century; medieval theology; and the concern with natural science from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. At the same time, Collingwood offers an 
account of the development of a different tradition of thinking which not until the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was able to offer a theory of 
knowledge which did proper justice to historical thought (Oldfield, 1995: 197). Each 
of the former three traditions had its period of dominance, when its concerns 
coloured the whole field of intellectual inquiry. The achievement of Herodotus in 
the field of historical knowledge lay ‘smothered’ for centuries, until revived by Vico, 
and developed thereafter mainly by Kant, Hegel, Marx, Simmel, Dilthey and Croce 
(Oldfield, 1995: 198).
Although my argument is not the same as Oldfield’s, I think that Oldfield’s 
distinction between ‘working backwards’ and ‘working forwards’ is especially 
useful. For Collingwood, I suggest, ‘working backwards’ in order to provide an 
account of the absolute presuppositions that underlie science is essentially the task of 
the metaphysician. But for philosophy to examine whether or not progress has 
occurred in a science or practice it must take into account, not just absolute 
presuppositions, but also the scientific thinking, or ‘working forwards’, to which 
absolute presuppositions have given rise.
Accordingly, on this interpretation, Collingwood’s reformed metaphysics is a 
solution to the crisis of Western civilisation and rejects both reactionary philosophy 
and irrationalism. However, it needs to be supplemented by a broader philosophy of 
history and of the history of science.
Metaphysics, then, does not provide an account of the advancement of 
science and civilisation. But it does facilitate this advance, or progress, by revealing 
absolute presuppositions. The historical change from one constellation of absolute 
presuppositions to another is not in itself progressive.
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The argument that I am putting forward here, however, is quite different from 
the interpretation of Martin. Martin argues that the transition from one set of 
absolute presuppositions to another can be seen as progressive. According to Martin 
(in his Introduction to the revised edition of An Essay on Metaphysics), metaphysics 
involves a modified scale of forms, where the overlaps are partial and spread out 
over time, in contrast with the ‘logical’ model in An Essay on Philosophical Method 
where all theories confront one another together (EM, xlii). Martin, referring to 
Collingwood’s short essay on progress at the end of The Idea o f History, points out 
that Collingwood thought that we can talk of ‘progress’ when referring to two 
contemporaneous but competing theories within a science, or regarding two stages in 
the development in one and the same science (EM, xliii). For Martin, just as we can 
say that one scientific theory, or phase of scientific development, marked an 
improvement over a competing theory or earlier phase, so we can say that one 
ingredient set of absolute presuppositions marked an improvement over another (EM, 
xliv). Therefore, Martin asserts, a modified scale of forms could be offered for the 
whole sequence of absolute presuppositions of a given science within the overall 
process of its development. In this way, metaphysics can be seen as progressive 
(EM, xlv).
Referring to Collingwood’s discussion of ‘the existence of God’ in Part IIIA 
of An Essay on Metaphysics, Martin argues that the metaphysician can say that in the 
practice of science, with the history it actually has had and in the process of 
development it has actually undergone, the monotheistic presupposition goes with 
improved science in that particular process of development and, hence, can be 
regarded as superior in a (modified) scale of forms to the presuppositions of 
polytheism. In Martin’s view, the metaphysician compares different phases in the 
history of a science with each other, but not with whole ways of life (EM, xlvi).
Martin contends, then, that the main task of metaphysics is the comparative 
one of assessing progress, of showing that it has occurred as between theories 
occupying two different stages in a historical process of development and 
differentiation. The crucial judgement of explanatory improvement can be 
accomplished, between two scientific theories covering roughly the same ground, by 
subjecting the presuppositions of each theory to scale of forms analyses (EM, 1). The 
work of metaphysics is not merely descriptive, but normative or critical (EM, lii).
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Martin argues that the metaphysician may also want to identify problems in present 
science and to suggest how these problems might be resolved (EM, xlvii).
Accordingly, referring to Collingwood’s discussion of causation in Part IIIC 
of An Essay on Metaphysics, Martin regards Collingwood as criticising Newtonian 
and post-Newtonian ideas of causation in theoretical natural science and replacing 
them with a more suitable set, which could be shown to solve certain problems in the 
earlier ideas while keeping a grip on the solid achievements there (EM, lxvii).
Like Martin, Hinz also argues that metaphysics is progressive. According to 
Hinz, the criteriological aspect of thought means that the process of development 
with which metaphysics is concerned must be shown to be progressive (Hinz, 1994b: 
132). The metaphysician regards the successive systems in a process of development 
as contentious versions of a single practice (Hinz, 1994b, 135). For Hinz, ‘dialectical 
argument informed by the criteria for progress supplied by the particular process of 
development in question’ demonstrates how progress has been made in a practice 
(Hinz, 1994b, 135-6).
I suggest, on the contrary, that Martin and Hinz are mistaken in their view 
that the transition from one set of absolute presuppositions to another is progressive 
and that Martin’s interpretation of Collingwood’s discussions of causation and ‘the 
existence of God’ is mistaken. Martin and Hinz are correct in their contention that 
there can be progress in a science or practice. However, progress occurs in a science 
or practice as a whole, not in its absolute presuppositions, and it is not the task of the 
metaphysician to assess whether or not progress has occurred.
As we have seen, for Collingwood, absolute presuppositions are not true or 
false. Therefore, ‘It is a mistake ... to fancy that by investigating the truth of their 
absolute presuppositions a metaphysician could show that one school of science was 
fundamentally right and another fundamentally wrong’ (EM, 52-3). Metaphysics, 
Collingwood explains, does not show which schools of scientific thought are 
justified in the light of metaphysical criticism and which are not. The metaphysician 
does not criticise absolute presuppositions: he or she finds out what they are (EM, 
54).
This view of metaphysics as aiding the progress of science through revealing 
absolute presuppositions, but not as judging whether or not progress has taken place, 
is evident in Collingwood’s discussion of ‘the existence of God’ in Part IIIA of An 
Essay on Metaphysics.
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According to Collingwood, the existence of God is an absolute 
presupposition of all the thinking done by Christians (EM, 186). Because it is not a 
proposition it is neither true nor false. However, the metaphysical proposition that 
‘somebody believes that God exists’, if true, can be proved, and if false, can be 
disproved (EM, 188). Thus, Anselm’s ontological proof proves the proposition that 
‘we believe in God’. People who cannot see that metaphysics is an historical 
science, Collingwood argues, have allowed themselves to become indignant over the 
fact, as they think it, that this argument starts from ‘our idea’ of God and seems to 
proceed thence to ‘God’s existence’ (and in this they are following Kant). But 
Anselm’s proof is a metaphysical argument, and therefore an historical argument. It 
proves that ‘... because our idea of God is an idea of id quo maius cogitari nequit we 
stand committed to belief in God’s existence’22 (EM, 190).
Collingwood argues that the Greek philosopher, Thales, in maintaining that 
the world and everything in it was made of water, was attempting to introduce unity 
into a pre-existing mass of scientific work which was polymorphic in character (EM, 
202-3). The collection and study of isolated blocks of material, each drawn from a 
single realm of nature, was finding itself handicapped by the obscurity of the 
relations between one such block and another (EM, 205). Thales, therefore, was 
fighting for the principle that in spite of all the differences between different natural 
realms and the different sciences that study them there is one thing that is nature, and 
one science that is natural science (EM, 206). He was attempting to replace a 
polymorphic natural science with a monomorphic one, and this was bound up with 
the attempt to replace a polytheistic by a monotheistic religion (EM, 207).
According to Collingwood, ‘The high-water of this reformation is recorded in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where the central problem is to expound the presuppositions 
of a science of nature ... in which the balance was evenly held between the oneness
22 Collingwood’s use of Anselm’s ontological proof here is consistent with his unpublished ‘Lectures 
on the Ontological Proof o f the Existence o f God’ of 1919, where Collingwood had argued that 
metaphysics tells us what we are logically committed to believing in. It is also consistent with his use 
of the Ontological Proof in An Essay on Philosophical Method, where he argued that the object of 
metaphysical thought is non-hypothetical and real (EPM, 124). As I have argued, then, 
Collingwood’s metaphysics transcends the distinction between belief and reality, and the belief (or 
absolute presupposition) in God is argued to be real.
This is something that Donagan finds unsatisfactory. According to Donagan, we want something 
more than the notion of God as a concept or presupposition: ‘Most religious men, certainly the general 
public which Collingwood addressed, want something they can worship; and his hypostatized copy­
book headings do not supply it’ (Donagan, 1962: 304). For Donagan, ‘It is a though he
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of things and their manyness’ (EM, 210-1). However, Collingwood contends, 
Aristotle thought that the existence of nature is not a presupposition, but an observed 
fact, and this metaphysical error was corrected by Christianity (EM, 215). Similarly, 
Aristotle thought that motion was an observed fact, but it is a presupposition (EM, 
216-7). Therefore, Aristotle failed in his metaphysical analysis, a metaphysical 
mistake that was a commonplace of Greek thought, and this implied a breakdown of 
Greek science (EM, 218). Hence, Collingwood argues, the Greco-Roman world was 
moribund from internal causes, specifically because it had accepted as an article of 
faith, as part of its ‘pagan’ creed, a metaphysical analysis of its own absolute 
presuppositions which was at certain points erroneous. This metaphysical error 
killed pagan science, and pagan civilisation with it (EM, 224).
Early Christian writers saw that the ‘pagan’ world was failing to keep alive its 
own fundamental convictions, because owing to faults in metaphysical analysis it 
had become confused as to what these convictions were. The remedy consisted in 
abandoning the faulty analysis and accepting a new and more accurate analysis, 
which they called the ‘Catholic Faith’ (EM, 225). These presuppositions needed to 
be made, they said, by anyone who wished to be ‘saved’: saved, that is, from the 
moral and intellectual bankruptcy, the collapse of science and civilisation, which was 
overtaking the ‘pagan’ world. Saving people, Collingwood explains, means inducing 
them to live in a different way, a way that is not impracticable (EM, 226). The new 
way of living would involve a new science and a new civilisation, and, Collingwood 
argues, the presuppositions that go to make up this ‘Catholic Faith’ have been the 
fundamental presuppositions of natural science ever since (EM, 227).
Thus, for Collingwood, through revealing absolute presuppositions, 
metaphysics facilitates the advancement of science and civilisation, and if the 
metaphysician’s task is done badly, the consequences for civilisation are grave (as 
Collingwood argues was the case with the collapse of Greco-Roman civilisation). 
However, crucially, Collingwood does not argue that the metaphysician replaces one 
set of absolute presuppositions with a better set. Rather, early Christian
metaphysical thinking provided a more accurate account of what the absolute 
presuppositions of European civilisation actually were.
[Collingwood] divined in Christianity something which compelled his veneration, while eluding his 
ardent attempts to define it’ (Donagan, 1962: 307).
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This view of the task of metaphysics is also evident in Collingwood’s 
discussion of causation in Part IIIC. Having outlined three senses of the word 
‘cause’23, Collingwood argues that during what he calls the ‘Kantian period’, roughly 
speaking from Kant to Einstein, the fabric of natural science rested on an insecure 
foundation (EM, 333). In so far as it arose out of the idea of causation, this 
insecurity consisted in two metaphysical dilemmas: the anthropocentric dilemma and 
the anthropomorphic dilemma. The anthropocentric dilemma was between the idea 
of natural science as practical, of the Baconian or experimental type, and the idea of 
a theoretical natural science, which aimed at knowledge of what the natural world is 
in itself. According to Collingwood, the latter was the orthodox or accepted view of 
natural science during the Kantian period. But the issue as between the two 
alternatives was not clearly envisaged, and in the latter part of the century it began to 
be replaced by the former view (EM, 334).
The anthropomorphic dilemma concerned the question of whether the natural 
scientist presupposes that the world of nature is animated by something like a human 
mind or psyche, or whether he or she makes no such presupposition. The latter, 
Collingwood asserts, was the orthodox view of natural science during the Kantian 
period, but once more the issue was not clearly defined. The natural science of the 
period regarded itself as a non-anthropomorphic natural science, but it failed to 
realise that within its faith in causation there lay concealed, because of a lack of 
metaphysical analysis, an element of anthropomorphism.
According to Collingwood, the ‘materialism’ of nineteenth-century anti­
metaphysical thinkers was ‘anthropomorphic at the core’ (EM, 336). He argues that 
while physicists were escaping from the Kantian confusion by the ‘... heroic 
measure of reconstructing their own science in such a way that the idea of causation 
no longer figures in it at all, philosophers, especially those of the reactionary and 
obscurantist schools which put forward the programmes of “realism” and “logical 
positivism”, show their desire to perpetuate whatever confusions there were in
23 Sense I is typical o f history: ‘here that which is “caused” is the free and deliberate act of a conscious 
and responsible agent and “causing” him to do it means affording him a motive for doing it’. Sense II 
is typical o f what Collingwood called ‘the practical sciences of nature’: ‘here that which is “caused” is 
an event in nature, and its “cause” is an event or state o f things by producing or preventing which we 
can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be’. The leading idea here is that of a means-end 
relationship. Sense III is typical o f the theoretical natural sciences, such as physics and chemistry, 
where things happen independently o f the human will (EM, 285-6; cf. EM, lix-lx).
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nineteenth-century science by reiterating the contradiction that vitiated the 
nineteenth-century idea of causation’ (EM, 336-7).
Superficially, this might seem simply to be an account of one set of absolute 
presuppositions being replaced by a ‘better’, or more coherent, set. But, with regard 
to causation, the primary task of the metaphysician, for Collingwood, was accurately 
to reveal the absolute presuppositions that would ground modem science, in contrast 
with the reactionary anti-metaphysics of the ‘realists’ and the logical positivists, who 
embraced contradictory absolute presuppositions as their ‘doctrine’.
Collingwood’s view that absolute presuppositions are not progressive and 
that the task of the metaphysician is simply to reveal what the absolute 
presuppositions of a given practice are is also discussed in ‘The Function of 
Metaphysics in Civilization’ (published in the revised edition of An Essay on 
Metaphysics).
According to Collingwood, ‘The presence of a given item in a metaphysical 
system is a question of fact, not a question of logic’ (EM, 384). The metaphysician 
has to settle the question of what relations there are between the items of a 
metaphysical system ‘... not on any abstract logical or dialectical methods of his own 
devising, but by studying the actual way in which the people whose thought he is 
analysing treat their presuppositions’ (EM, 384). For Collingwood,
... the only kind of system that the metaphysician expounds is the kind of system which he 
finds to exist in the minds of the people whose thought he is studying; and hence, if  he studies 
a pluralistic science like that o f the ancient Greeks he will necessarily produce a pluralistic 
metaphysics, whereas if  he studies a monistic science like that of the Renaissance and modem 
times he will necessarily produce a monistic one. (EM, 389)
In response to the question as to whether a monistic metaphysical system may 
not be better than a pluralistic one or vice versa, Collingwood asks:
If modem metaphysics is so much better than ancient, the improvement in natural science 
which is cited in evidence of this ought to be reinforced by a parallel improvement in all other 
branches o f theoretical and practical thinking: e.g. in morals, in law, in politics, in economics, 
in religion, in art, etc. Can this be maintained, or can it not rather be argued that in modem 
times we have specialized in certain directions and have progressed there at the price of  
retrogression elsewhere? This is often said, and I do not know how to refute it. (EM, 391)
Hence, we may have to qualify the statement that modem science is vastly 
better than the ancient, by pointing out that there is no real standard of comparison 
between them. Perhaps the ancients did the spadework in science, preparing a soil 
out of which we modems are winning our harvests, and ‘... if so, is not the richness
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of these harvests a proof, not of our superiority to the ancients, but of the excellence 
of their pioneer work? (EM, 392)’ There is, then, no way of answering the question 
definitely, Collingwood claims, except by surrendering to what he calls the ‘trousers 
criterion’: ‘We wear trousers, therefore trousers are the best things to wear, and 
everybody who doesn’t wear trousers is in that respect inferior to ourselves’ (EM, 
392).
Regarding the question of progress, therefore, it seems that the role of 
metaphysics in Collingwood’s philosophy is comparable to the role of art. Whereas 
the objective of metaphysics is to uncover and clarify what the absolute 
presuppositions of a given piece of thinking are, the artist uncovers and expresses 
emotions24. Like the absolute presuppositions that the metaphysician reveals, the 
emotions that the artist expresses (as we have seen in Part One) are not in themselves 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ than any other expressed emotions, but the act itself of accurately 
expressing emotions is indispensable for the advancement of civilisation.
As I have argued, therefore, Collingwood provides a solution to the 
predicament of Western civilisation (a predicament brought about by the inadequacy 
of traditional philosophy and the need to avoid irrationalism) by reconciling 
normative and historical thinking.
For Collingwood, metaphysics is a normative, or criteriological, science in 
that, unlike psychology as the pseudo-science of thought and positivism, metaphysics 
has as its object ‘high grade thinking’ and absolute presuppositions: making use of 
the former in order to identify the latter. The philosophy of history (and of the 
history of science) in the wider sense is also normative in that, by examining both 
absolute presuppositions and the relative presuppositions that they have given rise to, 
it assesses whether or not progress has occurred in a science or practice.
Collingwood’s apparent ‘relativism’, in regarding transitions from one set of 
absolute presuppositions to another as not progressive, does not contradict the fact 
that judgements about progress can be made regarding science. Collingwood’s 
theory of absolute presuppositions is not relativist, I have argued, precisely because, 
contrary to Martin, it is connected with his dialectical logic of question and answer. 
Martin, as we have seen, denies that absolute presuppositions are connected with the
24 The metaphysician does, however, employ an explicit methodology in order to discover absolute 
presuppositions, whereas for the artist there is not necessarily a distinction between means and ends in 
expressing emotions.
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logic of question and answer, and in order to avoid having to charge Collingwood 
with relativism, he argues that Collingwood’s transition from one set of absolute 
presuppositions to another is progressive.
Further support for the distinction I am drawing between metaphysics and 
philosophy in the wider sense can be found in Chapter XV of An Essay on 
Metaphysics. In this chapter (entitled ‘A Positivistic Misinterpretation of Plato’), 
Collingwood, referring to Plato’s Republic, first distinguishes between mathematical, 
or scientific, thought and dialectical thought. Mathematical thought depends on and 
argues from hypotheses or presuppositions. Dialectical thinking involves removing 
the hypotheses or un-supposing presuppositions. An example of mathematical 
thinking is: ‘let ABC be a triangle, and let the angle ABC be a right angle; then prove 
that the square on AC is equal to the sum of the squares on AB and BC’. This piece 
of mathematical thinking is based on the assumption ‘let ABC be a triangle and let 
the angle ABC be a right angle’. Throughout this particular work one must stand by 
that assumption (EM, 157).
An example of dialectical thinking, Collingwood asserts, is the kind of 
thinking that is going on in the Republic itself. The general question is: what is 
justice? The presupposition that justice is a craft or a skill is removed. Polemarchus 
unwittingly believes this but it is shown to be nonsensical. Thrasymachus then 
argues that injustice is a special kind of skill, and justice is a lack of skill. Here too 
the consequences are found to be nonsensical. Therefore, justice cannot be 
subsumed under the notion of craft at all, and the presupposition is removed.
However, Collingwood then goes on to distinguish between dialectic and 
metaphysics: ‘The dialectician may have to bring “hypotheses” to light before he can 
remove them. In bringing “hypotheses” to light the dialectician resembles the 
metaphysician. But in “removing” them he is doing something which it is certainly 
not the metaphysician’s business to do’ (EM, 158).
The ‘hypotheses’ that Collingwood refers to here must be relative 
presuppositions, not absolute presuppositions, as absolute presuppositions cannot be 
removed. Revisiting my use of Oldfield’s argument, the metaphysician in this 
context can be seen as ‘working backwards’ in order to reveal absolute 
presuppositions and the dialectician as ‘working forwards’ in order to make
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normative judgements about progress in science25. Metaphysics, then, is primarily 
an historical science, or a branch of history, in contrast with philosophy in its wider 
sense, which reflects on history26.
The interpretation that I have advanced, however, might seem to need 
qualification, to a slight extent. As I have already indicated, referring to the logic of 
question and answer in An Autobiography, Collingwood claimed that what is 
ordinarily meant when a proposition is called ‘true’ is this: ‘... the proposition 
belongs to a question-and-answer complex which as a whole is “true” in the proper 
sense of the word . . . ’ (A, 38). Martin argues that this means that absolute
• • • 27presuppositions can be true in an indirect manner .
A question-and-answer complex that is ‘true’, that is, one which occupies a 
higher position in a scale of forms as compared with a lower complex on the same 
scale, will have different absolute presuppositions than the lower. However, it is not 
clear that there would be any necessary connection between a ‘higher’ complex and 
the particular content of a set of absolute presuppositions.
It could perhaps be said that a higher science or question-and-answer 
complex will encompass historical self-consciousness and that therefore the absolute 
presuppositions of such a science or complex will necessarily include those of 
historical thinking. The science of history has its own presuppositions (EM, 84-5).
On the other hand, as Shipley speculates, Collingwood’s argument that only a 
question-and-answer complex as a whole can be true lends support to the view 
(which I have defended) that absolute presuppositions can be neither true nor false 
and yet be meaningful (Shipley, 2001: 173). Hence Shipley casts doubt on the need 
for Martin’s reconstruction of Collingwood’s philosophy.
25 Connelly thinks that Collingwood made a mistake on this point. According to Connelly, we ought 
to regard ‘hypotheses’ as hypotheses about the content of our absolute presuppositions, hence closely 
linking metaphysics with the role o f philosophy as described in An Essay on Philosophical Method 
(Connelly, 2003: 140n). Contrary to Connelly, I suggest that they are hypotheses primarily made by 
the scientist, not the metaphysician, although, as the work o f the scientist may overlap with that of the 
metaphysician, some hypotheses may also be about absolute presuppositions.
26 As Beaney remarks, in An Essay on Metaphysics there is no suggestion that philosophy is an 
historical science, only that metaphysics is (Beaney, 2001: 118).
27 As Martin indicates, this idea that a complex of statements can be true as a whole, though not in 
each of its parts, is not one that we find repeated in Collingwood’s Essay on Metaphysics (EM, lxxix). 
However, despite its omission from An Essay on Metaphysics, we can nevertheless take this idea to be 
an important part o f Collingwood’s logic o f question and answer. In An Autobiography, Collingwood 
claims to be providing an account of his logic o f question and answer, but in An Essay on Metaphysics 
he purports to provide a ‘theory of presuppositions’, and only ‘so much o f this theory as seems 
necessary for my present purpose’ (EM, 23). Perhaps Collingwood did not state this detail o f his logic 
of question and answer in An Essay on Metaphysics as he had already done so in An Autobiography.
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I contend, therefore, that a set of absolute presuppositions cannot be better or 
worse than another set, although our knowledge of them certainly can improve or 
deteriorate. This point regarding the relation between fundamental principles and 
wider cultural practices is further illuminated by the argument of Ortega y Gasset. 
But this is something I will discuss a little further on.
For Collingwood, the normative judgement that philosophy makes as to 
whether or not progress has occurred in a science or practice depends on historical 
knowledge. The argument that natural science cannot progress without historical 
knowledge is developed in The Idea o f Nature. In this book, Collingwood argues 
that natural science is not a self-contained and self-sufficient form of thought, but 
depends for its existence upon another form of thought, history, which is different 
from it and cannot be reduced to it (IN, 175-6). For Collingwood, ‘a scientific fact’ 
is a class of historical facts:
A scientific theory not only rests on certain historical facts and is verified or disproved by 
certain other historical facts; it is itself an historical fact, namely, the fact that someone has 
propounded or accepted, verified or disproved that theory. If we want to know, for example, 
what the classical theory of gravitation is, we must look into the records o f Newton’s thinking 
and interpret them: and this is historical research. (IN, 177)
Hence, Collingwood claims at the end of The Idea o f Nature that ‘we go from the 
idea of nature to the idea of history’28 (IN, 177).
In his 1936 essay ‘Progress as Created by Historical Thinking’ (in the revised 
edition of The Idea o f History), Collingwood argues that ‘... if a community of fish- 
eaters had changed their method of catching fish from a less to a more efficient one, 
by which an average fisherman could catch ten fish on an average day instead of 
five, this would be called an example of progress’ (IH, 325). The older generation, 
however, might think that the old method is better than the new ‘... because the way 
of life which it knows and values is built around the old method, which is therefore 
certain to have social and religious associations that express the intimacy of its 
connexion with this way of life as a whole’ (IH, 325). To a person of the older 
generation, therefore, the change is no progress, but decadence.
According to Collingwood, to choose between these two ways of life is 
impossible unless one has actual experience of each way of life, or ‘... the
28 As Boucher indicates, in investigating the idea of nature, Collingwood resolves nature itself into 
history. The modern idea o f nature asserts the principles of minimum space and time, and these 
principles have their counterparts in history (Boucher, 1995a: 21-2).
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sympathetic insight which may take its place for such a purpose’ (IH, 326). 
Historical changes in a society’s way of life are very rarely conceived as progressive 
even by the generation that makes them: ‘It makes them in obedience to a blind 
impulse to destroy what it does not comprehend, as bad, and substitute something 
else as good’ (IH, 326). But in order to conceive a change as a progress, the person 
who has made it must have historical knowledge of what he has abolished: ‘... the 
revolutionary can only regard his revolution as progress in so far as he is also an 
historian, genuinely re-enacting in his own historical thought the life he nevertheless 
rejects’ (IH, 326).
To legitimately use the word ‘progress’, the person who uses it must compare 
two ways of life ‘... both of which he can understand historically, that is, with 
enough sympathy and insight to reconstruct their experience for himself .... Then, 
having fulfilled that condition, he is entitled to ask whether the change from the first 
to the second was a progress’ (EH, 329).
Collingwood’s conception of progress is evidently a development from his 
view of dialectical logic that he first put forward in his early manuscripts, Truth and 
Contradiction and Libellus de Generatione. For Collingwood,
If thought in its first phase, after solving the initial problems o f that phase, is then, through 
solving these, brought up against others which defeat it; and if  the second solves these further 
problems without losing its hold on the solution o f the first, so that there is gain without any 
corresponding loss, then there is progress. And there can be progress on no other terms. If 
there is any loss, the problem o f setting loss against gain is insoluble. (IH, 329)
Collingwood contends, however, that we cannot know whether one period of 
history taken as a whole showed progress over its predecessor. The historian cannot 
take a period as a whole because ‘there must be large tracts of its life for which he 
has either no data, or no data that he is in a position to interpret’ (IH, 329). We 
cannot speak of progress in happiness, comfort or satisfaction: ‘Different ways of life 
are differentiated by nothing more clearly than by differences between the things that 
people habitually enjoy, the conditions which they find comfortable, and the 
achievements they regard as satisfactory’ (IH, 330). Similarly, there is no progress 
in art or morality.
Nevertheless, Collingwood explains, although in one sense there is no 
progress in morality, in another sense there is moral progress:
150
Part o f our moral life consists o f coping with problems arising not out o f our animal nature but 
out of our social institutions, and these are historical things, which create moral problems only 
in so far as they are already the expression of moral ideals. A man who asks himself whether 
he ought to take voluntary part in his country’s war is not struggling with personal fear; he is 
involved in a conflict between the moral forces embodied in the institution of the State, and 
those embodied not merely in the ideal, but in the equal actual reality, o f international peace 
and intercourse. Similarly the problem o f divorce arises not out of the whims o f sexual desire, 
but out o f an unresolved conflict between the moral ideal o f monogamy and the moral evils 
which that ideal, rigidly applied, brings in its train. (IH, 330-1)
Hence, for Collingwood, there can be progress in a civilisation, not in terms 
of individual appetites and desires, but in terms of shared practices. Similarly, there 
can be progress in economics, politics, law, science, philosophy and religion. The 
example of the fishing community, however, suggests that, in assessing whether or 
not progress has occurred in a science or practice, we must consider that science or 
practice in the context of its widest aspects and implications and in the context of its 
contribution to a ‘way of life’ as a whole, in so far as we have knowledge of it.
In an article called ‘A Philosophy of Progress’, (published in Essays in the 
Philosophy o f History) Collingwood similarly argued: ‘Goodness, like beauty and 
happiness, is not a product of civilisation. A man’s moral worth depends not on his 
circumstances, but on the way in which he confronts them. It was a good act to 
abolish slavery, but the men who are bom into a slaveless world are not 
automatically made good men by that fact. All it can do for them is to confront them 
with moral problems of a new kind’ (EPH, 115). Nineteenth-century believers in 
progress mistakenly ‘... thought that external circumstances, by being better, made 
men better. You might as well say that we are better soldiers than Napoleon because 
our guns have a longer range, or better musicians than Bach because our orchestras 
are larger’ (EPH, 115).
However, Collingwood contends that the idea of progress is a legitimate one. 
Why, he asks, (referring to the example of architecture) should we say that our new 
architecture is better than any of its predecessors? ‘The answer is simple. If we do 
not think it better, why do we build it?’ (EPH, 117) Similarly, Collingwood argues 
that ‘... the development of political life down to the present day has undeniably 
been a progress in the sense that it has led to the creation of political systems more 
supple, more adaptable, more responsive to individual initiative from within, and to 
alterations of conditions without, than systems of the past’ (EPH, 118).
Collingwood asserts that an increase in the power of the individual does not 
mean a diminution in the power of society:
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... any increase in freedom, intelligence, and self-reliance in individuals is automatically 
reflected in society, which is not a mythical superhuman being but just individuals themselves 
in their mutual relations. As the individual gains in power, his social and political life gains in 
power too; for the rigidity o f a primitive political system is not strength but weakness. The 
increase in the power of political institutions, which sometimes makes people fear for 
individual liberty, is thus one of the most certain proofs o f human progress, and is both the 
effect and the cause o f an increase in individual liberty itself. (EPH, 119)
Our political institutions may be unsuited to people of previous ages, but 
elements from these previous institutions have all ‘... gone to make modem political 
life what it is; and in so far as modem political life is based on the values which we 
consider the most important, this evolution must, to us, appear as a progress’ (EPH, 
120).
Therefore, in Collingwood’s view, the question of whether progress occurs in 
history depends on the question: ‘Have you the courage of your convictions? If you 
have, if you regard the things which you are doing as things worth doing, then the 
course of history which has led to the doing of them is justified by its results, and its 
movement is a movement forward’ (EPH, 120).
Historical thinking, Collingwood argues, not only discovers progress, but it 
creates this progress itself. This is because progress only happens ‘... by the 
retention in the mind, at one phase, what was achieved at a preceding phase’ (IH, 
333). Therefore:
If Einstein makes an advance on Newton, he does it by knowing Newton’s thought and 
retaining it within his own, in the sense that he knows what Newton’s problems were, and how 
he solved them, and, disentangling the truth in these solutions from whatever errors prevented 
Newton from going further, embodying these solutions as thus disentangled in his own theory 
.... Newton thus lives in Einstein in the way in which any past experience lives in the mind of 
the historian ... but re-enacted here and now together with a development of itself that is partly 
constructive or positive and partly critical or negative. (IH, 333-4)
Van der Dussen draws attention to Collingwood’s assertion in his ‘Lectures 
on the Philosophy of History’ of 1926 that ‘history is nothing but the attempt to 
understand the present by analysing it into its logical components of necessity, or the 
past, and possibility, or the future; and this is an attempt that is made by everybody 
and at all times’ (IH, 422; van der Dussen, 1995: 266). As van der Dussen indicates, 
the idea of progress can be understood as having the function of serving as a guiding 
principle in solving present problems and in deciding which possibilities and 
opportunities should be realised (van der Dussen, 1995: 260 and 266).
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For Collingwood, therefore, through historical thinking the advancement of 
science and civilisation, that is, the philosophical judgement that science and 
civilisation have advanced, is made possible. Historical knowledge, I have argued, 
includes knowledge of absolute presuppositions and the questions, answers and 
relative presuppositions that they have given rise to.
As Oldfield indicates, however, Collingwood recognised that the territory of 
the historian was wider than reflective thought about the actions of other people: ‘It 
included, for instance, the customs, habits and institutions of the past, and the 
changes which occur in them over time, not all of which could be traced to the 
intentions and purposes of the people who may have been ultimately responsible for 
them’ (Oldfield, 1995: 184).
Boucher, in his Introduction to the revised edition of The New Leviathan, 
demonstrates that although Collingwood regarded history as the re-enactment of past 
thought, knowledge of absolute presuppositions can be included in this. According 
to Boucher, ‘Given the inseparability of absolute presuppositions from the thought, 
or actions, which absolutely presuppose them, the re-enactment of the thoughts, or 
actions, necessarily entails implicating that from which they are inseparable’ (NL, 
xxx). Boucher also argues that re-enactment can be extended to the domain of 
rational emotions (NL, xxxvi).
I suggest, therefore, that Collingwood’s conception of history as the re­
enactment of past thought can be seen as consistent with his view of the task of the 
metaphysician. Part of the task of the historian is to re-construct or bring in to the 
light of consciousness what was ‘unconscious’ thought, and to make the implicit 
explicit (cf. Vanheeswijck, 1994: 114).
Oldfield points out that the achievement of historical knowledge is by 
inferential argument from that which is present: namely, the evidence which the past 
has left behind, and evidence is anything that can be so used (Oldfield, 1995: 187). 
Thought is always re-enacted in a new context, and this new context must be 
receptive to that thought. For example, in his folklore manuscripts Collingwood 
wrote: ‘If magic were a form of belief or custom peculiar to primitive peoples and 
absolutely foreign to the mind of civilized man, the civilized historian could never 
understand it’ (Oldfield, 1995: 189).
Oldfield draws attention to Martin’s suggestion that there appears to be an 
inconsistency between the demands of the re-enactment theory and the implications
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of the doctrine of absolute presuppositions, and Martin’s view that there may be 
some cultures where the kind of agency demanded by the re-enactment theory may 
simply be absent29 (Oldfield, 1995: 193).
Oldfield explains that from the fact that Collingwood said that change 
between absolute presuppositions could be radical, both Martin and Stephen Toulmin 
inferred, incorrectly, an incommensurability between different absolute 
presuppositions, such that trans-historical understanding is problematic. Contrary to 
Martin and Toulmin, Oldfield rightly argues that ‘... the problem does not arise if 
absolute presuppositions are interpreted dialectically’ (Oldfield, 1995: 194). Change 
in absolute presuppositions is not discontinuous: instead a new set of absolute 
presuppositions will be a ‘modification of the old’ (EM, 48; Oldfield, 1995: 194-5).
We can have historical knowledge of absolute presuppositions, therefore, 
because traces of the past survive in the present, allowing the past to be re-enacted, 
and hence the absolute presuppositions of past epochs can be revealed.
The example of conceptual change that Oldfield (cf. 1995: 195) takes, from 
Collingwood’s Autobiography, is useful in showing how we can have knowledge of 
the past because the historical process is continuous and it leaves traces of itself in 
the present. In An Autobiography, Collingwood argues that Plato’s Republic and 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, so far as they are concerned with politics, are concerned with 
different problems, for Plato’s ‘State’ is the Greek polis, and Hobbes’s is the 
absolutist State of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, there is a connection 
between Plato and Hobbes, but the connection is not
... the sameness of a ‘universal’, and the difference the difference between two instances of 
that universal. But this is not so. The sameness is the sameness o f an historical process, and 
the difference is the difference between one thing which in the course of that process has 
turned into something else, and the other thing into which it has turned. Plato’s polis and 
Hobbes’s absolutist State are related by a traceable historical process, whereby one has turned 
into the other ... (A, 62)
As Collingwood argues, therefore, the historian can only study a past event 
because it leaves traces of itself which survive in the present world30. History is not
29 As we have seen, Martin argues against the connection between absolute presuppositions and the 
logic o f question and answer. Similarly, Martin disagrees with the attempt by some interpreters to 
link the recovery o f absolute presuppositions with the re-enactment o f past thought. Martin argues 
that the re-enactment doctrine was meant only to explain actions -  to explain an action by reference to 
the thoughts, beliefs and motivations o f an agent (EM, xxxi). The idea that absolute presuppositions 
are to be explained by re-enactment is, according to Martin, a ‘deep mistake’ (EM, xxxiii).
30 As Boucher indicates, Croce also distinguished between history and chronicle. History, unlike 
chronicle, lives on in the present: it ‘vibrates in the soul o f the historian’ (Boucher, 1985: 7-8).
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concerned with ‘events’, but with ‘processes’, and ‘processes’ are things which do 
not begin and end but turn into one another:
... if  a process P 1 turns into a process P2, there is no dividing line at which P 1 stops and P2 
begins; PI never stops, it goes on in the changed form P2, and P2 never begins, it has 
previously been going on in the earlier form PI. There are in history no beginnings and no 
endings. History books begin and end, but the events they describe do not. If PI has left traces 
of itself in P2 so that an historian living in P2 can discover by the interpretation of evidence 
that what is now P2 was once PI, it follows that ‘traces’ o f PI in the present are not, so to 
speak, the corpse of a dead PI, but rather the real PI itself, living and active though 
encapsulated within the other form o f itself P2. (A, 98)
For Collingwood, ‘ . the essence of history lies not in its consisting of individual 
facts ... but in the process of development leading from one to another’ (IH, 169; cf. 
EM, xxxv).
As we have seen, therefore, in Collingwood’s view, the progress and advancement of 
civilisation and the solution to the crises that it faces depend on a philosophy of 
historical and dialectical thinking. For Collingwood, Platonism and the West, in so 
far as it is still dependent on Platonism, are in crisis and the solution is the working 
out of a philosophy where the criteria for value and truth are immanent to the 
historical process, and not located in an ideal transcendent world.
As Collingwood noted in ‘A Footnote to Future History’, the transition from 
Platonism to a comprehensive historicist philosophy has not yet been fully realised. 
For Collingwood, then,
This seems to be the end of an era. A world catastrophe is generally supposed to divide two 
purely different phases o f history. But this is a mistake. A catastrophe is not the end, nor yet 
the beginning; like the storms o f adolescence, it is the rebirth of an organism already 
established in vigorous growth and capable o f inflicting the uttermost torments upon itself in 
order to pass through them into the balanced life of maturity. (FFH, 9-10)
‘Such a catastrophe’, Collingwood thinks, ‘undoubtedly awaits our 
civilisation’, although ‘... it may not come for another nine centuries: our present 
conflicts, like the agonies of the expiring Roman Republic, are but a ripple on the 
surface of history’ (FFH, 10). Therefore, the role of the philosopher is to guide a 
new historical philosophy through the ‘storms’ of development and change before it 
is more fully realised in the form of a concrete civilisation. As we have seen, 
however, unlike Hegel, Collingwood does not regard philosophy as culminating in 
any final position, and nor is the development in any way pre-determined. As 
Collingwood remarks in ‘The Three Laws of Politics’ (published in Essays in
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Political Philosophy), the future ‘ . has to be made by us, by the strength of our 
hands and the stoutness of our hearts’ (EPP, 223).
As I have argued in Part One, in Collingwood’s view, it is through aesthetic 
experience that we first begin to apprehend the world. This is also true to some 
extent of religion. Art and religion are regarded as stages, which the mind must pass 
through, prior to the emergence of higher levels of consciousness. Hence the 
dialectical solution to the crisis of civilisation is foreshadowed in the activities of 
art31 and religion.
Using the arguments of Speculum Mentis (SM, 138-46) and The Idea o f 
History, Hinz provides an astute and compelling explanation of the correlation 
between religion and history in Collingwood’s solution to the crisis of civilisation. 
Hinz explains that the ground for the revitalisation of Western civilisation must 
reside in its own principles, and this pointed towards a ‘new interpretation of 
Christianity’ (Hinz, 1994a: 195). For Collingwood, like the world of nature, the 
world of historical fact does not exist ‘in itself, but as known by acts of thought 
which ‘make’ it. As Hinz indicates,
The world of historical fact, however, is not nature but historical process -  the activity of 
thought itself, which includes the activity by which the world of nature is ‘made’. Since, on 
the Christian view, God makes nature, it follows that the world of historical process is identical 
to God. Christianity, in holding that God is the creator o f all things, propounds the notion of 
creation ex nihilo, a conception which is elucidated and made fully intelligible in the theory of 
historical process as a self-creative activity. (Hinz’s italics; 1994a: 197)
31 In Speculum Mentis, in an early inchoate version o f what he later stated as his logic of question and 
answer (cf. Hinz, 1994a: 64), Collingwood regarded art as being an integral part of this logic. 
Aesthetic experience and imagination are associated with the attitude o f supposal. But, Collingwood 
argues, imagination, or supposal, does not exist in a vacuum. Supposal and assertion are not 
independent o f one another but correlative. Knowledge, Collingwood contends, is ‘... the interplay of 
question and answer in the soul’s dialogue with itse lf ...’ (SM, 77), and supposal and questioning are 
seen as ‘... at bottom the same thing . . . ’ (SM, 78). As questioning is essentially a suspension o f the 
activity of asserting, Collingwood speculates that ‘art, as pure imagination, imagination without 
assertion, may be paradoxically defined as a question which expects no answer: that is, a supposal’ 
(SM, 79). But, to ask any question we must already possess information: ‘so even if  art is pure 
imagination, it must spring from a soil o f concrete fact .... This basis o f fact in turn requires a basis of 
imagination, for no fact can be known until it has been sought by the imaginative act o f questioning, 
and this question itself requires a further basis o f fact, and so on ad infinitum’ (SM, 79-80). For 
Collingwood, then, ‘The process o f knowledge is therefore, strictly speaking, not so much an 
alternation o f question and answer as a perpetual restatement of the question, which is identical with a 
perpetual revision of the answer. If it is objected that this reduces all the diversity o f knowledge to a 
bare identity in which there is only one judgement judging one truth, our answer -  to be given in full 
later on -  will be that this identity contains all diversity within itself (SM, 80). Collingwood, of 
course, later distinguished questioning from presupposing, and distinguished art, as imagination and 
consciousness, from thinking, as questioning, answering and presupposing.
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The conception of the fall from grace, the separation of God and man, 
signifies man’s self-imposed estrangement from the source of spiritual wholeness, 
which corresponds to man’s ignorance of himself as a historical being. Therefore, 
Hinz argues:
With respect to Collingwood’s philosophy the significance of the Incarnation is that the work 
o f  historical process itself inaugurates the union o f God and man .... The doctrine of 
Incarnation corresponds to the realization that the source o f all value is historical process itself, 
through which all value is generated. Thus the activity of historical process brings about the 
realization that the justifying grounds fo r all systems o f  thought and value are historically 
conditioned. Just as the Incarnation is an act of God which is at the same time the death of  
God, the activity of historical process brings an end to the belief in any transcendent source of 
value. (Hinz’s italics; 1994a: 198)
The Christian conception of a fusion of God and man in a new unity, Hinz 
continues, is accomplished only if man cooperates in the effort and partakes in the 
divine nature. Hence, ‘... man is united with God and so comes to a knowledge of 
himself as free historical activity only when he engages in historical thinking’ (Hinz, 
1994a: 199). The rise of historical consciousness means that historical thinking is 
now a commonplace of humanity. Properly re-construed, Christian principles can 
overcome nihilism (Hinz, 1994a: 199).
As Hinz rightly argues, therefore, Christianity, for Collingwood, expresses in 
an allegorical form the solution to the crisis of Western civilisation that Collingwood 
articulated in his metaphysics and philosophy of history.
Collingwood’s historicist philosophy also articulates a solution for the causes 
and symptoms of cultural crisis pertaining to his philosophy of art and the 
suppression of emotion that I examined in Part One. For example, the Enlightenment 
rejection of the emotional and superstitious side of Christianity that Collingwood 
criticised in ‘Fascism and Nazism’ for depriving Western civilisation of its ‘vital 
warmth’ and emotional vigour (EPP, 187) is also criticised in The Idea o f History as 
a failure to see the superstition of past ages as a necessary stage in human 
development (IH, 76-81). Collingwood’s philosophy of history constitutes a 
response to the suppression of emotion and the fragmentation of human experience 
that he criticised in Speculum Mentis and in his philosophy of art.
Collingwood’s dialectical account of truth, however, as an open-ended 
process of development, which began with his modification of the coherence theory 
of truth in his early manuscripts, also constitutes a refinement of the ‘unity of the 
forms of experience’ argument in Speculum Mentis and ‘Ruskin’s Philosophy’. As
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we have seen, in Collingwood’s later philosophy progress in a science or practice can 
only be considered to have occurred when it is considered in the context of its 
contribution to a ‘way of life’ as a whole. But a way of life, or culture, is not static 
and complete: it has value only in so far as it assimilates and explains what is outside 
and different. This idea was first expressed in Truth and Contradiction, when 
Collingwood defined truth as that ‘... which expresses most, which includes most 
successfully within itself a number of diverse and by themselves conflicting points of 
view’ (TC, 8).
Collingwood’s solution to the crisis of civilisation, then, is an improvement 
and refinement of the Romantic idea of culture. This improvement was implicit in 
Collingwood’s criticism of Ruskin’s confusion about how greatness in art sometimes 
coincided with the downfall of civilisation (cf. EPA, 37-8). It seems that Ruskin 
subscribed to a more static view of culture. Hence, like Collingwood’s modification 
of the coherence theory of truth, the development of his dialectical philosophy meant 
an improvement and fine-tuning of the Ruskin-inspired idea of the unity of the forms 
of experience as a solution to the crisis of modernity.
To sum up, therefore, in Collingwood’s view, historical consciousness 
provides the ground for normative judgements about progress to be made. Only 
through historical thinking can civilisation overcome decadence and advance and 
prosper. Collingwood argues:
This understanding o f the system we set out to supersede is a thing which we must retain 
throughout the work o f superseding it, as a knowledge of the past conditioning our creation of 
the future. It may be impossible to do this; our hatred of the thing we are destroying may 
prevent us from understanding it, and we may love it so much that we cannot destroy it unless 
blinded by hatred. But if that is so, there will once more, as so often in the past, be change but 
no progress; we shall have lost our hold on one group of problems in our anxiety to solve the 
next. And we ought by now to realize that no kindly law o f nature will save us from the fruits 
of our ignorance. (IH, 334)
The idea that Western civilisation is faced with a crisis precipitated by the 
inadequacy of the Platonic ontology of being, to be resolved by a philosophy of 
becoming, is also strongly present in the works of Ortega y Gasset and Nietzsche. 
Furthermore, like Collingwood, for both Ortega and Nietzsche, it is not the truth or 
falsity of fundamental principles or individual judgements, but their ability to 
generate vitality and enhance life as a whole, which is important.
Ortega’s philosophy betrays a remarkable resemblance to Collingwood’s, 
especially in the importance placed on fundamental beliefs and in the need for a
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historicist philosophy as a solution to a cultural crisis that is brought about by the 
inadequacy of an abstract philosophy of being derived from the Greeks. The work of 
Ortega confirms the point that Collingwood’s philosophical concerns with the crisis 
of Western modernity ought not to be seen as singular and isolated. Instead they are 
a part of a broader historicist ‘tendency’ in early twentieth-century philosophy.
Ortega played a key role in the development of ‘crisis’ thought in the early 
twentieth century, and his importance as a ‘crisis’ theorist is emphasised by Graham: 
‘The fact is that most of his works either develop or apply concepts related to crisis, 
for Ortega took the understanding of this crisis -  as the first step toward resolution -  
to be the chief “mission” of his life and thought, quintessentially the mission of the 
intellectual’ (Graham, 1997: 226). Like Collingwood, part of the business of 
philosophy, for Ortega, is to define new faiths (cf. Dobson, 1989: 169), and 
philosophy’s present task is to describe the new type of reason which, replacing 
naturalistic reason, will provide a more adequate understanding of human life. As 
Graham indicates, both Collingwood and Ortega, as historicists, were influenced by 
Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel, Mommsen and Meyer. Both borrowed Dilthey’s 
distinction between ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ knowledge and both regarded Dilthey as 
failing sufficiently to overcome ‘naturalism’ and to distinguish clearly enough 
between history and the natural sciences (Graham, 1997: 133).
Ortega and Collingwood also both developed philosophies of history that 
regarded epistemology and ontology as properly inseparable. Despite Collingwood 
being seen as an Idealist and Ortega as a ‘realist’, opposition between them was more 
apparent than actual, and such labelling can be seen as superficial (cf. Graham, 1997: 
148). Both develop theories of truth that (to some extent) go beyond realism and 
Idealism. As I will explain, Ortega, like Collingwood, regards truth as that which 
allows the widest perspective on life.
Ortega’s conception of the crisis of Western civilisation and the historicist 
solution to it is particularly evident in History as a System, and because it is probably 
his most important work, a brief outline of it may prove illuminating. As Victor 
Ouimette points out, Ortega, in History as a System, began to develop the distinction 
between ideas that a person has, and beliefs that he or she is, with beliefs having an 
influence far more profound than mere ideas (Ouimette, 1982: 124). According to 
Ortega, the structure of human life depends primordially on the beliefs on which it is 
grounded (HS, 166). Beliefs always constitute a system in so far as they are effective
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beliefs: they function as beliefs resting on one another, combining with one another 
to form a whole (HS, 167). The diagnosing of any human existence must begin by 
an ordered inventory of its system of convictions, and it must establish which belief 
is fundamental, ‘ . breathing life into all the others’32 (HS, 168).
For Ortega, the European’s fundamental convictions changed profoundly in 
the early twentieth century. The generation of 1900 was the last of a cycle which 
was characterised by a faith in reason, which is expressed by Descartes (HS, 169). 
This rationalism, Ortega contends, ushered in the modem age, whose death agony we 
are now witnessing. For Descartes, the world is to become transparent to the human 
mind, and everything is to be reduced to clarity (HS, 170).
Europe came by this faith, having lost, in the fifteenth century, its faith in 
God and revelation (HS, 171). Hence, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were two 
centuries of crisis, and from this crisis Western man was saved by a new belief: faith 
in reason. In Ortega’s view, ‘The Renaissance is the parturient disquiet of a new 
confidence based on physico-mathematical science, the new mediator between man 
and the world’ (HS, 174).
But by the twentieth century this faith in science had decayed. Ortega argues 
that within its genuine territory, nature, science has transcended our hopes, but it has 
nothing to say about human life (HS, 178-9). ‘Life is haste and has urgent need to 
know what it is up against, and it is out of this urgency that truth must derive its 
method’ (HS, 182). Scientific utopianism and ‘the idea of progress, placing truth in a 
vague tomorrow, has proved a dulling opiate to humanity’ (HS, 182). Therefore, 
Ortega argues, we must shake ourselves radically free from the physical, natural 
approach to the human element: the collapse of physical reason leaves the way clear 
for vital, historical reason (HS, 183).
When naturalistic reason studies man, Ortega explains, it seeks to reveal his 
nature, and it entmsts the study of man’s psychic mechanism to psychology, a natural 
science. ‘The prodigious achievement of natural science in the direction of the 
knowledge of things contrasts brutally with the collapse of this same natural science 
when faced with the strictly human element’ (HS, 186). This is because man is not a 
thing and man has no nature, ‘... and in consequence we must make up our own
32 Ouimette explains that unlike ideas, one lives from one’s beliefs and is inseparable from them. 
Beliefs are taken for granted and assumed in all o f our activities. They are implicit and largely
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minds to think of it in terms of categories and concepts that will be radically different 
from such as shed light on the phenomena of matter’ (HS, 186).
According to Ortega, the moral or cultural sciences, the 
Geisteswissenschaften, which arose in opposition to the natural sciences in fact 
attempted to do the same as the natural sciences, by opposing the concept of spirit to 
nature (HS, 187-8). Idealists were guilty of the same mistake Descartes made when 
he defined the self by opposing res cogitans to res extensa (HS, 189).
Therefore, for Ortega, in the concept of nature the European man is heir to 
Parmenides and Eleaticism: ‘This Greek destiny continues to weigh on us, and in 
spite of some notable rebellions we are still prisoners within the magic circle 
described by Eleatic ontology’ (HS, 192). Ever since Parmenides, the orthodox 
thinker searches for a fixed static consistency, and following Aristotle, the ‘nature’ of 
things. Until Kant no one had ‘... begun to see clearly that thought is not a copy or 
mirror of reality but a transitive operation performed on it, a surgical intervention’ 
(HS, 194). Kant has taught us that thought has its own forms and projects these on to 
the real. Thus ‘... we must learn to disintellectualize the real if we are to be faithful 
to it. Eleaticism was the radical intellectualization of being’ (HS, 195).
In naturalism what veils human phenomena to our minds is the idea of res 
founded on identical being, and fixed, static, predetermined. But ‘Naturalism is, at 
bottom, intellectualism, i.e., the projection on to the real of the mode of being 
peculiar to concepts’ (HS, 196).
The concept of spirit, Ortega explains, is a disguised naturalism. Spirit ‘. .. is 
already, to begin with, what it is going to be’, and ‘Hegel’s movement of the spirit is 
a pure fiction, since it is a movement within the spirit, whose consistency lies in its 
fixed, static, pre-established truth’ (HS, 197). The entity whose being consists in 
identical being possesses already all it needs in order to be. Identical being is 
substance, or thing. For Ortega, then, we need to transcend the idea of nature, as ‘. .. 
this idea can have no authentic reality: it is something relative to the human intellect, 
which in its turn has no detached, independent reality ... but is only real when 
functioning in a human life, by whose constitutive urgencies it is moved’ (HS, 198).
Ortega asserts that man is ‘no thing, but a drama’ (HS, 200). Each one has to 
make human life for himself or herself and has to determine what he or she is going
unconscious suppositions from which we set out. The existence of ideas depends on will, but beliefs 
are inescapable because they are involuntary (Ouimette, 1982: 126).
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to be. One makes choices in accordance with the general programme one has 
mapped out for one’s life. I am free by compulsion, whether I wish to be or not.
Accordingly, we must ‘... elaborate a non-Eleatic concept of being .... The 
time has come for the seed sown by Heraclitus to bring forth its mighty harvest’ (HS, 
203). In human life the ‘substance’ is precisely change, which means it cannot be 
thought of ‘Eleatically’ as substance. The being of whatever is alive ‘... must be 
thought of in concepts that annul their own inevitable identity’ (HS, 205). All 
concepts that seek to think of authentic reality must be ‘occasional’ concepts (HS, 
206).
According to Ortega, what we have been acts negatively on what we can be: 
one is still a Christian in the form of having been a Christian (HS, 208). The same 
might be said about being ‘a democrat’, being ‘a liberal’, being ‘feudal’. Man’s 
being, then, ‘... is irreversible; he is compelled ontologically always to advance on 
himself... ’ (HS, 209). Society is primarily the past, and the determination of what at 
each moment society is going to be, depends on what it has been, just as in individual 
life. In the public opinion of the present, an enormous amount of the past continues 
active (HS, 210).
The past forms part of our present, in that it is active in us now (HS, 212). 
Man’s authentic being consists in ‘being what one has not already been’, and, Ortega 
proposes, as we cannot hope to rid the term ‘being’ of its traditional static 
signification, we should be well advised to dispense with it (HS, 213). For Ortega, 
unlike physico-mathematical reason, ‘to comprehend anything human, be it personal 
or collective, one must tell its history .... Life only takes on a measure of 
transparency in the light of historical reason ’ (HS, 214).
According to Ortega, man invents for himself a program of life that gives a 
satisfactory answer to the difficulties posed for him by circumstances. But 
experience makes apparent the shortcomings and limitations of the said program of 
life. He thinks out another program of life, drawn up in the light of the first. In the 
second, the first is still active: it is preserved in order to be avoided. On the second 
project of being, there follows a third, and so on (HS, 215). Therefore: ‘He goes on 
accumulating being -  the past; he goes on making for himself a being through his 
dialectical series of experiments. This is a dialectic not of logical but precisely of 
historical reason . . .’ (HS, 216).
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Ortega asserts that ‘Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is history’ 
(HS, 217). That man’s being progresses can only be affirmed a posteriori by 
concrete historical reason. In our present ‘crisis’, Ortega argues, in our present doubt 
concerning reason, we find included the whole of our earlier life: ‘We are other than 
the man of 1700, and we are more’ (HS, 219). To progress is not simply to change 
one’s form of life. Progress demands that the new form ‘... should rise above the old 
and to this end should preserve it and turn it to account, that it should take off from 
the old, climbing on its shoulders as a high temperature mounts on lower ones. To 
progress is to accumulate being, to store up reality’ (HS, 219).
In Ortega’s view, therefore, ‘History is a system, the system of human 
experiences linked in a single, inexorable chain. Hence nothing can be truly clear in 
history until everything is clear ... Every historic term whatsoever, to have 
exactness, must be determined as a function of all history, neither more nor less than 
each concept in Hegel’s Logic has value only in respect of the niche left for it by the 
others’ (HS, 221-2). History is a science of the present, and the past is the active 
force that sustains our today.
According to Ortega, ‘Man stands in need of a new revelation. And 
whenever he feels in contact with an absolute reality distinct from himself, there is 
always revelation’ (HS, 223). Man ‘... loses himself in the infinite arbitrariness of 
his inner cabalism when he cannot essay this and discipline it in the impact with 
something that smacks of authentic, relentless reality. Reality is man’s only true 
pedagogue and ruler’ (HS, 227-8). The physical world, or nature, turns out to be an 
apparatus of man’s own manufacture that he interposes between authentic reality and 
himself: ‘Every disillusionment consequent on depriving of faith in some reality on 
which he had set store brings into the foreground and permits the discovery of the 
reality of what remains to him . . . ’ (HS, 229).
Having lost his faith in physico-mathematical reason, man is compelled to 
take his stand on his disillusioned life. Having arrived at this point through the 
dialectical series of his experiences, which is the transcendent reality, ‘Man ... is 
brought up against himself as reality, as history’ (HS, 230). ‘Historical reason’ 
reveals a reality which is the self underlying his theories (HS, 231). Historical 
reason is ‘... still more rational than physical reason, more rigorous, more exigent’ 
(HS, 232). Unlike physical reason, historical reason accepts nothing as mere fact.
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Instead it shows how these facts have come about: they are nothing more than 
interpretations that man has manufactured at a given juncture of his life (HS, 232-3).
Like Collingwood, then, for Ortega, the progress and advancement of 
civilisation can only take place through historical thinking. Also, like Collingwood, 
there might appear to be some degree of ambivalence in Ortega’s philosophy as to 
whether or not fundamental convictions themselves are progressive. Ortega’s 
position on this point, however, is clearer in Man and Crisis, and is consistent with 
the interpretation of Collingwood that I have defended: that is, fundamental 
principles are not in themselves progressive, although the sciences or practices that 
make up a civilisation are.
Overlapping with the argument of History as a System, in Man and Crisis 
Ortega argues that history ‘... advances dialectically, although that basic dialectic of 
life is not, as Hegel believed, a conceptual dialectic composed of pure reason, but the 
dialectic of a reason much broader, and richer than pure reason -  the dialectic of life, 
of living reason’ (MC, 176). Ortega asserts that ‘The medieval universe was made 
up of absolutes .... Today nothing is what it is, but stands always in a state of 
transition toward being in another wise. Each thing can be something else, 
everything has in it a little of everything. We are in the era of the cats that are 
neither black nor white, but grey’ (MC, 211).
Ortega suggests that today we are confronted by a cultural crisis, and crisis 
differs from normal change. Normal change is where ‘yesterday’s system of 
convictions gives way to today’s, smoothly, without a break . . .’ (MC, 85). An 
historical crisis occurs when ‘... the system of convictions belonging to the previous 
generation gives way to a vital state in which man remains without these convictions, 
and therefore without a world’ (MC, 86). There are no new positive beliefs to 
replace the traditional ones. Consequently, life as crisis is a condition in which man 
holds only negative convictions, and as he ‘... is not truly decided about anything, 
man, and indeed the masses of men, move from black to white with the greatest of 
ease’ (MC, 87). But
... in order that man may stop believing in some things, there must be germinating in him a 
confused faith in others .... These new enthusiasms soon begin to stabilise themselves in some 
dimension o f life, while the rest o f life continues in the shadow o f bitterness and resignation. It 
is curious to note that almost always the dimension of life in which the new faith begins to 
establish itself is art. (MC, 88)
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Ortega argues that in order to make decisions about my existence I must have 
a repertoire of convictions, or opinions, about the world. But those opinions must be 
truly mine, and
... I adopt them only because I am fully convinced of them. This is possible only if  I have 
thought them out from their very roots and they have come forth nourished and advanced by 
undeniable evidence. Now, nobody can give me this evidence ready made; it takes shape for 
me only when I analyze for myself the matter in question, when I take it to myself and form 
my own convictions about it. For me to have an opinion about something is merely a matter of 
knowing on what facts to rely to determine my own position in regard to a thing. Several 
possible ideas on a question may occur to me; but I must come to agreement with myself in 
order to see which one o f them it is that convinces me, which one is my real opinion. An 
opinion which I have formed for myself in this manner and which I base on my own evidence 
is truly mine; it contains what I truly think about the matter, and therefore when I think thus I 
am in agreement with myself. I am myself. And the series o f actions, o f conduct, which that 
genuine opinion engenders and which it motivates will be genuinely my life, my real and 
authentic being. (MC, 90)
In this way, according to Ortega, man is ‘centred in himself and he does not ‘... 
permit himself to be alienated or converted into what he is not’ (MC, 91).
Many things, Ortega asserts, we do not understand very well because we have 
not tried to rethink them on our own account. We hide behind the selves of other 
people and flee from our genuine life which is synonymous with solitude (MC, 92). 
Man, unlike animals, is able to retire from the world, to withdraw inside himself 
(MC, 95). According to Ortega, ‘Culture is only the interpretation which man gives 
to his life, the series of more or less satisfactory solutions which he invents in order 
to handle his problems and the needs of his life’ (MC, 97). But,
For the very reason that an effective solution has been created ... subsequent generations do 
not have to create it, but to inherit and develop it .... the inheritance which frees one from the 
effort o f creation has the disadvantage o f being an invitation to inertia. He who receives an 
idea from his forebears tends to save himself the effort o f rethinking it and recreating it within 
himself. This recreation consists in nothing more than the task o f him who created the idea, 
that is, in adopting it only in view o f the undeniable evidence with which it was imposed on 
him .... On the other hand the man who does not create an idea but inherits it finds between 
things and his own person a preconceived idea which facilitates his relationship with things as 
would a ready-made recipe. He then will be inclined not to ask himself questions about things, 
not to feel genuine needs, since he has in hand a repertory o f solutions before he feels the needs 
which call for these solutions. So that the man who is already heir to a cultural system 
accustoms himself... to using mental processes ... for which he has no evidence, because they 
were not bom out of the depth of his own genuine self. (MC, 97-8)
Hence one lives ‘on top’ of a culture or system of opinions that come from a 
collective irresponsible ‘I’, which does not know why it thinks what it thinks. 
Meanwhile, the culture, which in its origin was simple, becomes complicated. The 
individual, effective and primitive ‘I’, Ortega contends, is replaced by the
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conventional, complicated, cultivated T . Every culture ends in man’s socialisation, 
or collectivisation: the maximum degree of man’s alienation or otherness’ (MC,
99). For example, the complexity of culture was one of the principal causes of the 
crisis suffered at the end of the Middle Ages. The clearest and most continuous 
desire from the fifteenth century to Descartes was the desire for simplification (MC,
100).
Ortega argues that the man who is too cultivated and socialised must free 
himself from his received culture in order to return to himself. Accordingly there are 
periods of ‘return to nature’, for example, the Renaissance, Rousseau and 
romanticism (MC, 101).
From this perspective, Ortega explains, the words ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ 
thus take on a new meaning. Something is a problem when I do not know what my 
genuine attitude towards it is: ‘The essential basic problem ... is ... to be in 
agreement with myself, to find myself (MC, 109). The solution is to be very clear 
what one’s sincere attitude is toward each and every thing. The humblest peasant is 
so clear about his actual convictions that he has hardly any problems. But ‘There are 
few of these countrymen left now; culture has reached them, and so has the topical, 
and that which we call socialization; and they are beginning to live on ideas received 
from the outside and to believe things they do not believe’ (MC, 110). The 
cultivated man, then, ‘... runs the risk of losing himself in the jungle of his own 
knowledge; and he ends up by not knowing what his own genuine knowledge is’ 
(MC, 110). This is the position of the average modem man, who does not know 
which thoughts he believes. He feigns beliefs in order to ease the pretence in which 
he lives, drugging himself with those attitudes which are easiest, most topical, most 
according to formula (MC, 111).
In a ‘classic age’ or ‘golden age’, according to Ortega, man lives with a 
repertory of sincere beliefs about his surroundings (MC, 114). He has, however, 
solved his own problems, not those of other eras. He feels in accord with himself; 
there is a perfect equilibrium between man and his surroundings.
But it is obvious how carefully one must tread when giving to the classic the value of a norm. 
Strictly speaking, only the classic is classic, that is, perfect, for itself. To wish that another era 
would live in the classic manner is to invite it to internal falsification. What seems profitable 
and exemplary about the classic age is not the particular content o f its ideas, but the balance 
between them and its life, the congruence with which it habitually behaves. (MC, 115)
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Ortega’s philosophy, therefore, transcends both rationalism and relativism. 
As Ortega argues in What is Philosophy?, things do not exist either inside or outside 
of consciousness, but rather together with my thoughts about them. Neither 
independent thought nor independent world exist in themselves: they are mere 
constructions or inventions. Reality is the coexistence of myself with things. 
Dobson explains that ‘... the truth of a statement or belief is, in Ortega’s mature 
opinion, to be judged from the point of view of its efficacy in the economy of the 
individual life’ (Dobson, 1989: 156-7), and in this Ortega resembles Collingwood. 
For Ortega, ‘Authentic truth, then, will be a function of authentic life, and only 
inferior or partial truths will be available to those who live their lives inauthentically’ 
(Dobson’s italics; Dobson, 1989: 160).
For both Collingwood and Ortega, therefore, the solution to the crisis of 
Western modernity is a historicist philosophy. Through a philosophy of historical 
thinking Western man can achieve authentic self-understanding, the Greek ontology 
of being is transcended and civilisation can advance.
Harold C. Raley indicates that ‘Ortega elevated history to a prominence as a 
valid philosophical component that it almost certainly had never before enjoyed in 
Spain, or, with a few exceptions (Dilthey, Hegel, etc.), in European thought 
generally’ (Raley, 1971: 4). As we have seen, for Ortega, like Collingwood, history 
is not equated with the mere past: anything worthy of the name ‘history’ does not 
pass away completely but continues to exist in the present, though in an altered form 
(cf. Raley, 1971: 5). It is idle to look for human reality in abstract Reason, but it is 
equally absurd to renounce all reason. It is impossible to reduce man to an 
unchanging essence or to an unchanging ‘nature’, but this does not mean that man 
must remain incomprehensible (Raley, 1971: 9).
Raley points out that according to Ortega, until now, philosophy has always 
been utopian. Each system tried to speak for all times and all men, and lacked ‘the 
vital, historical, perspectivist dimension’ (cited from Raley, 1971: 16). On the other 
hand, ‘the doctrine of the point of view demands that within the system there be 
merged the vital perspective from which it sprang ... ’ {The Modern Theme, cited 
from Raley, 1971: 16). Life, for Ortega, is historical and perspectivistic (Raley, 
1971: 17). Far from being relativistic, as critics allege, under the new criteria of 
perspective, circumstance, and historicism, ‘... philosophy acquires a more urgent 
and pragmatic aim. Relieved of the onerous task of deciphering eternal truth, it
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assumes the responsibility of defining or redefining man’s course through the ages’ 
(Raley, 1971:21).
In this respect, Raley argues that Ortega’s philosophy is close to 
existentialism, and on the many points where their thought coincides, he is the 
predecessor of both Sartre and Heidegger (Raley, 1971: 23). However, Ortega saw 
existentialism as a one-sided view of human life. Human life does not exclusively 
consist in anguish, or dread, or care, or being unto death. It is not reducible to any of 
the usual ‘existential characteristics’: ‘If human life has a characteristic, it is its 
openness to many possibilities’ (Ferrater Mora, 1963: 77; cited in Raley, 1971: 26).
Similarly, as Mink has noted, Collingwood’s philosophy has affinities with 
pragmatism and existentialism (Mink, 1969: 7). Mink argues that some of the 
principles of Collingwood’s logic of question and answer -  for example that all 
propositions are answers to questions, and that they are not true or false but ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ in the sense that they help or fail to help us get ahead in the process of 
inquiry -  are intelligible only as characteristic of a pragmatic, rather than a 
correspondence, coherence or semantic conception of truth (Mink, 1969: 9). 
According to Mink, ‘We do not have a name to describe or an articulated theory to 
explain the movement of thought which transformed, after the First World War, what 
we call, in its earlier forms, “Romanticism”. But I think it is likely that the future 
historians of our time will see Collingwood along with pragmatists and existentialists 
as tributaries of a common stream’ (Mink, 1969: 12).
According to the historicist philosophies put forward by Collingwood and 
Ortega, then, individual principles, judgements and categories are not in themselves 
‘true’. Instead truth and value are to be found in a way of life, or culture, as a whole. 
Cultures or ways of life, however, are not self-contained. A culture can become 
decadent or fossilised if its development is taken as complete and its principles are 
taken as eternal truths. As we have seen, Collingwood’s philosophy transcends the 
coherence theory of truth, in that true philosophy strives to assimilate what has yet to 
be explained. Similarly, Ortega’s historicism is a progressive attempt to strip away 
abstractions until one is left with the reality of history and open-ended process.
Like Collingwood and Ortega, for Nietzsche33 also, the development of 
historical thinking coincided with a need to respond to the crisis of modernity by
33 In my overview o f Nietzsche’s philosophy here I draw upon Hinz’s Self-Creation and History: 
Collingwood and Nietzsche on Conceptual Change (1994a).
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replacing a philosophy of being with a philosophy of becoming34. As with 
Collingwood and Ortega, Nietzsche distinguishes the worth of individual principles 
and judgements from the value of a culture or a life as a whole. Nietzsche’s 
distinction, however, between ‘truth’ and ‘life’ is more emphatic and radical than 
with Collingwood and Ortega. As I have already mentioned in Part One, for 
Nietzsche, consciousness is a development of instinctive activity and reason is a 
reflection of irrational drives. The goal of reason, therefore, is not knowledge or 
truth. As a result, Nietzsche’s solution to the nihilism of the West is quite different 
from Collingwood’s and Ortega’s.
For Nietzsche, we impose order and direction on the world through the 
activity of valuation35. The standard according to which the self gives value is 
conduciveness to life, or the further creativity of the self in question (Hinz, 1994a: 
54). But, as Hinz explains, according to Nietzsche, the valuations adopted by the 
sick and the weak are products of decadence, bad conscience and ressentiment, and 
can become an indirect means for the weak to dominate over the strong, by exalting 
its own mode of valuation as the nature of valuing as such and by according ‘honour’ 
to a world of eternal truth and being (Hinz, 1994a: 56-8). Hence, morality has 
become a form of valuation which attacks the essential valuational activity of life 
itself, and so kills the very thing it feeds on (Hinz, 1994a: 61).
Valuations reflect the need ‘... to impose upon chaos as much regularity and 
form as our practical needs require’ (WP, 515) and, by schematising the world, they 
impart to it the character of ‘being’ (Hinz, 1994a: 76). As Hinz indicates, Nietzsche 
is critical of the fact that greater honour is given to abstractions than to the
34 According to Hinz, Collingwood and Nietzsche address the problem o f resolving the ‘postmodern’ 
crises facing present-day Western culture -  its nihilism, barbarism, and relativism -  and provide a 
philosophical basis for its solution, ‘nihilism’ and ‘barbarism’ ‘... being understood as names for a 
“moral” or “spiritual” disease which threatens the integrity and vitality o f Western civilization as a 
system o f thought and value’ (Hinz, 1994a: 3). Reflection on Collingwood and Nietzsche furnishes a 
valuable way o f understanding one o f the fundamental antagonisms in contemporary philosophical 
thought and ‘postmodern’ society: the move towards deconstruction and other radical modes of 
interpretation on the one hand, and the insistence on adhering to criteria o f rationality and tradition on 
the other (Hinz, 1994a: 3). Collingwood and Nietzsche, Hinz contends, demonstrate that only a 
proper explanation o f the ‘death o f God’ can furnish a liberating movement beyond the merely 
religious, theological, scientific and metaphysical points o f view: ‘Thus, Collingwood and Nietzsche 
both acknowledge the end o f metaphysics in the traditional sense’ (Hinz, 1994a: 8). As we have 
already seen, however, Collingwood claims to be revealing the true nature o f metaphysics by arguing 
that it has always been an historical science, and by insisting on the name ‘metaphysics’ he, unlike 
Nietzsche, retains a continuity with the past.
35 According to Hinz, Nietzsche’s ‘valuation’ correlates with Collingwood’s presupposing, both of 
which provide ‘... the context o f a priori criteria in terms o f which self-creation proceeds beyond the 
activity of art’ (Hinz, 1994a: 52).
169
valuational process by which these things are created (Hinz, 1994a: 80). Through 
decadent modes of valuation, reason has been exalted and assumes a tyranny over the 
self (Hinz, 1994a: 81).
For Nietzsche, in Hinz’s account, rather than being a science of ‘what is’, 
philosophy must be a study of the activity of transfigurative creation whereby 
systems of valuation come to be (Hinz, 1994a: 121). Genealogy construes values as 
a function of will-to-power, that is, attempts by a form of life to create the conditions 
for its continued existence and self-overcoming (Hinz, 1994a: 123). Because 
philosophy must study not some unchanging mental substance or fixed human 
nature, but the flux of becoming, there is a need for ‘historical philosophising’. In 
order to be ‘cured’ of Platonism, the philosopher must study systems of thought in a 
psychological and historical fashion (Hinz, 1994a: 124).
According to Nietzsche, therefore, there is no ‘truth’ or ‘falsehood’ as such. 
The opposition of true and false is part of a perspective which makes the world (cf. 
Hinz, 1994a: 79). In The Will to Power, Nietzsche argues that logical thinking is 
made possible only by taking for granted the assumption that there are identical cases 
(WP, 512). The categories of reason ‘... represent nothing more than the expediency 
of a certain race and species -  their utility alone is their “truth”’ (WP, 514). The 
formation of logic, Nietzsche asserts, depended on ‘... the utilitarian fact that only 
when we see things coarsely and made equal do they become calculable and usable 
to us’ (WP, 515).
Hence, for Nietzsche, Aristotle’s law of contradiction, that we are unable to 
affirm and to deny one and the same thing, is not a reflection of reality, but part of 
the axioms of logic which are ‘... a means and measure for us to create reality ... ’ 
(WP, 516)
Supposing there were no self-identical ‘A ’, such as is presupposed by every proposition of 
logic (and of mathematics), and the ‘A ’ were already mere appearance, then logic would have a 
merely apparent world as its condition. In fact, we believe in this proposition under the 
influence of ceaseless experience which seems continually to confirm it. The ‘thing’ -  that is 
the real substratum o f ‘A ’; our belief in things is the precondition of our belief in logic. The 
‘A ’ o f logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction o f the thing -  if  we do not grasp this, but make of 
logic a criterion of true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those hypotheses: 
substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc.; that is to conceive a metaphysical world, that 
is, a ‘real world’ (this, however, is the apparent world once more). (WP, 516)
Accordingly, the implicit claim of logic to assert something about the true-in- 
itself is ‘quite coarse and false’ (WP, 516). Nietzsche continues:
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Our subjective compulsion to believe in logic only reveals that, long before logic itself entered 
into our consciousness, we did nothing but introduce its postulates into events: now we 
discover them in events -  we can no longer do otherwise -  and imagine that this compulsion 
guarantees something connected with ‘truth’. It is we who created the ‘thing’, the ‘identical 
thing’, subject, attribute, activity, object, substance, form, after we had long pursued the 
process of making identical, coarse and simple. The world seems logical to us because we 
have made it logical. (WP, 521)
Similarly, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche contends that it is a prejudice 
of metaphysicians that things of the highest value cannot be derivable from the 
transitory world, and must, rather, have their origin in the intransitory ‘thing in 
itself: ‘The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical 
values’ (BGE, 2).
Consequently, for Nietzsche, the standard of value according to which 
genealogical inquiry explains and assesses systems of thought is not truth, utility or 
justice, but ‘life’ (Hinz, 1994a: 127). Nietzsche argues:
The falseness o f a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement: it is here that 
our new language perhaps sounds strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, 
life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding; and our fundamental 
tendency is to assert that the falsest judgements (to which synthetic judgements a priori 
belong) are the most indispensable to us, that without granting as true the fictions o f logic, 
without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self- 
identical, without a continual falsification o f the world by means o f numbers, mankind could 
not live -  that to renounce false judgements would be to renounce life, would be to deny life. 
To recognize untruth as a condition o f life: that, to be sure, means to resist customary value- 
sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which ventures to do so places itself, by 
that act alone, beyond good and evil. (BGE, 4)
In Nietzsche’s view, genealogy provides an account of the way in which 
valuations are interpreted by consciousness, and how interpretations arise and 
supersede one another,36 and genealogy is part of the necessary destructive 
preliminary to a revivification of the Western world (Hinz, 1994a: 130-2).
Nietzsche argues (as Hinz explains) that nihilism is the culminating condition 
of Western culture and it is confronted by ‘nihilism’ because of the dominance of 
decadent modes of valuation based on ressentiment (Hinz, 1994a: 161). The 
decadent mode of valuation establishes a perspective where its own mode of
36 In a society, culture, or system o f thought at any given time there are dominant and recessive 
elements, where the competing valuations make it unstable and ever liable to change. Unlike 
Collingwood, who regards conceptual change as produced by continual development, for Nietzsche, 
conceptual change is characterised by discontinuity and is brought about by novel irruption (Hinz, 
1994a: 129). Contrary to Nietzsche, however, it could be argued that conceptual change can only be 
understood because we impose some kind o f conceptual apparatus on it. Thus, Collingwood rightly 
argues that the past can only be understood because it leaves traces o f itself in the present. There is a 
limit, then, to how much chaos and ‘novel irruption’ that a knowable historical process can contain.
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valuation is absolute and unconditional, and the source of all value is regarded as 
situated in ‘the beyond’, outside the realm of becoming. However, Nietzsche asserts, 
this mode of valuation ‘devalues’ itself. Truthfulness as a moral value becomes the 
very means by which the falsification, or idealisation, of the world is at last revealed 
(Hinz, 1994a: 164-5). The rational demand to eradicate dogma ultimately results in 
the discovery of reason’s own dogmatic foundations (Hinz, 1994a: 166). Hence the 
value of truth is recognised as a problem, and the will to truth gains self- 
consciousness. In order to create new values, what is initially needed is to carry 
nihilism to its ‘logical conclusion’ (Hinz, 1994a: 170).
Nietzsche provides an acute diagnosis of the crisis of modernity and his 
critique of Platonism and abstract rationalism has much in common with the views of 
Collingwood and Ortega37. But, while Collingwood and Ortega develop an 
alternative logic to the one that they criticise, Nietzsche, as I will explain, does not 
put forward a solution in rational terms.
Nietzsche contends that Western civilisation must attempt self-overcoming 
through a transvaluation of all values. The transvaluation involves the irruption of a 
new will-to-power into history and the establishment of a new perspective (Hinz, 
1994a: 171). For Nietzsche, according to Hinz’s account, the beginnings of a 
remedy are in the idea of eternal recurrence. In the hands of those who can endure it, 
it becomes a principle of reinterpretation. This idea creates an ‘order of rank’, which 
allows for the development of a new ‘aristocracy’ through whom the self- 
overcoming of humanity can be achieved (Hinz, 1994a: 175).
The development of a higher, self-creative type of being, the Ubermensch, is 
itself an ideal. Humanity must become conscious of itself as the creative source of 
values and cultivate a scepticism towards convictions and prejudices (Hinz, 1994a: 
176-7). The will to truth must be used to promote self-creative activity rather than 
hindering it. Nietzsche, then, is not opposed to conviction as such, only to complete 
submission to them (Hinz, 1994a: 178). As Hinz argues, ‘Knowledge here serves 
first and foremost the value of creative fecundity rather than truth’ (Hinz, 1994a:
37 Nietzsche’s objection to logic because it does not allow for contradiction correlates with similar 
arguments by Collingwood and Ortega. However, Collingwood and Ortega, along with the Italian 
Idealists followed on from this to develop a post-Hegelian ‘logic of contradiction’. Croce asks ‘And 
who has ever destroyed or eradicated the truth o f Hegel, that the principle “A is A, and not-A is not- 
A” must be profoundly modified, since reality is not static but living, not fixed but changing, and 
therefore demands the new principle that “A is both A and not-A”, so that rationalist logic gives place 
to the dialectic?’ (Croce, 1949: 12)
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179). In the establishment of a new order with a new interpretation and new 
principles, the will-to-power is fundamental (Hinz, 1994a: 180).
It seems, therefore, that whereas Collingwood’s solution to the crisis of the 
West is something that can be known, Nietzsche’s is intuited. As Hinz puts it, 
Nietzsche’s appeal is not primarily to one’s reason. Whereas Collingwood’s 
philosophy is intended to be judged by primarily rational standards, it would seem 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy is intended to persuade by virtue of the force of its 
rhetoric (Hinz, 1994a: 214).
Because, for Nietzsche, the basic principles of Western Civilisation are 
grounded in artistic failure and ressentiment, his proposed remedy is more severe: the 
revaluation of all values. Collingwood, on the other hand, rejects the idea that the 
cause of the crisis of civilisation rests ultimately in the basic principles of Western 
culture itself. Hinz contends: ‘Because of Collingwood’s philosophy we can 
concede much of the substance of Nietzsche’s concerns about the state of Western 
culture, and yet still have some reason for thinking that the demise of Western 
civilization is not an inevitable outcome of the direction it has traditionally taken’ 
(Hinz, 1994a: 221). While Collingwood’s philosophy consistently provides a
rational ground for acting, Nietzsche’s philosophy is not one that a person could 
simply agree with: a genuine agreement could only be a call to one’s own creative 
act (cf. Hinz, 1994a: 222).
In conclusion, therefore, Collingwood’s philosophy is intended as a response 
to a crisis in Western civilisation and the solution to the crisis is an improvement in 
our self-understanding through a historicist and dialectical philosophy. What is now 
needed is a discussion of how Collingwood’s solution to cultural crisis in terms of 
logic, metaphysics and philosophy of history manifests itself in the practices of 
civilisation and politics. In some sense, then, in Part Three, we move from theory to 
practice, although, as I will explain, in Collingwood’s view, theory and practice are 
intimately related. As we will see, Collingwood’s dialectical theory of truth as the 
ability to assimilate and explain what is different from and outside of one’s 
individual principles and judgements becomes evident in his morality of duty, a 
reform of social contract theory, and a dialectical response to the problems of 
economics and bureaucratic administration.
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Part Three:
Dialectic, Civilisation and Politics
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Chapter Eight:
The Phenomenology of Mind
In Part One and Part Two I have examined Collingwood’s diagnosis and response to 
the crisis of Western civilisation, which he presents in his philosophy of art and his 
logic and metaphysics, or alternatively his philosophy of emotion and his philosophy 
of thought. For Collingwood, as we have seen, our first apprehension of the world 
comes through aesthetic activity, and it is through art that we first become aware of 
cultural crisis. However, what we become conscious of in art is made detailed and 
explicit in thought proper. Thus in Collingwood’s logic, metaphysics and philosophy 
of history the crisis of the West manifests itself as a failure to move beyond a 
reliance on rationalistic thinking and the solution is the development of a dialectical 
philosophy. The dialectical philosophy meant a reform of logic and metaphysics, 
and advancing the idea of thinking and truth as an open-ended process of 
development.
Part Three explores how Collingwood’s dialectical philosophy, which 
includes the philosophy of emotion, leads to a reform in our conceptions of morality, 
society and politics. Thus this section will provide a more detailed and enhanced 
view of his diagnosis and response to the ills of modernity and draw together some of 
the conclusions from the first two parts.
In Collingwood’s view, there is an extremely close relation between theory 
and practice. In An Autobiography he criticised the ‘realist’ dogma that theory has 
no effect on practice. Collingwood asserted that it is a truth that ought to be familiar 
to every human being
... that in his capacity as a moral, political, or economic agent he lives not in a world of ‘hard 
facts’ to which ‘thoughts’ make no difference, but in a world of ‘thoughts’; that if  you change 
the moral, political, and economic ‘theories’ generally accepted by the society in which he 
lives, you change the character of his world; and that if  you change his own ‘theories’ you 
change his relation to that world; so that in either case you change the ways in which he acts. 
(A, 147)
The relation between theory and practice, therefore, was one of mutual 
dependence. Thought depends on what we have learned from our experience of 
acting, and action depends on how we think of ourselves and the world (A, 150). 
Similarly, at the beginning of Speculum Mentis, Collingwood declared that
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All thought exists for the sake of action. We try to understand ourselves and our world only in 
order that we may learn how to live. The end of our self-knowledge is not the contemplation 
by enlightened intellects of their own mysterious nature, but the freer and more effectual self­
revelation of that nature in a vigorous practical life. (SM, 15)
Furthermore, Collingwood held that the influence of the ‘realist’ view that 
theory is irrelevant to practice taught people to think of philosophy as a ‘futile 
parlour game’ and prepared the ground for the threats to civilisation by irrationalism 
and Fascism (A, 50 and 166-7).
Regarding the precise nature of the relation between theory and practice, 
Collingwood argued in ‘Political Action’1 that theory is not directly concerned with 
finding a solution to practical problems, but aims ‘... to clear them of 
misunderstandings which make their solution impossible’ (EPP, 94).
However, it is evident that for Collingwood practical reason, to some extent, 
is itself philosophical. As I will discuss in more detail further on, the highest forms 
of practical reason and moral thinking correspond with the highest form of 
theoretical reason. Collingwood in the Autobiography asserted that the theoretical 
activities of ‘... scientific, historical, or philosophical thinking depended quite as 
much on “moral” qualities as on “intellectual” ones, and that “moral” difficulties 
were to be overcome not by “moral” force alone but by clear thinking’ (A, 150). For 
Collingwood, ‘... the plane on which, ultimately, all problems arise is the plane of 
“real” life: that to which they are referred for their solution is history’ (A, 114).
The rejection of any sharp distinction between theory and practice was also 
evident, as we have seen, in An Essay on Philosophical Method. There Collingwood 
argued that experience and theory are names for any two successive stages in a scale 
of forms of philosophical knowledge, where the higher stage explains the lower 
(EPM, 172).
For Collingwood, then, all of us are philosophers, to some extent, in our 
everyday lives, and we engage with theory in our ordinary moral thinking. 
Collingwood’s rapprochement between theory and practice meant overcoming the 
distinction between the contemplative life and the practical life as a division between
1 This essay appears in Essays in Political Philosophy, pp. 92-109.
2 With this reading o f the relation of theory and practice in Collingwood’s thought, I am inclined to 
qualify Connelly’s view that the function o f theory is ‘essentially negative’ in that it helps our practice 
by clarifying what our fundamental principles about morality are (Connelly, 2003: 175). Following 
on from the argument o f Part Two of this study, I suggest that the function o f philosophy is not merely 
to clarify what our opinions are but also to consider how they manifest themselves in particular kinds 
of practice. I would question what seems to be Connelly’s effective identification of the purpose of 
philosophy with metaphysics, and moral philosophy with a ‘metaphysics o f morals’.
176
two classes of specialists (A, 150). Collingwood’s response to the crisis of Western 
civilisation, therefore, culminates in The New Leviathan, which outlines a theory of 
mind, morality, society and politics, and makes explicit his dialectical philosophy.
As we have seen in Part Two, for Collingwood, the philosophical foundations 
of Western culture presupposed a static conception of being, which is ultimately 
nihilistic. According to his moral and political philosophy (which I now discuss here 
in Part Three), this crisis of civilisation is evident in the dominance of abstractly 
rationalistic forms of thought and action, associated with natural science. The 
solution to this problem is the development of an account of mind both where each of 
the levels of consciousness makes an important contribution to human life and where 
mind is seen as a process of development that is dialectical and leading to greater 
degrees and kinds of self-consciousness. Thus, the characterisation of thinking and 
truth as an open-ended process of development, assimilating and explaining diverse 
points of view, in Collingwood’s reform of logic and metaphysics, is demonstrated 
and made use of in his social and political thought.
In Part Three, particularly in this chapter and the next, I will make extensive 
reference to David Boucher’s The Social and Political Thought o f R.G. Collingwood 
(1989). Boucher’s important and ground-breaking book first brought to prominence 
Collingwood’s political philosophy and The New Leviathan, Hence in my exposition 
of the way in which Collingwood’s dialectical philosophy reveals itself in his 
account of mind, morality and politics, it will be necessary to engage with this text 
frequently.
Collingwood’s dialectical method, which is expressed in An Essay on 
Philosophical Method as the theory of the scale of forms, was developed in his early 
work, including the moral philosophy lectures, and the moral philosophy lectures 
formed the basis of what was to become The New Leviathan. As Boucher indicates, 
then, a version of the scale of forms emerges in The New Leviathan, and An Essay on 
Philosophical Method and The New Leviathan are related as theory and its 
application (Boucher, 1989: 28). Boucher explains that ‘... the principles of method 
which inform The New Leviathan are in substance, with minor changes in detail, 
those exemplified in varying degrees in Speculum Mentis, Outlines o f a Philosophy 
o f Art, and later The Principles o f Art, as well as in the lectures on moral philosophy, 
and articulated as theory in An Essay on Philosophical Method’ (Boucher, 1989: 37).
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The New Leviathan was also a culmination of Collingwood’s attempts to 
bring about rapprochements both between philosophy and history and between 
theory and practice. Boucher argues that The New Leviathan is the concrete 
exemplar of the union of philosophy and history, citing a letter to Malcolm Knox in 
1936 where Collingwood claims: ‘What I do wish to resolve without residue into 
history is the Philosophy o f Spirit, or Theory of Mind, or Science of Human Nature’ 
(Boucher, 1989: 38). In ‘Notes on Historiography’ (which was written during the 
same voyage on which he wrote An Essay on Metaphysics) Collingwood made his 
now famous assertion that ‘Philosophy as a separate discipline is liquidated by being 
converted into history’, and also claimed that ‘history is the only kind of 
knowledge’3 (Boucher, 1989: 38 and 49).
The New Leviathan, as Boucher explains, was a concrete demonstration of the 
rapprochement between philosophy and history, because Collingwood developed the 
argument there that history means self-knowledge of the mind and knowledge of 
what mind has done in the past (Boucher, 1989: 50-1).
Following on from The Idea o f History, Collingwood declares that the 
argument of The New Leviathan is constructed on what Locke called the ‘historical 
plain method’, and concentrates on ‘facts’, things done, or deeds (NL, 9.1-11). The 
historical study of mind involves studying the activities of mind. It does not ask 
what mind is, only what it does, and not what mind always and everywhere does, 
only what it does on certain occasions (NL, 9.16-8).
Contrary to Locke, however, for Collingwood, the study of human mind 
using the historical plain method would not result in knowledge of a universal human 
nature. Collingwood rejects the idea of mind as substance, and, as we have already 
seen, argues that mind is activity and is creative of itself and its environment4.
3 Boucher points out that in this Collingwood was following the example of his Italian sources of 
inspiration: Croce and Gentile (Boucher, 1989: 38). Similarly, in a letter to E.R. Hughes in December 
1939, Collingwood said that he would continue to devote his life to ‘the idea of a union of philosophy 
and history’, an idea that ‘could save Europe’ (Boucher, 1989: 50).
4 Boucher draws attention to an affinity between Collingwood and Gentile on this point. Gentile, in 
viewing mind as pure act, reached a philosophical position termed ‘absolute immanence’, whereby the 
mind attains self-consciousness by bringing about a unity in historical reality. Boucher cites de 
Ruggiero’s summing up of Gentile’s doctrine: ‘Philosophy, in creating its own history, creates itself. 
Hence an absolute immanence o f philosophical truth in the historical process, which is at the same 
time the phenomenological process of spirit’ (Boucher, 1989: 112). Although Collingwood did not 
follow Gentile’s views without modification, Gentile’s views show us that Collingwood’s use of the 
word ‘facts’ does not mean ‘facts’ in abstraction from the acts that created them: ‘The word fact, then, 
is Collingwood’s term for that which is the unity o f the immanent and transcendent aspects of  
experience’ (Boucher, 1989: 113).
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Collingwood argues that the sciences of mind, unlike the natural sciences, 
only give us knowledge about things of which we were already conscious (NL, 1.71). 
The answer to any question in a science of mind is provided by reflection: ‘The 
sciences of mind, unless they preach error or confuse the issue by dishonesty or 
involuntary obscurity, can tell us nothing but what each can verify for himself by 
reflecting on his own mind’ (NL, 1.85).
This is consistent with the dialectical principle that Collingwood advanced in 
An Essay on Philosophical Method: that in a philosophical inquiry what we are 
trying to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant, 
but to know better something which in some sense we always knew -  to know it 
better in the sense of coming to know it in a different and better way (EPM, 11).
For Collingwood, in The New Leviathan, a mind develops when it has the 
mental energy to do so: ‘There are no laws of development or progress. Occasions 
arise when certain kinds of progress, certain steps in development, are possible for a 
mind. They are never necessary. Whether the mind takes the step that is possible for 
it depends entirely on the mind’s practical energy’ (NL, 7.28-29).
Collingwood states that he is concerned only with the modem European 
mind, as that is enough for deciding how to deal with the attack on modem European 
civilisation, as represented by Fascism and Nazism (NL, 9.2-21). He aims to give a 
catalogue of the mind’s functions, to be arranged serially, albeit in an irregular series 
(NL, 9.32-9.4).
Collingwood’s methodology is obviously Hegelian5. However, as I have 
argued in Part Two, Collingwood also reforms Hegel’s dialectic by getting rid of the 
Absolute and developing the idea of an open-ended process of development. Hence, 
Collingwood argues that the development of the mind is not predictable (NL, 9.43), 
and it only develops if it has the energy to do so. He refers to this as the Taw of 
contingency’: ‘the earlier terms in a series of mental functions do not determine the 
later’ (NL, 9.48).
Another principle which Collingwood introduces into the study of mind is the 
Taw of primitive survivals’: ''When A is modified into B there survives in any
5 The Hegelian aspect to Collingwood’s phenomenology of mind is noted by Gary Browning. 
Browning points out that the notion of the mind ascending forms and functions to achieve a self­
recognition of itself as free, social and self-moving which is presented in The New Leviathan rehearses 
a similar journey to that followed by mind in Hegel’s Phenomenology o f  Spirit (Browning, 1995: 
104).
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example o f B, side by side with the function o f B which is the modified form o f A, an 
element o f A in its primitive or unmodified state’ (NL, 9.51). Apes have evolved into 
men; but there are still apes (NL, 9.52). The lower levels of mind survive in the 
higher as objects of reflection. Thus, this resembles the idea of a scale of forms in 
An Essay on Philosophical Method.
According to Boucher, the Taw of primitive survivals’ qualifies the doctrine 
of An Essay on Philosophical Method. It means that there is no longer a complete 
overlap of forms on the scale. Something of the lower form remains ‘pure’ in the 
higher form: that is, modification is only partial and never complete. Following from 
this, the law of primitive survivals is at variance with his principle of the ‘fallacy of 
precarious margins’, which, as we have seen, ‘... consists in assuming that the 
overlap which has already affected a certain area of the class in question can be 
trusted not to spread, and that beyond its limits there lies a marginal region in which 
the instances exhibit only one of the specific forms, uncontaminated by the presence 
of the other’ (EPM, 48; Boucher, 1989: 96). However, Collingwood did argue 
further on in An Essay on Philosophical Method that the higher of any two adjacent 
forms fails to include the lower in its entirety because there is also a negative aspect 
of the lower, which is rejected by the higher (EPM, 90). This seems to suggest that 
the principle of the ‘fallacy of precarious margins’ was modified in the text of An 
Essay on Philosophical Method itself.
Collingwood’s account of the development of mind in The New Leviathan 
supplements and modifies his account of mind in The Principles o f Art. In doing so, 
The New Leviathan provides a more detailed exposition of the levels of 
consciousness and the dialectical development from one to the other than we saw in 
his philosophy of art. Collingwood’s theory of mind culminates in an account of 
morality as duty, and the way in which this dialectical account of mind and duty 
provides a solution to the problem of the crisis of civilisation, or the nihilistic 
consequences of an over-reliance on rationalistic thinking, will become evident in the 
course of the overview I now provide.
Collingwood begins his dialectic of mind in The New Leviathan by discussing 
the relation between mind and body. ‘The problem of the relation between body and 
mind’, he asserts, is a bogus problem, based on the false assumption that man is 
partly body and partly mind (NL, 2.41-2). In fact, body and mind are the same thing, 
known in two different ways. From the point of view of natural science, the whole
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of man is body. From the point of view of the sciences of mind, the whole of man is 
mind. The problem of the relation between body and mind, then, resolves itself into 
the problem of the relation between the sciences of body and the sciences of mind, 
each of which are a valid search for the truth, with their own methods and problems 
(NL, 2.43-63). Adopting the methods of one to solve the problems of the other is the 
‘fallacy of swapping horses’ (NL, 2.71).
However, Collingwood contends that there is a psychological sense of the 
word ‘body’, for example, ‘bodily appetite’, ‘bodily pleasure’ and ‘bodily exertion’ 
(NL, 3.2). Lying in a hot bath is referred to as a ‘bodily pleasure’, whereas reading 
Newton’s Principia is not. The word ‘bodily’ here refers to a certain group of 
feelings (the pleasure of warmth on the skin and so forth), as opposed to the pleasure 
of thinking in a certain way (NL, 3.4-43). Hence, a ‘bodily’ pleasure means a 
pleasure arising out of ‘feelings’, that is, sensations and the emotions directly 
connected with them6 (NL, 3.44).
According to Collingwood, consciousness is an activity which is a constituent 
of the mind. In contrast, feeling is an apanage of the mind. It is what simple 
consciousness is conscious of. Mind, then, is consciousness and has feeling (NL, 
4.14-2). Consciousness in its specialised form finds feeling in a correspondingly 
specialised form as ‘ready made’ and ‘immediately given’ (NL, 4.22).
Knowledge is a highly specialised form of consciousness. In order to know 
anything one must achieve second-order consciousness, or reflection on simple 
consciousness (NL, 4.3-31). This means that we attend to an object, focussing our 
consciousness on it, make suppositions about it, subject it to questioning, and attempt 
to answer the question (NL, 4.33-36). Second-order consciousness is the level at 
which conceptual thinking takes place (cf. Boucher, 1989: 122).
The object of second-order consciousness, therefore, is not found ready-made 
or ‘given’, but is produced by the act of selective attention. Out of the confusion in
6 Boucher interestingly contends that this is a modification of the principle in The Idea o f  History that 
historical knowledge consists solely in the re-enactment o f past purposive thought. In The Idea o f  
History Collingwood maintained a sharp distinction between rational thought and feelings, or psyche: 
a distinction that continues in both The Principles o f  Art and An Essay on Metaphysics. The inclusion 
of the psychical level o f experience in the science o f mind in The New Leviathan means that reason 
now studies the sensations, feelings and appetites which ‘feed and support’ it. History must now 
concern itself with thought at all the preceding levels o f consciousness, and thought in The New 
Leviathan begins at the level o f simple consciousness, that is, at the level he had previously termed the 
psyche (Boucher, 1989: 117-9).
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which feeling is given to simple consciousness, selective attention makes a pattern 
and reduces the confusion to order (NL, 4.52-6).
In Collingwood’s view, ‘Knowledge rests on a foundation of feeling’ (NL, 
5.1). All thought has a certain degree of difficulty, causing emotional strains in the 
mind, which in extreme cases can lead to insanity. The solidity or robustness of a 
person’s sensuous emotional nature affords a sane basis for his or her thinking and 
consists of two kinds of strength: vividness and tenacity (NL, 5.11-14).
On methodological grounds Collingwood argues that there are no objects of 
feeling, thus agreeing with Descartes and disagreeing with Locke. Both the 
Cartesian view and the Lockean view fit the facts, but the Cartesian theory is 
preferable as it means that a theory of feeling does not need objects as well as 
modes7 (5.2-39).
In second-level consciousness the activity of attending to, or selecting, 
feelings takes place within a context of evocative thinking. This is the process by 
which we encounter appetite in the forms of hunger and love, and we become 
conscious of passion in the forms of fear and anger (cf. Boucher, 1989: 124).
Hunger, Collingwood explains, is not a feeling, but an appetite: a complex 
thing ‘... consisting of feelings and ghosts of feelings combined into a certain pattern 
by the practical work of consciousness’ (NL, 7.1). Hunger or appetite involves an 
act of practical consciousness, namely conceptual thinking, or selective attention 
(NL, 7.19-23). In second-order consciousness, the act of selective attention is 
accompanied by ‘... the act of evocative thinking: the act of arousing in yourself, by 
the work of thought, feelings you do not find as “given” in yourself (NL, 7.32).
The evocation of feelings provides a context where feelings that are present 
are contrasted with feelings that are absent. One tries to attain the absent feeling 
because of its ‘pleasure potential’ (NL, 7.43). Appetite, then, makes partially 
determinate what was completely indeterminate (cf. Boucher, 1989: 124). When in a 
condition of appetite, one is not conscious of either the feeling-state one has or the 
feeling-state one wants as having any determinate characteristics, except that each 
contrasts with the other (NL, 7.52-3).
Thus, for Collingwood, ‘Appetite is what thought makes out of feeling when 
thought develops by its own activity from mere consciousness to conceptual
7 For Descartes, for example, colour is a mode, not an object, of action (NL, 5.34-35).
182
thinking. It is both a specialized form of consciousness (namely conceptual thinking) 
and a specialized form of feeling produced out of simple feeling by that form of 
consciousness’ (NL, 7.6). ‘Appetite is a name for the inherent restlessness of the 
mind’ (NL, 7.69). The mind is driven unconsciously from an indeterminate here- 
and-now towards some indeterminate there-and-then in a quest ‘... due to no choice, 
guided by no reason, directed on no goal. Choice and reason and goal are not among 
the sources or conditions of appetite, they are among its products’ (NL, 7.69).
Collingwood divides appetite into the hunger-type and the love-type. 
Appetite involves a movement from an actual self towards an ideal self. Hunger is a 
wanting to be strong. The ideal self in this case is a self that is indefinitely 
strengthened. Love, on the other hand, is a wanting to be attached. The ideal self is 
a self that has achieved a relation with something other than itself, a ‘not-self, of 
such a kind that one’s present dissatisfaction is removed (NL, 8.12-16).
Love, therefore, is an appetite for a relation with a not-self. In the struggle 
towards this relation, the not-self is created, and the self establishes itself as a focus 
of activity with an identity of its own, unique and different from every not-self. Prior 
to this there is no self or not-self, only a chaos of consciousness and feeling in which 
appetite works (NL, 8.44-47).
Love is a modification of hunger, or the impossible quest for omnipotence. 
Love comes about when blind appetite suffers repeated disappointments in its quest 
for omnipotence, despairs of that quest, and seeks instead strength from something 
not itself (NL, 8.52-5). According to Collingwood, ‘The birth of love is the act of 
limiting your demands: substituting for the quest of absolute satisfaction ... the quest 
of many partial and incomplete satisfactions, each derived from a specialized relation 
to this, that, or the other not-self (NL, 8.58).
However, in frustrating the satisfaction of a limited set of demands, the not- 
self has the power to throw one into a passion, and passion has two forms: fear and 
anger (NL, 10.2). Collingwood rejects the rationalistic accounts of fear, given by 
Hobbes and Spinoza, which explain fear by reference to our supposed reasons for 
being afraid. Fear does contain an intellectual element, not of propositional thinking 
(for example, ‘this may hurt me’), but of conceptual thinking: the idea of a not-self, 
and a contrast between it and oneself. Fear is simply a practical reaction to this 
contrast (NL, 10.26-27). Love turns into fear when one starts thinking of the not-self
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no longer being in the passive role of accepting adoration, but being alive and having 
an independent character of its own (NL, 10.3-32).
Collingwood similarly rejects the rationalistic accounts of anger given by 
Hobbes and Spinoza. There is the same intellectual element in anger as in fear, 
namely the contrast between yourself and something other than yourself. The 
difference is practical. The first thing one feels inclined to do on encountering 
opposition is to give way to it. But fear is self-contradictory. Like hunger it is 
insatiable, and yielding to it completely would be self-annihilation. The flight from 
self-contradiction arises from despair, and combined with resilience or adaptability, 
passion changes from fear to anger. Anger means fighting against the not-self and is 
accompanied by shame, the renunciation of the cowardly self for being afraid (NL, 
10.45-49). Shame and anger, Collingwood explains, are a critical point in the whole 
development of mind. Anger is a bridge between the lower levels of consciousness 
and the higher forms where propositional thinking develops (NL, 10.5-51).
At the third level of consciousness we encounter desire and happiness. With 
desire, truth and error, and self-knowledge, originate. Unlike appetite, desire 
involves knowing what you want. It involves asking and answering a question and 
contemplating alternatives: ‘which do I want, a or bV The idea of alternatives is 
abstracted from the experience of fear and anger as two alternative reactions to the 
not-self (NL, 11.1-14). According to Collingwood, you find out what you want by 
going through a process of fear and anger (NL, 11.17).
Appetite has no negative form: there is only its presence and its absence. But 
desire has a negative form: aversion or loathing. Desire involves propositional 
thinking. Appetite and absence of appetite, as objects of knowledge, become desire 
and aversion (NL, 11.21-24). Also, one can have true and false desires (NL, 11.3). 
In answering the question ‘which of these alternatives do I want?’ the answer given 
is either true or false (NL, 11.32). The first step in knowing yourself is knowing 
what you want (NL, 11.39).
‘Good’ is the name for the object of our desires (NL, 11.41). The mind 
bestows goodness on whatever it desires. Thus, for Collingwood, ‘... desire first 
makes us able to know (knowledge being the theoretical function of which desire is 
the practical counterpart); and good is the first thing we come to know’ (NL, 11.69).
Collingwood follows Aristotle by arguing that the general name for the things 
we desire and think good is called ‘happiness’. Happiness is a combination of
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internal well-being, or virtue, and external well-being, or power (NL, 12.2-22). 
Happiness and unhappiness are freedom from and subjection to passion or the force 
of circumstances (NL, 12.34). Interestingly, Collingwood criticises Nietzsche for 
confusedly asserting that what one wants is not happiness but power. Our word 
‘happy’, Collingwood explains, is derived from Aristotle and a title used by Roman 
emperors, and ‘... what was good enough for Greek philosophers and Roman 
emperors is good enough for us’ (NL, 12.44).
Unhappiness is a familiar element in contemporary civilisation. Despite 
having a different conception of the nature and content of mind from that of Hobbes, 
Collingwood praises Hobbes for emphasising that the social, economic and political 
structures which exert such power over us are our own creations. There is a sense of 
despair when we realise that those very agents whose protection we expected to 
enjoy are perpetrators of the very evils they were meant to end. But despair is 
parasitic upon hope, and the solution is to strengthen the hope until it overcomes the 
nightmare, by constructing a science of politics for the modem world (NL, 12.9-97; 
cf. Boucher, 1989: 128 and 130). The New Leviathan, therefore, is intended as a 
remedy for the ills of modernity.
According to Collingwood, the next level of consciousness is choice. Choice 
is distinguished from preference. Preference means that one desires a and suffers 
aversion to b. Choice, on the other hand, presupposes freedom. The question of 
whether or not we have free will, Collingwood argues, is a pseudo-problem, 
involving ‘the fallacy of misplaced argument’. Instead, ‘... freedom is a first-order 
object of consciousness to every man whose mental development has reached the 
ability to choose’ (NL, 13.18).
Freedom of the will is, positively, freedom to choose and, negatively, 
freedom from being at the mercy of desires, and its achievement is involuntary (NL, 
13.25-26). One achieves freedom through accepting unhappiness: that is, by 
accepting badness and weakness, and renouncing virtue and power. Through an act 
of self-denial, therefore, instead of happiness, a person gains self-respect, or the 
consciousness of being free (NL, 13.3-31). We escape from any particular desire by 
naming it: a doctrine common to Spinoza, fairy-tales, and psychoanalysis (NL, 
13.41-47).
Collingwood indicates that the doctrine that a person acquires free-will by 
conquering his or her passions is fundamental to Confucianism, Buddhism,
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Christianity and Islam, and that the denial of this doctrine in modem Europe is 
popularly referred to as ‘paganism’ (NL, 13.48-51). But, he explains, this so-called 
‘paganism’ is an escapist fantasy. The proposal to abandon freedom, in the shape of 
an organised and scientific Christian world, in exchange for a better pagan world is 
inconsistent. We cannot choose to get rid of choice: abandoning freedom cannot be a 
free act, but can only happen due to psychological causes (NL, 13.52-5).
The achievement of free-will marks the reaching of mental maturity. 
However, in some people self-liberation may be achieved but remain pre-conscious. 
A person is made conscious of being free by arousing his or her self-respect, 
something extremely important in government and education (NL, 13.6-64). Also 
when self-respect is achieved, it may still be precarious and it may be felt that desire 
is still not completely conquered. This leads to asceticism where people bolster up 
their self-respect by deliberately doing things they would rather not, something 
which dies away at mental maturity (NL, 13.67-68).
This fourth level of consciousness involves a distinction between ‘the will’ 
and ‘the deed’. However, as Collingwood argues: ‘A voluntary act is not preceded 
by a decision to do it; it begins with a decision to do it. But the process from the will 
to the deed is at every stage under the control of the will; the will is not content to 
initiate the process, leaving the details to be completed by the other hand; it fills in 
the details itself as it goes on’ (NL, 13.8-81). A will is an example of practical 
thinking, and as practical it expresses itself by the initial stage of action. The rest of 
the action, the part that is as yet unperformed, is ‘intended’: ‘The development of the 
process from the will to the deed involves the progressive conversion of intention or 
decision into performance. There are perhaps occasions on which thought turns 
wholly and without residue into deed; more often the process is incomplete, and 
some of what begins as intention ends as -  what shall we say? -  frustrated intention’ 
(NL, 13.85).
In the phenomenology of mind that Collingwood presents in The New 
Leviathan, language occupies a crucial place8. Each conversion from one level of 
consciousness to another is brought about by a linguistic act. Collingwood’s theory 
of language in The New Leviathan is a modification of that propounded in The 
Principles o f Art. What was, in The Principles o f Art, psychical experience now
8 Boucher declares that ‘The importance of language in Collingwood’s philosophy of mind cannot be 
overestimated’ (Boucher, 1989: 134).
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becomes simple consciousness, or first-level consciousness. Language, which had 
only appeared at the second level of experience, namely consciousness or 
imagination, now emerged at the level of simple consciousness. Collingwood, then, 
abandoned the distinction between language, which is expressive, and 
intellectualised language, which has meaning. All language now has meaning9.
Language is defined as ‘... any system of bodily movements, not necessarily 
vocal, whereby the men who make them mean or signify anything’ (Collingwood’s 
italics; NL, 6.1). Language is an abstraction from discourse. Whereas discourse is 
the activity by which a person means anything, ‘... a language is the system adopted, 
the means employed, the rules followed, in this activity’ (NL, 6.11). Discourse is 
continuous, the ‘rests’ and ‘pauses’ being an integral part of it. It begins as 
continuous activity and is then broken up into words -  vocal words or gesture words 
-  by selective attention (NL, 6.12-14).
The vehicle of discourse is a succession of sensations with their emotional 
charges. Discourse is ‘... the activity of meaning something (a) by something else 
(b), where meaning a is an act of theoretical consciousness, and b is a practical 
activity, the production in oneself or others of a flow of sounds or the like which 
serve you as the vehicle of that meaning’ (NL, 6.19).
We become conscious of our feelings by means of language. Naming a 
feeling awakens consciousness of it. It remains pre-conscious until it is named (NL, 
6.26-28). The act of naming a feeling itself also remains preconscious until one 
reflects upon it. According to Collingwood, ‘This is the difference between 
linguistic activity in general and that reflective, critical form of it which is called 
“literature” or “poetry” or in general “art”. The artist or poet, like other men, 
achieves consciousness of his feelings only so far as he finds words for them; but he 
is conscious not only of the feelings but of the linguistic activity, and works at 
performing this activity as well as he can’ (NL, 6.29)10.
Collingwood remarks that it is a commonplace today that not only is 
language the means by which knowledge is communicated from one person to 
another, making possible social life, but it is ‘... an activity prior to knowledge itself, 
without which knowledge could never come into existence’ (NL, 6.41). Unlike in
9 Here I am making use of Boucher’s account (1989: 138).
10 Collingwood does not discuss the corruption of consciousness in relation to artistic activity in The 
New Leviathan, presumably because he had already discussed it in The Principles o f  Art. Here his 
main concern is to explain how one progresses from simple consciousness to thought.
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The Principles o f Art, in The New Leviathan, Collingwood credits Hobbes with the 
discovery of this truth, and cites from p. 14 of Hobbes’ Leviathan: ‘ . without words, 
there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of 
Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the 
being, or well-being of man-kind’ (NL, 6.46; cf. Boucher, 1989: 139).
In Collingwood’s view, therefore, language and consciousness develop in
unison:
Language in its simplest form is the language o f consciousness in its simplest form; the mere 
‘register’ o f feelings, as wild and mad as those feelings themselves; irrational, unorganized, 
unplanned, unconscious. As consciousness develops, language develops with it. When 
consciousness becomes conceptual thought, language develops abstract terms. When 
consciousness becomes propositional thought language develops the indicative sentence as the 
standard verbal form in which to state the proposition. When consciousness becomes reason 
language becomes demonstrative discourse wherein sentences are so linked together as to state 
verbally ‘the Consequence of one Affirmation to another’. (NL, 6.58-59)
In The New Leviathan, then, (to sum up what I have outlined so far) 
Collingwood modifies and extends the theory of mind that he presented in The 
Principles o f Art. As we have already seen in Part One, for Collingwood, the lower 
levels of consciousness constitute a foundation for the emergence and development 
of mind at higher levels. Because of this, aesthetic experience plays a crucial role in 
our self-understanding and in our understanding of civilisation and the problems 
which beset it. Art is seen as the beginning of the process by which we create the 
self and the world, and in this emphasis on the importance of art Collingwood is 
demonstrably working in the Romantic tradition.
In The New Leviathan, this position is developed such that what was 
previously termed the psyche is more completely integrated into the life of mind and 
Collingwood’s theory of language is modified accordingly. Furthermore, in contrast 
with The Principles o f Art, The New Leviathan provides a more detailed account of 
the levels of consciousness (simple consciousness, appetite, passion, desire, choice 
and reason) and the dialectical development from one to another.
Regarding the point that the emergence of reason and society depends 
fundamentally on the lower levels of consciousness, Collingwood can profitably be 
compared with Ortega y Gasset. In ‘The Sportive Origin of the State’11, Ortega 
argues that we can divide animal and human activity into two classes: one original,
11 This essay is published in History as a System and other essays toward a philosophy o f  history, 
(1961) pp. 13-40.
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creative, vital, spontaneous and disinterested, and the other of utilitarian character, in 
which the first is put to use and mechanised: ‘Utility does not create and invent; it 
simply employs and stabilizes what has been created without it’ (HS, 17).
Life, Ortega argues, presents itself as an effort of two different kinds, one 
made for the sheer delight of it, which becomes most manifest in sport, and the other 
‘ . an exertion in which we are urged on and worn out by a necessity imposed on us 
and not of our invention or desire’, the classic instance of which is what we call work 
(HS, 18). On this view, ‘Sportive activity seems to us the foremost and creative, the 
most exalted, serious, and important part of life, while labour ranks second as its 
derivative and precipitate. Nay more, life, properly speaking, resides in the first
• • 1 9alone; the rest is relatively mechanic and a mere functioning’ (HS, 18).
Ortega contends that in every vital process the first impulse is derived from 
‘. .. an energy of supremely free and exuberant character’ (HS, 19). Life then selects 
among the possibilities created, some of which consolidate in the form of useful 
habits. According to Ortega, ‘Abundance of possibilities is a symptom of thriving 
life, as utilitarianism, the attitude of conforming oneself to the strictly necessary, like 
the sick man who begrudges every expenditure of energy, discloses weakness and 
waning of life’ (HS, 19). Life, then, needs overflow: ‘He who rests content with 
barely meeting necessity as it arises will be washed away. Life has triumphed on this 
planet because it has, instead of clinging to necessities, deluged it with 
overwhelming possibilities, so that the failure of one may serve as a bridge for the 
victory of another’ (HS, 21).
Similarly, in ‘Man the Technician’13, Ortega asserts that ‘... man begins 
where technology begins’ (HS, 117). But, ‘... the meaning and final cause of 
technology lie outside itself, namely in the use man makes of the unoccupied 
energies it sets free. The mission of technology consists in releasing man for the task 
of being himself (HS, 118). Technology can mobilise its ingenuity and perform the 
task life is and, within limits, realise the human project, but it does not draw up that
12 This is an idea that Nietzsche alludes to in Beyond Good and Evil: ‘Mature manhood: that means to 
have rediscovered the seriousness one had as a child at play’ (BGE, 94). As we have seen, Nietzsche 
also emphasises the crucial role of the pre-rational levels o f mind in human life. However, for 
Nietzsche, unlike Collingwood and Ortega, appetite and desire are not merely pre-rational, but 
irrational, and cannot lead to knowledge or truth. Comparisons and contrasts between Nietzsche and 
Collingwood on the subject of the phenomenology o f mind and the idea of duty will be discussed 
further on in this chapter.
13 This essay is published in History as a System and other essays toward a philosophy o f  history, 
pp.87-161.
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project. The vital program is pre-technical, and depends on ‘original desire’ (HS, 
119).
However, desiring is not easy. Every wish for this or that particular thing, 
Ortega explains, is ultimately connected with the person you want to be, and one can 
distinguish between the pseudo-wish and the genuine wish. Not knowing how to 
wish may mean that ‘... one of the basic diseases of our time is a crisis of wishing 
, . .’ 14 (HS, 120-1). The material wealth and superabundance of contemporary 
civilisation surpasses that of all other ages, ‘Yet we suffer from an appalling 
restlessness because we do not know what to do with it, because we lack imagination 
for inventing our lives’15 (HS, 121). Consequently, Ortega suggests that those in 
special charge of the human project are poets, philosophers, politicians, founders of 
religions, and discoverers of new values. The engineer is dependent on them, and 
has a secondary role (HS, 121).
The crucial role played by the lower levels of consciousness in human life, 
therefore, is vividly emphasised by Ortega. Ortega’s emphasis in this respect can, I 
suggest, enrich our understanding of Collingwood’s dialectic of mind. For both 
Collingwood and Ortega, responding to the ills of contemporary civilisation means 
recognising the importance of the lower levels of consciousness in order to avoid the 
self-deception of abstractly rationalistic forms of thinking (and this supplements 
what I have argued in Part One). But the solution to the crisis of civilisation also 
occurs at the higher levels of mind, in terms of the development of dialectical and 
historical thinking (as I have argued in Part Two). In the life of mind, however, 
dialectical thinking manifests itself in a historical morality, and the way in which 
Collingwood’s historical account of morality constitutes a response to cultural crisis 
is something that I will now explore.
Collingwood’s response to the crisis of civilisation with the development of a 
dialectical and historical philosophy is not only evident, as we have seen, in the use 
of a dialectical methodology in his theory of mind. It is also evident in the way that 
Collingwood’s phenomenology of mind assimilates and transcends various 
inadequate theories. Collingwood displayed a growing admiration for Hobbes in his
14 This is something discussed by Gadamer in Reason in the Age o f  Science (1981: 81).
15 Ortega distinguishes three stages in the evolution o f technology: technology o f chance, technology 
of the craftsman, and technology of the technician (HS, 142). At the third stage, technology is the 
source o f practically unlimited human activity, and finding ourselves in principle capable of being 
almost anything, we find it even more difficult to know what we actually are (HS, 150-1). Our time, 
‘... being the most intensely technical, is also the emptiest in all human history’ (HS, 151).
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later career, and, as Boucher indicates, Hobbes’s tendency to equate morality with 
the ‘springs of human nature’ provided an alternative to the excessive intellectualism 
of Plato16. However, Collingwood found Hobbes’s subjectivism to be deficient (cf. 
Boucher, 1989: 66).
For Collingwood, as Boucher demonstrates, Hobbes’s hedonism was a 
considerable advance on the ethics of the Greeks, because, unlike the latter, it 
emphasised the fact that action is self-willed, creative, and spontaneous, and not 
something imposed upon the individual from outside the self. But Hobbes, like 
Descartes, failed to move beyond the one-sidedness of subjectivism. According to 
Collingwood, all forms of subjectivism rest on a misconceived distinction between 
subject and object (Boucher, 1989: 77). Hobbes conceives the self as something 
fixed and complete, standing in opposition to a world which is hostile. But in 
Collingwood’s view, in the ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’: ‘The self is really in 
constant flux, a process of creating itself and its world’ (cited from Boucher, 1989: 
78). Hence, in his 1921 ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’, Collingwood argued: ‘The 
task is to think on from Plato to Hobbes and then from Hobbes to something new 
which shall overcome the defects of Hobbes’ (cited from Boucher, 1989: 67).
Collingwood’s theory of mind also absorbs and transcends utilitarianism. For 
Collingwood, utilitarianism constitutes a modification of hedonism, in that it appeals 
to a criterion, or standard, of what feelings ought to be, and uses as its criterion the 
feeling of society as the greatest happiness of the greatest number. However, the 
radical subjectivism and autonomy of the will, the strong points of hedonism, are 
sacrificed by subjecting the individual to an external authority which is beyond 
question. The greatest happiness is an object which stands outside the individual (cf. 
Boucher, 1989: 78). Nonetheless, utilitarianism does have genuine philosophical 
value, although one-sided, in that it demonstrates that utility ‘is one of the permanent 
and necessary categories of ethical thought’ (Collingwood, 1923: 25; cited from 
Boucher, 1989: 79).
According to Boucher, therefore,
16 Furthermore, Boucher suggests that a second reason why Collingwood admired Hobbes is that the 
former, like his distinguished predecessor, endeavoured to ground his theories of ethics and politics in 
a philosophy o f human nature, or philosophy o f mind. A third factor to bear in mind is that 
Collingwood saw certain similarities between the revolt against civilisation which was occurring in 
his own day with the rise of Fascism, and the events o f Hobbes’s day (Boucher, 1989: 67).
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In relation to the general philosophical aims o f the two Leviathans, Collingwood was 
attempting to formulate a different criterion of conduct from that o f Hobbes, one which he 
hoped would overcome the deficiencies o f the subjectivist and objectivist traditions. We can, 
then, take the title o f The New Leviathan to mean new in the sense that it would attempt to 
establish the criterion o f moral conduct on a different foundation; namely on the idea o f duty 
rather than upon the principle of utility. (Boucher, 1989: 80)
In keeping with his dialectical conception of philosophy, Collingwood did not think 
that his project entailed refuting what Hobbes had argued. Collingwood argued in 
the ‘Lectures on Moral Philosophy’ that we do not refute philosophies, but continue 
them17 (cf. Boucher, 1989: 80).
For Collingwood, the forms of practical reason, which, as we will see, are 
utility, right and duty, are related not as species of a genus, but as an overlapping 
series of forms in which the lower includes within itself the potential of the higher. 
Neither utility, nor right, nor duty is exclusive or autonomous, and each is a 
characteristic of all action. Moral goodness, or duty, contains in itself, as 
indispensable elements, the subordinate goods of utility and rightness (cf. Boucher, 
1989: 30-1). According to Collingwood,
Duty is thus the truth o f action; it is what action really is, it is so far as we act morally that we 
really act at all. Yet in acting morally we do not rid ourselves of such distinctions as that of 
means and end, law and the application of law, any more than we shake ourselves free of the 
physical world or leave our animal nature behind us. Moral action includes all these things 
within itself, makes of them the material out o f which it builds its own world. (Collingwood, 
1929:142)
Collingwood’s attempts to specify the character of action can be
distinguished into two categories. First, as Boucher points out, corresponding to the
earlier part of Collingwood’s career, there are those accounts of action which wholly,
or substantially, conform to the sequence, at the level of the rational will, of utility,
duty, and absolute ethics. The second sequence with which Collingwood
characterises the concept of action is that of utility, right and duty, and was not
published in a fully articulated form until The New Leviathan (Boucher, 1989: 82).
In the second sequence, utility is associated with economic action, right is associated
1 8with politics, and duty is associated with morality, the highest form of action .
17 This is also consistent both with his distinction between dialectical and eristical discussion in The 
New Leviathan, which I will discuss in the next chapter, and with his argument on p.l 1 of An Essay 
on Philosophical Method that in philosophy we aim to know better something which in some sense 
we always knew.
18 This is discussed in An Autobiography, pp. 148-9, and by Connelly (2003: 189-90).
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Both sequences demonstrate how at each successive level capriciousness is 
gradually eliminated19. Caprice, Collingwood explains, is mere choice or mere 
decision, uncomplicated by any reason why it should be made in this way and not 
th a t. . . ’ (NL, 13.12).
Of the two categories of answers that Collingwood gave to the problems of 
moral philosophy, I will concentrate on the second, as it is here that Collingwood 
provides his mature account of duty. In the second sequence, unlike in the first, right 
and duty are distinguished, and duty now includes within itself what was 
characterised as absolute ethics in the first sequence (cf. Boucher, 1989: 93).
As we have already seen, for Collingwood, there is an intimate relation 
between theory and practice. In The New Leviathan, he distinguishes between 
practical and theoretical reason: whereas practical thinking is to ask and answer 
questions about oneself, for example, ‘why am I doing this?’, theoretical thinking 
asks and answers questions about what is not oneself (NL, 18.1). However, concern 
with how things are in themselves, is interrelated with the problems of relations 
between the self and other things (NL, 18.11). All real thinking, then, *... starts from 
practice and returns to practice; for it is based on “interest” in the thing thought 
about; that is, on practical concern with it’ (NL, 18.13). Theoretical reason, 
Collingwood argues, always includes within itself an element of practical reason, and 
our practical attitude towards something has a strong bearing upon our theoretical 
attitude towards it (NL, 18.2).
In the first sequence of answers which Collingwood gave to the problems of 
ethics, the practical form of reason, utility, had its theoretical counterpart in science; 
duty had its counterpart in history; and absolute ethics had its counterpoint in 
philosophy. The second category of answers postulates a different set of relations. 
Utility gave rise to the teleological view of nature, which was held by the Greeks.
19 Boucher also provides an instructive analysis o f how in both sequences the Hegelian dialectic 
becomes modified into a scale of forms analysis, a difference expressed by Croce. For Croce, Hegel’s 
important contribution to philosophy was the formation o f the concept as concrete universal, the 
development of the doctrine o f degrees o f reality as opposed to coordinate species o f a genus, and the 
recognition that opposites are not opposed to unity. According to Boucher, ‘Hegel’s error lay in 
conflating the ideas of distincts and opposites, which led him to misconceive the relation between a 
concept and its contrary as the dialectic o f opposite concepts, whereas, Croce argues, the distinct 
concept has within itself its own opposite. Therefore the relation between concepts is not that of 
contradiction, but of implication. Collingwood’s idea of the concept as a fusion o f differences in kind 
with differences in degree, and a fusion o f opposites and distincts, owes more to Croce, it seems, than 
it does to Hegel. Collingwood denied the dialectic of opposites and conceived the philosophical 
concept as a series o f distinct degrees, each of which implicates the others and includes its opposite 
within itself (Boucher, 1989: 84).
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The medieval view of right as obedience to law gave rise to the theoretical view of 
nature in terms of law and conformity to law. Duty gave rise to history as its 
theoretical counterpart (cf. Boucher, 1989: 94).
Crucially, then, each of the forms of practical reason and the corresponding 
forms of theoretical reason is associated, albeit roughly, with different stages in 
Western civilisation or culture. In so far as there has been a development from utility 
and right to duty and from an emphasis on natural science to an emphasis on history, 
this represents a gradual advancement in European civilisation.
According to Collingwood, the Greeks thought of their practical life in 
utilitarian terms, and therefore thought of the world about them in utilitarian terms. 
According to Greek science Nature had her ends and devised means to those ends. 
This teleological view of Nature has a rational basis, but depends also on irrationality 
and caprice. It was retained throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance, and 
displaced in the sixteenth century (NL, 18.3-34).
Thinking in terms of right, or regularian thinking, Collingwood asserts, came 
to Europe through Roman law and Jewish religion. As a result, in the Middle Ages 
right took precedence over utility such that ‘... the business of man was not to 
achieve ends but to obey laws’ (NL, 18.42). When people began to think of the 
world around them in the same way, modem science arose, and with it the idea of a 
Taw of nature’ (NL, 18.44). Again, however, this concept of nature is not fully 
rational as it depends on a certain level of irrationality or caprice, which it calls 
‘brute fact’ (NL, 18.45).
According to Collingwood, the idea of obligation or duty has existed since 
ancient times, but has slowly become disentangled from ideas of right and utility. 
When applied to the world at large, the idea of duty leads to history:
The consciousness o f duty means thinking o f myself as an individual or unique agent, in an 
individual or unique situation, doing the individual or unique action that I have to do because it 
is the only one I can. To think historically is to think of a world consisting o f things other than 
myself, each of them an individual or unique agent, in an individual or unique situation, doing 
an individual or unique action which he has to do because, charactered and circumstanced as he 
is, he can do no other. (NL, 18.52)
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For Collingwood, in contemporary times the world of nature is no longer the primary 
object of study. The world of human affairs and history is central, and the problems 
of nature are only peripheral20 (NL, 18.8-92).
The transition from utility and right to duty will now be explored in more 
detail. According to Collingwood, there are two kinds of choice: capricious choice 
and rational choice. In capricious choice the agent is conscious of choosing, but not 
of the reason for making the choice (NL, 13.12). In rational choice, on the other 
hand, the person who chooses is conscious of having reasons why this, rather than
that, was chosen (cf. Boucher, 1989: 96). Collingwood argues that European history
• 0 1 •reveals three types of rational choice, or practical reason . That is, to the question
‘why did you do that?’ there are three possible answers: firstly, ‘because it is useful’,
secondly, ‘because it is right’, and thirdly, ‘because it is my duty’ (NL, 14.63-68).
The first kind of practical reason, utility, involves a distinction between 
means and end. The relation between means and end is one of logical priority, that 
is, of ground to consequent (NL, 15.4). In planning, the choice of end logically 
necessitates the choice of means. Conversely, in execution, the means logically 
necessitates the end (NL, 15.42-4). However, Collingwood explains, this implication 
of means by end in planning, and the converse implication of end by means in 
execution, is characteristic of every form of practical reason: ‘In respect of its 
positive element utility is identical with rightness and duty’ (NL, 15.51).
What distinguishes utility from rightness and duty is its negative aspect: the 
limits of its rationality, or what it fails to explain. For example, as Collingwood 
argues, if I go to the tobacco shop to buy tobacco, there are different ways of paying 
for the tobacco. The means of payment are left indeterminate. The choice of 
payment is made by what, from a utilitarian point of view, is caprice: in other words, 
something that the utilitarian point of view leaves unexplained. Similarly, the end is
20 According to Boucher, the culmination of theoretical reason in history in The New Leviathan 
suggests that Collingwood’s rapprochement between philosophy and history is complete. I would 
suggest, however, that the rapprochement can never be regarded as ‘complete’, because, as I have 
already argued, in Collingwood’s view philosophical thinking is an open-ended process of 
development without any particular end point. Hence, whereas Croce saw an identity between 
philosophy and history, Collingwood posited a rapprochement (cf. Peters, 1999: 10). Boucher, 
however, rightly criticises Rubinoff, who argued that Collingwood envisaged a philosophical ethic 
which would supersede the ethic of duty. As Boucher explains, Rubinoff is deceived by the fact that 
duty in The New Leviathan transcends the inadequacies of duty in Speculum Mentis (Boucher, 1989: 
94-5).
21 As we have already seen, practical reason, for Collingwood, is the original form o f reason and 
theoretical reason is a modification of it (NL, 14.3).
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indeterminate: the plan to purchase tobacco cannot tell me which brand to buy (NL, 
15.63-6). Furthermore, utility gives us no reason for choosing one end rather than 
another. Many things may be useful for quite different ends22.
Each utilitarian action, then, is ‘... an indefinite individual, required to satisfy 
certain specifications but free to vary so long as those specifications are satisfied’ 
(NL, 15.72). Utility, in Collingwood’s view, ‘... explains nothing except the abstract 
conformity of the means-plan with the abstract specifications of the end-plan’ (NL, 
15.8). Everything else is irrational, where irrational means what my principles of 
explanation do not explain.
Collingwood rejects the utilitarian contention that ‘right’ is only utility under 
another name, and that utility is the only form of practical reason. Right, he explains, 
is whatever is conformable to a rule (NL, 16.15). The ‘right’ key for a given lock is 
any key which obeys the rules governing the relations between lock-form and key- 
form (NL, 16.2-22). Something may be useful without being right. The wrong key, 
or a bent wire, may sometimes open a lock, but that does not make it the right key 
(NL, 16.24).
A rule is a generalised purpose to do things of a certain kind on all occasions 
of a certain kind (NL, 16.31). As well as making a rule, regularian action includes 
the decision to obey the rule or to disobey it. Although it is often a social thing, the 
simplest case of regularian action is making rules for oneself.
However, regularian explanations, like utilitarian explanations, are only 
partial. They cannot explain why a person does this particular act, only why he or 
she does an act of this kind, one of the alternative actions which satisfy the 
specifications of the rule (NL, 16.63).
Furthermore, the same act may be both right and wrong, if it is judged by 
different rules. Collingwood cites Kant’s example: if there is a rule to tell the truth, 
and another to save human life, what do you do when an intending murderer asks 
you where his intended victim is hiding? Different rules define different ways of 
living. One has to choose, from among many different rules that appear to be 
applicable, which to follow in one’s own unique circumstances (cf. Boucher, 1989: 
101). Collingwood argues that ‘Even the best-thought-out rules leave much to 
caprice and accident.... the rules you are trying to obey are hard enough to obey as it
22 This point is explored in ‘Monks and Morals’ (EPP, 147-8) and discussed by Connelly (2003: 194).
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is; do not make them harder by attaching to them a degree of importance which no 
rule can ever have’ (NL, 16.77).
As Collingwood argues in An Autobiography, in acting according to rules we 
are moving among certain standard types of situations. But the existence of a rule 
means that a certain body of experience has been accumulated before the rule could 
be known to anyone (A, 103). There are two kinds of occasion on which it is 
necessary to act without rules. Firstly, ‘... you find yourself in a situation that you 
do not recognize as belonging to any of your known types. No rule can tell you how 
to act. But you cannot refrain from acting’ (A, 103-4). You must improvise a way 
of handling it. The second kind of occasion on which you must act without rules is 
when you know a rule for dealing with the kind of situation that you are in, but ‘... 
you are not content with applying it, because you know that action according to rules 
always involves a certain misfit between yourself and your situation’. The rule ‘... 
comes between you and the situation it enables you to grasp’ (A, 104; cf. Connelly, 
2003: 199-200).
The inadequacies of utility and right are transcended in duty. ‘Duty’ refers to 
a logically prior act of incurring a debt (NL, 17.11-2). Collingwood explains that, 
etymologically, ‘duty’ and ‘ought’ mean the same thing: the idea of a debt incurred 
by one act and discharged by another act (NL, 17.16).
One of the special characteristics of duty is that it admits of no alternatives. 
There is only one of it, and nothing else will do instead. It is my duty and nobody 
else’s, in so far as it remains my duty, and it is a duty to do ‘this’ particular act, not 
‘an act of this kind’. There is a one-one relation between duty and its consequent. 
With utility and right, there is a many-one relation: there are many different 
alternatives. Hence, Collingwood argues, dutiful action is the only one of the three 
kinds of rational action that is completely rational in principle: the only one that fully 
explains (NL, 17.5-55).
The idea of duty, however, is an abstraction, and thus incompletely 
determinate. Consciousness of duty, or conscience, tells me that I am under an 
obligation but not what the obligation is. This is something that I discover by 
thinking through what the situation requires (NL, 17.59, cf. Connelly, 2003: 203). 
To the question ‘what is my present duty?’ one can only answer: ‘I have considered 
x, y , and z as claimants for the title of my present duty: x  is a better answer than 
either y  or z; but there may be a better answer than any, which I have overlooked’
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(NL, 17.81). The question of what my duty is does not admit of a conclusive and 
unequivocal answer, only one which is ‘morally certain’ (NL, 17.81).
Duty in general, then, is abstract, but “‘my present duty” ... is a phrase which 
at any given time applies to only one thing or person ... and many different acts have 
been at different times my present duty’ (NL, 17.83). Collingwood sums up his 
account of duty by asserting that ‘A man’s duty on a given occasion is the act which 
for him is both possible and necessary: the act which at that moment character and 
circumstance combine to make it inevitable, if he has a free will, that he should 
freely will to do’ (NL, 17.8).
For Collingwood, therefore, the ability to think of our actions in terms of duty 
constitutes a solution to the malaise of contemporary culture epitomised by 
utilitarianism and rule-based morality. In Collingwood’s view, rule-based morality 
and its associated form of theoretical reason, natural science, are inadequate for 
human self-understanding: an inadequacy that is overcome by duty and historical 
thinking.
As Collingwood argued in his Autobiography, the growth of natural science 
and human control over nature contrasted starkly with a lack of power to control 
human situations (A, 91). Greater knowledge of human affairs would be provided by 
history, that is, a reformed scientific history and not ‘scissors-and-paste’ history, 
where the historian asks questions and interrogates the evidence and where the past 
which the historian studies in some sense still lives in the present (A, 96-7). Thus, 
Collingwood declares that
The reason why the civilization of 1600-1900, based upon natural science, found bankruptcy 
staring itself in the face was because, in its passion for ready-made rules, it had neglected to 
develop that kind o f insight which alone could tell it what rules to apply, not in a situation of a 
specific type, but in the situation in which it actually found itself. It was precisely because 
history offered us something altogether different from mles, namely insight, that it could afford 
us the help we needed in diagnosing our moral and political problems. (A, 101)
The ills of modernity are resolved by duty, or history as embodied in practical 
reason.
In Part Two, I explained that Collingwood responded to the crisis of 
civilisation by developing a dialectical logic, metaphysics and philosophy of history. 
Duty, then, is the practical aspect of this dialectical philosophy. This is a point that is 
made clear by Helgeby. Helgeby argues that Collingwood’s logic of question and 
answer is ontological in that it must be seen in the context of his theory of action and
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agency23 (Helgeby, 1994: 97-8). To answer a question adequately, Helgeby explains, 
is to act from what Collingwood called ‘duty’ (Helgeby, 1994: 100). According to 
Helgeby,
Collingwood thought that duty is reason obligating action; our actions are conclusions to our 
arguments. The question we ask ourselves at any given time is which amongst our competing 
desires will we pursue. We eliminate our various options because they suit our interests less, 
or go against principles we follow. Beyond such considerations, we are conscious that there is 
one act which is necessitated by our conception o f ourselves and our situation. This is what we 
choose. (Helgeby, 1994: 105)
In acting according to duty, Helgeby asserts, there are two sources of 
compulsion in our choice. Firstly, we choose to do the only thing we can do at the 
risk of no longer acting rationally. Secondly, we have to choose the only thing we 
can do at the risk of no longer being the only person we have become. To do 
otherwise would be ‘. .. the most vicious form of insincerity’ (Helgeby, 1994: 105).
Hence, Collingwood’s dialectical solution to the ill effects of the abstractions 
of modernity is given a more complete form in his theory of mind and practical 
reason. Thinking and acting according to duty means practising dialectical and 
historical thinking.
There are two aspects to duty in this context that particularly deserve 
attention. Firstly, there is a seeming paradox in duty, whereby it excludes freedom 
associated with caprice. Duty, as we have seen, allows no options and is completely 
determined by one’s consciousness of obligation. But, as Boucher comments, 
‘Someone who is aware of what he, or she, has to do, with no alternative left open, is 
completely obliged only in so far as the person is consciously resolved to do his, or 
her, duty. The resolution is an act of free will, “and hence the apparent absence of 
freedom is not a genuine absence of freedom’” (Boucher, 1989: 105; NL, 472). 
Boucher cites de Ruggiero’s position in The History o f European Liberalism: ‘The 
really free man is not the man who can choose any line of conduct indifferently -  this 
being rather a frivolous and weak-willed man -  but the man who has the energy to
23 As Helgeby remarks, the remedy for the crisis o f civilisation was ‘... the restoration of our capacity 
to express our emotions and desires, and the extension of our capacity to know ourselves. 
Collingwood’s concern with religion and art were central to his first task; his concern with history, 
metaphysics and reasoned action were central to the second’ (Helgeby, 1994: 100).
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choose that which is most conformable to his moral destiny ... the man who acts 
according to duty’24 (de Ruggiero, 1959: 351-2; Boucher, 1989: 105n).
As Boucher indicates, then, the highest forms of freedom and rationality, duty 
and history, include within themselves their own criterion (Boucher, 1989: 108). In 
this respect, Collingwood’s conception of duty, like his dialectical reform of logic
• • 25and metaphysics, is ‘... representative of the immanent, or rational will, tradition’ 
(Boucher, 1989: 109).
The second point that deserves emphasis is that Collingwood’s conception of 
duty transcends conventional notions of morality based upon rules and draws upon 
the Romantic idea of authenticity. Authentic action, as I argued in Part One, occurs 
when one makes decisions for oneself and is not determined by external influences.
Each of us has an original way of being human and being true to ourselves,
26something which only each individual can articulate and discover .
In the 1929 Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Collingwood explains that 
morality, or duty, means facing the responsibility of life lived by your own decisions: 
‘This responsibility means that you are responsible for your life, not to anyone else, 
but to yourself, in your capacity as judge of your own actions, the only judge from 
whose decision there can be no appeal’ (Collingwood, 1929: 146).
One respects others in the same way as one respects oneself, and self-respect, 
Collingwood asserts,
... is at least a clearer approximation to the true nature of morality than anything depending 
upon right and wrong, praise and blame, and the other categories o f moral life. The fact is that 
when we come face to face with the deepest problems of action these everyday moral terms 
lose their force and seem irrelevant to the realities o f the problem. To classify actions into 
right and wrong, to praise people or to blame them for what they do, when one is face to face 
with things that really matter, is to amuse oneself with toys. No doubt the occasions on which 
one breaks through the tissue o f ordinary moral life, with its conventions and assumptions and 
concealments, are comparatively rare: but we know very well when we do so, that these are the 
only occasions on which we are conscious of ourselves as really acting. (Collingwood, 1929: 
147)
24 This also overlaps with the conception of freedom held by Ortega y Gasset, which will be discussed 
further on. The view of freedom here is developed in detail by de Ruggiero, particularly in pp.351-57 
of The History o f  European Liberalism (1959).
25 This is also apparent in the 1929 Lectures on Moral Philosophy, where Collingwood argues that 
‘Duty lies beyond the distinction o f right and wrong, because that distinction assumes the existence of 
rules, and duty goes behind this assumption and takes upon itself the task o f making and unmaking all 
rules except the one formal rule that rules must exist’ (Collingwood, 1929: 132). Hence: ‘It is the 
really moral man who cannot help being moral. His complete subjection to the law of duty is the 
measure of his complete command o f the situation and of himself .... This is because at the level of 
duty all otherness between the mind and itself has disappeared, or rather has been transfused with 
identity’ (Collingwood, 1929: 140-1).
26 Here I draw upon Taylor (1991: 27-9).
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Therefore, ‘The way in which we try to determine our course of action is by a 
resolute clearing of our vision, in order to see ourselves as we actually are’ 
(Collingwood, 1929: 147). When we see ourselves truly, we have overcome the 
enemy against which we were fighting:
The enemy is nothing else than the tissue of illusions which forms the practical life o f our 
everyday world: pleasure, satisfaction, expediency, right, benevolence and all the other things 
that pass for moral principles because we are too listless to probe through them to the reality 
which in less vivid moments they conceal from us. For it is a great mistake to think that only 
our bodily appetites and openly selfish passions stand between us and genuine moral action. 
We are far more likely to be seduced by the idea of doing good to people, or of regulating our 
lives according to the best rules, than by any sensuous temptations. (Collingwood, 1929: 148)
At this point, Collingwood’s theory of duty as the practical aspect of his 
dialectical solution to the crisis of civilisation, with its concurrence of freedom and 
determination and its affinity with the Romantic idea of authenticity, can be further 
illuminated by a comparison with Ortega y Gasset27. Collingwood’s theory of duty, I 
suggest, closely corresponds to Ortega’s conception of ‘destiny’.
As I indicated in Part Two, the comparison of Collingwood with Ortega helps 
to situate Collingwood’s philosophical concern with the crisis of Western civilisation 
in the context of the development of ‘historicism’ in the twentieth century. 
According to Ortega, as we have seen, like Collingwood, European civilisation is 
confronted by a crisis due to the predominance of naturalism and a static conception 
of being, which we have inherited from the Greeks. The solution to this predicament 
is the development of dialectical and historical reason. For Ortega, ‘destiny’ is a 
practical aspect of historical reason.
27 More generally, Mink compares Collingwood’s conception of duty to existentialism. Mink points 
out that what morality proper, or duty, affirms is that intentional action is always one act, not merely 
because o f what one is, but also in order to become what one is not. Such a self-creative choice is a 
situation which comes into being and is constituted only as it is consciously affirmed, and ‘It is at this 
point that Collingwood comes closest to the view o f human nature which has been given currency in 
modem existentialism, but with a difference’ (Mink, 1969: 91). Collingwood is more ‘radically 
dialectical’ than any existentialist: ‘For an existentialist like Sartre, consciousness or Vetre-pour-soi is 
completely cut off from the causal nexus o f nature, although it evades the anxiety of total 
responsibility for its own self-creation by inventing pathological forms of in-authenticity in which it 
regards itself as a “thing”, a determinate outcome of causal forces in its own past and in its 
contemporary world’ (Mink, 1969: 91). Sartre posits a dichotomy o f physical nature and human 
consciousness. For Collingwood, on the other hand, fourth-level consciousness is not an intrusion 
into the causal nexus o f the natural world: ‘It emerges from that world, to which it remains forever 
attached through its bodily processes and activities, and the level o f all the lower levels of 
consciousness survive at higher levels. But as consciousness at lower levels reflects the world, at 
higher levels it transforms and expands it .... The freedom o f consciousness is not “absolute” 
freedom; it is the freedom o f men who are creatures of feeling, appetite, and desire as well as the 
creators of mind’ (Mink, 1969: 91-2).
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For Ortega, like Collingwood therefore, there is a dialectical relation between 
theory and practice, and between historical thought and practical reason. All thought 
begins with and returns to practice. In Man and People Ortega argues that man 
gradually transforms his environment, imposes himself on nature, and humanises it. 
There are three different moments, which are repeated throughout human history, in 
forms each time more complex and rich:
1. Man feels himself lost, shipwrecked among things; this is alteracion. 2. Man, by an 
energetic effort, withdraws into himself to form ideas about things and possible ways of 
dominating them; this is being within one’s self, ensimismamiento, the vita contemplativa of 
the Romans, the theoretikos bios o f the Greeks, theory. 3. Man again submerges himself in the 
world, to act in it according to a preconceived plan; that is action, vita activa, praxis. 
Accordingly, it is impossible to speak o f  action except in so fa r as it will be governed by a 
previous contemplation; and vice versa, contemplation, or being within on e’s self, is nothing 
but a projecting o f  future action. (Ortega’s italics; MP, 23)
Thus for Ortega, action is ‘... not a random fisticuffs with the things around 
us’ (MP, 29). Instead: ‘Action is to act upon the environment of material things or of 
other men in accordance with a plan preconceived in a previous period of meditation 
or thought. There is no genuine action if there is no thought, and there is no 
authentic thought if it is not duly referred to action and made virile by its relation to 
action’28 (MP, 29).
To return to Ortega’s account of ‘destiny’, then, in The Revolt o f the Masses, 
Ortega asserts that ‘All life is the struggle, the effort to be itself (RM, 99). In a 
world where there is a superabundance of resources the average person may lose 
contact with the reality of life and think that he or she can do what he or she likes. 
But, Ortega contends, ‘It is not that one ought not to do just what one pleases; it is 
simply that one cannot do other than what each of us has to do, has to be .... We can 
quite well turn away from our true destiny, but only to fall a prisoner in the deeper 
dungeons of our destiny’ (RM, 103). For example, regarding those parts of destiny 
that are shared in common, Ortega explains that ‘... the European of today must be a 
liberal .... the most reactionary of Europeans knows, in the depths of his conscience, 
that the effort made by Europe in the nineteenth century, under the name of 
liberalism, is, in the last resort, something inevitable, inexorable; something that 
Western man today is, whether he likes it or no’ (RM, 103).
28 Ortega contends that this true relation between contemplation and action has been persistently 
ignored, from the Greeks onwards. The Greeks believed that man’s destiny was solely to exercise his 
intellect, and this doctrine of ‘intellectualism’ is something that we have inherited and continued with 
the Enlightenment and Idealism (MP, 30 and 47).
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Whereas theoretical truths owe their meaning to being discussed and 
disputed, ‘... destiny -  what from a vital point of view one has to be or has not to be 
-  is either accepted or rejected. If we accept it, we are genuine; if not, we are the 
negation, the falsification of ourselves. Destiny does not consist in what we feel we 
should like to do; rather is it recognised in its clear features in the consciousness that 
we must do what we do not feel like doing’ (RM, 104). Ortega adds that 
‘Abasement, degradation is simply the manner of life of the man who has refused to 
be what it is his duty to be. This, his genuine being, none the less does not die; rather 
is changed into an accusing shadow, a phantom which constantly makes him feel the 
inferiority of the life he lives compared with the one he ought to live. The debased 
man survives his self-inflicted death’ (RM, 104n).
As is the case with Collingwood’s conception of duty, for Ortega, the highest 
form of freedom excludes the freedom associated with caprice. The human being, 
Ortega asserts in Man and People, is ‘... free before and in the face of his destiny. 
He can accept it or resist it, or, what is the same thing, he can be it or not be it’ (MP, 
133). Our destiny is not only the past, but ‘. .. projects itself, in openness, toward the 
future’ (MP, 133). We are not predetermined by our past, but freedom presupposes 
plans of action, and in creating them the past is ‘the guiding thread of our 
inspirations’. Hence, ‘destiny directs, it does not drag’ (MP, 133). We cannot 
escape maintaining continuity with the past, even if we make a plan to negate it and 
do the opposite of what has been done (MP, 134). As Ouimette points out, then, for 
Ortega, human life is an endless series of actions intended to give man freedom to be 
himself in total authenticity (Ouimette, 1982: 116).
In terms of the attempt to respond to the rationalism of modernity by 
transcending a conventional rule-based morality with an account of action as 
historical and concrete, Collingwood and Ortega have an affinity with Nietzsche. 
According to Nietzsche, one must ‘become what one is’ (cf. Hinz, 1994a: 51-2) and 
this, I suggest, coincides with Collingwood’s idea of duty whereby one acts 
according to the unique details of one’s situation.
In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche asserts that it is a sign of nobility ‘... 
never to think of degrading our duties into duties for everybody; not to want to 
relinquish or share our own responsibilities; to count our privileges and the 
exercising of them among our duties' (Nietzsche’s italics; BGE, 272). Tanner, in his 
Introduction to Beyond Good and Evil, indicates that Nietzsche’s distinction between
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those who are used to obeying and those who are used to commanding can be 
equated with the distinction between those who regard values as imposed, external 
and universal in their application and those who regard values as coming from 
within, created by those who are powerful enough for the task, and who delight in 
their sense of being different from others29 (BGE, p.23). According to Nietzsche, 
‘The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values, he does not need 
to be approved of, he judges “what harms me is harmful in itself’, he knows himself 
to be that which in general first accords honour to things, he creates values' (BGE, 
260).
In a book review for Oxford Magazine in 1918, Collingwood refers to 
Nietzsche’s ‘two-fold relation to Christianity’ and ‘... his striking reaffirmation of 
Christian ethics30, in their conception of the tragic nature of life and the uselessness 
of code morality, as against the utilitarianism, the bourgeois respectability, the “sofa- 
millennium”, of his age . . . ’ (Collingwood, 2001: 146). Collingwood’s own later 
critique of the ‘uselessness of code morality’ and his development of the theory of 
duty originated in a romantic and historicist response to the crisis of Western 
civilisation, where Nietzsche played an important role.
As I have already argued, however, Collingwood, unlike Nietzsche, provides 
a reason-based solution to the crisis of Western civilisation and one which emerges 
from within the Western tradition. This difference between Collingwood and 
Nietzsche is particularly evident in Collingwood’s insistence on the use of the word 
‘morality’ to describe authentic action:
I admit that morality is a bad name for absolute action, because morality very often seems to 
mean doing what other people think respectable because one is afraid of offending them; but if  
that is what morality means, we have already dealt with it under the head of economic action, 
for it is merely a case o f expediency. I admit that duty is a bad name for it, because duty seems 
to mean blind obedience to rules traditionally received and obeyed in a spirit o f gloomy 
loyalty; but if  that is what duty means it is only a somewhat low and slavish form of political 
action. But it would be treason to the ideas of morality and duty to acquiesce in these 
degradations of them. When we consider the analysis o f duty given by Kant, for instance, or
29 Nietzsche, Tanner points out, saw the Germans as highly advanced examples o f slave morality, 
partly because of their delight in obeying the laws o f the Reich and partly because of Kantian morality 
and the ‘categorical imperative’, a law founded in reason alone and equally applicable to all rational 
beings (BGE, p.24). Adherence to both o f them results in the total legalisation o f life. In such a 
context art is seen as a relief from serious things in life, and the great artist is reduced to the level of a 
great sportsman (BGE, p.25).
30 Collingwood’s claim that, in spite o f Nietzsche’s real anti-Christianity, ‘In much that he says, 
Nietzsche is profoundly Christian . . . ’ (Collingwood, 2001: 146) is consistent with the views of 
Nietzsche commentators: for example, R.J. Hollingdale’s Introduction to the 1969 edition of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra.
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the account o f morality expressed by Spinoza, we see that no conception short o f absolute 
action is adequate to contain the wealth of meaning and the depth of moral experience which 
these accounts contain. (Collingwood, 1929: 149)
Although Collingwood was critical of Kant in The New Leviathan, Kantian rule- 
based morality, along with the rest of the history of Western moral philosophy, is 
assimilated and transcended in Collingwood’s philosophy, rather than wholly 
rejected.
In conclusion, then, Collingwood’s view is that European civilisation 
progresses if we think dialectically and historically. Collingwood’s solution to the 
crisis of abstract rationalism in practical reason was the development of an account 
of duty as concrete and historical, and this was the practical aspect of his solution to 
the crisis of civilisation in terms of a dialectical and historical philosophy.
Collingwood’s dialectical philosophy, however, not only manifests itself in a 
historical morality, but also in a dialectical account of society and the state. His 
critique of the abstractions of modernity entails a reform of social contract theory, 
which will be examined in the next chapter. The way in which this dialectical theory 
of morality and society resolves particular manifestations of cultural crisis, relating 
to the role of capitalism and bureaucratic administration, will also be explained.
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Chapter Nine:
The Politics of Dialectic
Collingwood’s view, evident in his logic and metaphysics and his account of 
morality as duty, that the advancement of civilisation depends on dialectical thinking 
and historical self-consciousness becomes further elucidated in his social and 
political theory. By the mid-1930s Collingwood’s concern for the future of 
civilisation became accentuated by the rise of fascism and the undermining of 
liberalism. In order to combat this threat he sought to expound the fundamental 
principles31 of a liberal society and civilisation, and this culminated in The New 
Leviathan.
Liberalism, according to Collingwood, meant ‘... the dialectical solution of 
all political problems: that is, their solution through the statement of opposing views 
and their free discussion until, beneath this opposition, their supporters have 
discovered some common ground on which to act’ (EPP, 177). Accordingly, 
liberalism actively sought to foster the free expression of political opinions, and 
government would draw strength from the enlightened and co-operative criticism of 
its people (EPP, 177-8). In his Autobiography, Collingwood asserted that fascism 
meant ‘... the end of clear thinking and the triumph of irrationalism’ (A, 167), and 
his account of society and politics in The New Leviathan was explicitly intended as a 
response to this irrationalism (cf. Boucher, 1989: 58).
It seems that, in writing The New Leviathan, Collingwood was inspired by 
C.E.M. Joad’s exhortation to return to the classical tradition in philosophy to combat 
the crisis of civilisation (EPP, 196; Boucher, 1989, 61). But whereas Joad thought 
that Plato and Aristotle exemplified the classical tradition, Collingwood refers to 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau as classical (cf. Boucher, 1989: 142). The ‘classical 
politics’, the theory of politics put forward by Hobbes, and restated with minor 
differences by Locke and Rousseau, is not a definitive and final statement on the 
topic of political life, but it is classical in that every beginner in the subject must start 
with it (NL, 31.23).
31 In this respect, it may be said that Collingwood’s theory of politics and civilisation in The New 
Leviathan includes a metaphysics, or a history of our absolute presuppositions, concerning politics 
and civilisation and how they have been modified since the times of Hobbes and Locke. This is 
indicated by Connelly (2003: 76).
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Collingwood turned to the classical tradition in political theory, or social 
contract theory, because it emphasised the fact that society is created though the free­
will of agents. Social contract theory recognises that the body politic is based not 
upon force, but authority (NL, xli; Boucher, 1989: 62). As Collingwood indicates, 
Hobbes’ Leviathan demonstrates that society is but an ‘artificial man’ (NL, lix). 
However, for Collingwood, as I will explain in the course of this chapter, social 
contract theory is not fully adequate to respond to the irrationalism that threatens 
contemporary civilisation, and therefore it must be modified and extended in 
important ways.
The ‘classical politics’, Collingwood argues, is a product of the same 
seventeenth-century notion of scientific method as the ‘classical physics’ of Galileo 
and Newton (NL, 31.24). Like all modem sciences, it is based on the principle o f the 
limited objective, according to which instead of trying to interpret every fact, one 
selects the facts that call for immediate attention and the rest are left to wait (NL, 
31.61-68). Following the principle o f the limited objective, the theorists of the 
classical politics limited their explanatory efforts to facts that could be explained by 
the idea of society (NL, 31.81). They drew their idea of society from the Roman idea 
of societas, which comes into existence through a ‘social contract’, or an agreement 
between persons of free will. Classical politics could use the Roman law of society 
only because partnership was a thing with which its authors were familiar, from the 
‘bourgeois’ life of medieval and post-medieval Europe (NL, 31.9-93).
According to Collingwood, classical politics sees political life as a dialectic 
with two ends: ‘society’ and ‘nature’ (NL, 32.21-2). Society is the part of political 
life which consists in agreement between mentally adult persons for the purposes of 
joint action. What ‘nature’ is, classical politics does not describe in positive terms: it 
is the element in political life which is not society (NL, 32.23). On this view, 
political life is dynamic or dialectical, where what was not society is converted into 
society. Human beings who hitherto did not possess free will must be educated up to 
mental maturity by those who possess free will. They are educated out of the ‘state 
of nature’ and into the ‘state of civil society’ (NL, 32.27-32). Rousseau is seen as 
expressing this idea more clearly than any of the other classical political theorists, 
and as recognising that ‘... the work done in the council chamber is to recruit itself, 
with all that this implies. The life of politics is the life of political education’ (NL, 
32.34).
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The classical political theorists did not expect the state of nature to vanish and 
be wholly superseded by a social condition. Hobbes pointed out that even in a civil 
society people remain in certain respects in the state of nature. Also Hobbes 
observed that progress is not inevitable and that the process of political life is 
reversible. The social element in a community may regress into the non-social (NL, 
32.44).
In Collingwood’s view, however, the deficiency of classical social contract 
theory was that it did not achieve a theory of the non-social community and give a 
positive meaning to the phrase ‘state of nature’ (NL, 33.18). As Boucher indicates, 
‘The theorists of the classical politics, in acknowledging the perpetual danger of 
regression, merely postponed rather than eliminated the necessity for a theory of the 
non-social community’ (Boucher, 1989: 145).
Rousseau confusedly asserted that man is bom free and everywhere found in 
chains (NL, 33.18). Collingwood responds that, in contrast to the abstractions of 
‘human nature’, the facts of human infancy are a safer foundation for a science of 
human community: ‘A man is bom a red and wrinkled lump of flesh having no will 
of its own at all, absolutely at the mercy of the parents by whose conspiracy he has 
been brought into existence. That is what no science of human community, social or 
non-social, must ever forget’ (NL, 23.96-7).
Contrary to Rousseau, Collingwood agreed with de Ruggiero and Green that 
freedom was an achievement, and not an innate attribute of human life. According to 
de Ruggiero, ‘Men are not bom free, they become free by means of society and the 
State .... This is the great distinction between the liberal conceptions of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The one places liberty at the beginning, the 
other at the end, of the historical process’ (de Ruggiero, 1959: 32; Boucher, 1989: 
144).
Boucher explains that Collingwood’s account of the development of freedom 
echoed that of the British and Italian idealists. For most of the British and Italian 
Idealists, the development of freedom was correlative with the development of 
liberalism in Europe, that is, it made its greatest strides in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth. Liberalism was not equated 
with economic freedom and was compatible with many measures that abstract 
theorists may classify as socialist (Boucher, 1989: 147).
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Liberalism, according to the Italian and British idealists, is opposed to the 
authoritarian kind of socialism, or that which impedes the development of the 
freedom of the will. For them, the individualism of classical liberalism had given 
way to a more organic conception of society in which the antinomy of individualism 
and authority is resolved (Boucher, 1989: 148). Hence de Ruggiero argues that 
liberalism’s hostility to the state has diminished as the state has become more 
capable of synthetically expressing the varied interests in society. The state has 
become conscious of its duty to broaden and strengthen the energies of individuals 
and of their free and voluntary associations. As Boucher points out, therefore, 
‘Collingwood’s own account of the development of the freedom of the will and its 
gradual elimination of capriciousness is a theoretical and extended articulation of de 
Ruggiero’s point that freedom is an achievement rather than an endowment’ 
(Boucher, 1989: 149).
According to Collingwood, then, classical social contract theory is deficient 
as an account of society. In order to combat both the abstract rationalism that 
undermines human self-understanding and irrationalism (of which fascism was a 
prime example), Collingwood found it necessary, as I will now illustrate, to 
overcome the inadequacies of social contract theory in a dialectical account of 
liberalism32.
Collingwood’s dialectical account of liberalism involves a distinction 
between society and community. The word ‘society’ in modem European languages 
is borrowed from the vocabulary of Roman law. Society, or societas, is a relation 
between personae, that is, people who are capable of free will and joint action, and 
comes into existence through a ‘social contract’, which is a simple agreement of will 
between two personae. Both the Roman and the modem use of the word ‘society’ 
try to safeguard the idea that a contract must be the joint activity of free agents (NL, 
19.5-58). Variations of the term society that disregard the idea of free will are 
dismissed as being perversions of its true meaning (cf. Boucher, 1989: 146). In its 
‘true and proper sense’, society is constituted by free activity on the part of its 
members (NL, 19.11 and 19.81).
A community, on the other hand, is a state of affairs in which something is 
divided or shared by a number of human beings. A society is a kind of community
32 As Boucher remarks, the lack o f a theory o f the non-social community is not only a defect o f the 
classical politics: it is also a defect of liberalism (Boucher, 1989: 154).
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where the members share a social consciousness or a will (NL, 20.12-2). Social 
consciousness, Collingwood explains, is an act of deciding to become a member and 
go on being a member: ‘A society or partnership is constituted by the social will of 
the partners, an act of free will whereby the person who thereby becomes a partner 
decides to take upon himself a share in a joint enterprise’ (NL, 20.22).
Although every society is a community, a community may exist that has not 
yet become a society, that is, a non-social community (NL, 20.31-2). In every 
community something is divided among the members, and everybody gets their 
share. The establishment and maintenance of this allotment of shares is called ruling. 
Whereas a society is a self-ruling community, a non-social community needs for its 
existence to be ruled by something other than itself (NL, 20.34-36).
Something capable of ruling itself may sometimes give authority to 
something else to rule over it. For example, B is a surgeon who undertakes to 
remove C’s appendix. He receives authority to do so from A, which is the society of 
which B and C are members. The decision to take out the appendix is a joint 
decision of the surgeon and patient, where the patient is adult and of a sound mind 
(NL, 20.45-47). If the patient is a child, the decision is taken by the surgeon and the 
patient’s parent. From the child’s point of view, the removal of the appendix is an 
act of force (NL, 20.49). For Collingwood, ‘force’ in a social or political context 
always means ‘moral force’ or relative mental strength: ‘When a man suffers force 
the origin of the force is always something within himself, some irresistible emotion 
which makes him do something he does not intend to do’ (NL, 20.59).
The idea of oneself as having a will is correlative to the idea of something 
other than oneself as having a will (NL, 21.14). Collingwood insists that the 
individual will only emerges in the context of the recognition of other wills (cf. 
McIntyre, 1996: 121). He declares: ‘No man has any idea of himself as a free agent, 
without an idea of free agents other than himself and of social relations between 
them. No man has an accurate idea of himself as a free agent without an accurate 
idea of free agents other than himself and of social relations between them’ (NL, 
21.19). As McIntyre indicates, then, contrary to foundational social contract theory, 
Collingwood claims that free will is not constitutive of society, but develops only 
within a pre-existing society (McIntyre, 1996: 121).
The development of free will, or the conversion of a non-social community 
into a society, is never complete. Something of the non-social element always
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remains, out of which society develops (NL, 21.5-55). The law of primitive 
survivals, therefore, which operates in relation to the development of mind, also
pertains to societies (cf. Connelly, 2003: 214-5). As Boucher demonstrates, this
complements Collingwood’s argument in the ‘Fairy Tales’ manuscript (1936-37), 
according to which modem societies retain traces of the primitive societies out of 
which they grew. Thus, in order to understand our own culture, we must ‘face the
savage within us’ (Boucher, 1989: 156).
Whereas authority and initiative are an important part of social life, in a non­
social community there is force instead of authority (NL, 21.7-72). In a non-social 
community, A forces B to do something by promise of reward or threat of 
punishment. The first arouses an irresistible desire in B, the second an irresistible 
fear. If B is sufficiently foolish he or she can be controlled by an insincere promise, 
or fraud, that is, ‘... a special form of force specially adapted for use against fools’ 
(NL, 21.74). Reward and punishment, Collingwood asserts, are useless against 
people of free will.
The exercise of force is either voluntary or involuntary. If it is involuntary, 
the slave-driver sinks to the mental level of the slaves he or she drives, and the 
exercise of force, or the ‘corrupting influence of power’, undermines a person’s will. 
According to Collingwood, ‘Slave-driving is compatible with freedom only if the 
slave-driver retains the conviction of his own freedom by consorting with other men 
whom he recognizes as free’ (NL, 21.76). The idea of oneself as a free agent can 
only be retained by discussing one’s intentions on equal terms with one’s equals.
A free agent may be unable to prevent a certain passion or desire from taking 
charge, and his or her will may be said to ‘crack’ (NL, 21.81). If this occurrence is 
sufficiently widespread, a society may break down into the non-social community 
out of which it has arisen. As a last resort against this, societies use criminal law. 
Accordingly, a person whose will has cracked is forcibly prevented from impeding 
the other members of the society from living socially or politically. Crime, then, is 
an action by one member of a society prejudicial to the pursuit of the self-appointed 
task of the society as a whole and by lapsing into criminality a person ceases to 
function as a member of society (NL, 21.84-88).
Collingwood points out that ‘Most communities, if not all, are mixed 
communities . . . ’ (NL, 22.11). As an example, he discusses the family. One part of a 
family is a society, and the other part is a non-social community. The nursery is a
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non-social community because the children do not join it of their own free will; they 
are drafted into it when they are too young to consent. If nurseries are to exist, there 
must be nurses to run it and parents to replenish it. In the simplest and commonest 
case, the ‘typical family’, the same persons discharge both functions (NL, 22.1-19).
When children reach physical and mental maturity, they become able to fend 
for themselves, to have their own children and organise them into a nursery (NL, 
22.28). In so-called ‘savage’ life puberty marks the end of childhood and the 
initiation into adulthood. Because European life is more complicated, the 
educational or nursery period is longer (NL, 22.31-3).
According to European ideas, marriage is a social contract whereby a man 
and woman become partners in the enterprise of producing children (NL, 22.34). A 
marriage which entails the production of children passes through three phases. 
Firstly, before any children are conceived, the family is a society working at turning 
itself into a mixed community. In the second phase the family has transformed itself 
into a mixed community consisting of a social nucleus of parents and a non-social 
community of children. The children are engaged in growing up and the parents in 
helping them to do so. In the third phase the children have grown up to the point of 
possessing free will, and are incorporated into the family-society (NL, 23.22-8).
According to Collingwood, modem Europeans today think of marriage as 
having the aim of producing children. Prior to the widespread knowledge and use of 
contraceptives, the aim of marriage was seen as being the gratification of sexual 
desire, with the procreation of children as a consequence of this. Knowledge of 
contraceptives means that most people only have children when they do so of their 
own free will (NL, 23.48-52).
Children, as members of the non-social family community, are incorporated 
into the family society, on reaching maturity. In order to reach this stage, a process 
of education is carried out partly by the child upon itself, and partly by others upon 
it. The educative process must always hold out the promise of future incorporation 
into the society. In the family the parents have to make it clear to the child from an 
early age that he, or she, will be welcomed as an equal as the signs of mental 
maturity become manifest. This is an aspect of the child’s education that parents 
cannot delegate (NL, 23.62-4; Boucher, 1989: 157).
Collingwood’s account of the family as a mixed community prepares the 
ground for his discussion of the body politic. Collingwood contends that the Greeks
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saw the body politic as a society of citizens corporately ruling themselves, with non­
citizen dependants, such as wives, children and slaves; whereas in the Middle Ages it 
was regarded as a non-social community, a human herd ruled by strong men (NL, 
24.5). Hobbes said that the body politic is both. It changes out of one and into the 
other. The medieval account of it represents the starting point, and the Greek 
account the finishing point. It is always moving between these two points.
In Collingwood’s view, history records a process whereby a Greek social 
body politic has turned into a medieval non-social body politic, and from that to a 
new social kind of body politic, the ‘bourgeois’ life of the medieval and post- 
medieval age. Similarly, in political theory, the Greek theory of political life as the 
theory of a social body politic has turned into the medieval theory of a non-social 
body politic, and that again into the conception of the ‘bourgeoisie’ as the root of all 
princely authority (NL, 24.51-3).
According to Collingwood, ‘We are in a world where nothing stays put, but 
everything moves; the things we say must move, too, in the same rhythm as the 
things we are talking about’ (NL, 24.55). He refers to Plato’s distinction between 
two kinds of discussions: ‘eristical’ and ‘dialectical’. An eristic discussion is one in 
which each party tries to prove that he was right and the other wrong, whereas: ‘In a 
dialectical discussion you aim at showing that your own view is one with which your 
opponent really agrees, even if at one time he denied it; or conversely that it was 
yourself and not your opponent who began by denying a view with which you really 
agree’ (NL, 24.58-9).
Plato’s belief in the superiority of dialectical discussion, Collingwood asserts, 
rested on his assumption that there is a dialectic in things. He followed Heraclitus’ 
idea that everything moves and nothing stays still (NL, 24.61-62). A Heraclitean 
world is a world of change where the positive term in a pair of contradictories is 
gradually gaining on the negative term. What was not-jc is turning into x. It is like a 
pot of black paint in which you are mixing more and more white: ‘The paint was 
never either pure black or pure white; it is always turning into a paler and paler grey. 
And if you settle upon any standard of light-greyness with which at any moment it 
conforms, you must be ready to give up as a standard which by now has been left 
behind. This readiness to give up something which at a certain time you settled upon 
as true is dialectical thinking’ (NL, 24.64-5).
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For example, the same community could be described as a society or a non­
social community, by attending to different elements. But this is only a difference in 
‘point of view’: a dialectical difference (NL, 24.67). As Collingwood explains, 
‘According to Hobbes ... a body politic is a dialectical thing, a Heraclitean world in 
which at any given time there is a negative element, an element of non-sociality 
which is going to disappear, or at least is threatened with abolition by the growth of 
the positive element; and a positive element, an element of sociality’ (NL, 24.68). 
Just as in families children grow up and are incorporated into the family-society: ‘By 
a dialectic of the same kind the subjects in a body politic grow up into sharing the 
work of rule’ (NL, 24.75).
Collingwood attempts to summarise his account of the body politic in what 
he calls ‘the three laws of politics’. Firstly, a body politic is divided into a ruling 
class and a ruled class. Secondly, the barrier between the two classes is permeable in 
an upward sense. Members of the ruled class must be susceptible of promotion into 
the ruling class. Thirdly, there is a correspondence between the ruler and the ruled 
(NL, 25.7-9). For example, vigorous rulers teach the ruled to develop a vigorous 
political life: ‘Here the freedom whereby the rulers rule percolates, owing simply to 
the process of ruling, without any intention that it shall do so, downwards through 
the strata of the body politic’ (NL, 25.94). On the other hand, if the rulers are 
slavish, what will percolate is slavishness:
In Plato’s Republic the tyrant is not a skilful and determined politician who seizes power for 
himself, but a piece o f flotsam floating on the political waves he pretends to control, shoved 
passively into power by the sheer lowness of its own specific gravity. This is quite possible by 
the inverse working o f the third law of politics. Hitler, referring to Plato’s sense of the word 
‘democracy’, claims to be a democratic ruler. He claims that he has been, so to speak, ejected 
by the automatic working of a mob, which elevates to a position of supremacy over itself 
whatever is most devoid of free will, whatever can be entirely trusted to do what is dictated by 
the desires which the mob feels. (NL, 25.95-8)
As Boucher indicates, what Collingwood is implying in his third law of 
politics is that although the ruling class rules over the ruled class by means of force, 
the relationship between them cannot merely be based on force. The rulers prepare 
the ruled for rule by providing exemplars that the ruled will be inspired to follow. 
Such inspiration will affect only those who have almost reached the level of free will. 
This requires cooperation rather than confrontation, a dialectical rather than an 
eristical or adversarial relationship (Boucher, 1989: 160-61).
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Connelly rightly points out that Collingwood’s conception of the ruling class 
can be interpreted in two different ways. Sometimes the term ‘ruling class’ appears 
to mean those who happen to be rulers in relation to a particular political problem, 
and at other times it appears to mean those who by virtue of being capable of self- 
rule are eligible as members of the ruling class. In one sense the ruling class is 
coextensive with society, and in another sense it is not. Connelly decides that it is 
best to restrict the term ‘ruling class’ to the former meaning and distinguishes 
between the ‘ruling class’ and ‘society’ (Connelly, 2003: 221-2). I suggest, however, 
that the alternative interpretation is at least as valid. If we take the term ‘ruling class’ 
to designate a wider group of people than those working in the formal institutions of 
government (and roughly equate the ruling class with society), this allows for some 
illuminating comparisons with Ortega y Gasset, which I will discuss further on in 
this chapter.
In Collingwood’s view, then, democracy and aristocracy, properly 
understood, are not hostile to each other, but mutually complementary. Thinking that 
every member of a body politic should rule is ‘doctrinaire democracy’. Forgetting 
that the function of ruling must be a function in any body politic, that a body politic 
must rule itself, is ‘doctrinaire aristocracy’ (NL, 26.1-12).
Democracy and aristocracy give partial answers to the question: ‘how shall 
we make the ruling class as strong as possible?’ Democracy answers: ‘By enlarging 
it so far as possible. By recruiting into it, to discharge one or other function, every 
member of the ruled class who may constitute an addition to its strength’. 
Aristocracy answers: ‘By restricting it so far as is needful. By excluding from its 
membership everyone who does not or would not increase its strength’ (NL, 26.14- 
15). In the dialectical process of recruitment of a ruling class, democracy and 
aristocracy are positive and negative elements in that process. When the two 
elements are considered in false abstraction from this dialectical process, and then 
considered eristically as two competing views, what follows is ‘doctrinaire 
democracy’ and ‘doctrinaire aristocracy’ (NL, 26.16-17). No pure democracy or 
pure aristocracy has ever existed. Every body politic is composed of a ruling class 
and a ruled class. The ruling class may contain persons not capable of ruling, who 
need to be excluded, and the ruled class may contain persons capable of ruling, but 
debarred from it on frivolous grounds, who need to be promoted (NL, 26.23-27).
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Collingwood contends that political thought in the nineteenth century allowed 
itself to be dazzled by the French Revolution and failed to apprehend its continuity 
with the long historical process out of which it had grown. The word ‘revolution’ 
had been borrowed towards the end of the seventeenth century by the vocabulary of 
politics from the vocabulary of literary criticism (NL, 26.7-71). This indicated and 
perpetuated a superficial concept of history, as it implies that history normally flows 
uniformly in a straight line, then it waggles and you are surprised (NL, 26.75-6). 
Thus, for Collingwood, ‘If a twentieth-century reader of history came to an incident 
that surprised him, he would know what to call it. He would call it a piece of bad 
history: something his author had failed to explain’ (NL, 26.77).
The word ‘revolution’ has no scientific significance, therefore, only an 
emotional one: ‘It means an event whereby the mighty are put down from their seat 
and the humble and meek exalted. It is uttered, if you are one of the mighty, with 
intent to freeze your blood; if you are one of the humble and meek, to give you 
opium-dreams of coming felicity’ (NL, 26.82). Misled by the false view of 
‘revolution’ in general, and the French Revolution in particular, nineteenth-century 
observers thought that democracy had defeated aristocracy and established itself as 
the only political system rational in theory and tolerable in practice. But the 
dialectical process of political life had not come to an end: both democratic and 
aristocratic elements had been present in the French and American revolutions (NL, 
26.9-92).
Hence political life, like family life, contains an indispensable element of 
force. Children have to be looked after without their consent, and similarly the ruled, 
so far as they are not capable of ruling themselves, must be ruled without their 
consent (NL, 27.1-13). This involves the use of force and fraud. Force and fraud on 
the part of the rulers is necessary if it is for the good of the ruled or for the 
facilitation of ruling (NL, 27.21-29).
However, Collingwood explains, force and fraud are used by a capable ruler 
only upon those of his subjects most backward in political education. For the less 
childish, they are differentially replaced by ‘induction’ and other forms of partial and 
progressive sharing in the liberty of the ruler (NL, 27.38). The principle of 
aristocracy is the principle of force, and the principle of democracy is the principle of 
self-government (NL, 27.47).
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According to Collingwood, throughout the history of Europe the democratic 
principle and the aristocratic principle have always been positive and negative 
elements in the dialectical process of recruiting to and excluding from the ruling 
class (NL, 27.5). However, in the nineteenth century, there arose the idea that 
democracy and aristocracy were in an eristical and not a dialectical relation. 
Constitutional history had been a battle between the two, which the French 
revolution had settled in favour of democracy (NL, 27.51).
The supposed victory in an imaginary eristic of one false abstraction over its 
opposite means the replacement of a dialectical process in which the two co-operate 
by a continuation of the imaginary eristic. The eristic is imagined to proceed 
pendulum-wise. In the make-believe disputation of false abstractions, the
vanquished abstraction draws strength from its defeat and comes back re-invigorated 
to the imaginary fight. The real dialectic of harmonious co-operation between 
contradictory principles is imagined as being replaced by a false dialectic of 
oscillating conflict between false abstractions. The whole mistake is the logical 
consequence of making false abstractions (NL, 27.53-57).
The illusion that democracy had triumphed over aristocracy gave rise to the 
opposite illusion in the twentieth century that the reassertion of aristocracy was 
imminent. Tyranny arose in Germany and Italy, because democracy had been 
introduced in Germany in a doctrinaire spirit and under the strain of military defeat 
and into nineteenth-century Italy, which was inadequately grounded in the tradition 
of political dialectic (NL, 27.6-62). Collingwood goes on to claim that ‘This is why, 
as an anti-dialectical system of politics, it has succeeded in overwhelming France, 
where the dialectic of political life has never been well understood; for the defeat of 
France in 1940 was not a strictly military defeat but a defeat in the realm of political 
ideas’ (NL, 27.63). Similarly it failed to conquer England, because the English 
retained the mental vigour to hold on to the lesson that political life is essentially 
dialectical33 (NL, 27.64).
As an example of dialectic in political life Collingwood refers to nineteenth 
century English politics, which was dominated by two parties, Liberal and 
Conservative. The aim of the Liberal party was to hasten the percolation of liberty
33 There is a hint o f English nationalism in Collingwood’s views here: something which Eric Voegelin 
castigates Collingwood and others for in ‘The Oxford Political Philosophers’ (1953). Voegelin’s 
argument is refuted by J.D. Mabbott (1954).
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throughout the body politic, and the aim of the Conservative party was to retard it. 
The relation between them was consciously dialectical. They were not 
fundamentally in disagreement. Both agreed that the process of percolation must go 
on and both tried to find the optimum rate of progress. Collingwood cites Disraeli’s 
Reform Bill of 1867 as an example of the agreement between the two parties (NL, 
27.79-83). Disraeli boasted that he had ‘dished the Whigs’, meaning that under his 
leadership the Conservative party, by extending the franchise, was adopting the 
traditional Liberal policy.
Another Conservative said that he was a brake on the vehicle of progress. 
The policy of the Conservatives was not to stop the vehicle but to slow it down when 
it seemed likely to go too fast (NL, 27.84). Thus, the two parties may be compared 
to two barristers who agree that justice shall be done, but they show the court what is 
to be said for the plaintiff and for the defendant respectively (NL, 27.89).
The failure to understand the dialectic of politics is also used to explain the 
decline of the Liberal party in the early twentieth century: ‘In a dialectical system it 
is essential that the representatives of each opposing view should understand why the 
other view must be represented. If one fails to understand this, it ceases to be a party 
and becomes a faction, that is, a combatant in an eristical process instead of a partner 
in a dialectical process’ (NL, 27.92). Liberals pictured themselves as dragging the 
vehicle of progress against the dead weight of human stupidity, the Conservatives 
being a part of that dead weight. Whereas Conservatives understood that there must 
be a party of progress, Liberals never understood that there must be a party of 
reaction. Therefore the Liberal party was replaced by the Labour party, which the 
Liberal party would have absorbed had it understood the dialectic of English politics 
(NL, 27.94-7).
As well as providing an account of the dialectical process by which non­
social communities are converted into societies, Collingwood stressed that the 
principles of liberalism needed to be extended more fully into the sphere of 
international relations. Collingwood argues that there are three logically distinct 
stages in political life. The first stage is society, in which a number of persons 
immanently rule themselves. The second stage is internal politics, where a society 
rules over a dependent non-social community. The third stage is external politics, 
whereby a body politic deals with problems arising out of its relation with other 
bodies politic. These three stages exist in a logical series. Internal politics
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presupposes the existence of a social will. Problems connected with the rule of one 
class over another are envisaged by the rulers as problems confronting their joint 
social consciousness. Similarly external politics presupposes internal politics (NL, 
29.1-17).
Each of these stages has its own dialectic. Each is a Heraclitean world, where 
everything moves and nothing rests. The dialectic of society is the conversion of a 
non-social community into a social community. People find themselves in a non­
social community and form a society by a joint act of will, by deciding to do so. The 
non-social element is never completely eliminated. It is just prevented from 
impeding social life. The dialectic of internal politics converts the ruled class into 
collaborators with the ruled. Freedom percolates throughout the body politic from 
the ruling class merely by their act of ruling, so long as they have free will. If the 
ruling class do not have free will, and their ruling is an involuntary act due to 
irresistible passion or desire, what percolates through the body politic will be 
servility. In proportion as the ruling class fails to make itself a society, it cannot lift 
its subjects to the level of co-operators (NL, 29.2-44).
Collingwood’s dialectical conception of liberalism is also applied to 
international politics. The dialectic of external politics, he explains, is where 
differences between bodies politic are converted from non-agreement into 
agreement, rather than hardened into disagreement. For resolving differences 
between bodies politic, conflicts of interests, conflicts of rights, or conflicts of duties, 
making war is the alternative to dialectic. War is a state of mind which consists in 
believing that such differences have to be settled eristically. It does not necessarily 
involve the employment of military force. Yielding to a threat of armed conflict (real 
or bluff) is war, regardless of whether the threat is implicit or explicit. Similarly it is 
war whether the force used is military force, or the force of economic or religious 
sanctions (NL, 29.5-69).
War is a reversal of the dialectical methods hitherto employed in the dialectic 
of society and the dialectic of internal politics. Social life only exists because 
persons deliberately aim at agreeing together. Bodies politic only exist because the 
so-called ‘pugnacious instinct of mankind’ has been twice overcome (NL, 29.7-82). 
Similarly in ‘Man Goes Mad’, Collingwood rejects the notion that ‘... roots of war 
are a combative instinct inherent in human nature’. Conflict is ‘. .. a condition of all 
life: but conflict and war are not the same things, and combative instinct, if there is
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such an instinct, no more entails the use of battleships than daggers in the street’ 
(MGM, 15).
Collingwood argues that war cannot be blamed entirely on one party (NL, 
29.85). Any aggressor can argue that he fights only because he is forced to fight: ‘If 
A attacks B because he is afraid of B and is convinced that he must hit first, the 
blame is shared. A is acting, admittedly, like a criminal lunatic; but B is to blame for 
having been so foolish as to frighten him into a fit of aggressiveness’34 (NL, 29.88).
A breakdown in the dialectic of external politics is caused by the internal 
condition of a body politic being unsound, where the rulers are unskilful and 
unsuccessful at ruling (NL, 30.3-35). War makes rule easier for an incompetent and 
heavy-handed ruler, increasing loyalty among the ruled and justifying rigorous 
demands being made of them. The reason why the rulers rule badly is because of 
disharmony among the rulers. War masks the disharmony and inward corruption in a 
body politic.
Thus, the ultimate cause of war is that traces of non-sociality are not 
completely overcome by the ‘dialectic of society’ whereby a ruling class harmonises 
itself (NL, 30.35-39). No society ever totally leaves behind the ‘Yahoo herd’ that it 
has emerged from. War, therefore, can never be abolished. Any individual case of a 
defect in sociality can be removed by the various techniques for coming to 
agreement. But with the curing of one defect, another comes into existence: defect is 
infinitely changeable (NL, 30.8-86).
Collingwood asserts that a body politic would be justified in making war 
upon another if it is itself intent on peace, and the other body politic has already 
reduced itself so far as possible to the level of the ‘Yahoo herd’. The second body 
politic, by its very existence, would constitute a threat to the first. War is a form of 
disagreement where the disagreement cannot be reduced to agreement because one 
party will not argue or listen to reason. He must be reduced to the state of somebody 
prepared to listen to reason before the dialectic can begin (NL, 30.9-98). According 
to Collingwood,
34 This does not mean that a partial acceptance of blame should lead one to desist from responding to 
aggression. Pacifism, Collingwood argues, is ‘war-mongery complicated by defeatism’ and promotes 
war by ensuring that war-makers shall have their reward: ‘Not realizing that modem war is a neurotic 
thing, an effect o f terror where there is nothing to fear and of hunger where the stomach is already 
full, he proposes to deal with it by throwing away his arms so that the war-makers shall not be afraid 
o f him, and giving up what they would snatch (from him or others) so that their hunger shall be 
appeased’ (NL, 29.9-97; cf. Boucher, 1989: 184-5).
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War serves the cause of peace, and is therefore politically justified, when it is the only 
available method o f discouraging a people who are individually the victims of their own 
emotions, and collectively a prey to the tyrannous but popular ‘rule’ o f a sub-man whom they 
hail as a superman, from pursuing abroad an aggressively belligerent policy, the natural 
extension o f the tyranny to which they are accustomed at home, and forcing them to realize 
that the only way to prosperity at home is through peace abroad. (NL, 30.99)
Collingwood argued in ‘Man Goes Mad’ that the failure to extend the 
principles of liberalism into international relations35 had given rise to international 
anarchy, militarism and Fascism in the 1930s (EPP, 185). Militarism, in 
Collingwood’s view, was one of the signs of madness in our civilisation (MGM, 3), 
and the dialectical understanding of liberalism was the solution.
As we have seen, then, Collingwood found classical social contract theory to 
be deficient because of its failure to attach a positive meaning to the phrase ‘state of 
nature’ (NL, 33.18). In particular, Collingwood criticises the Germans in this 
respect. Unlike Western Europe, Collingwood argues, Germany and Prussia lacked 
the experience of political and social life that was necessary to understand the 
classical politics (NL, 33.21-25).
Rousseau’s German readers misunderstood ‘the natural condition of 
mankind’ to mean, not the nursery where babies are bom, but the cave or ‘savage’ 
life; not the opposite of society, but the opposite of civilisation (NL, 33.2). The 
phenomenon observed by Machiavelli had never occurred in eighteenth-century 
German consciousness: the spontaneous creation by subjects of a social order 
capable of protecting their rights against a prince inclined to override them (NL, 
33.26). The classical politics was interpreted as a theory of law and morals for a 
subject who never did anything except what was prescribed by convention or what 
was ordered by the prince and his servants (NL, 33.31).
Collingwood accuses the Germans of ‘herd-worship’, a form of communal 
self-adoration, which expresses a man’s feeling of powerlessness in the grip of a 
non-social community of which he is a member (NL, 33.35-6). Kant and Hegel are 
accused of promoting ‘herd-worship’ by rejecting Hobbes’ notion of the 
commonwealth as an ‘artificial Man’, characterised by joint social activity. For 
them, the state is natural in its origin and divine in its essence (NL, 33.41-2).
35 Collingwood also argued in ‘Man Goes Mad’ that the principles of liberalism needed to be extended 
into economic life, but this is something that I will discuss in the next chapter.
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There has been a tension in political and social sciences, Collingwood argues, 
between the Western European scientific tradition and German ‘herd-worship’ (NL, 
33.7). For example, Nietzsche perceived a divided consciousness in German 
intellectual life, rejected the nationalism which was deliberately emphasising all that 
was anti-rational in the German tradition, and exhorted his countrymen to be ‘good 
Europeans’ (NL, 33.72). According to Collingwood, when Marx calls for a 
revolution and property to be transferred to ‘the state’, by ‘state’ he means ‘non­
social community’ (NL, 33.79). Marx is accused of embracing ‘materialism’ 
because it involved denying the existence of free will, and of hating the bourgeois, 
because he thought of the bourgeois as a man specially addicted to entering into free 
partnerships (NL, 33.97-9).
As I have illustrated, then, the deficiencies of social contract theory are 
overcome in an account of liberalism where the non-social community is converted 
by a dialectical process into society. As Boucher remarks, Collingwood’s theory 
attempts to locate the state of nature, or the non-social aspects of life, within the 
framework of the body politic itself (Boucher, 1989: 166).
According to K.B. McIntyre, Collingwood’s elucidation of the necessary 
social element within the concept of freedom echoes the critique of contract theory 
offered by the German and British idealists of the nineteenth century, and that his 
unusual appropriation of the vocabulary of social contract theory is best understood 
as a rhetorical manoeuvre designed to undermine the validity of the concept of the 
atomistic individual which grounds social contract theory (McIntyre, 1996: 117). 
McIntyre explains that ‘For Collingwood, the notion of the pre-social individual is a 
myth which he supplants with a conception of the continuous conversion of the non­
social community into membership in society. This conversion does not involve the 
voluntary consent of the converted. It is a decision based upon the political context 
of the particular body politic’ (McIntyre, 1996: 131).
As Boucher indicates in his Introduction to the revised edition of The New 
Leviathan, social contract, for Collingwood, is a continuing and continuous process 
(NL, xlii). For Collingwood, society and political entities such as the state and the 
nation are continuously made and remade.
The concept of the state designates the ruling class within the body politic 
(NL, 25.23; cf. Boucher, 1989: 168). For Collingwood, like Croce, Boucher 
explains, there exists ‘not the State, but political actions’, and the State ‘is not a
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substance but an activity’36 (Boucher, 1989: 167). The state does not have a 
monopoly of political action. Political action is identical with action in general in so 
far as it organises itself: ‘Political action is therefore bound to overflow the limits of 
the state and to appear wherever there is action of any kind’ (EPP, 113). The 
administration of criminal law by the state does not take away the right and duty of
nn
every citizen to keep his own peace (EPP, 114).
Collingwood’s view, contrary to foundational social contract theory, that 
political systems are continuously made and remade is illustrated in ‘Political 
Action’:
When the political spirit o f a society is no longer satisfied with its existing structure, no longer 
finds that structure to express its own political aspirations, it alters it. And this process is really 
going on at all times. To speak o f a stable political system as ‘existing’, and then as suddenly 
altered with a jerk by a so-called reformation or revolution, is to be deceived by appearances. 
Every fresh political action is in reality a modification o f the whole political poise and attitude 
( ‘constitution’) o f the agent. (EPP, 102)
Similarly, in An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood argues that Locke’s 
political theory is outdated, and to retain it unmodified is an example of ‘reactionary 
anti-metaphysics’ (EM, 97-8). The Lockian theory, as we have seen in Part Two, 
assumed that nationality was an absolute presupposition. For the contemporary 
historian or political theorist, however, it is a relative presupposition: nationality is 
constantly destroyed and remade (EM, 99). For Collingwood, society and the state 
are not things, but processes. The aim of these processes, as I will now explain, is 
the achievement of civilisation, or civility.
Collingwood’s dialectical account of politics and reform of social contract 
theory culminates with his theory of civilisation and barbarism. Civilisation, 
according to Collingwood, is a process of approximation to an ideal state; it is to 
approach nearer to an ideal state of ‘civility’ and recede from the opposite ideal state 
of ‘barbarity’ (NL, 34.5-51). No actual state is purely civil or purely barbarous, and 
is always a mixture of the two (NL, 34.52). When the process of civilising is at 
work, the civil elements in the life of a community are gradually predominating and
36 When we understand the State philosophically, rather than as substance, Collingwood believes, the 
State cannot confine itself to the making and administering of rules or laws. It must to some extent 
interest itself in economic and moral questions as well, but for political, and not for economic or 
moral, reasons (Boucher, 1989: 171). The promotion, maintenance, and protection of the political 
good of orderliness is the justification for political, or state, intervention. The state should intervene 
to alleviate poverty because it is an offence against order (EPP, 97; Boucher, 1989: 172).
37 The role o f the state is something that I will discuss in more detail in the final chapter.
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the barbarous elements are being prevailed over (NL, 34.55). Repeating the 
argument of An Essay on Philosophical Method, Collingwood argues that all mental 
processes have this approximative character. A mental process from ignorance to 
knowledge or from fear to anger or from cowardice to courage never begins simply 
at the first term, but always at the first term with a mixture of the second; and never 
ends simply at the second term, but always at the second term qualified by the first 
(NL, 34.58; Boucher, 1989: 215). The process does not begin in pure ignorance and 
end in pure knowledge (NL, 34.58-59).
Collingwood argues that there are three senses in which the term civilisation 
has been used. Secondly, the term civilisation is used to refer to the condition which 
is achieved as the result of undergoing the process of civilisation. Thirdly, the ideal 
of civilisation itself, towards which the process of civilisation aims, is often referred 
to as civilisation. For the sake of symmetry, Collingwood believes that it is 
justifiable to use three corresponding senses of the term barbarism: as a name for the 
process of barbarising, as a name for the condition to which that process leads, and as 
an equivalent to ‘barbarity’ (NL, 34.7-79; cf. Boucher, 1989: 209).
-J Q
In ‘What Civilisation Means’ Collingwood points out that whereas ‘civility’ 
is a certain state or condition of society, ‘civilization’ implies something more, 
namely the act of bringing about that state or condition. Civility has a static 
implication, civilisation a dynamic (NL, 481-2). Every society is at a stage between 
civilisation and barbarism, moving away from barbarism and attempting to move 
closer to civility (NL, 487-8).
Collingwood argues that the simplest way of conceiving the relation between 
civilisation and barbarism is to regard them as two contradictory entities separated by 
a dichotomy. This understanding is outmoded and the result of obsolete conceptions 
of historical change (NL, 485-6; cf. Boucher, 1989: 209).
A second view of the relation between civilisation and barbarism arises out of 
late eighteenth-century historical thought, which viewed every period as one of 
transition. According to this view, each existing society stands on a scale somewhere 
between the absolute zero of barbarism and the infinity of civilisation, and is 
civilised to some degree relative to the ideal. The idea of degrees of civilisation 
presupposes that there is one universal civilising process through which all
38 This appears in Appendix 2 o f the revised edition o f The New Leviathan: pp.480-511.
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communities go, and reflects the monism of historical thought in the nineteenth 
century.
In terms of An Essay on Philosophical Method, as Boucher indicates, this 
view is deficient. Although the ideal of civility, as the generic essence, is recognised 
to be manifest in differing degrees, the manifestations are not acknowledged to be 
different in kind. Also all of the intermediate forms on the scale are mutually 
exclusive. This view of the relation between barbarism and civilisation denies the 
overlap of forms. Opposition and distinction are thought to be mutually exclusive 
types of relation, whereas an adequate understanding of the concept of civilisation 
must exhibit it as a fusion of opposites and distincts (NL, 487-8; Boucher, 1989: 
210).
Twentieth-century historians, Collingwood claims, have rejected historical 
monism and embraced historical pluralism. They recognise that at various times 
different communities have followed their own ideals and instituted different 
processes to achieve them, and are not therefore embodiments of different degrees of 
one single ideal (NL, 488-9; Boucher, 1989: 210). Each civilisation attempts to live 
a different kind of civilised life. However, this view does not imply historical 
relativism: ‘The plurality of civilizations does not exclude a sense in which 
civilization is one’ (NL, 490).
Each civilisation is both and ideal and a fact. In so far as each will have 
achieved a certain kind and degree of civilisation, it actually exists and is a fact. The 
fact is itself an ideal, in that the degree and kind of fact achieved will have been 
conceived as something desirable and worth aiming for, and its continuing existence 
is dependant upon its continuing to be thought of as an ideal worth pursuing (NL, 
490; Boucher, 1989:211).
The attainment of a certain kind and degree of civilisation implies the concept 
of a further ideal that is as yet unrealised. As well as ideals that are facts, or ideals of 
the first order, there are also ideals that are recognised but not realised, or ideals of 
the second order. The extent to which the second-order ideals differ from those of 
the first will vary considerably from person to person and from society to society. 
But even second-order ideals are only partial. For example, the ideal English 
gentleman might not behave with equal gentility on all occasions. Beyond first- and 
second-order ideals is a third order. This is the ideal of universal civility -  not 
civility on this or that occasion, but civility on each and every occasion. All
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particular ways of behaving civilly presuppose the ideal of behaving civilly without 
any limit whatever (NL, 492-4; Boucher, 1989: 212).
Collingwood argues that the discrepancies between its achievements and its 
second-order ideal are elements of barbarism in a civilisation. However, the failure 
to realise the second order ideal is a failure only to realise that part of the second 
order ideal that goes beyond the first order ideal. According to the nineteenth- 
century conception of progress, the source of this failure is a time-lag between the 
formation and execution of a plan (NL, 495). Each stage of progress demolishes a 
piece of barbarism, and man becomes more and more civilised as time passes. In the 
twentieth century we recognise that elements of barbarism that exist are not relics of 
a past age (as claimed by the nineteenth century concept of progress), but new 
creations, for example, the wretchedness of poverty and the horrors of twentieth 
century war. These barbarisms are products of the civilising process (NL, 496). 
Every advance in the civilising process gives opportunity for barbarism as well as for 
civilised behaviour.
According to Collingwood, man creates his own posterity. The facts of a 
situation determine the agent’s opportunities, but they cannot determine his or her 
choice among those opportunities: ‘His awareness of himself as a free agent is an 
awareness of these alternative possibilities for action which arise from the situation, 
and awareness of his power to choose between them’ (NL, 497). He inherits certain 
facts -  economic facts, social facts, legal facts and so forth -  but he makes his will 
for himself.
Ideals are not inherited, only the fact that certain ideals were pursued. The 
heirs to the ideals decide whether the same ideals will continue to be pursued. The 
achievements of civilisation, inherited in the form of fact, are always opportunities to 
build a new civilisation or a new barbarism (NL, 497). Opportunities progress, but 
the human will is just as capable of using opportunities for good or ill as always. 
The greater the opportunities it inherits, the greater the temptation to abuse them, and 
this temptation is the origin of barbarism (NL, 498).
Opportunities progress, but human beings are always capable of using 
opportunities for good or ill. Man inherits certain facts, but he makes his will for 
himself (NL, 497-8). The will here is inextricably linked with historical self- 
consciousness. The act of becoming historically self-aware is an act of will: an idea, 
as we have seen, that Collingwood illustrates in the concept of duty.
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For Collingwood, the civilising process leads to what he calls the dialectic of 
discontent. ‘Dialectic’ here means contradictory propositions about the right method 
of treating a thing with which you are discontented. ‘Discontent’ refers to the 
discrepancy between what is realised in your society and what you would wish to be 
realised; between ‘first order ideal’ and ‘second order ideal’ (NL, 498). In the work 
of practical rationality, which we call civilisation, people are more discontented with 
their achievements the more they have achieved. Discontent means being aware of 
the barbarous elements in one’s own civilisation. This leads to two attitudes: the 
reforming attitude and the conservative attitude. The reforming attitude demands 
their removal, the altering of institutions so that the barbarous elements are left out. 
The conservative attitude is to accept them as necessary evils, and because one 
cannot see how they can be left out, to argue that they cannot be altogether evil (NL, 
499).
The reforming attitude is justified, as civilisation is an activity and cannot 
exist statically. The will to be civilised is the will to become more civilised. The 
conservative attitude is justified, in that advancement in civilisation is not made by 
throwing away what one has acquired because it is imperfect. The spirit of reform 
unchecked by the spirit of conservatism would lead to retrogression by destroying 
these foundations and thus produce effects as disastrous as its intentions are 
admirable. The spirit of reform is the first attitude towards recognised imperfection. 
The spirit of conservation is man’s second thoughts about the same problem. Thus, 
many people take up the reforming attitude when young, and move towards 
conservatism as they grow older. Without this dialectical interaction between the 
two, the spirit of reform becomes Utopianism, and the spirit of conservation becomes 
reaction (NL, 500). A wise discontent is one which asks, not merely ‘what ideal do 
we want to realize?’ but ‘what ideal can we realize here and now?’ (NL, 501).
For Collingwood, civilisation presupposes society, and there is an integral 
relation between mind, society and civilisation. Collingwood argues that there are 
two constituents of civilisation. The first constituent of civilisation is concerned with 
the relation of a community to itself, the relation of its members to one another. The 
second constituent concerns the relation of the community to what is outside the 
community. This can be subdivided into relations with the natural world and 
relations with other communities (NL, 35.3-34).
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In relations between members of a community, ‘civilization’ means behaving 
‘civilly’ to one another. Acting civilly is to refrain from acting in a way that would 
arouse a strong passion or desire in another individual strong enough to diminish that 
person’s self-respect -  ‘that is threaten his consciousness of freedom by making him 
feel that his power of choice is in danger of breaking down and the passion or desire 
likely to take charge’ (NL, 35.41; Boucher, 1989: 216). The word ‘civil’ came to 
have this meaning in ancient Latin (NL, 35.42). However, complete civility between 
all members of a community is only a council of perfection. ‘Civilization is not 
civilization but barbarity unless it insists that you shall treat every member of your 
community as civilly as possible; it is not civilization but utopia unless it 
distinguishes occasions on which you simply must be civil from others on which you 
may (and indeed, even for civility’s sake, must) be uncivil’ (NL, 35.49).
A community that is civil in relation to the natural world is one which gets 
from the world of nature what it needs in the way of food, clothing and other 
satisfactions, as the fruit of its own industry, and through intelligent labour, directed 
and controlled by a scientific understanding of the natural world (NL, 35.5). The 
difference between a ‘civil’ community and a ‘savage’ community is that the 
civilised community has learned to save its muscles by using its brains in getting 
what it can out of the natural world (NL, 35.53). This is a modem sense of the word 
‘civil’, and is found in derivatives of the Latin word such as ‘civilite’, ‘civilita’, 
‘civility’, a Renaissance group of words whose central idea is that by coming to a 
better understanding of the natural world, man can increase his ability to get what he 
needs out of it, and become more civilised in relation to it (NL, 35.55).
Need, in this respect, is not a fixed entity, and needs change in accordance 
with expectations. ‘What man needs of the natural world is what he thinks he can get 
from it. His catalogue of these needs undergoes expansion as his consciousness of 
power over the world of nature expands. As men become, in this second sense of the 
word, more “civilized”, what passed for luxuries are constantly being transferred into 
the list of necessaries, and new luxuries are constantly being invented. And what is a 
luxury to a higher civilization is not a luxury to one at a lower level of development 
. . . ’ (NL, 35.58-9; Boucher, 1989: 217).
The question of whether civilisation means an increase in civility towards 
members of other communities depends on how any given community answers the 
question: ‘Are foreigners human?’ If the answer is ‘yes’, then civility requires that
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we treat them civilly. If the answer is ‘no’, then foreigners are part of the natural 
world and are scientifically exploited (NL, 35.6-64). The conviction that foreigners 
are human arises through experience of common action with them, setting up a social 
consciousness in virtue of which we recognise them as part of ourselves (NL, 35.68). 
The process of civilisation regarding the relation of a community to members of 
other communities is one where, originally treating people outside the community as 
natural things to be exploited, they come to consider them as human beings entitled 
to civility (NL, 36.14).
• • * I QAlthough a historicist, therefore, Collingwood’s perspective is universalist . 
Historicism and universalism, in Collingwood’s thought, are complementary. This is 
clear from his early manuscripts on logic onwards. As I indicated in Part Two, 
Collingwood argued in Libellus de Generatione that the world changes through and 
through, although in this incessant change it remains unalterably the same 
(Collingwood 1920a: 56).
The historicist nature of Collingwood’s universalism is also evident in the 
fact that the existence of the ideal of universal civility is not separate from the 
holding of the ideal. The ideal is not something transcendent and detached from the 
world of becoming and change: instead, it is an historical fact within that world, and 
a presupposition of particular ways of behaving civilly. For Collingwood, in 
comparing and evaluating civilisations and ideals of civility, different civilisations 
can be judged by the same standard, but it must be a standard that each civilisation 
regards as valid (see Connelly, 2003: 276-7). Furthermore, the transition from seeing 
foreigners as other to recognising them as one of us exemplifies Collingwood’s 
conception of dialectic as stages in the development towards a wider truth.
To define the essence of civilisation, Collingwood explains, we must find the 
connection between a spirit of civility towards our fellow human beings and a spirit 
of intelligent exploitation of the natural world (NL, 36.25-6). The intelligent 
exploitation of the natural world involves ‘natural science’, which in this case means
39 Boucher contends that Collingwood’s ideas are close to those o f Michael Walzer, who suggests that 
the thin morality we claim to be universally valid among human beings by the very fact that they are 
human, and among different states as the instruments through which they act on the world stage, is a 
projection of the thick morality that pertains in civilised communities. According to this view, ‘... 
there is an international society which is grounded, not on a natural or hypothetical contract in a 
Rawlsian original position, but on norms that have become commonly acknowledged by leaders of  
states and their citizens’ (Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 199). For Collingwood, on this view, it is by 
means o f some form of common action that we develop our social consciousness and recognise 
foreigners not as other, but as one o f us.
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the handing on from generation to generation of knowledge which it is useful for a 
farmer, sailor, hunter, fisherman or the like to have. This is the kind of ‘natural 
science’ which was mostly discovered during the Neolithic Age, and of which the 
masters among ourselves are what we call ‘unskilled agricultural labourers’ (NL, 
36.3-32). To have achieved any degree of civilisation relative to the natural world, a 
community must have acquired and conserved an incredible amount of this sort of 
natural science (NL, 36.33).
According to Collingwood, ‘The mainspring of the whole process is the spirit 
of agreement. So vast a body of knowledge (I call it knowledge, but it is not the kind 
of thing logicians call knowledge; it is practical knowledge, knowing how to tie a 
bowline, knowing how to swim, knowing how to help a lambing ewe, how to tickle a 
trout, where to pitch a tent, when to plough and when to sow and when to harvest 
your crop) can only be brought together in a community (for it is too vast for the 
mind of one man) whose custom is that everybody who does not know a thing that 
may be useful for the betterment of living shall go frankly to one who knows it, and 
listen while he explains it or watch while he shows it, confident by custom of a civil 
answer to a civil question’ (NL, 36.46).
The connection between the two above characteristics of civilisation is 
civility. Civility between human beings not only constitutes civilisation relative to 
the human world; it is also what makes possible a community’s civilisation relative 
to the natural world (NL, 36.5-51). The condition for the build up of knowledge in a 
community is that inventions are not hoarded but taught. It depends on a desire for 
knowledge and a desire to impart knowledge (NL, 36.59-64). But, as well as this 
‘dialectic of knowledge’, which is the origin and essence of civilisation, there is also 
an ‘eristic of knowledge’: the monopolising of knowledge to gain power over people 
(NL, 36.65-6).
The trends towards the destruction of civilisation are, as Boucher points out, 
incorporated in the concept of barbarism (Boucher, 1989: 240). For Collingwood, 
civilisation can be promoted unconsciously. Barbarism, however, can never be 
promoted unconsciously, because it entails a clear conception of what it is revolting 
against in order to flourish. Barbarism cannot win in its revolt against civilisation 
because ‘there is no such thing as civilization’ (NL, 41.68). All we have are various 
approximations to the ideal, with infinite capacities for modifying their civilisations
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and inventing new channels of development as soon as barbarism attacks (cf. 
Boucher, 1989: 241).
As I have argued, therefore, for Collingwood, the deficiencies in human self- 
understanding due to abstract rationalism are overcome in a dialectical theory of 
politics and civilisation, and this involved resolving the inadequacies of classical 
social contract theory. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Ortega y Gasset, 
like Collingwood, argues for a rapprochement between theory and practice. 
Therefore Ortega, along with Collingwood, also develops a dialectical account of 
society and politics, which was an integral part of a historicist response to the crisis 
of Western civilisation. Ortega emphasises the dynamic and dialectical character of 
European liberalism but, unlike Collingwood, he outrightly rejects social contract 
theory.
As we have seen, Collingwood’s interpretation of social contract theory 
rejects the traditional idea of atomistic individuals and a foundational contract. 
Instead the contract is a continuous socialising process. The rationalism of 
traditional social contract theory, then, is assimilated and transcended in a dialectical 
manner. Thus, importantly, Collingwood’s position means that ‘the Western 
European scientific tradition’ (NL, 33.7) is to some degree vindicated and absorbed, 
and not simply discarded. Although it is true that Ortega’s philosophy also absorbs 
and transcends rationalism, this dialectical approach is not quite as explicit in 
Ortega’s treatment of social contract theory.
Whereas Collingwood distinguishes between society and community, Ortega 
rejects social contract theory and instead draws a distinction between association and 
society. In ‘Unity and Diversity of Europe’,40 Ortega argues that Europe since the 
Middle Ages has existed as a common space or environment, and coexistence and 
society are equivalent terms (HS, 49). For Ortega, society, unlike association, (and 
like Collingwood’s conception of community) is that which is produced 
automatically by the simple fact of coexistence, and it secretes customs, habits, 
language, law and public power41. It is a ‘modem’ error, Ortega asserts, to think that 
society is brought about by willed agreement. Any such agreement presupposes the
40 This essay is published in History as a System and other essays toward a philosophy o f history, 
(1961) pp.43-83.
41 Collingwood contends that the word Gesellschaft is not derived from the societas and is not an 
equivalent for it. It means a non-social community (EPP, 207n). Perhaps Ortega was influenced by 
the German word for society?
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existence of people living together under certain customs, and the agreement can 
only determine one form or another of this coexistence. The idea of a social contract 
is an attempt ‘to put the cart before the horse’ (HS, 50).
Ortega criticises rationalistic conceptions of the origin of society in ‘The 
Sportive Origin of the State’. He argues that primitive tribes are divided into the 
social classes of youth, maturity and old age, and are dominated in power and 
authority by youths, whose primary concern is to fight. But: ‘War calls for a leader 
and necessitates discipline, thus bringing into being authority, law, and social 
structure’ (HS, 28). The aggression of youths, Ortega argues, provides the irrational 
historical origin of the state: ‘It is not the worker, the intellectual, the priest, properly 
speaking, or the businessman who started the great political process, but youth, 
preoccupied with women and resolved to fight -  the lover, the warrior, the athlete’ 
(HS, 32). However, despite the different interpretation of the word ‘society’ and the 
refusal to engage with social contract theory, Ortega’s argument does to some extent 
complement Collingwood’s criticism of social contract theory for not sufficiently 
taking into account what the latter calls the non-social part of the body politic, and its 
dynamic or dialectical relationship with society proper.
For Ortega, it is a symptom of crisis in a civilisation when societal 
circumstances do not favour the emergence of the excellent human being. Thus 
Ortega’s dialectical liberalism was integrally related to promoting the conditions 
favourable to the emergence of cultural elites42. While Collingwood distinguishes 
between a society and a non-social community (or a ruling class and a ruled class), 
Ortega argues in The Revolt o f the Masses that society is always a dynamic unity of 
two component factors: minorities and masses (RM, 13). Those who belong to a 
‘select minority’ demand more of themselves than others, even though they may not 
themselves fulfil those higher exigencies. There is a distinction between ‘... those 
who make great demands on themselves, piling up difficulties and duties; and those 
who demand nothing special of themselves, but for whom to live is to be every 
moment what they already are, without imposing on themselves any effort towards 
perfection; mere buoys that float on the waves’ (RM, 15).
According to Ortega, the mass-man does not accept authority external to 
himself, unless his surroundings force him to do so, and today his surroundings do
42 For Ortega, capitalism promotes the wrong kind o f aristocracy. He argues instead for a hierarchy of 
culture, divided into better and worse rather than rich and poor (cf. Dobson, 1989: 53).
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not so force him. On the contrary the excellent man is urged, by interior necessity, to 
appeal from himself to some standard beyond himself, whose service he freely 
accepts. Contrary to what is usually thought, it is the man of excellence, and not the 
common man, who lives in essential servitude.
When, by chance, such necessity is lacking, he grows restless and invents 
some new standard, more difficult, more exigent, with which to coerce himself43. 
Ortega refers to Goethe: ‘To live as one likes is plebeian; the noble man aspires to 
order and law’ (RM, 63). Noble life stands opposed to the common or inert life, 
which reclines statically upon itself, condemned to perpetual immobility, unless an 
external force compels it to come out of itself: ‘Hence we apply the term mass to this 
kind of man -  not so much because of his multitude as because of his inertia’ (RM,
65).
Ortega argues that mass-man is hermetically enclosed within himself, 
incapable of submitting to anything or anybody, believing itself self-sufficient (RM,
66). On the other hand, he cannot control by himself the process of civilisation. He 
has learned to use much of the machinery of civilisation, but is ignorant of its very 
principles (RM, 67). Something paradoxical, but natural, has happened. From the 
very opening-out of the world and of life for the average man, his soul has shut up 
within him (RM, 68). The individual finds himself with a stock of ideas. He decides 
to content himself with them and regard himself as intellectually complete (RM, 69). 
The mass-man has ‘ideas’, Ortega asserts, but they are not genuine ideas, nor is there 
possession culture (RM, 71). According to Ortega,
It is no use speaking of ideas when there is no acceptance of a higher authority to regulate 
them, a series o f standards to which it is possible to appeal in a discussion. These standards are 
the principles on which culture rests .... There is no culture where there are no principles of 
legality to which to appeal. There is no culture where there is no acceptance of certain final 
intellectual positions to which a dispute may be referred. There is no culture where economic 
relations are not subject to a regulating principle to protect interests involved. There is no 
culture where aesthetic controversy does not recognise the necessity of justifying a work of art. 
(RM, 71-2)
Instead there is barbarism, which is the absence of standards to which appeal can be 
made (RM, 72).
With Syndicalism and Fascism, Ortega argues, there appeared for the first 
time in Europe a type of man who does not want to give reasons or to be right, but
43 Likewise, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche declares ‘Under conditions of peace the warlike man 
attacks him self (BGE, 76).
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simply shows himself resolved to impose his opinions (RM, 73). Hence the ‘new 
thing’ in Europe is ‘to have done with discussions’, and detestation is expressed for 
all forms of intercommunion which imply acceptance of objective standards, ranging 
from conversation to parliament and science. Normal processes are suspended, and 
hermetism of the soul urges to masses to intervene in public life by direct action 
(RM, 74):
Restrictions, standards, courtesy, indirect methods, justice, reason! Why were all these 
invented, why all these complications created? They are all summed up in the word 
civilisation, which, through the underlying notion o f the word civis, the citizen, reveals its real 
origin. By means of all these there is an attempt to make possible the city, the community, 
common life. Hence if  we look into all these constituents o f civilisation just enumerated, we 
shall find the same common basis. All, in fact, presuppose the radical progressive desire to 
take others into consideration. Civilisation is before all, the will to live in common. A man is 
uncivilised, barbarian in the degree in which he does not take others into account. (RM, 75-6)
In Ortega’s view,
The political doctrine which has represented the loftiest endeavour towards common life is 
liberal democracy. It carries to the extreme the determination to have consideration for one’s 
neighbour and is the prototype o f ‘indirect action’. Liberalism is that principle of political 
rights, according to which the public authority, in spite of being all-powerful, limits itself and 
attempts, even at its own expense, to leave room in the State over which it rules for those to 
live who neither think nor feel as it does, that is to say as do the stronger, the majority. (RM, 
76)
Liberalism is the supreme form of generosity. It announces the determination to 
share existence with the enemy -  with an enemy which is weak: ‘It was incredible 
that the human species should have arrived at so noble an attitude, so paradoxical, so 
refined, so acrobatic, so anti-natural. Hence, it is not to be wondered at that this 
same humanity should soon appear anxious to get rid of it. It is a discipline too 
difficult and complex to take firm root on earth’ (RM, 76).
According to Ortega, the mass-man believes that the civilisation into which 
he was bom and which he makes use of, is as spontaneous and self-producing as 
nature (RM, 89). The principles on which the civilised world is based and by which 
it has to be maintained have no interest for him. Civilisation becomes more complex 
and difficult in proportion as it advances, and today man is unable to keep pace with 
the progress of his own civilisation. As civilisation advances, each new generation 
needs a great deal of experience, or history. ‘Historical knowledge is a technique of 
the first order to preserve and continue a civilisation already advanced’ (RM, 91). It 
does not give us positive solutions to the new aspect of vital conditions, but it 
prevents us from committing the mistakes of other times.
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Thus, there is not anything ‘new’ in Bolshevism or Fascism. The future must 
overcome the past by swallowing it. If it leaves anything outside it is lost. An 
advance must be made on the liberalism of the nineteenth century, but this is not to 
be done by being anti-liberal (RM, 94). Liberalism had its reason, which will have to 
be admitted. It is the part that it not reason that must be taken from it. Europe needs 
to preserve its essential liberalism, as a condition for superseding it (RM, 95). For 
Ortega, then, ‘There is no hope for Europe unless its destiny is placed in the hands of 
men really “contemporaneous”, men who feel palpitating beneath them the whole 
subsoil of history, who realise the present level of existence, and abhor every archaic 
and primitive attitude. We have need of history in its entirety, not to fall back into it, 
but to see if  we can escape from it’ (RM, 96).
According to Ortega, a superabundance of resources does not favour 
existence. Instead it produces deformities (RM, 100). Human life has arisen and 
progressed only when the resources it could count on were balanced by the problems 
it met with44. Ortega argues that the average man ‘... finds himself surrounded by 
marvellous instruments, healing medicines, watchful governments, comfortable 
privileges. On the contrary, he is ignorant of how difficult it is to invent those 
medicines and those instruments and to assure their production in the future; he does 
not realise how unstable is the organisation of the State and is scarcely conscious to 
himself of any obligations’ (RM, 101-2). People lose contact with the very substance 
of life, which is made up of absolute danger, and is radically problematic (RM, 102). 
Hence, Ortega explains, we must accept our true destiny, and the destiny of the 
European today is to be a liberal (RM, 103).
According to Ortega, the scientist is the prototype of mass-man (RM, 108-9). 
In order to progress, science demanded specialisation. Hence the scientist has been 
gradually restricted and confined into narrower fields of mental occupation, and has 
progressively lost contact with other branches of science, and with it that integral 
interpretation of the universe which is the only thing deserving the names of science, 
culture, and European civilisation (RM, 109-10). The specialist knows very well his 
own tiny comer of the universe, but he is radically ignorant of the rest (RM, 111). In
44 This resembles John Ruskin’s view, according to which wealth is not automatically equivalent with 
possessions and production, for of these some are wealth and some are ‘illth’. Wealth is determined 
by the ‘intrinsic value’ of a thing, not its exchange value, and ‘intrinsic value’ rests in the fitness of 
such labour or commodity as a means to ‘the joyful and right exertion o f perfect life in man’ (see 
Williams, 1993: 142).
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politics, in art, in social usages, and in other sciences, he will adopt the attitude of the 
primitive, ignorant man; but he will adopt them forcefully and with self-sufficiency. 
By specialising him, civilisation has made him hermetic and self-satisfied within his 
limitations; but the very inner feeling of dominance and worth will induce him to 
wish to predominate outside his speciality (RM, 112).
Science, therefore, needs from time to time, as a necessary regulator of its 
own advance, a labour of reconstitution, an effort towards unification, without which 
the progress of science itself is not assured (RM, 113). The specialist is radically 
ignorant of the historical conditions requisite for the continuation of science; that is 
to say, how society and the heart of man are to be organised in order that there may 
continue to be investigators (RM, 114).
Ortega’s political theory, therefore, like Collingwood’s, is a vindication of 
liberalism and the idea of freedom, and it constitutes a specifically historicist 
response to the ills of modernity. Although not using the language of social contract 
theory, Ortega affirms the idea that society and the state are the products of an open- 
ended dialectical process of human construction.
However, as I indicated in Part One in the discussion of the relation between 
artist and community, Ortega’s elitism is slightly different from Collingwood’s. 
Ortega’s distinction between the minority aristocracy and the masses is far more 
rigid than Collingwood’s distinction between society and the non-social community. 
While Collingwood emphasises the importance of members of the non-social 
community being gradually incorporated, through education, into society and mental 
maturity, Ortega provides few explicit ideas about how and whether members of the 
masses could achieve a fuller more developed rationality. In this respect, Ortega’s 
theory is less dynamic and dialectical than Collingwood’s.
As we have seen, Collingwood’s dialectical and developmental theory of 
society and politics led him to argue that different societies that embody different 
ideals of civilisation are attempts to achieve the ideal of universal civility. In 
Ortega’s case, the dialectical view of politics led to the argument that the individual 
European nation-state constitutes a movement towards European unity.
During the Modem Age, Ortega asserts, Europe exercised authoritative 
influence over the rest of the world (RM, 126). Europe had been the ruler of the 
world, but now she is no longer sure that she is or will continue to be the ruler (RM, 
131). But, Ortega argues, this apparent decadence may be a beneficial crisis which
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will enable Europe to be really, literally Europe: ‘The evident decadence of the 
nations of Europe, was not this a priori necessary if there was to be one day possible 
a United States of Europe, the plurality of Europe substituted by a formal unity?’ 
(RM, 139) Europe’s loss of command is a worry because there is no other group of 
countries to take its place. If the European grows accustomed to not ruling, it will 
lose the discipline of responsibility that can keep Western minds in tension: ‘If this is 
lacking, the European will gradually become degraded. Minds will no longer have 
that radical faith in themselves which impels them, energetic, daring, tenacious, 
towards the capture of great new ideas in every order of life’ (RM, 144).
According to Ortega, European decadence manifests itself in the fact that the 
nation-state has become obsolete. European nations, he asserts, face economic 
difficulties because they are limited by the political frontiers of the respective states 
(RM, 146). The European has lost respect for national states, and has discovered that 
to be English, German or French is to be provincial (RM, 148-9). The state is the 
result of movement, struggle and effort, where man strives to escape from the natural 
society of which he has been made a member by blood. In its origins it is crossbred 
and multilingual: ‘There is no possible creation of a state unless the minds of certain 
peoples are capable of abandoning the traditional structure of one form of common 
life, and in addition, of thinking out another form not previously existing’ (RM, 155). 
The state begins by being a work of imagination. It is not a thing, but a movement. 
It is at every moment something which comes from  and goes to. Its unity consists 
precisely in superseding any given unity (RM, 163).
As Europeans, Ortega argues, we are more influenced by what is European in 
us than by what is special to us as Frenchmen, Spaniards, and so on (RM, 180). 
According to Ortega, therefore, the grave demoralisation which manifests itself as a 
rebellion of the masses has its origin in the demoralisation of Europe: ‘No one knows 
towards what centre human things are going to gravitate in the near future, and hence 
the life of the world has become scandalously provisional .... The European cannot 
live unless embarked upon some great unifying enterprise. When this is lacking, he 
becomes degraded, grows slack, his soul is paralysed’ (RM, 181-2).
What are known as nations arrived in the nineteenth century at their highest 
point of expansion: ‘Nothing more can be done with them except lead them to a 
higher evolution. They are now mere past accumulating all around Europe, weighing 
it down, imprisoning it .... Everyone sees the need of a new principle of life ... Only
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the determination to construct a great nation from the peoples of the Continent would 
give new life to the pulses of Europe. She would start to believe in herself again, and 
automatically to make demands on, to discipline, herself (RM, 182-3).
Ortega argues that Europe has been left without a moral code. No new 
morality has appeared to replace the old antiquated one (RM, 187). Modem culture 
and civilisation tend to belief in the amorality of life. ‘Europe is now reaping the 
painful results of her spiritual conduct. She has adopted blindly a culture which is 
magnificent, but has no roots’ (RM, 189).
Ortega’s promotion of the idea of a united Europe, then, is explicitly 
connected with the development of historical and dialectical reason. In ‘Unity and 
Diversity of Europe’, he points out that the shape of this super-national state would 
be very different from those to which we are accustomed, just as the national state 
differed from the city-state of ancient times. To conceive of reality as dynamic, 
Ortega argues, was never easy for Greco-Roman thought. It was not able to detach 
itself from the visible. The corporeal object was for them the essential ‘thing’ (HS, 
53). To the European mind, on the other hand, everything visible seems simply the 
apparent mask of a hidden force which is constantly producing it and is its true 
reality. For centuries the peoples of Europe have lived under a public power so 
purely dynamic that it can be characterised only by names like ‘European balance’ 
and ‘balance of power’ (HS, 54). Europe is not a ‘thing’ but a balance (HS, 55).
According to Ortega: ‘Aligning oneself with the left, as with the right, is only 
one of the numberless ways open to man of being an imbecile: both are forms of 
moral hemiplegia’ (HS, 70). In contemporary civilisation the whole of life tends to 
be absorbed by politics, and this total ‘politicalism’ is one and the same phenomenon 
as the revolt of the masses: it drains people of solitude and intimacy (HS, 71).
From the eighteenth century onwards it became a general belief throughout 
most of Europe that the only method of solving great human problems was the 
method of revolution, to change everything at a single blow and in all spheres of life 
(HS, 76-7). However, in revolutions the abstract tries to rebel against the concrete. 
Human affairs are historical and therefore in the highest degree concrete. The only 
method of thinking about them with some chance of hitting the mark is ‘historic 
reason’ (HS, 78).
Three centuries experience with ‘rationalism’ and Cartesian ‘reason’ enable 
us to realise its failure in the realm of strictly human affairs, and demand that it be
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integrated in the more deep-rooted system of ‘historic reason’. Historical reason, 
Ortega argues, demonstrates the futility of all general revolutions, of all attempts to 
bring about a sudden change of society and begin history anew. It opposes 
revolution with continuity (HS, 80). The method of continuity is ‘... the only one 
that can avoid, in the course of human affairs, that pathological element that makes 
history a notorious, constant struggle between paralytics and epileptics’ (HS, 83).
For Collingwood, therefore, a dialectical and historical theory of liberalism is 
an important part of his philosophical response to the crisis of modernity. As the 
comparison with Ortega helps us to understand, however, Collingwood’s response to 
cultural crisis (with its overlap of philosophy and political theory) ought to be seen as 
playing a salient role in the wider context of the development of early twentieth- 
century historicism and ‘crisis’ thought. In the final section of this chapter, I will 
discuss how dialectical and historical philosophy is used by Collingwood to respond 
to particular examples of cultural crisis, namely the problems of economics and of 
bureaucratic administration.
From the dialectical nature of civilisation certain elements of civilisation can be 
deduced. In The New Leviathan Collingwood describes the elements, or properties, 
of civilisation as wealth, education, Taw and order’, and ‘peace and plenty’. 
Regarding the role of wealth in civilisation, which I discuss in this section, 
Collingwood’s dialectical philosophy implies a critique of industrialism and laissez- 
faire capitalism. As is the case with Collingwood’s theory of art, and the Romantic 
theory of ‘culture’, which I outlined in Part One, the critique of capitalism develops 
from a holistic point of view.
According to Boucher, ‘Collingwood’s concern with the larger questions in 
social and political theory allies him much more closely with modem theorists, such 
as Hannah Arendt, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty, who have 
sought to uncover the fundamental forces serving to corrupt contemporary 
civilisation, than with those who explore issues of social justice and economic 
redistribution’ (Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 187). However, as I will argue, for 
Collingwood, issues of social justice and economic redistribution were 
interconnected with fundamental forces serving to corrupt Western civilisation.
As we have seen, Collingwood argues that what a community needs from the 
natural world changes according to its power to get things from the natural world.
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What people have no power to get from the natural world they learn to do without, 
docking their needs to match their powers: ‘Man’s demands upon the natural world, 
if his mastery of ‘natural science’ ... is increasing, increase concurrently with his 
power to satisfy them; and it makes no difference whether civilization is defined in 
terms of increased demand or increased power to satisfy demand’ (NL, 38.12-13 and
35.58).
Wealth, then, is a comparative term. One community A may be wealthier 
than another community B, but each may be ‘worse o ff as compared with a still 
wealthier community C. ‘How much a community demands of nature and how much 
it gets from nature is the measure of its wealth, and thus one measure of its 
civilization’ (NL, 38.21-29).
In both The New Leviathan and ‘What Civilization Means’, Collingwood 
distinguishes between wealth and riches. He argues that the adjective ‘wealthy’ 
applies primarily to a community, whereas ‘rich’ applies in the first instance to 
individuals. Also wealth is a comparative term, which involves reference to a 
standard, whereas ‘rich’ is a relative term (NL, 38.3-38). If every member of a 
community is sufficiently fed, clothed, and housed to a standard it is satisfied with, it 
is wealthy (NL, 38.5-51).
To be rich is to be rich in relation to another party who is poor. The relation 
between rich and poor in economic relations is a relation of power. Riches and 
economic force are the same thing. Uncomplicated by force, an economic 
transaction is freely entered into and viewed as mutually beneficial. The exercise of 
force in a transaction introduces an element of compulsion which undermines the 
free will of the individual. A person is forced to sell something for less than he or 
she regards as a just price, a ‘just price’ being that for which I am willing to 
exchange something when I am not forced to do so (NL, 38.6-65; Boucher, 1989: 
229).
The distinction between a ‘fair price’ and ‘the price a thing will fetch’ is a 
moral distinction. It is an application to exchange of the distinction between free 
action and forced action. Exchanges involving a fair price, because they involve no 
force, are wholly civil (NL, 505).
Thus to take advantage of one’s economic power by paying low wages to a 
labourer is to exploit the latter’s economic weakness. Collingwood, however, doubts 
that law can prevent this from happening: ‘I suspect that ... once the contrast
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terms of increased demand or increased power to satisfy demand’ (NL, 38.12-13 and
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than another community B, but each may be ‘worse o ff as compared with a still 
wealthier community C. ‘How much a community demands of nature and how much 
it gets from nature is the measure of its wealth, and thus one measure of its 
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In both The New Leviathan and ‘What Civilization Means’, Collingwood 
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applies primarily to a community, whereas ‘rich’ applies in the first instance to 
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standard, whereas ‘rich’ is a relative term (NL, 38.3-38). If every member of a 
community is sufficiently fed, clothed, and housed to a standard it is satisfied with, it 
is wealthy (NL, 38.5-51).
To be rich is to be rich in relation to another party who is poor. The relation 
between rich and poor in economic relations is a relation of power. Riches and 
economic force are the same thing. Uncomplicated by force, an economic 
transaction is freely entered into and viewed as mutually beneficial. The exercise of 
force in a transaction introduces an element of compulsion which undermines the 
free will of the individual. A person is forced to sell something for less than he or 
she regards as a just price, a ‘just price’ being that for which I am willing to 
exchange something when I am not forced to do so (NL, 38.6-65; Boucher, 1989: 
229).
The distinction between a ‘fair price’ and ‘the price a thing will fetch’ is a 
moral distinction. It is an application to exchange of the distinction between free 
action and forced action. Exchanges involving a fair price, because they involve no 
force, are wholly civil (NL, 505).
Thus to take advantage of one’s economic power by paying low wages to a 
labourer is to exploit the latter’s economic weakness. Collingwood, however, doubts 
that law can prevent this from happening: ‘I suspect that ... once the contrast
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between riches and poverty is allowed to exist a force is set up which henceforth it is 
idle to resist. However men work to minimize the result, there will always be one 
law for the rich and another for the poor; for that is what being rich and being poor 
are’ (NL, 38.67-71).
The existence of the contrast between rich and poor is an offence against the 
ideal of civility, as it implicitly involves the constant use of force by the rich in 
economic dealings with the poor (NL, 38.74). However, any civilisation is only an 
approximation to the ideal of civility, and in many respects so far departs from it as 
to permit the use of force:
Those responsible for the institutions o f a particular civilization, then, must recognise clearly 
that the existence o f a contrast between rich and poor, even a slight contrast, is an element of  
barbarity in it; but if  it is only a slight contrast they may judge it sufficiently paid for by the 
service done to the whole community by the rich as the class charged with maintaining the 
communal wealth. The community in which the contrast between rich and poor exists, 
therefore, will not, if it is wise, waste the ingenuity o f its lawyers in trying to abolish the evils 
resulting from that contrast. It will examine its economic life very carefully, to decide whether 
that contrast is necessary to the preservation o f what it regards as a tolerable standard of living. 
If it decides that the contrast can be diminished (for it can never be wholly abolished, any more 
than any other of the forms in which force appears as a feature in political life) without a 
greater inroad on its income or capital than it can afford, it will take the necessary steps to that 
diminution. (NL, 38.77-38.8)
According to Collingwood, ‘... the raison d ’etre not only of bodies politic 
but of every community is that men should live, as Aristotle says, a good life; and in 
our terminology Aristotle’s ‘good life’ is called civilization. This is the only motive 
for which men accumulate wealth: in order to pursue civilization. To accumulate 
wealth in order to create by its means a contrast between rich and poor is to use it for 
the destruction of civilization, or the pursuit of barbarism’ (NL, 38.81-3).
The wealth of one member of society, Collingwood explains, tends to 
promote the wealth of every other member with whom he is in exchange (NL, 505). 
The laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith is justified as a theory of wealth, but is 
folly when applied to the relation between rich and poor. Because it is a moral 
distinction, the distinction between riches and wealth has not always been understood 
by economists and the general public, thus leading to a confusion of terms. ‘The 
confusion affects not only theory and vocabulary, it affects economic life too. There 
is some reason to think that in the countries which call themselves civilized the 
pursuit of riches though incompatible with the very idea of civilization, has sheltered 
itself behind the pursuit of wealth, which is an integral part of civilized life, and in
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this concealed position has grown into a monstrous parasite upon civilization itself 
(NL, 506).
Christian moral theology denounced avarice as a deadly sin. Certain thinkers 
at certain times have interpreted this as implying that economic life as such is sinful, 
and there was an opposite reaction to this in Calvinist influenced countries. But, 
Collingwood argues, ‘avarice’ means the pursuit of riches, not wealth (NL, 507).
Collingwood’s dialectical account of wealth, then, implies a critique of 
capitalism. Capitalism can be understood here in terms of how it is described by 
Max Weber, who contrasted modem capitalism with traditional types of economic 
activity. According to Weber, in communities where modem productive 
organisations have not previously been known, workers are interested, not in 
maximising their daily wage, but only in earning enough to satisfy their traditionally 
established needs. The regular reproduction of capital, involving its continual 
investment and reinvestment for the end of economic efficiency, is foreign to 
traditional types of enterprise (Weber, 1992: xi-xii).
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism, Weber traces the 
connections between Puritanism (especially the ideas of predestination and the 
‘calling’) and modem capitalism. For Weber, the ‘spirit of capitalism’ is represented 
by the accumulation of wealth and the negation of worldly pleasures. The 
accumulation of wealth combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous 
enjoyment of life is thought of as an end in itself. According to Weber,
... from the point o f view o f the happiness of, or utility to, the single individual, it appears 
entirely transcendental and absolutely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of money, 
by acquisition as the ultimate purpose o f his life. Economic acquisition is no longer 
subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal of 
what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive point o f view, is 
evidently as definitely a leading principle o f capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under 
capitalistic influence. (Weber, 1992: 53)
In so far as attempting to diminish the contrast between rich and poor hinders 
the increase of communal wealth, capitalism means tolerating this contrast to a 
greater extent. Hence, capitalism, or the perpetual demand for more and more 
wealth, is, in Collingwood’s terms, uncivilised. For Collingwood (and, it seems, for 
Weber), the accumulation of wealth cannot be an end in itself, but only a means to 
the end of civilised life. According to Collingwood, the obsession in Western
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civilisation with justifying every act, custom and institution by showing its utility 
(EPP, 197-8) means that we neglect the question of substantive ends.
As Collingwood argues, if nothing is good except in so far as it is useful, 
there is no utility and therefore no goodness (EPP, 147). Sooner or later the 
judgement that something is good because it is useful rests on the judgement that 
something is good in itself, irrespectively of whether or not it is also useful. For 
Collingwood, the utilitarian trick of judging all human activities by assessing their 
utility is therefore logically nonsensical and the first step on the road to moral 
bankruptcy (EPP, 148). Our civilisation has adopted as the first maxim of wisdom 
the rule: ‘take care of the means, and the ends will take care of themselves’45. 
‘Obedience to this rule is the method in the madness of modem civilization’ (MGM, 
9).
Similarly, according to Peter Drucker, capitalism has been successful purely 
as an economic system, but people lose faith in it because it does not lead to a free 
and equal society. Dmcker argues that Henry Ford forgot that economic increase 
and expansion are not ends in themselves: they make sense only as means to a social 
end (Dmcker, 1939: 35). George Orwell argues that there is a need for spiritual 
brotherhood as an antidote to the ills of modem civilisation: ‘Man is not an 
individual, he is only a cell in an everlasting body, and he is dimly aware of it. There 
is no other way of explaining why it is that men will die in battle .... the Kingdom of 
Heaven has somehow got to be brought on to the surface of the earth ... man does 
not live by bread alone ... a world worth living in cannot be founded on “realism” 
and machine-guns’ (Orwell, 1996: 17-8).
For Collingwood, then, as it is for Weber, Orwell and Dmcker, the emphasis 
on increasing material wealth and the neglect of the social aspect of civilisation 
contribute greatly to the crisis of the West. In Collingwood’s terms, the excesses of 
free-market capitalism point to an increase in civility in terms of human control over 
nature, but, crucially, a decrease in terms of relations between people.
For Collingwood, the problem that capitalism poses can be seen in terms of 
the failures of liberalism. Modem liberalism has failed, Collingwood argues, to 
diffuse wealth adequately in order to reduce the contrast between rich and poor. In 
clinging to the distinction between public and private, the liberal state preferred not
45 Similarly, as we have seen, Ortega y Gasset argues that the meaning and final cause of technology 
lie outside itself, namely in the use man makes o f the unoccupied energies it sets free (HS, 118).
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to intrude in economic life if nothing illegal was being done. Just as there had been 
anarchy among liberal polities in international relations, anarchy was also the 
principle by which the economy operated internal to the state. According to 
Collingwood, ‘This was tolerable in theory only because of the extraordinary 
doctrine, learnt from Adam Smith, that free pursuit of individual interest best 
subserved the interest of all; in practice it was soon found wholly intolerable, and the 
misery of the weaker, to which it gave rise, was the source of modem socialism’ 
(EPP, 185). The solution to this problem, he argues is the more complete application 
of liberal principles.
Like Collingwood (and Ortega, Orwell and Drucker), Croce argues that the 
problems of suffering, hardship and the desire for better conditions can only be stated 
and solved on the plane of moral liberty, and not with materialistic schemes such as 
laissez-faire or communism or intermediates between these extremes. Rather than 
with such abstract schemes, these problems can be solved as they arise on the moral 
plane, with due regard for the facts of the situation. The solutions will vary from 
time to place, the only constant criterion being that of moral liberty and the advance 
of civilisation (Croce, 1949: 107-8). Thus liberalism must be free from economic 
prejudice, and Croce is emphatic in his distinction between political, or moral, 
liberalism and economic liberalism, or laissez-faire (Croce, 1949: 28-9).
Collingwood’s dialectical account of wealth also complements his account of 
the crisis of Western civilisation which I outlined in Part One. Throughout his 
writings, then, Collingwood seems to attack industrialism and capitalism from at 
least two standpoints. On the one hand, capitalism is uncivilised and un-dialectical 
in so far as it leads to an increase in the contrast between rich and poor. On the other 
hand, industrialism and consumerism are responsible for the suppression of emotion, 
something which threatens human sanity and self-knowledge.
As we have seen, for Collingwood, emotion is the dynamo that drives 
practical life (PA, 68-9). Failure to express emotions leads to the ‘corruption of 
consciousness’ and has grave consequences for civilisation. In ‘Fairy Tales’, 
Collingwood argues that our civilisation has suppressed emotion by the cultivation of 
a thick-skinned or insensitive attitude towards it. Our civilisation’s obsession with 
utilitarianism means that whatever cannot be justified in utilitarian terms it tends to 
suppress. In particular, art and religion are distrusted as things not altogether 
respectable: ‘To live within the scheme of modem European-American civilization
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involves doing a certain violence to one’s emotional nature, treating emotion as a 
thing that must be repressed, a hostile force within us whose outbreaks are 
destructive of civilized life’ (EPP, 197-8).
As a result, the role of magic in society has been misunderstood as pseudo­
science. Its influence has been suppressed and the ritualised and conventionally 
accepted ways of discharging emotions into practical activities have been 
undermined. Our utilitarian civilisation prides itself on eradicating superstition and 
‘irrational’ emotions and does not realise that the denial of such emotions amounts to 
a corruption of consciousness (cf. Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 202).
Collingwood argued that the rise of industrialism led to the replacement of art 
proper with the pseudo-art of amusement, and the corruption of Western civilisation. 
Whereas art proper is the expression of emotion, amusement involves the discharge 
of emotion, and has a corrupting effect when it discharges emotions needed in 
ordinary life. The suppression of emotion resulting from industrialism and 
capitalism creates a desire for the drug of amusement art as ‘an escape from the all- 
pervading gloom and squalor of our urban civilization’ (PAE, 436). Also, as I 
indicated in Part One, Collingwood regarded the suppression of emotion as 
manifesting itself in the destruction of the countryside by industrialisation46.
According to Collingwood’s dialectical philosophy, therefore, the pursuit of 
wealth is one aspect of civilisation, but civilisation as a whole includes emotional 
expression through art and religion, and the historical thinking and dialectical 
interaction of social life. The accumulation of wealth is important, but if it is 
pursued at the cost of undermining society and suppressing emotion, it is a 
manifestation of the crisis of civilisation. The solution to the crisis is the cultivation 
of forms of emotional expression and the further development of historical and 
dialectical thinking.
Along with wealth, Collingwood describes the properties of civilisation in 
The New Leviathan as education, Taw and order’ and ‘peace and plenty’. In his 
discussion of these properties, especially education, Collingwood again demonstrates
46 For Orwell also, modem capitalism implies the suppression of emotional expression. Referring to 
his return from Burma and five years service in the Indian Imperial Police, Orwell wrote: ‘At that time 
failure seemed to me to be the only virtue. Every suspicion of self-advancement, even to ‘succeed’ in 
life to the extent of making a few hundreds a year, seemed to me spiritually ugly, a species of  
bullying’ (Orwell, 1989: 138). Orwell refers to industrialism as an unhealthy way o f living: the 
modem industrial technique provides cheap substitutes for everything. Thus ‘We may find in the long 
run that tinned food is a deadlier weapon than the machine gun’ (Orwell, 1996: 91).
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that modernity has reached a point of crisis because of an over-reliance on forms of 
thought derived from natural science, and the solution is the cultivation of forms of 
emotional expression and dialectical thinking.
For Collingwood, education is one of the most important properties of 
civilisation, and this is something he emphasises throughout his writings. In order to 
keep itself alive from one generation to the next, a civilisation must provide 
sufficient education to keep in perpetual motion the conversion of non-social 
members into social members of the community (cf. Boucher, 1989: 222). In a body 
politic those entrusted with the task of bringing about the civilising, or socialising, 
process are the rulers. Political activity and political education are correlative. ‘In 
the case of the family, the agent in this process is the parental society, and the name 
of the process is education’ (NL, 40.63). In a family, the nursery must be converted 
from a non-social community into a society, and this is the process of civilising the 
children (NL, 37.31).
Education develops the mind up to the level of mental maturity, through 
various stages of consciousness, emerging into the life of rational consciousness, 
and, as we have seen, the specifications of the number and nature of the level of 
consciousness are articulated in The Principles o f Art and modified in The New 
Leviathan (see Boucher, 1995b: 272).
As for the content of education, Collingwood never systematically addressed 
the question of what it should be, except in relation to the place of art in education, 
but we can construct an answer from his many and varied comments on such matters. 
Education should attempt to provide an understanding of all the forms of experience. 
In Speculum Mentis these forms of experience were art, religion, science, history and 
philosophy, all of which constituted a linked hierarchy, and each of which 
represented a different stage of mental development. All of the forms of experience 
were seen by Collingwood as having an important place in the education of a 
civilised community (Boucher, 1995b: 283-4; Hughes-Warrington, 1996: 222-6).
However, as Boucher remarks, although Collingwood never fully and 
formally presented his ideas on the content of education, he did write a remarkable 
account of its manner (Boucher, 1995b: 291). Collingwood argues that the civilising 
or educating of children is better done by parents than by specialists or public 
education institutions (NL, 37.32-3). The parent has greater power over the child 
and, to the child, stands for omnipotence as a specialist can never do. Also the parent
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has the resourcefulness and versatility of a non-specialist in finding and allowing the 
child to find new subjects to study. The parent is tied to no particular methods and is 
judged by no particular results (NL, 37.34-37). According to Collingwood,
It is pitiable to see men who have ‘devoted their lives to education’ struggling against 
overwhelming odds to run schools in such a way that in favourable cases, and granted 
exceptional ability on their own part, they can excite in pupils a very small fraction of the 
enthusiasm and the self-confidence that any ordinary parent can excite in his own very ordinary 
children by taking hardly any trouble at all; and to hear their admirers hailing them as great 
reformers in the world o f education. (NL, 37.38)
Plato is ‘the man who planted on the European world the crazy idea that 
education ought to be professionalized’, and that the profession ought to be a public 
service (NL, 37.4). For Collingwood, ‘The loss of power and efficiency it has 
brought about is beyond my calculating; I will only suggest that this is what is wrong 
with European civilization. It has entrusted the conservation of its own traditions to 
a class of persons who, owing to their position, have not the power to conserve them’ 
(NL, 37.41-2).
Collingwood refers to William Cobbett, who brought up his children, ‘as 
“savages” bring up theirs’, by joining in their daily lives and encouraging them to 
join in his own (NL, 37.43). The children pursued ‘the deeply interesting and never- 
ending sports of the field and pleasures of the garden’, and they took naturally to 
book learning, which he accommodated with ‘a large strong table’ and stationery. A 
child Teamed to ride, and hunt, and shoot and fish, and look after cattle and sheep, 
and to work in the garden, and to feed his dogs, and to go from village to village in 
the dark’ (NL, 37.44-48). This, of course, corresponds to what Collingwood calls 
practical ‘natural science’ in his definition of ‘the essence of civilization’ (NL, 36.3- 
46).
To the objection that, while Cobbett made his living by farming and writing 
at home, his method of education could not be employed in a world of ‘office- 
drudges’ and ‘factory-drudges’, Collingwood responds that this is ‘... a good reason 
for smashing a world of office-drudges and factory-drudges ... a world unfit for men 
to live in’ (NL, 37.56).
Like Max Weber, Collingwood criticises the Marxist alternative as leading to 
even greater bureaucratisation (although, unlike Weber, Collingwood regards 
bureaucracy as inefficient). Collingwood argues that Marxism leads to
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... a world committed not only to the first Platonic error of professional education but to the 
second Platonic error of bureaucratising the educators. Any relics of efficiency left intact by 
the first error will inevitably be dissipated by the second. Nor do I advocate standing bogged 
in the world of capitalism bolstered up by what they call cold socialism; a world infested by the 
Juggernauts o f big business preserved from the bankruptcy fairly earned through their own 
incompetence by subsidies paid for out o f taxation. (NL, 37.58-6)
Collingwood puts forward a number of suggestions to help reduce the 
influence of what he calls the ‘Old Man of the Sea’, the professional educator (NL, 
37.65). Whatever is done must be done individually. ‘There must be no waiting for 
legislative help, and no attempt to do what we want by legislative action. Legislation 
is controlled by the Old Man of the Sea in his own interest. The sort of 
professionalized, bureaucratised education ... is the only kind politicians can 
produce’ (NL, 37.7-73). A wise person will not ask politicians to help to get rid of a 
politician’s system of education, a point which also applies to the totalitarians and 
the communists: ‘The “Revolution” of one kind and another, which these gentry 
agree in proclaiming, is only fire to your frying-pan; it is in either case only the event 
piously expected by herd-worshippers when the herd shall be all in all and the Old 
Man of the Sea shall rivet every one of us in permanent chains’ (NL, 37.79).
Collingwood declares ‘But there is a vast region of experience in which the 
irresponsible attitude of doing things for fun resists all the onslaughts of 
professionalism. For every man who indulges himself in games and sports and 
pastimes, this region includes all those things. For almost every human being it 
includes eating and sleeping and making love’ (NL, 37.83-4). This region is to be 
defended and enlarged. Parents should arrange matters so that they can spend more 
time with their children, and are urged to be irresponsible about them and do nothing 
for them except what they find it fun to do themselves. Teaching children is not so 
important as ‘all modem children are grossly and criminally overtaught’ (NL, 37.9- 
94).
However, despite the seemingly extreme nature of Collingwood’s views, he 
is not opposed to professional education as such. Collingwood argues that, having 
being rendered ‘harmless’, professional teachers can go on teaching. When there are 
things a child wants to know which the parents cannot teach, it can be sent to learn 
them from a professional teacher, and the parent, if it wants, can go too (NL, 37.97). 
The expertise of professional teachers would therefore be solicited rather than 
imposed. This would leave professional educators with more time to conduct 
research (cf. Hughes-Warrington, 1996: 228). As many educational institutions as
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are needed for the purpose should be kept, ‘... partly as teaching institutions where 
specialized teaching is on tap for all comers who want it, and partly as institutions of 
research where science and learning shall be kept alive instead of being, as they too 
often are in our educational institutions of today, dead’ (NL, 37.98).
Collingwood, then, takes a holistic approach to education. Education is a 
philosophical concept. As we have already seen, he distinguished philosophical 
concepts from non-philosophical empirical concepts. An empirical concept applies 
to specific classes of facts, whereas a philosophical concept is inter-connected with 
reality as a whole (EPM, 35).
Education proper is conducted by society in general, not merely by specialist 
educational institutions. Specialist educational institutions have a role to play within 
the context of education in general. As Hughes-Warrington argues,
For Collingwood, however, any social institution is a potential educator. If, he argues, 
education is a matter o f inculcating education to help students to pass examinations, then we 
should look no further than the public school of the early 20th century (1939, ch 2). If, on the 
other hand, education is seen as the process of socialisation, then any individual, group or 
institution that contributes to the development of rational consciousness should be recognised 
as educative .... What Collingwood asks us to do is to look beyond the contributions of 
institutions to recognise the role that individuals, parents and communities can play in the life 
of the mind. (Hughes-Warrington, 1996: 232)
For the British Idealists also, education, as well as having a narrow institutional 
meaning, had a broader sense in which the organised will of society was at once the 
exemplar and facilitator of virtue fulfilling the educative function of the state 
(Boucher, 1995b: 271).
Hughes-Warrington indicates that Collingwood is influenced by Hegel and 
Green in being aware of the importance of mediating communities between the 
individual and the largest social communities. For Green the state grows directly out 
of the primitive community, differing from it in the degree of freedom it allows, and 
this means that, at least potentially, the family-community plays an important part in 
the process of self-realisation (Hughes-Warrington, 1996: 230).
But, because of class divisions, according to Green, education is best carried 
out by a state-run system and could not be left in the hands of parents: ‘... it is 
doubtful whether under the modem system of labour in great masses, which draws 
all who have to work for their living more and more away from their homes, the fate 
of children can ever with safety be left solely in the hands of the parents’ (cited from
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Hughes-Warrington, 1996: 230; Boucher, 1995b: 294); and ‘all questions of 
education are complicated by questions of class’ (cited from Boucher, 1995b: 293).
According to Boucher, Collingwood’s own educational experience instilled in 
him a blind optimism regarding the capabilities of parents and he did not address the 
plight of those children bom to uneducated, ignorant, and uncaring parents (Boucher, 
1995b: 293; 1989: 223-4). Collingwood, Boucher argues, was divorced from the 
poverty and deprivation prevalent among large sections of the community, and was 
far less sensitive to the social condition of England than idealists such as Green, D.G. 
Ritchie, Bernard Bosanquet, and Henry Jones (Boucher, 1995b: 293).
British idealists saw a role for the state to play in education in order to 
counteract the consequences of such conditions for the child. State education was 
needed to overcome class divisions in society and the condition of the poor 
(Boucher, 1989: 223-4). Whereas Collingwood criticised the 1870 Education Act, 
British idealists praised it as contributing to the breaching of class barriers. The 
extension of the school leaving age and provision for continuing education were seen 
by them as an enhancement of individual liberty (Boucher, 1995b: 291).
However, what Collingwood seems to say is that the professional or state 
educator is a good servant, but a bad master. Collingwood was not opposed to 
professional education as such, but, unlike the British idealists, he argued that the 
parent, not the state, is to have authority. Parents are more able to focus on the 
development of consciousness than professional educators because they are free from 
demands simply to inculcate information (Hughes-Warrington, 1996: 231). It seems 
that, for Collingwood, when the state, and not parents, has ultimate authority in 
educational matters, and when education is confined to educational institutions, there 
may be a tendency for education to become regarded as a means to an end and to 
become confused with the teaching of skills.
In ‘The Place of Art in Education’ Collingwood asserts that education is 
directed to the betterment of human nature in its universality, although there is ‘a 
danger that the necessity of such a general education, as distinct from vocational 
training, may be overlooked or denied under the stress of our economic scramble for 
existence’ (PAE, 435). As Ridley argues, education, unlike vocational training, or 
the learning of crafts, has to do with self-knowledge. The student is introduced to 
books, ideas, theories, works of art, formulae; not in the hope, primarily, that they 
might prove useful later, as ways of getting things done, but in the hope that they will
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be understood. When it is properly so-called education is aesthetic; it is something 
‘of which there can be no technique’47 (Ridley, 1998: 50-1).
Ridley contends that, with higher education in Britain today, unclear political 
thinking has led to the pernicious doctrine that education, if it is to be worthwhile, 
must impart something called ‘transferable skills’. The difference between getting ‘a 
certain thing’ right and getting ‘a thing of a certain kind’ right is abolished; and so 
the distinction between education and vocational training collapses (Ridley, 1998: 
51). Under these conditions, the effect is to drive education properly so-called 
underground. Education still goes on only under a corrupt misdescription. The 
official ideology means denying students an education. According to Ridley,
Collingwood’s philosophy o f art shows with exemplary directness what sort o f ethical and 
conceptual muddle lies at the heart o f all this. The mistaking o f purposeful activity for 
technical activity, the confounding o f success with the successful realization o f a preconceived 
end, the confusion o f the hard task o f clarification for the relatively easy one of classification: 
every element repeats the errors o f the technical theory o f art, and for just the same reasons. 
(Ridley, 1998: 52)
The confusion of education with vocational training leads to the ‘profoundly 
vicious’ idea that art is an ornament or a form of escape from the practical strain of 
everyday life (PAE, 437). According to Collingwood, we must recover the 
conviction that the function of art in life is not ornamental, but structural (PAE, 439).
As Hughes-Warrington points out, another reason that, for Collingwood, 
education should be left primarily to parents is because they have a stronger 
relationship with very young children. Also, the family is the form of community 
out of which the social community grows, and a state-centred system weakens the 
bond between the family and the social community (Hughes-Warrington, 1996: 231).
For Collingwood, parents should carry out education at the initial stages of 
mental development, or education of the emotions. According to Collingwood, art is 
the ‘initial state’ in the formation of knowledge, and out of art, the primary activity 
of mind, all others grow. Art is imagination, and ‘imagination is a fundamental 
mode of mind’s activity, and the right training of imagination is therefore a 
fundamental part of education’ (PAE, 442). Art is also the expression of emotion, 
something which is necessary for knowledge of emotions, and hence it is a form of 
self-understanding (Boucher, 1995b: 284). According to Collingwood in Speculum 
Mentis, ‘Art is the foundation, the soil, the womb and the night of the spirit; all
47 This is also consistent with Oakeshott’s views in Rationalism in Politics (1962).
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experience issues forth from it and rests upon it; all education begins with it; all 
religion, all science, are as it were specialized and peculiar modifications of it’ (SM, 
59).
Collingwood also saw compulsory state education as part of a wholesale 
destruction of the countryside by town-dwellers. Our vital emotional attachment to 
the land was being eroded by the values of a utilitarian civilisation. The imposition 
of the standards of the town by a uniform education system was a threat to the 
emotional foundations of our civilisation48 (cf. Boucher, 1995b: 294-5). If, on the 
other hand, education cultivates self-expression, children ‘need no longer experience 
that boredom of school’ which is the product of a utilitarian, industrialised 
civilisation, and are given the foundations of a sane and rational life (AM, 15).
Collingwood’s focus is on the development of the child, rather than the 
formal subject matter of the curriculum. In this respect, Boucher suggests that 
Collingwood’s views on the role of parents in education echo the modem move to 
transfer the authority of the teacher to the parent, and in this respect he stands in the 
tradition of Rousseau and Dewey (Boucher, 1995b: 270).
Because Collingwood equated education with the civilising process, and 
argued that ‘the life of politics is the life of political education’ (NL, 32.34), he 
regarded education as something needed by adults as well as children. Adults need 
political education, and education at the higher levels of mental development. This 
kind of education is carried out by society in general and not necessarily by public 
education institutions. In An Autobiography, he criticises the Daily Mail for not 
living up to its educational responsibilities (A, 155). Members of the public need to 
be kept adequately informed on public questions and imbued with public spiritedness 
to do their work creditably. Parliamentary democracy depends on a politically 
educated public opinion (A, 153-4).
Through education people are made conscious of their freedom and 
stimulated to develop their self-respect. To think of oneself as free is correlative 
with thinking of others as being free, and as people with whom social relations exist. 
Rational consciousness is correlative to social consciousness. In a society each
48 Boucher also indicates that Collingwood’s intense distrust o f the specialist is echoed by Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Ronald Beiner, who take the technological revolution not as evidence o f liberation from 
the drudgery o f everyday life, but as the rejection and denial o f our vital human capacities. For them, 
and for Collingwood, our ever-increasing reliance upon experts or technocrats subdues our critical 
faculties, and leads to the denial o f emotions in our civilisation (Boucher, 1995b: 292).
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mentally adult person recognises the freedom of others, and acknowledges the wills 
of others as a source of rules binding on everyone (NL, 21.77; cf. Boucher, 1995b: 
279-80).
Political education also involves converting occasions of non-agreement into 
occasions of agreement, and not allowing them to harden into disagreement. This 
means developing in people a social consciousness which gradually renounces eristic 
or adversarial methods of resolving disputes, and adopts a dialectic or conciliatory 
approach to overcoming differences. Education has the role of refining social 
relations and prompting mutual respect, in order that society approximates to civility 
(Boucher, 1995b: 281).
Regarding the question of education being complicated by class divisions, a 
civilised society will not tolerate a great contrast between rich and poor (NL, 38.77- 
83). But, for Collingwood, diminishing the contrast between rich and poor is not 
best pursued by a policy of compulsory state education.
As we have seen, then, Collingwood’s support for parental control over 
education is connected with his belief in the cultivation of forms of emotional 
expression as a solution to the crisis of Western civilisation. However, his views 
about education are also related to the role of dialectical thinking. For Collingwood, 
excessive reliance on state bureaucracy stifles the dialectical interaction and 
spontaneity of civilised life. This is also evident in his discussion of the other 
properties of civilisation: Taw and order’ and ‘peace and plenty’.
According to Collingwood, through the rule of law people develop and 
strengthen their wills. People become more and more capable of controlling their 
desires and passions and less and less likely to succumb to the threats of those who 
would cajole and frighten them into doing things that they would not do of their own 
free will. Hence, Taw and order mean strength’ (NL, 39.92; Boucher, 1989: 230). 
‘Peace and plenty’ are the fruits of civilisation, and a consequence of Taw and 
order’. Peace does not mean a life of stagnation and quiescence. It is ‘a dynamic 
thing’ and ‘a strenuous thing’ whereby the process is checked by which non­
agreements are hardened into disagreements, and it involves the ‘dialectical labour’ 
whereby non-agreements are converted into agreements (NL, 40.24).
Collingwood argues that keeping the peace is not solely the business of the 
rulers. In a community which consists of a social ruling class, and a non-social ruled
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class, a dialectical process is set up whereby the non-social community changes by 
degrees into a society (NL, 40.6-62).
It is by the operation of the Third Law of Politics that the non-social community gradually 
approximates to the character of a society. So far as this happens, every member of the ruled 
class comes to share in the civilization o f the community as a whole and hence in the work of  
keeping the peace. To throw the whole work o f keeping the peace upon the shoulders o f ‘the 
state’ means that ‘the state’ is conceived as doing its work so inefficiently that the Third Law 
of Politics never comes into operation, and no share in that work is ever taken by the ruled. 
This is fully recognized by the tradition o f English Law: which makes a distinction between the 
king’s peace and the peace of the individual subject, and requires every man to keep his own 
peace and thus co-operate in keeping the peace o f the community. To take the education of 
children out o f their parents’ hands and put it in the hands o f the king (or, as we nowadays say, 
‘the state’) demonstrates a charming loyalty to the king and trust in his omnipotence; but it is 
taking a job away from those who can do it and handing it over to those who cannot. This 
dodge for the avoidance of responsibility ... I shall c a ll... ‘passing the baby’. (NL, 40.65-40.7)
A community among which the peace is adequately kept by converting 
occasions of non-agreement into occasions of agreement and thus averting quarrels 
before they happen, is called a well-mannered community (NL, 40.71). According to 
Collingwood, ‘in each case the tradition of good manners is an outcome of a tradition 
that in one way or another men keep their own peace’ (NL, 40.76). A tradition of 
good manners is easy to maintain, including in a public house:
It is not (as might be thought by confirmed baby-passers) that the chucker-out keeps men 
polite, any more than the policeman keeps them honest. They keep themselves polite and 
honest. They have been civilized up to that point; and being civilized they value their 
civilization and keep themselves by their own free will up to the standard they now recognize. 
(NL, 40.78-9)
As with keeping the peace, so with the procuring of plenty, there are some 
things that can be done publicly and there are some things that can only be done 
privately. The labour of procuring plenty, or thrift, means restricting consumption, 
increasing production and improving distribution (NL, 40.91-2). Collingwood 
distinguishes between the king’s thrift and private thrift:
If the ruled class in the community had remained utterly non-social and uncivilized through 
bestiality in itself and incompetence in its rulers, there would be no private thrift; whatever 
plenty the community enjoyed would have to be procured solely by the rulers, and ‘the king’s 
thrift’ would be all the thrift there was .... From this Yahoo condition they would by degrees 
be elevated through the work o f any body politic worthy o f the name. From a brutally passive 
or non-social condition the mere fact o f being ruled, if it were done with the least competence, 
would to some extent civilize them, socialize them, and endow them with a conviction (or as it 
is called a ‘sense’) o f responsibility. However little way this process went, it would lead them 
to distinguish what I have called ‘the king’s thrift’ from ‘private thrift’ and to see that, just as 
every man has a peace o f his own, so every man has a plenty o f his own to procure by his own 
thrift... (NL, 40.94-97)
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Like Collingwood, Ortega y Gasset also regards excessive reliance on the 
bureaucratic state as symptomatic of the crisis of modernity and he proposes 
dialectical thinking as a solution. Ortega refers to the state as ‘the gravest danger 
now threatening European civilisation’ (RM, 117). The contemporary state has 
become a formidable machine capable of exercising overwhelming power on any 
portion of the social framework. But mass-man ‘is not conscious of the fact that it is 
a human creation invented by certain men and upheld by certain virtues and 
fundamental qualities which men of yesterday had and which may vanish into air 
tomorrow’ (RM, 119-20). The mass-man will tend to demand that the state intervene 
immediately to solve any problem or difficulty in public life, leading to the danger 
that it will absorb all spontaneous social effort and historical action, ‘which in the 
long run sustains, nourishes, and impels human life’ (RM, 120).
There is a danger that, through the state, the mass will tend to crush any 
creative minority which disturbs it. Spontaneous social action will be broken up, and 
society will have to live fo r  the governmental machine: ‘The people are converted 
into fuel to feed the mere machine which is the State. The skeleton eats up the flesh 
around it. The scaffolding becomes the owner and the tenant of the house’ (RM, 
121-2). An example of this is the enormous increase in the police force of all 
countries, made necessary by the increase of population. The Conservative 
government in England in the early nineteenth century refused to establish a police 
force considering disorder the price to pay for liberty49.
As we have seen, to the problem of the crisis of civilisation, Ortega regards 
dialectical thinking and historical thinking as a solution. Furthermore, Ortega’s 
dialectical understanding of liberalism leads him to regard the state as not a thing, but 
a process, possibly leading to the transcending of the (European) state in a united 
Europe.
Like Collingwood and Ortega, de Ruggiero also puts forward the idea of a 
dialectical political life as a solution to the overweening influence of the bureaucratic 
state. De Ruggiero argues that democracy, although compatible with liberalism, 
implies a strong emphasis on the collective or social elements in political life at the 
expense of the individual element (de Ruggiero, 1959: 370-2). Democracy is
49 Ortega cites John William Ward: ‘In Paris they have an admirable police force, but they pay dear 
for its advantages. I prefer to see, every three or four years, half a dozen people getting their throats 
cut in the Ratcliffe Road, than to have to submit to domiciliary visits, to spying, and to all the 
machinations o f Fouche’ (RM, 124).
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impatient towards gradual individual development from within and tries to determine 
social development from without. Hence, self-government is permitted only to the 
highest ranks of the social hierarchy, but denied to subordinate associations and 
individuals, and this leaves society a prey to bureaucracy and demagogues. State 
interference is the ‘open sesame’ of the democratic mind, destined to make good 
every lack of experience and of energy (de Ruggiero, 1959: 373-4).
For de Ruggiero, ‘the democratic worship of the state’, through the social 
contract, confers upon citizens a general will, in practice the will of the numerical 
majority, and threatens the rights of minorities (de Ruggiero, 1959: 374-5). The evil 
of democracy is not the triumph of quantity, but the triumph of bad quality. Lack of 
education on the part of the masses and the omnipotence of the state widen the gulf 
between the actual majority and the majority of representatives, and threaten to make 
democracy a tyranny over the many in the interests of the few. Democratic tyranny 
finds a spy in every citizen, and knows no limit to its extension. The liberal, in 
contrast, knows that the autonomy of his own consciousness possesses an absolute 
spiritual value which is the very source of political progress (de Ruggiero, 1959: 
376-7).
These consequences also partially result from industrial evolution, which by 
degrees has reduced the margins of individual independence. The rigid and 
unintelligent application of the principle of equality tends to diffuse mediocrity, and 
reduces the practical opportunities for individual independence, self-government and 
resistance to oppression by the central power (de Ruggiero, 1959: 378). It is 
therefore necessary to liberalise the structure of democratic society, to vitalise its 
elements from within, and to make them into centres of spontaneous co-operation. 
The feasibility of such a task, de Ruggiero declares, depends on the original unity of 
liberalism and democracy, and the dialectical character of the opposition between 
them (de Ruggiero, 1959: 379).
This synthesis, liberal democracy, aims at instilling a sense of autonomy into 
the masses, and at paving the way for self-government of the state by means of 
varied and independent forms of particular and local self-government. Its execution 
cannot be entrusted to state providence, and can only be effected by patient and 
assiduous education (de Ruggiero, 1959: 379). Liberal parties can fulfil a function of 
critical examination, or opposition, within democratic society: ‘Unable to compete 
with democracy in the work of electoral campaigns among the masses, they may
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carve from the great common territory a small district to be cultivated in their own 
way, as a nursery garden of freedom’ (de Ruggiero, 1959: 380). In de Ruggiero’s 
view, a practical demonstration must be given of the origin and development of 
aristocracies of freedom, or social elites, so that the entire block of the masses may 
by degrees shape itself into a multiplicity of definite forms and figures (de Ruggiero, 
1959: 380).
For Collingwood, de Ruggiero and Ortega y Gasset, then, dialectical thinking 
is seen as a solution to the crisis of modernity. One of the symptoms of crisis is the 
overweening influence of bureaucratic administration and a dialectical political life is 
the solution. This is quite different from the view of Weber, however, for whom 
bureaucratic administration is a symptom of the crisis of modernity but who does not 
regard dialectical thinking as a solution.
For Weber, rationality is problematic in the modem world. The process of 
rationalisation appears in terms of a reversal of the relation between means and ends: 
that which was originally a mere means becomes an end in itself. This reversal 
marks the whole of modem civilisation, whose arrangements, institutions and 
activities are so ‘rationalised’ that they enclose and determine humanity like an ‘iron 
cage’ (Lowith, 1993: 68). According to Weber,
No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end o f this tremendous 
development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth o f old ideas and 
ideals, or, if  neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self- 
importance. For o f the last stage o f this cultural development, it might be truly said: 
‘Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a 
level of civilization never before achieved’. (Weber, 1992: 182)
Rationalisation is associated with bureaucratic administration. For Weber, 
once it is fully established, bureaucracy is ‘a form of power relation ... that is 
practically unshatterable’ (Weber, 1970: 228). Bureaucratic rationalisation is 
something from which escape is ever more improbable (Sayer, 1991: 144).
Similarly, (following on from Weber’s analysis of rationalisation) 
Horkheimer and Adorno put forward a critique of ‘Enlightenment’: ‘For the 
Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is 
suspect’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973: 6). According to Horkheimer and Adorno, 
with ‘Enlightenment’ rationalisation, ‘Being is apprehended under the aspect of 
manufacture and administration’ and everything is converted into a repeatable, 
replaceable process (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973: 84).
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The pessimistic analysis o f modem , rational society, put forward by Weber, 
and further developed by the Frankfurt school o f  Adomo and Horkheimer, had 
Nietzschean roots50. According to Nietzsche, the ‘herd’ was increasingly subject to 
the state, which was the new idol (replacing a dead God) that would rob people o f 
their freedom. In Nietzsche, according to Lowith, ‘we can see W eber’s anxieties 
about the slavery o f m odem  people w ithin the bureaucratic machine o f  the modem 
state and about the possibilities o f personal autonomy in a w orld which had been 
transformed by the processes o f rationalisation’ (Lowith, 1993: 10). For Nietzsche, 
‘when empires were doomed they had m any laws’ (W P, 745).
Orwell (another m ember o f the Romantic tradition) refers to bureaucratic 
administration as one o f the most problematic features o f modernity. Referring to 
broadcasting, Orwell complains that ‘M ore and more the channels o f production are 
under the control o f  bureaucrats whose aim is to destroy the artist or at least castrate 
h im ’ (Orwell, 1996: 335). However, ‘the huge bureaucratic machines o f which we 
are all part are beginning to work creakily because o f their mere size and their 
constant growth. The tendency o f the modem state is to wipe out freedom o f the 
intellect . . . ’51 (Orwell, 1996: 335).
As I have indicated, then, the extensive bureaucratisation and rationalisation 
o f life is regarded as symptomatic o f  a crisis o f the West not only by Collingwood, 
Ortega and the Italian Idealists, but also by such thinkers as Nietzsche and Weber. 
However, unlike the latter, Collingwood and Ortega regard dialectical thinking as the 
solution52. For Collingwood, Ortega and de Ruggiero, abstract rationalism can be 
transcended and overcome through dialectical and historical reason: it might be 
suggested that their arguments could be applied in political theories o f civil 
association, agonistic liberalism, and pluralist participatory democracy. With
50 Weber ranked Nietzsche with Marx as the dominant interpreters and critics of modernity. He 
claimed that the probity of the modem scholar could be judged by the extent to which they 
acknowledge that their work would not be possible without Marx and Nietzsche (Owen, 1995: 3n; 
Lowith, 1993: 2).
51 While discussing the privateness of English life Orwell declares: ‘It is obvious that this purely 
private liberty is a lost cause. Like all other modem peoples, the English are in the process of being 
numbered, labelled, conscripted, “co-ordinated” ... in all societies the common people must live to 
some extent against the existing order’ (Orwell, 1996: 59). Orwell criticises the attempt of the 
modernist writers, Lawrence, Yeats, and Pound, to escape the homogenising and centralising pull of 
industrialised civilisation as hopeless yearning (in ‘Socialism and the English Genius’ and ‘Inside the 
Whale’). Nevertheless, he praises Yeats for being ‘too big a man to share the illusions of liberalism’ 
(Orwell, 1996: 273).
52 The relative merits or defects of the solutions proposed by Nietzsche and Weber will not be 
assessed in this thesis, which is specifically concerned with Collingwood’s solutions to the crisis of 
modernity.
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dialectical and historical thinking, therefore, something of what might be called the 
‘Enlightenment project’ can be salvaged, and civilisation is provided with a way 
forward.
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Conclusion
The argument of this thesis has been that Collingwood’s philosophy ought to be 
understood as a diagnosis of and a response to a crisis of Western civilisation. The 
theme of the crisis of civilisation has not been explicitly discussed in much detail by 
commentators on Collingwood’s philosophy. Hence this thesis, in discussing ‘crisis’ 
thought, places Collingwood’s philosophy in a wider context than that in which it is 
usually placed.
The theme of the crisis of modernity is crucially important not only in 
twentieth-century philosophy, but also in social and political thought and literary and 
artistic discourse. It is pivotal to Romanticism, historicism and most of twentieth- 
century continental philosophy in terms of the development of alternatives to 
positivism and hegemonic modes of thinking derived from natural science.
This thesis, therefore, locates Collingwood’s philosophy in the wide context 
of the emergence, in the late nineteenth- and twentieth century, of philosophies of 
process and becoming and the understanding of truth and meaning as historically 
contextual and contingent. Historicism seeks to reconcile the quest for truth with 
historical change and process, and this problem, which Dilthey tried to solve, 
continued into the twentieth century and still goes to the heart of contemporary 
philosophical debate (see Meyerhoff, 1959: 16-8).
The argument that I have presented not only adds to our understanding of 
Collingwood by placing his philosophy in the context of Romanticism, historicism 
and ‘crisis’ thought, but it also enhances our comprehension of these philosophical 
movements by enabling us to see Collingwood as providing a key contribution to 
them. One of Collingwood’s principal aims was to develop a new kind of 
philosophy which would understand history. It would be devoted to both 
epistemological problems, such as how historical knowledge is possible, but also 
‘metaphysical problems, concerned with the nature of the historian’s subject-matter: 
the elucidation of terms like event, process, progress, civilization, and so forth’ (A, 
77). Collingwood’s philosophy is not a last word on these subjects, and it provides a 
fertile ground for future explorations of these themes. This thesis has argued that one 
of the key contributions of his philosophy lies in tracing a common ground between a 
variety of intellectual traditions: between the development of a philosophy of art, 
following from the Romanticism of John Ruskin, and the emergence of a dialectical
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and historical philosophy, as is particularly evident in the thought of the Italian 
Idealists and Ortega y Gasset.
As I have argued, the conception of the crisis of civilisation and the specific 
solutions that Collingwood advocated for it take a variety of complementary forms. 
In Part One, I first discussed Collingwood’s early conceptualisation of the crisis of 
civilisation in terms of the separation of the forms of experience from one another. 
Influenced by Romanticism and Ruskin, Collingwood’s proposed solution to this 
problem was the re-union of the forms of experience in ‘a complete and undivided 
life’. Following Speculum Mentis, however, Collingwood’s view of the forms of 
experience came to be modified in important ways, and greater emphasis was placed 
on his philosophies of art and of historical and dialectical thinking, which became 
related solutions to the crisis of civilisation.
As I argued in Chapter Two, for Collingwood, the crisis of civilisation 
reveals itself first in aesthetic activity. Collingwood argued that Western culture is 
afflicted by the suppression of emotion. Symptoms of this include the confusion of 
art with craft, the predominance of the pseudo-art of amusement over art proper, the 
destruction of the countryside and the hegemony of values associated with 
industrialism. Collingwood’s solution for this problem is a theory of art as the 
expression of emotion. Art proper is distinguished from craft. Whereas crafts (such 
as magic and amusement) represent, describe and generalise, art, on the other hand, 
is the expression of emotions in their unique individuality. Through expressing his 
or her emotions, the artist enables others to express their emotions. Through the 
development of this theory of art and the critique of the dehumanising effects of 
industrialism, Collingwood assimilates and extends the Romantic tradition of Ruskin 
and D.H. Lawrence.
Chapter Three explored Collingwood’s philosophy of art in more detail. Art, 
in Collingwood’s view, was revealed to be identical with consciousness and 
language and was explained as providing the raw material on which intellect can 
build. Art provides the concrete individual points between which it is the business of 
intellect to establish or apprehend relations. Through artistic activity we both create 
the world and become conscious of it. Hence art provides a solution to the 
corruption of consciousness and an antidote to the crisis of civilisation. By 
expounding the conception of art as the expression of emotion and the consciousness
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of truth, Collingwood draws together various strands of Romantic and modernist 
ideas about art into a systematic and comprehensive philosophy.
Chapter Four demonstrated that the kind of solution that Collingwood 
developed in his philosophy of art for the crisis of modernity becomes clearer in his 
account of the interaction between artist and audience. This was an addition to the 
theory of art that he had hitherto developed and provides an indication of the kind of 
solution to the crisis of the West that Collingwood put forward in his logic and 
metaphysics. As I explained in this chapter, then, for Collingwood, artistic 
production necessarily involves collaboration between artist and audience. The artist 
is the spokesperson for his or her audience, and art is the community’s medicine for 
the corruption of consciousness. The dialectical interaction between innovation and 
tradition in Collingwood’s philosophy of art complements and, in some ways, 
improves on the philosophies of art put forward by Ruskin, Eliot and Ortega y Gasset 
by being more completely dialectical or historical. All of this, of course, prefigures 
Collingwood’s dialectical view of logic and metaphysics, which I expounded in part 
Two.
Part Two demonstrated that, for Collingwood, the suppression of emotion 
was a symptom of a deeper malaise. Collingwood argued that the philosophical 
foundations of Western civilisation were unsustainable because of a reliance on the 
Platonic philosophy of being. The solution, he argues, is a dialectical logic and 
metaphysics and a philosophy of history that reconciles normative standards with the 
process of becoming. Collingwood’s dialectical logic, as I explained in Chapter 
Five, transcends the coherence theory of truth, replacing it with an account of truth as 
that which includes within itself most successfully diverse and by themselves 
conflicting points of view. This is a dialectical process, therefore, that leaves out the 
Hegelian Absolute and where further dialogue, criticism and counter-criticism is 
always possible.
Collingwood’s dialectical logic is inextricably linked with an ontological 
claim that reality is dialectical. Therefore, his promotion of dialectical logic as a 
solution to the ailments of Western civilisation is paralleled by a reform of 
metaphysics. Hence Collingwood’s dialectical logic (or logic of question and 
answer), as I argued in Chapter Six, cannot be separated from his account of 
metaphysics as a historical science which uncovers absolute presuppositions. The 
meaning of a set of absolute presuppositions, I contended, can only fully be
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understood in the context of the complex of questions and answers that it gives rise 
to. Contrary to the views of some commentators, I argued that Collingwood’s reform 
of logic and metaphysics is more than hermeneutics because it also includes an 
ontological claim about the nature of reality. For Collingwood, spiritual or 
intellectual changes transform the nature of reality as much as physical changes do.
Chapter Seven demonstrated in more detail how Collingwood’s philosophy 
responded to cultural crisis by reconciling normative thinking with historical change. 
Collingwood’s historical metaphysics became more clearly defined through its 
rejection of both reactionary traditional philosophy and irrationalism. But, in 
Collingwood’s view, the advancement of science and civilisation are not achieved by 
metaphysics alone. Metaphysics, I argued, must be supplemented by a broader 
philosophy of history which gives an account of the sciences and practices (with their 
questions, answers and relative presuppositions) that absolute presuppositions have 
given rise to and thus determining if an example of progress has occurred. Like the 
emotions that an artist expresses, the absolute presuppositions that the metaphysician 
reveals are not in themselves ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than another set of absolute 
presuppositions, but the act of uncovering them and clarifying what they are is 
indispensable for the advancement of science and civilisation.
For Collingwood, as I explained, there can be progress in a civilisation, not in 
terms of individual appetites and desires, but in terms of shared practices or a ‘way 
of life’ considered as a whole. However, our knowledge of whether one period of 
history taken as a whole showed progress over its predecessor may be limited -  
depending on how much we know of each period as a whole. Nevertheless, we make 
changes in social and cultural life only because we have faith that they are advances. 
According to Collingwood’s philosophy, then, the criteria for value and truth are 
located not in a transcendent world removed from human experience, but in a ‘way 
of life’ considered in its widest context. But a culture or way of life is not static or 
complete: it has value only in so far as it assimilates and explains what is outside and 
different. In this respect, Collingwood’s philosophy of history moves beyond the 
coherence theory of truth and Ruskin’s more static view of culture.
Chapter Seven also included a comparison of Collingwood with Ortega y 
Gasset and Nietzsche. These comparisons place Collingwood in the context of 
historicism and the development of ‘crisis’ thought more generally. Ortega and 
Nietzsche are also significant because both advance philosophies which place value
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less on fundamental principles or individual judgements in themselves, but on their 
ability to generate vitality and enhance life as a whole. Unlike Collingwood and 
Ortega, however, Nietzsche is more sceptical about reason. Thus his more severe 
diagnosis of and proposed remedies for the nihilism confronting civilisation are 
rejected by the dialectical approach of both Collingwood and Ortega.
Part Three examined the way in which Collingwood’s solution to the crisis of 
modernity in his philosophy of art, logic, metaphysics and philosophy of history 
manifests itself in a dialectical account of morality, politics and civilisation. For 
Collingwood, there is an intimate relation between theory and practice. As I 
explained in Chapter Eight, the historicist phenomenology of mind developed in The 
New Leviathan modifies and extends the theory of mind put forward in The 
Principles o f Art, providing a more detailed account of the levels of consciousness 
and the dialectical development from one level to the next. The phenomenology of 
mind culminates with an account of morality as duty, and duty, as the practical 
aspect of historical thinking, transcends the inadequacies of utility and right. Duty, 
as the highest form of freedom and rationality, excludes the freedom of caprice and is 
completely determined by one’s consciousness of obligation. In this respect, 
Collingwood’s conception of duty constitutes a solution to the rationalism of 
modernity and overlaps with the Romantic idea of authenticity and the theories of 
Ortega and Nietzsche. Collingwood, however, differs from Nietzsche in insisting on 
the word ‘morality’ to describe authentic action. Hence his theory is an extension to 
the history of Western moral philosophy rather than a rejection of it.
As I demonstrated in Chapter Nine, Collingwood’s view that the 
advancement of civilisation depends on dialectical thinking and historical self- 
consciousness becomes further elucidated in his theory of society and politics. 
Collingwood sought to reform traditional social contract theory by providing an 
account of how members of the non-social community could be educated into 
society, mental maturity and free will. Political life, Collingwood argues, proceeds 
through dialectical discussion, which through free discussion of opposing views finds 
some common ground on which to act -  as opposed to eristical or adversarial 
discussion, where one party tries to prove that he or she is right and the other wrong. 
In the dialectical process of recruiting people into the ruling class, democracy and 
aristocracy are complementary positive and negative elements in that process. 
Contrary to foundational social contract theory, then, in Collingwood’s view, society
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and the state are not things, but processes. Political systems are continuously made 
and remade.
The aim of these processes is the achievement of civilisation, or civility. 
Acting civilly, according to Collingwood, means refraining from diminishing a 
person’s self-respect or threatening their consciousness of freedom. However, it also 
denotes a scientific exploitation of the natural world. The process of civilisation 
towards foreigners or strangers is one where, originally regarding them as natural 
things to be exploited, we come to consider them as human beings entitled to civility. 
Despite the existence of a plurality of civilisations and ideals of civility, each ideal 
presupposes a further ideal of universal civility: that of behaving civilly without any 
limit whatever. Civility between human beings also makes civility towards the 
natural world possible through the dialectical sharing of knowledge.
Part Three unites many of the concerns of Part One and Part Two. The 
articulation of a philosophy of art as the expression of emotion and consciousness of 
truth as an antidote to the corruption of consciousness is complemented by the 
development of a dialectical philosophy which is neither relativist nor removed from 
the world of historical change. Collingwood’s historicist theory of mind, society and 
civilisation, a focal point of which is the account of how human beings can move 
from the lower levels of consciousness to the higher, illustrates how his solutions to 
the crisis of civilisation examined in Part One and Part Two include one another.
In particular, the examination of Collingwood’s account of capitalism and 
bureaucratic administration in the final chapter demonstrates that the aesthetic and 
the dialectical understandings of the crisis of civilisation in his philosophy are 
intertwined. For Max Weber, like Collingwood, as I have explained, bureaucratic 
rationalisation was a symptom of a crisis in modem Western civilisation: something 
which Weber described as an ‘iron cage’. Bureaucratic administration was also one 
of the problematic features of modem civilisation which Horkheimer and Adorno 
analysed under the rubric of ‘Enlightenment’.
However, the solution proposed by Collingwood (and to some extent by the 
similar philosophies of Ortega y Gasset and the Italian Idealists) is a specifically 
dialectical, historicist and Romantic philosophy where faith is placed in the ability of 
human beings to overcome rationalism through dialectical/historical thinking and 
aesthetic self-expression. As Collingwood argued in ‘The Present Need of a 
Philosophy’, philosophy could help to solve the ills of contemporary civilisation by
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providing a reasoned conviction that human progress is possible and that the 
problems of moral and political life are in principle soluble (EPP, 169). Nietzsche, 
Weber, and the Frankfurt School represent an alternative approach that is rejected by 
Collingwood.
Nevertheless, the importance of Nietzsche cannot be ignored, in particular 
because of his seminal articulation of the problem of nihilism in the late nineteenth 
century, and because of his huge influence on ‘crisis’ theory in the twentieth century. 
Similarly, Weber’s theory of rationalisation and bureaucratic administration and the 
critique of Enlightenment by Horkheimer and Adorno (each of which had 
Nietzschean origins) illustrate the wider context of Collingwood’s concern with the 
bureaucratic state as a symptom of the crisis of the West and provide a counterpoint 
to Collingwood’s dialectical solution.
Throughout the thesis I have pointed out that Collingwood’s dialectical 
response to the crisis of civilisation is a salient part of a wider development of 
historicism in the early twentieth century, where both Collingwood and Ortega y 
Gasset play a key role. Both attempt to develop historical thinking and to make an 
advance on Dilthey’s distinction between Geisteswissenschaften and the natural 
sciences. In Graham’s view, Collingwood and Ortega can be regarded as virtual co­
founders of a new ‘critical’ philosophy of history, replacing the older speculative 
philosophies of history (Graham, 1997: 140). The comparison with Ortega, then, 
illustrates the point that Collingwood’s response to the crisis of the West should be 
seen as more than simply an Idealist response. Collingwood’s response, like 
Ortega’s, to some extent transcends both Idealism and realism to play a key role in 
the development of early twentieth-century philosophy.
Ortega’s pivotal role as a ‘crisis’ thinker has already been mentioned -  
however, as Graham indicates, Ortega’s treatment of crisis connects more visibly 
with the old speculative philosophies of history than Collingwood. While Dilthey 
and Collingwood concentrated more on historical knowledge, Ortega stressed the 
ontological aspects of history more (Graham, 1997: 135 and 152).
Also Ortega emphasises the aristocratic aspect of the dialectical solution to 
the crisis of modernity, particularly in his conceptions of art, culture and politics. 
His concern is the somewhat Nietzschean one of trying to resurrect an aristocracy of 
culture from within the mediocrity and rationalism of mass society. (Unlike 
Nietzsche, of course, Ortega’s solution embodies a faith in dialectical reason.)
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It is here that Collingwood differs from Ortega. There seems to be greater 
faith in Collingwood’s philosophy in the ability of human beings to move from the 
lower types of consciousness to the higher. The artistic self-expression that 
Collingwood champions includes that of ordinary persons whose understanding of 
art is rudimentary but whose emotional self-expression can develop through 
education. For Collingwood, the expression of emotion and the understanding of art 
are potentially open to all whose consciousness can develop and not only to those 
who, as Ortega argues, are members of the excellent minority or the cultured few. In 
this respect, as I argued in Chapter Nine, Collingwood’s philosophy seems more 
completely dialectical and he is more optimistic about the ability of dialectical 
thinking to counteract the rationalism of modernity.
In any case, Collingwood’s theory of society is one where the barrier between 
the ruling class and ruled class (or, in Ortega’s terms, between the excellent minority 
and the masses) is more permeable in the upward sense (NL, 25.8) than in Ortega’s 
philosophy. This difference between Collingwood and Ortega is also especially 
pronounced in their political philosophies in general. Ortega has less to say about 
how one could join the minority aristocracy and seems to take a less optimistic view 
about the prospects for liberalism in a mass society.
For Ortega, then, (because of his less dialectical view of the relation between 
elites and the masses) there is less emphasis on both the philosophy of art and 
political philosophy in providing a solution to the ills of contemporary civilisation. 
The solution that Ortega proposes is more concentrated on the philosophy of 
historical reason than Collingwood’s. The more completely dialectical response to 
the crisis of modernity that we can see in Collingwood’s philosophy is multi-faceted: 
a solution that embraces not only logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of history, 
but one that is also expressed or intimated in a philosophy of art (where, to some 
extent, all of us are artists, unlike Ortega’s theory, where only an elite few are artists) 
and is made explicit in a theory of mind, society, politics and civilisation. The New 
Leviathan thus represents a kind of culmination in Collingwood’s treatment of the 
theme of crisis, especially, as I have argued, in his controversial and seemingly 
eccentric views about the education of children. Despite the controversial nature of 
these views, Collingwood’s account of education and of capitalism and the role of 
the state in general in Part III of The New Leviathan effectively draws together the 
response to cultural crisis in his aesthetics and the attempt to work out a philosophy
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of becoming (reconciling normative thinking with historical development) in his 
logic and metaphysics. Throughout the various aspects of Collingwood’s 
philosophy, it becomes clear that the individual development of consciousness from 
the lower levels to the higher has a fundamental importance.
Collingwood, therefore, inherits a philosophical outlook from Ruskin, Hegel 
and Dilthey and attempts to develop an improved response to the key problems that 
they confronted: the corruption of Western civilisation (as explicitly concerned 
Ruskin) and the working out of a more completely dialectical and historical 
philosophy (than was achieved by Hegel and Dilthey). The comparisons with Ortega 
y Gasset, and to a lesser extent with Nietzsche and Weber, provide key 
contextualisations to Collingwood’s arguments and help us to situate Collingwood’s 
concerns, as well as to appreciate the persuasiveness of his solutions. Other 
comparisons with literary figures such as Orwell and the modernist writers, 
Lawrence, Pound, and Eliot have also been used. Like Collingwood, writers such as 
Lawrence and Pound thought that reason must be supplemented by emotion in order 
to save European civilisation from degeneration, but (being, first and foremost, 
artists and not philosophers) they seem more to provide inspirational examples of the 
expression of emotion, rather than fully worked-out philosophies.
To follow Collingwood, then, the solution to the problem of the crisis of 
civilisation is both the cultivation of forms of emotional expression and the 
development of historical and dialectical thinking. If modem Western civilisation is 
identified with the term ‘Enlightenment’, then Collingwood demonstrates that, 
through a re-conceptualisation of Enlightenment, the West can advance and we can 
afford to be hopeful about its future prospects.
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